

Chapter 1 : Norris, John | Open Library

Note: Citations are based on reference standards. However, formatting rules can vary widely between applications and fields of interest or study. The specific requirements or preferences of your reviewing publisher, classroom teacher, institution or organization should be applied.

His father was a minister, and Norris was the second of four siblings. His early training was a Puritan one. In 1667, he began a course of study at Winchester School, where he received a classical education; the curriculum included Greek and Latin literature, and the young Norris excelled at his studies. He matriculated at Exeter College, at Oxford, spending the years from 1670 studying the Scholastic and ancient authors. In 1673, Norris was elected a Fellow of All Souls College, a distinction he enjoyed for nine years and would always recall fondly. He was ordained in 1675 and sometime before he also discovered the works of Malebranche, who would become one of his philosophical heroes. It was during his stay at All Souls that Norris published several of his most popular works. He published the first edition of *A Collection of Miscellanies* in 1677, which would culminate in a ninth edition printed in 1700. *The Theory and Regulation of Love*, a piece characterizing love as the summons of God, was published in 1687, and the first text in which Norris clearly adopted Malebranchian arguments. Norris appended to this text his correspondence with Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist. Finally in 1689, he published *Reason and Religion*, which would be reissued seven times until 1700. He resigned the fellowship in 1689, married, and began a two-year occupation as rector at Newton St. There, he published one of his most popular texts, *Christian Blessedness*, in 1690. In general, he preferred study and meditation, and found his duties as rector to impinge upon his scholarly activities. Nonetheless, he maintained various correspondences. Moreover, he found the time to publish pamphlets and treatises on a variety of topics including the Toleration Act, Christian morality, the immortality of the soul, and the difference between the Ideal Philosophy he endorsed and the enthusiasm of the Quakers. Norris made clear these differences in an addendum to *Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life* in 1691. Richard Vickris, the Quaker, replied irately to this addendum. This work was entitled *Two Treatises concerning the Divine Light* and was issued in 1692. But their differences far outweighed their similarities. Lady Masham had entrusted a letter for Locke to Norris, but news reached Locke that Norris had opened the letter. Locke suspected Norris in spite of his protests, and from that time forward, which was the end of 1693, they were not on friendly terms. Cranston, 1694. Shortly thereafter, Locke wrote *Remarks upon some of Mr. In the Cursory Reflections*, Norris stated that he would soon publish a treatise, in which he would present his own philosophy at length. The second volume was issued in 1695. Norris examines the divine nature in *Theory I* and in *Theory II* he details the nature of creation, specifically the nature of humanity and animals. These highly theoretical works did not enjoy the popular success of his other writings. One of these, *An Account of Reason and Faith, in Relation to the Mysteries of Christianity*, was so well-read that it was issued in a fourteenth edition as late as 1700. His last two theoretical works concerned the nature of the soul: *Dodwell concerning the Immortality of the Soul of Man*, issued in 1696. It would seem that his many duties as rector did not hinder him completely from engaging in his beloved intellectual pursuits, as his publication record demonstrates. His final publication within his own lifetime, *A Treatise concerning Christian Prudence*, was printed just a year before his death. He died in February of 1695, aged fifty-six years, at Bemerton, and was interred there. It is puzzling that a figure as popular and widely-read as Norris has received such little recognition from intellectual historians of the early modern period. Perhaps Norris has not been paid much attention because his philosophical writings appear to contain an eclectic mixture of many divergent, incompatible sources rather than a coherent synthesis of those sources. Norris also draws liberally from his Scholastic background, and frequently uses theoretical tools borrowed from the canonical thinkers taught at the universities, such as Aquinas, Augustine and Suarez. His heavy reliance on diverse intellectual sources, especially Descartes and Malebranche, is apparent in his writings. Nonetheless, his arguments are tremendously valuable for understanding better the debates of his time. He also influenced the views of other minor figures, most notably, Mary Astell and Arthur Collier. Malebranch has ventured the farthest of any that I know upon the Discovery. He is indeed the great Galileo of the Intellectual World. He has given us the Point

