Chapter 1 : The Invention of the Internet - HISTORY

Share via Email December Apollo 17 commander Eugene Cernan at the Taurus-Littrow landing site, photographed by fellow astronaut Harrison Schmitt. Note the tyre tracks of the lunar rover. On board were the last three astronauts to visit the moon on Apollo Riding home with them was the precious negative of a photograph that would go on to become the most reproduced image in human history. Frame number in magazine NN was a single shot of the whole Earth â€" later branded "the Blue Marble". Snapped 12 days earlier by astronaut-geologist Harrison Schmitt as the spacecraft accelerated away from the Earth, the picture was immediately captivating. Journeying southwards, towards the moon, Schmitt had seen his home planet upside down, with the continent of Antarctica sprawling over the top. Below it the entire African land mass arced downwards towards the cradle of civilisation in the Middle East, with the edge of southern Europe right at the bottom. On a rare, relatively cloudless day, so many human histories, causes and stories were on show in one view. Subsequently, this single image was embraced by everyone from NGOs working in the developing world to the environmental movements seeking to protect our planet. For 40 years it has been used to change minds, behaviours and political policies. They prompted many into thinking differently about our home planet. One such person was Stewart Brand , who self-published his ecologically themed Whole Earth Catalogue the same year, with a colour image of the entire Earth seen from space on the cover. American poet Archibald MacLeish, also influenced by these visions of the whole Earth from space, penned an essay in the New York Times, as Apollo 8 was heading home in December , pointing out the eternal loveliness of such pictures of Earth from space. For MacLeish these images suddenly revealed us all as "brothers who know now they are truly brothersâ€¦ riders on the Earth together". Shortly afterwards Friends of the Earth was formed by David Brower and other campaigners who felt that if there was one thing the Earth needed it was friends. Schweickart just stood up and spoke from the heart, recounting the story of his space walk, when he had nothing to do but look down on the Earth from miles above it for five precious minutes after a camera jammed. Look at it from this perspective. The ASE was established in and today numbers astronauts from 35 nations, who work to foster environmental awareness and planetary stewardship. Forty years after Apollo, the ASE still has its work cut out. Today, thanks to the human impact on the environment over the past four decades, many of these national borders that the early astronauts struggled to resolve are now clearly visible from space. And the "brothers" that Archibald MacLeish saw in those whole-Earth images are still killing each other around the world. The messages of peace and better environmental stewardship from those space flights of the s and 70s sometimes feel forgotten. The technological boost that the space race provided has changed the course of human history in far more profound ways than anyone could have predicted. In , when a new president, just a few months into his term in the White House, challenged America to "land a man on the moon and return him safely to the Earth", no one in America knew how to make it happen. As progress in human space flight accelerated through the 60s, PhD intake at American universities, particularly in the field of physics, increased almost threefold. Apollo was making America cleverer. Nasa knew that its entire moonshot challenge would rely on one thing above all others â€" navigation. The prototype inertial guidance system they came up with could not be relied on completely and would need to be manually realigned during the flight. To assist the astronauts in this task, and to help them control the fly-by-wire systems in their new Apollo spacecraft, a small, lightweight computer was proposed by MIT. In the early 60s computers still tended to take up entire rooms. Fairchild Semiconductor was one of the few companies experimenting with these new micro-electronic components at the time; keen to help them perfect the performance of these novel miniature circuits, Nasa ordered one million of them. The agency really needed only a few hundred for its Apollo programme, but, aware that they would be betting the lives of their astronauts on them, they were keen to make sure the manufacturers could make them has reliable as possible. Such a financial kickstart to a fledgling