of View, and what ever farther Detections are made, it must be through his Telescope. But even this great Apelles has drawn this Celestial Beauty but half way, and I am afraid the excellent Piece will Suffer, whatever other hand has the finishing of it. Norris first argues for the existence of an ideal counterpart to nature. He considers the nature of a being that is capable of bringing existence from absolute privation, and concludes such a being must be infinitely powerful. His second argument for the intelligible world is from the existence of natural kinds. This stance marks a noteworthy departure from Malebranche, who claims God does not have particular ideas of bodies in Elucidation 10 of the Search. Norris concludes that human thought of perfect circles proves an ideal circle exists as the cause of thought because there are none in nature. His fourth argument comes from the nature of truth. If the skeptic is right, then there is no truth, which is itself an absolute truth. And besides when they go to prove this sceptical Position they must do it by pretending to lay the Grounds of it in Philosophic Principles and Maxims, which besides the Confession of such Principles would be to erect their scepticism as an Institution of Science, and then since all Science is of Necessary and Immutable things, and whatsoever is necessary and immutable is also Eternal, hence it follows yet farther that they will by consequence and must allow not only Truth in general, but also Eternal Truth, since both the Conclusion which they pretend to prove, and the Principles whereby they prove it, according to them must be such. Since all science concerns the necessary and unchanging, science cannot be about contingent things, but about universals. These universals are the intelligible objects, or the divine ideas. Indeed, Norris views his own work as the culmination of the project begun by Plato. If God has the ideas, then the intelligible world exists because God exists. Relying upon the principle that all knowledge is knowledge of something, Norris concludes that the divine ideas are real objects in the mind of God. God considers himself adequately and inadequately, Again when he knows himself absolutely Speaking, he considers himself adequately, but in the knowledge of Creatures, or rather of himself in relation to Creatures, he considers himself inadequately, according to those degrees of Being or Perfection wherein his Essence is imitable or participable by them. As Descartes had argued, the senses are part of the natural world and are designed to assist in preserving the union of soul and body, or to keep one alive, not for delivering knowledge. The nature and existence of the intelligible world is discovered by intellectual activity; the highest degree of intellectual activity is the clear and distinct perception. In traditional Christian doctrine, these attributes are of paramount importance. Any philosophical theory compromising them must be rejected. And therefore it is necessary to acquit our Theory of Ideas from that Inconvenience which on this side it may seem to lie open to, and which alone would be sufficient utterly to Silence and Overthrow it. Theory I Some critics, including Arnauld, had charged Malebranche with Spinozism because he claimed God has the idea of intelligible extension. Such critics reasoned that the only way for God to contain extension is for God to be extended. There are two ways a thing can be contained in another, formally or eminently. Norris notes formal and eminent containment are usually discussed in the context of causation. Generally, formal containment explains cause and effect sequences amongst similar causes and effects. Eminent containment explains dissimilar causes and effects. All human actions, as long as they are planned, are eminently contained in the human mind. Analogously, Norris states God eminently contains extension as a divine idea just as the architect eminently contains the building. Intelligible extension, then, is a divine idea. And as his Ideality may be Demonstratively proved from his Infinity so his Infinity may be very Rationally collected from his Ideality, it being not Conceivable that any Being that is not Infinite in Being, should be Omniform, or have the Ideal Reasons of all things in himself. His answer again relies upon the thought of Suarez, whom Norris reread carefully before writing his Theories I and II. Suarez had distinguished two ways of being finite. If a thing is positively finite, it is limited in such a way that can never be infinite. A divine idea, according to its esse formale is negatively finite whereas according to its esse reale is infinite. If each idea is identical to God, then each idea is really infinite, and negatively finite. A further consequence is that an idea can be called both infinite and finite without contradiction. Norris also notes there is no multiplication of infinities in God on his view. Norris explains why this need not concern us: But now there is no more absurdity in proving the same by the same, if by the same be meant only really, not formally the same, than in proving one attribute of God by another, as his eternity, suppose, from the necessity or immutability of his being, which though really the same, yet being of a distinct