industry, coupled with the third great gift of Apollo â€" inspiration â€" would prove to be a powerful driver for social change in the decades that followed. In two employees from Fairchild would go on to found a new company called Intel. As an act of human ingenuity, Apollo made them giddy, intoxicated on admiration and inspiration. As William Bainbridge put it, in his book The Spaceflight Revolution, Apollo was "a grand attempt to reach beyond the world of mundane life and transcend the ordinary limits of human existence through accomplishment of the miraculous â€" a story of engineers who tried to reach the heavens". And the generation that followed them took this philosophy and ran with it, harnessing the new Apollo-driven technologies of micro-electronics to wire up the modern world and reinvent society. Canadian-born space entrepreneur Bob Richards points out: Caught up in the wonder of it all, Jeff Bezos served for a year as president of this student group. He would eventually go on to change the world in his own Apollo-inspired way, creating the giant e-commerce website Amazon. Bezos is not alone. Many hi-tech entrepreneurs who have built the new tools of the internet and the computing and communications infrastructure that underpins it also cite Apollo as their inspiration. Former Nasa flight director Glynn Lunney witnessed this technological trickle-down straight from Apollo to the rest of us. We were asking people to do things that were probably 10 or 20 years faster than they otherwise would have done. And they knew it. They stepped up to it and succeeded. Thanks to this final legacy of the lunar landings, the Earth of today has at last become that borderless world the astronauts looked back on during those heady days of the space race. The gifts of Apollo continue to ripple down the decades, and they still have the power to unite and inspire us. Dr Christopher Riley is visiting professor of science and media at the University of Lincoln.

Chapter 2 : Life Nature Library: Books | eBay

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Life and work Husserl was born in Prossnitz Moravia on April 8th, His parents were non-orthodox Jews; Husserl himself and his wife would later convert to Protestantism. They had three children, one of whom died in World War I. In the years â€"78 Husserl studied astronomy in Leipzig, where he also attended courses of lectures in mathematics, physics and philosophy. Wundt was the originator of the first institute for experimental psychology. In â€"81 Husserl continued his studies in mathematics, physics and philosophy in Berlin. His mathematics teachers there included Leopold Kronecker and Karl Weierstrass, whose scientific ethos Husserl was particularly impressed with. However, he took his PhD in mathematics in Vienna January , with a thesis on the theory of variations Variationstheorie. When Weierstrass got seriously ill, Masaryk suggested that Husserl go back to Vienna, to study philosophy with Franz Brentano, the author of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint This recommendation enabled Husserl to prepare and submit his habilitation dissertation On the Concept of Number with Stumpf. In this work, Husserl combined his mathematical, psychological and philosophical competencies to attempt a psychological foundation of arithmetic see Willard , pp. The book was, however, criticized for its underlying psychologism in a review by Gottlob Frege. In any case, Husserl sharply attacked that kind of psychologism raising about eighteen objections in total; see Soldati , pp. Husserl now adheres to a version of platonism that he derived from ideas of Hermann Lotze and especially Bernard Bolzano, where he embeds platonism about meaning and mental content in a theory of intentional consciousness see Beyer Among those who influenced him in this regard are Descartes, Hume and Kant. As Husserl explains in detail in his second major work, Ideas , the resulting perspective on the realm of intentional consciousness is supposed to enable the phenomenologist to develop a radically unprejudiced justification of his or her basic views on the world and himself and explore their rational interconnections. It is here that he made his most important philosophical discoveries cf. Mohanty , such as the transcendental-phenomenological method, the phenomenological structure of time-consciousness, the fundamental role of the notion of intersubjectivity in our conceptual system, the horizon-structure of our singular empirical thought, and more. In he received a call to Berlin, which he rejected. In he accepted an invitation to Paris. His lectures there were published as Cartesian Meditations in In Hitler took over in Germany. Husserl received a call to Los Angeles but rejected. Because of his Jewish ancestors, he became more and more humiliated and isolated. In he gave a series of invited lectures in Prague, resulting in his last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl died on April 27, in Freiburg. His manuscripts more than pages in total were rescued by the Franciscan Herman Leo Van Breda, who brought them to Leuven Belgium , where the first Husserl archive was founded in Pure logic, meaning, intuitive fulfillment and intentionality As a philosopher with a mathematical background, Husserl was interested in developing a general theory of inferential systems, which following Bolzano he conceived of as a theory of science, on the ground that every science including mathematics can be looked upon as a system of propositions that are interconnected by a set of inferential relations. Mill, he argues in Logical Investigations that the best way to study the nature of such propositional systems is to start with their linguistic manifestations, i. How are we to analyse these sentences and the propositions they express? These units of consciousness he labels intentional acts or intentional experiences, since they always represent something as somethingâ€"thus exhibiting what Brentano called intentionality. According to Husserl, there are non-intentional units of consciousness as well. He quotes pain as an example. It is precisely an intentional content that does the trick here as in all cases of intentional consciousness , according to Husserl, in a way to be explained in more detail by his phenomenology of consciousness. In the case of propositional acts, i. In the case of their non-propositional but still intentional parts, he identifies the corresponding intentional content with a sub-propositional meaning. Accordingly, the judgement can be looked upon as an act of ascribing the

property of being French to the referent of that name. Inconsistent meanings can be singled out and studied by means of reflection upon corresponding experiences of intuitive conflict, like for instance the discrete switching back and forth between a duck-head-imagination and a rabbit-head-imagination in the case of an attempted intuitive imagination of a duck-head that is at the same time a rabbit-head. Some meanings are inconsistent for formal-logical reasons. According to Husserl, all analytically false propositions belong to this category. Meanings generally and propositions in particular exist independently of their actually functioning as intentional content. Thus, true propositions such as the Pythagorean theorem can be discovered. Propositions and their components are abstract, i. However, what does it mean to grasp a proposition or, more generally, a sense? How can an abstract object become the content of an intentional act? Combining ideas of Bolzano and Lotze, Husserl answers this question by taking recourse to the notion of an ideal i. Propositions and other meanings are ideal species that can be but do not have to be instantiated by certain particular features, i. Thus, an experience of pleasure about a given event is one-sidedly founded, relative to the stream of consciousness it belongs to, in a particular belief-state to the effect that this event has occurred. Like all foundation relations, this one holds in virtue of an essential law, to the effect that conscious pleasure about some state of affairs requires a corresponding and simultaneous belief. Quite generally, a given object a of type F is founded in a particular object b of type G where a is different from b and F is different from G relative to a particular whole c of type H if and only if i there is an essential law in virtue of which it holds that for any object x of type F there is an object y of type G and a whole z of type H, such that both x and y are proper parts of z, and ii both a and b are proper parts of c. Of course, the notion of an essential law needs further clarification. Indexicality and propositional content However, as Husserl was well aware, the species-theory of content faces at least one serious objection. If the intentional content of an indexical experience is to serve as a sub- propositional content, it must uniquely determine the object if any that the respective experience refers to. That is to say: It seems, though, that the moments of matter of two such experiences can instantiate the same ideal matterâ€"the same type of particular contentâ€"whilst representing different objects. However, it is doubtful whether this distinction really helps Husserl overcome the difficulty the phenomenon of context-sensitivity poses for his species-theory of content. And this content does not appear to be an ideal species. It may be argued, however, that even sub- propositional contents of indexical utterances can be instantiated multiply in thought and speech, thus qualifying as ideal species after all. But the crucial question is whether this holds true in complete generality: For the claim that noematic sense is contextually determined respective meaning rather than general meaning functionâ€"which rules out any internalist reading; see Section 4 belowâ€"cf. Singularity, consciousness and horizon-intentionality Husserl sees quite clearly that indexical experiences just as experiences given voice to by means of genuine proper names are characterized, among other things, by their singularity: Thus, for instance, in sec. Smith and McIntyre For example, if you see something as a table, you will expect it to appear to you in certain ways if you go around and observe it. What binds together the intentional horizon of a given indexical experience? According to Husserl, all of the actual or potential experiences constituting that horizon share a sense of identity through time, which sense he labels as the determinable X they belong to. As a first approximation, two experiences of a given subject belong to the same determinable X if and only if the subject believes them to represent the same object. For a related criterion of intersubjective identity of determinable X, see Beyer , sec. Hence, experiences belonging to a determinable X must be accompanied by at least one higher-order belief. This view fits in well with the thesis shared, at least in part, by so-called dispositional higher-order belief theories of consciousness that intentional experiences automatically give rise to i. It is controversial whether such a dispositional higher-order view may be ascribed to Husserl see Zahavi , sec. It should be uncontroversial that on his view the motivational basis of the relevant higher-order dispositional beliefs must already display the essential feature of consciousness independently of occurrent higher-order thought in order to be available for such thought in the first place see Beyer , p. However, there is ample textual evidence showing that he regards the availability to inner perception in the sense of a "real possibility" or "practical ability"; see Section 8 below and to accordingly motivated reflective higher-order judgements in which a hitherto "latent Ego" becomes "patent" as an essential feature of consciousness, constituting its "mode of