formality, are allowed in all rational discourses about them to be considered and used as if really distinct, as to any consequence from one to the other. See *A Metaphysical Essay* in *Miscellanies*. These arguments preserve the divine attribute of simplicity. If God is simple, then proofs utilizing different attributes must be proofs that utilize the same subject. The diversity of the attributes are explained as various ways of cognizing the same divine essence: Not that they are so in respect of God, with whom they are really one and the same, and consequently so also among themselves, but only with respect to our manner of conception. In the mode of creating, God is the omnipotent Creator. The relevant object here is all of creation. In the mode of legislator, God is the Supreme Lawgiver, and the relevant object is the moral realm. In the end, humanity has partial, imperfect views of God according to his operations. A lesser being, such as a human, can also be known under many operations. One might be a parent, spouse, writer and teacher. But that person is defined in those roles because of the objects that these titles refer to; in the case of the teacher, the person is a teacher only with respect to the students taught. Norris believes that all attributes are one in God, differently conceived according to the roles played and objects considered. Furthermore, Norris reduces the eternal truths, which are the accidental relations amongst the divine ideas to the ideas themselves, and then reduces the ideas to God: The Divine Ideas are really the same with the Divine Essence. But Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Ideas. Therefore Eternal Truths are really the same with the Divine Essence. If the attributes are all one, it is difficult to argue for a priority amongst attributes. Nonetheless, Norris argues that Descartes was correct to claim truth must depend on God alone, but incorrectly believed God arbitrarily creates the eternal truth, for this renders truth as mutable as any other creature.

Chapter 2 : William Payne (priest) - Wikipedia

WorldCat is the world's largest library catalog, helping you find library materials theinnatdunvilla.com more [â€œâ€œ](#).

According to Locke, Filmer cannot be correct because his theory holds that every man is born a slave to the natural born kings. This text laid the foundation for modern forms of democracy and for the Constitution of the United States. The Second Treatise consists of a short preface and nineteen chapters. In chapter i, Locke defines political power as the right to make laws for the protection and regulation of property. In his view, these laws only work because the people accept them and because they are for the public good. In chapter ii, Locke claims that all men are originally in a state of nature. A man in this original state is bound by the laws of nature, but he is otherwise able to live, act, and dispose of his possessions as he sees fit. More important, human beings, free from the arbitrary laws of other men, have an obligation to protect the interests of each other, since they are all equally children of God. In chapters iii and iv, Locke outlines the differences between the state of nature and the state of war. The state of nature involves people living together, governed by reason, without need of a common superior. The state of war occurs when people exert unwelcome force on other people, interfering with their own natural rights and freedom, without common authority. The difference between war in society and war in nature depends on when they end. In society, war ends when the act of force, such as fighting, is over. When the last blow has been thrown, both parties can appeal to common authorities for the final resolution of past wrongs. But in nature, war does not end until the aggressive party offers peace and offers to repair the damage done. Locke claims that one of the major reasons people enter into society is to avoid the state of war. Chapter v deals with the definition and function of property. Whether by natural reason or the word of the Bible, the earth can be considered the property of all the people in the world to use for their collective survival and benefit. But Locke also believes in individual property. For individual property to exist, there must be a way for individuals to take possession of the things around them. Locke explains that the best theory of right to ownership is rooted in the fact that each person owns his or her own body and all the labor that he or she performs with that body. So, when an individual adds his own physical labor, which is his own property, to a foreign object or material, that object and any resulting products become his property as well. Locke defines labor as the determining factor of value, the tool by which humans make their world a more efficient and rewarding place for all. Locke explains that money fulfills the need for a constant measure of worth in a trading system but is still rooted in the property of labor. The rest of the Treatise is devoted to a more specific critique of government, stressing the rule of the majority as the most practical choice for government. He identifies three elements necessary for a civil society: He calls for a government with different branches, including a strong legislature, and an active executive who does not outstrip the lawmakers in power. Toward the end of the Treatise, Locke finally arrives at the question of forming a new government. When the state ceases to function for the people, it dissolve or is overthrown and may be replaced. When the government is dissolved, the people are free to reform the legislative to create a new civil state that works in their best interest. Locke insists that this system protects against random unrest and rebellion because it allows the people to change their legislative and laws without resorting to force. Shaftesbury and many others wanted to prevent him from allowing James II, his Catholic brother, to ascend to the throne. Locke worked on both treatises over several years, finally publishing them when William of Orange invaded and seized the throne in what was called the Glorious Revolution.