being" cf. The determinable X a given indexical experience belongs to, with respect to certain other experiences, helps us answer the question of what determines the reference of that experience, if not its ideal meaning species alone. In order to take the role played by the determinable X into account properly, we have to employ a Husserlian research strategy that could be called the dynamic method. In a more recent terminology, one may say that in this perceptual situation the subject has opened a mental file about a particular object cf. The same goes for cases of perceptual judgements leading to, or taken by the respective subject to be confirming, entries into an already existing file. See Beyer , sec. Notice, however, that Husserl does not naively take the existence of an extra-mental referent for granted. Instead, he asks which structures of consciousness entitle us to represent the world as containing particular objects transcending what is currently given to us in experience see Sections 7 and 8 below. Husserl can thus be read or at least be rationally reconstructed as both an early direct reference theorist headword: This may help to explain why the species-theory of content had become less important to Husserl by the time he wrote Ideas. It may be regarded as a radicalization of the methodological constraint, already to be found in Logical Investigations, that any phenomenological description proper is to be performed from a first person point of view, so as to ensure that the respective item is described exactly as is experienced, or intended, by the subject. Now from a first-person point of view, one cannot, of course, decide whether in a case of what one takes to be, say, an act of perception one is currently performing, there actually is an object that one is perceptually confronted with. For instance, it is well possible that one is hallucinating. From a first-person point of view, there is no difference to be made out between the veridical and the non-veridical case—for the simple reason that one cannot at the same time fall victim to and detect a perceptual error or misrepresentation. That is to say, the phenomenological description of a given act and, in particular, the phenomenological specification of its intentional content, must not rely upon the correctness of any existence assumption concerning the object s if any the respective act is about. This is supposed to enable the phenomenologist to make explicit his reasons for the bracketed existence assumptions, or for assumptions based upon them, such as, e. In Section 7 we shall see that Husserl draws upon empathy in this connection. By contrast, there may be some such contents, even many of them, without intentional content generally having to be dependent on a particular extra-mental object. The phenomenologist is supposed to perform his descriptions from a first-person point of view, so as to ensure that the respective item is described exactly as it is experienced. If one is hallucinating, there is really no object of perception. However, phenomenologically the experience one undergoes is exactly the same as if one were successfully perceiving an external object. Therefore, the adequacy of a phenomenological description of a perceptual experience should be independent of whether for the experience under investigation there is an object it represents or not. Either way, there will at least be a perceptual content if not the same content on both sides, though. It is this content that Husserl calls the perceptual noema. Phenomenological description is concerned with those aspects of the noema that remain the same irrespective of whether the experience in question is veridical or not. However, this lands him in a methodological dilemma. This is the first horn of the dilemma.

Chapter 3 : List of science fiction films of the s - Wikipedia

Issues. December The Light and Might of Meekness Building the Temple designed to put on record the divine Science of Truth" - Mary Baker Eddy.

Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic meaning The lifeworld can be thought of as the horizon of all our experiences, in the sense that it is that background on which all things appear as themselves and meaningful. Up until then, Husserl had been focused on finding, elucidating, and explaining an absolute foundation of philosophy in consciousness, without any presuppositions except what can be found through the reflective analysis of consciousness and what is immediately present to it. Originally, all judgments of the real were to be " bracketed " or suspended, and then analyzed to bring to light the role of consciousness in constituting or constructing them. With the concept of the lifeworld, however, Husserl embarked on a different path, which recognizes that, even at its deepest level, consciousness is already embedded in and operating in a world of meanings and pre-judgements that are socially, culturally, and historically constituted. The lifeworld is one of the more complicated concepts in phenomenology, mainly because of its status as both personal and intersubjective. However, a homeworld is also always limited by an alienworld. The internal "meanings" of this alienworld can be communicated, but can never be apprehended as alien; the alien can only be appropriated or assimilated into the lifeworld, and only understood on the background of the lifeworld. Compared to Husserl with his focus on consciousness, however, Habermas, whose social theory is grounded in communication, focuses on the lifeworld as consisting of socially and culturally sedimented linguistic meanings. It is the lived realm of informal, culturally-grounded understandings and mutual accommodations. For Habermas, communicative action is governed by practical rationality â€"ideas of social importance are mediated through the process of linguistic communication according to the rules of practical rationality. By contrast, technical rationality governs systems of instrumentality, like industries, or on a larger scale, the capitalist economy or the democratic political government. This occurs when means of mediating instrumental ideas gains communicative power â€"as when someone pays a group of people to stay quiet during a public debate , or if financial or administrative resources are used to advertise some social viewpoint. When people take the resulting consensus as normatively relevant, the lifeworld has been colonized and communication has been systematically distorted. The diffused perspectives of the local culture cannot be sufficiently coordinated to permit the play of the metropolis and the world market to be grasped from the periphery. Social coordination and systemic regulation occur by means of shared practices, beliefs, values, and structures of communicative interaction, which may be institutionally based. We are inevitably lifeworldly, such that individuals and interactions draw from custom and cultural traditions to construct identities, define situations, coordinate action, and create social solidarity. Ideally this occurs by communicatively coming to understanding German Verstehen , but it also occurs through pragmatic negotiations compare: The epistemological concept[edit] In the course of recent constructivist discourses a discussion about the lifeworld term took place as well. On the other hand this constructâ€"in spite of all subjectivity â€"is not random: Kraus accordingly picks up the lifeworld term, adds the term "life conditions" German Lebenslage [12] and opposes the two terms to each other. More precisely, the life conditions include the material and immaterial living circumstances as for example employment situation, availability of material resources, housing conditions, social environment friends, foes, acquaintances, relatives, etc. The lifeworld, in contrast, describes the subjective perception of these conditions. This integration is not only necessary in order to relate the subjective perspectives and the objective frame conditions to each other but also because the objective frame conditions obtain their relevance for the subjective lifeworlds not before they are perceived and assessed.

Lifeworld (German: Lebenswelt) may be conceived as a universe of what is self-evident or given, a world that subjects may experience together. For Edmund Husserl, the lifeworld is the fundamental for all epistemological enquiries.