Chapter 3 : Treatise | Revolv

Treatises upon several subjects viz. reason and religion, or the grounds and measures of devotion, reflections upon the conduct of human life, the charge of schism continued, two treatises concerning divine light, spiritual counsel.

This is known as the Glorious Revolution, also called the Revolution of 1688-1689. He suggests that they are instead better associated with the revolutionary conspiracies that swirled around what would come to be known as the Rye House Plot. Locke knew his work was dangerous—he never acknowledged his authorship within his lifetime. Publication history[edit] The only edition of the Treatises published in America during the 18th century Two Treatises was first published, anonymously, in December following printing conventions of the time, its title page was marked Locke was unhappy with this edition, complaining to the publisher about its many errors. For the rest of his life, he was intent on republishing the Two Treatises in a form that better reflected his meaning. Peter Laslett, one of the foremost Locke scholars, has suggested that Locke held the printers to a higher "standard of perfection" than the technology of the time would permit. The second edition was even worse, and finally printed on cheap paper and sold to the poor. The third edition was much improved, but Locke was still not satisfied. There were no other American editions until the 20th century. The Second Treatise outlines a theory of civil society. From this, he goes on to explain the hypothetical rise of property and civilization, in the process explaining that the only legitimate governments are those that have the consent of the people. Therefore, any government that rules without the consent of the people can, in theory, be overthrown. Locke chose Filmer as his target, he says, because of his reputation and because he "carried this Argument [jure divino] farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection" 1st Tr. According to Filmer, the Biblical Adam in his role as father possessed unlimited power over his children and this authority passed down through the generations. Locke attacks this on several grounds. Nor is the power of a father over his children absolute, as Filmer would have it; Locke points to the joint power parents share over their children referred to in the Bible. In the Second Treatise Locke returns to a discussion of parental power. Both of these discussions have drawn the interest of modern feminists such as Carole Pateman. To this, Locke responds that the world was originally held in common a theme that will return in the Second Treatise. And even if this charity were not commanded by reason, Locke continues, such a strategy for gaining dominion would prove only that the foundation of government lies in consent. Locke intimates in the First Treatise that the doctrine of divine right of kings jure divino will eventually be the downfall of all governments. In his final chapter he asks, "Who heir? Filmer must therefore say that men are duty-bound to obey their present rulers. I think he is the first Politician, who, pretending to settle Government upon its true Basis, and to establish the Thrones of lawful Princes, ever told the World, That he was properly a King, whose Manner of Government was by Supreme Power, by what Means soever he obtained it; which in plain English is to say, that Regal and Supreme Power is properly and truly his, who can by any Means seize upon it; and if this be, to be properly a King, I wonder how he came to think of, or where he will find, an Usurper. According to Locke, no king has ever claimed that his authority rested upon his being the heir of Adam. It is Filmer, Locke alleges, who is the innovator in politics, not those who assert the natural equality and freedom of man. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. March Learn how and when to remove this template message In the Second Treatise Locke develops a number of notable themes. It begins with a depiction of the state of nature, wherein individuals are under no obligation to obey one another but are each themselves judge of what the law of nature requires. It also covers conquest and slavery, property, representative government, and the right of revolution. State of nature[edit] Locke defines the state of nature thus: To properly understand political power and trace its origins, we must consider the state that all people are in naturally. That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. People in this state do not have to ask permission to act or depend on the will of others to arrange matters on their behalf. The natural state is also one of equality in which all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal and no one has more than another. It is evident that all human beings—as creatures belonging to