Greenville, North Carolina, United States Abstract This paper examines the effect of technical-rational social work practice upon the lived experience of recipients. The authors explore the influence of technical-rational practice upon the creation of reality from a social constructionist perspective. The differences between the two views are explored by means of a discussion of theories of language and reality as well as the contrasting worldviews found in comparing existential versus behavioral approaches and strengths perspective versus cognitive-behavioral approaches to social work. The emphasis upon a technical-rational practice is identified as an element in the deformation of the symbolic structure of the life-world.
Formal and substantive rationality in social work practice," in which she drew heavily from the works of Jugren Habermas , Michael Polanyi , and Donald Schon She presented an argument for the construction of professional knowledge that was independent of the technical-rational approach as described by Schon She suggested, among other things, that the truth claims for professional knowledge resulted from methods of authentication not found in the technical-rational approach p. Kondrat summarized her approach to authentication of professional knowledge as follows, "The starting point for inquiry about practice knowledge should be the empirical question: Social work theory production and the subsequent practice based on a technical-rational approach leads to the colonization of the life-world and "has arguably been a contributory mechanism in the creation of precisely many of those socially problematic circumstances that social work sets out to address" Penna, According to Schon, technical-rational knowledge is applied science. That is, it is the application of empirically validated grand theoretical claims. By definition, these techniques can be applied across situations regardless of context. In distinction to technical-rational theory Schon suggested that there is an alternate way of knowing, which he termed reflective knowledge, or knowledge-in-action. This is an inductively derived knowledge in which the knower interacts in a specific context to formulate ad hoc theories that guide the unfolding of activity. Sometimes this knowledge can be articulated and sometimes elements of it are tacit Polanyi, and can be seen from action but remain unarticulated. Schon suggested that this method is akin to artistry, and is used by professionals such as architects, as well professionals who interact intimately with others such as teachers and social workers. The categories used by both Schon and Habermas correspond to the two fundamental streams of modern social theory; those focused upon social integration and those focused upon systems integration Offe, What constitutes practice knowledge ultimately has to do with the conceptualization of the nature of reality as reflected in those two streams as can be seen in the differences between existential and behavioral approaches and between a strengths perspective and a cognitive-behavioral approach. These categories represent different cognitive interests and, as stated above, correspond to the two fundamental streams of modern social theory: Social integration theory refers to the understanding of the coordinated activities of social actors Habermas, These activities are based on tradition and cultural consensus. For example, in the United States automobile drivers navigate along the right side of the street. This is so because a rule was set and agreed upon, and later enforced by social structures. Likewise, drivers agree to stop when traffic lights are red, and proceed when they are green. These are social conventions; they are culturally dependent. While there may be a need for clarification of misunderstandings along the way and refinement of actions, ultimately all is potentially knowable to the actors involved. From this perspective the social world is not an object but a process. As a process it does not stand still to be investigated and its investigation becomes incorporated into the process. Social integration theory explores the purposeful actions of people which are derived from shared meaning and values governing social life. Without reference to the meaning and values, the intent, purpose, and rationale of the action is invisible. Systems integration, on the other hand, results from the consequences of social actions. The consequences of these actions may not, and frequently are not, intended, desired, or even know by the social actors Habermas, While systems integration usually refers to the polity or economic system, a heuristic example in keeping with the traffic metaphor may be instructive. When a driver on a