the same species and rank and born indiscriminately with all the same natural advantages and faculties” are equal amongst themselves. They have no relationship of subordination or subjection unless God the lord and master of them all had clearly set one person above another and conferred on him an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. There is not and never has been any divinely ordained monarch over the entire world, Locke argues. However, the fact that the natural state of humanity is without an institutionalized government does not mean it is lawless. Human beings are still subject to the laws of God and nature. In contrast to Hobbes, who posited the state of nature as a hypothetical possibility, Locke takes great pains to show that such a state did indeed exist. Actually, it still exists in the area of international relations where there is not and is never likely to be any legitimate overarching government. Whereas Hobbes stresses the disadvantages of the state of nature, Locke points to its good points. It is free, if full of continual dangers 2nd Tr. Nobody in the natural state has the political power to tell others what to do. However, everybody has the right to authoritatively pronounce justice and administer punishment for breaches of the natural law. Thus, men are not free to do whatever they please. The specifics of this law are unwritten, however, and so each is likely to misapply it in his own case. Lacking any commonly recognised, impartial judge, there is no way to correct these misapplications or to effectively restrain those who violate the law of nature. The law of nature is therefore ill enforced in the state of nature. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: Conquest and slavery[edit] Ch. Because the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina provided that a master had perfect authority over his slaves, some[who? Most Locke scholars[who? In the rhetoric of 17th-century England, those who opposed the increasing power of the kings claimed that the country was headed for a condition of slavery. Locke therefore asks, facetiously, under what conditions such slavery might be justified. To be a slave is to be subject to the absolute, arbitrary power of another; as men do not have this power even over themselves, they cannot sell or otherwise grant it to another. One that is deserving of death, i. This is, however, but the state of war continued 2nd Tr. In providing a justification for slavery, he has rendered all forms of slavery as it actually exists invalid. Moreover, as one may not submit to slavery, there is a moral injunction to attempt to throw off and escape it whenever it looms. The legitimacy of an English king depended on somehow demonstrating descent from William the Conqueror: Locke first argues that, clearly, aggressors in an unjust war can claim no right of conquest: Their children retain this right, so an ancient usurpation does not become lawful with time. The rest of the chapter then considers what rights a just conqueror might have. The argument proceeds negatively: Locke proposes one power a conqueror could gain, and then demonstrates how in point of fact that power cannot be claimed. He gains no authority over those that conquered with him, for they did not wage war unjustly: Those who were governed by the defeated aggressor do not become subject to the authority of the victorious aggressor. They lacked the power to do an unjust thing, and so could not have granted that power to their governors: While the property is technically that of the defeated, his innocent dependents have a claim that the just conqueror must honour. He cannot seize more than the vanquished could forfeit, and the latter had no right to ruin his dependents. In so arguing, Locke accomplishes two objectives. In the absence of any other claims to authority e. Property[edit] In the Second Treatise, Locke claims that civil society was created for the protection of property. Thus, by "property" he means "life, liberty, and estate. For this account to work, individuals must possess some property outside of society, i. If the purpose of government is the protection of property, the latter must exist independently of the former. Filmer had said that, if there even were a state of nature which he denied, everything would be held in common: Thomas Hobbes had argued the same thing. Locke therefore provides an account of how material property could arise in the absence of government. As a result, each must also own his own labour: In an alternate argument, Locke claims that we must allow it to become private property lest all mankind have starved, despite the bounty of the world. A man must be allowed to eat, and thus have what he has eaten be his own such that he could deny

others a right to use it. The apple is surely his when he swallows it, when he chews it, when he bites into it, when he brings it to his mouth, etc.: This does not yet say why an individual is allowed to take from the common store of nature. Locke assures his readers that the state of nature is a state of plenty: Moreover, one can take only so much as one can use before it spoils. There are then two provisos regarding what one can take, the "enough and as good" condition and "spoilage. Neither does silver, or any other precious metal or gem. They are, moreover, useless, their aesthetic value not entering into the equation. One can heap up as much of them as one wishes, or take them in trade for food. By the tacit consent of mankind, they become a form of money one accepts gold in exchange for apples with the understanding that someone else will accept that gold in exchange for wheat.

Chapter 4 : Formats and Editions of Treatises upon several subjects, [theinnatdunvilla.com]

Enter your mobile number or email address below and we'll send you a link to download the free Kindle App. Then you can start reading Kindle books on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required.

Mary Astell and John Norris: Letters Concerning the Love of God. Conway, Anne, Henry More. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Sarah Hutton. Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, The Union of Christ and the Church in a Shadow. London, , reprinted Bristol: Thoemmes, ; Another edition, 4 vols. London, , reprinted, Elibron Classics, Edited by Sarah Hutton. Essays on several important subjects in Philosophy and Religion. Discourse concerning the Love of God. A Platonicall Song of the Soul. The Immortality of the Soul. More, Henry, Geoffrey Bullough. Manchester University Press, Philosophical Writings of Henry More. Treatises upon Several Subjects. Norris, John, and Richard Ed Acworth. Philosophical and Theological Writings. Morden Bookseller in Cambridg, Printed by John Hayes for W. King, Cambridge, ; and most modern collections of Cambridge Platonist writings. With the printed letters of Dr. Worthington to Hartlib, 29 Nov. The Diary and Correspondence of Dr. Michael Lort and George Charmers. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Contains historical, geographical and cosmographical notes on many topics as well as some notes on figures of philosophical and theological significance. Discourse of the Freedom of the Will. Sterry, Peter, and N. Peter Sterry, Select Writings. Sterry, Peter, and Vivian de Sola Pinto. Peter Sterryâ€™Platonist and Puritan. Taliaferro, Charles, and Alison J. The Classics of Western Spirituality. Whichcote, Benjamin; Tillotson, John. Lawrence Jewry, London, May 24th Also a sermon of drawing nigh to God, by the late Reverend B. London, ; 2nd ed. John Jeffrey, 4 vols. London, ; Enlarged edition by S. Aberdeen, ; Reprinted New York, The Diary and Correspondence of John Worthington, ed. Chetham Society Remains 13, 36 and Manchester, , ,

Chapter 5 : Women Writers Online Texts by Author

Reflections upon the Conduct of Human Life; with Reference to the Study of Learning and Knowledge. 2nd ed. London, Norris, John. Treatises upon Several Subjects.

Chapter 6 : Payne, William () (DNB00) - Wikisource, the free online library

[PDF] Treatises Upon Several Subjects, [PDF] The Obligations Muslims Owe To The Quran [PDF] Conversion, Catechumenate, And Baptism In The Early Church.

Chapter 7 : Two Treatises of Government - Wikipedia

Two Treatises of Government (or Two Treatises of Government: In the Former, The False Principles, and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, and His Followers, Are Detected and Overthrown. The Latter Is an Essay Concerning The True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government) is a work of political philosophy published anonymously in by John.

Chapter 8 : Puritan Writings in The Spurgeon Library at William Jewell College

Treatises upon several subjects: viz.: Reason and religion, or, the grounds and measures of devotion ; reflections upon the conduct of human life By: Norris, John, Published: ().

Chapter 9 : John Norris (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Lodowick Muggleton, (born July , London, Eng.â€™died March 14, , London), English Puritan religious leader and anti-Trinitarian heretic whose followers, known as Muggletonians, believed he was a prophet.