crowded highway slows to look at scenery, the act of slowing will have the unintended consequences of slightly slowing the car behind him or her and in turn the following cars. The result of a small number of drivers slowing, initially to view the scenery and then as a result of the preceding car slowing, may be a slowdown of the entire traffic stream which is far beyond the intent of the drivers. It is in this case an unintended consequence of behaviors that are spatially related but do not share logically connected meaning systems; the consequence is not a purposeful act. That is, the consequence seems to follow a set of laws that can, upon close inspection, be deduced. Continuing with the traffic metaphor, civil engineers might decide that in order to keep traffic moving on newly constructed expressways they must construct barricades to obstruct the vista. It must be immediately noted here that while these events appear to have rule-like qualities, they are in fact externalizations of human activity that have become elements in a common world Berger and Luckmann, Habermas identified two approaches to knowledge production corresponding to social and system integration. These are the empirical-analytic approach corresponding to the natural sciences and systems integration and the historical-hermeneutic approach corresponding to the social integration and the cultural sciences. The object domain is meaning, not facts, and the goal is the coordination of purposeful human actions. While values are excluded from the empirical-analytic sciences, the consideration of and mutual understanding of values in social life is a focus of the cultural sciences Habermas, All this is well and good but the boundary between the intentional acts of social integration and the actions of systems integration is porous. Putting these ideas together, one may determine that Habermas suggested that there are three types of theoretical approaches to understanding the world. Empirical-analytic theory is used to study systems integration. Historical-hermeneutic theory is employed to help understand social meaning and social integration. Combining critical theory with historical-hermeneutic theory, one may come to understand both the meaning of social actions as well as the contextualized nature of consequences. Technical-rational knowledge is application of empirical-analytic theory, and reflective knowledge requires the use of critical and historical-hermeneutic theory. While there are a number of methods of coping with the ideographic-normative knowledge dilemmas, there are modes of coping that are professionally inappropriate, because they involve replacement of scientifically based knowledge with other kinds of considerations. One such attempted resolution of the idiographic-normative dilemmas is reflected in fundamental challenges to the relevance of scientific knowledge to clinical practice. The uncertainty and the limited generalizability to an individual client of scientifically derived practice guidelines are used as reasons for categorical dismissal of the relevancy of research knowledge to practice and for justifying as extra-scientific status of practice knowledge. Rosen understood his perspective to be quite different from that of the authors cited. Our interest is focused on the comparison with Kondrat. As shown in the discussion above, Kondrat drew upon traditions that recognize multiple sciences and a variety of methodological approaches rather than a single science and methodological approach. His approach thus appears to be in line with the logical-positivist world view. He confirmed his allegiances to the logical-positivist paradigm when he stated in a latter work: Rosen took exception to the possibility of understanding knowledge differently from the logical positivist perspective. As challengers to this position he cited Davis , Gergen , Heineman , Karger , Kondrat, , Peile , Rodwell , and Witkin Rosen believed that the objective, outside observer, devoid of applicable contextual understanding, can accurately describe and explain human actions. However, this approach appears to eliminate from humans that which makes them human: As noted above, he expanded his criticisms to Gergen , and Rodwell who focused on theory, methodology, knowledge, and for that matter, reality as a social construction. These latter perspectives are at strong variance with logical positivism. Theories of Language and Truth Some of the basis for the differences between Rosen and Kondrat may be found in the differing perspectives of logical positivists and social constructionists regarding theories of language and truth. Logical positivists assume a correspondence theory of language. From this perspective, language is assumed to be neutral, corresponding or reflecting the objects of an independently existing world Rorty, A word or concept corresponds to an object in the world and language is adjusted to the content of the world. Concepts, and hence language, are seen to be a derivative of an objective reality existing independently of the knower. This belief suggests a unity and singularity to a scientific method; Rosen , appears to be a latter day adherent to the perspective. Ferdinand de Saussure , often

considered the founder of modern linguistics, suggested another theoretical approach. As opposed to correspondence, Saussure suggested the arbitrary nature of the sign as a fundamental principle. Any other sound would do as well provided it is socially agreed upon. Languages do not use equivalent concepts but are still able to adequately describe reality. Culler makes the point this way: It is obvious that the sound sequences of fleuve and riviere are signifiers of French but not of English, whereas river and stream are English but not French. Less obvious, but more significantly, the organization of the conceptual plane is also different in English and French. The signified "river" is opposed to "stream" solely in terms of size, whereas a "fleuve" differs from a "riviere" not because it is necessarily larger but because it flows into the sea, while a "riviere" does not. In short, "fleuve" and "riviere" are not signified or concepts of English. They represent a different articulation of the conceptual plane. This being the case, the neutrality and transparency of language is highly questionable. For a correspondence theory of language, relevance is derived from the fit of language to reality. If, as Saussure suggested, language does not fit into pre-existing divisions of reality, how does it derive relevance and meaning? Meaning and relevance are derived from the system and the relation of words within the system. Thus a word has meaning and relevance in relation to other words. Going one step further with this perspective, it is assumed that reality exists but a particular organization of reality is dependent on language. As humans use language in thinking about reality and as we use language in conveying our thoughts to others we both define and create reality. The extension of this thesis is that the knower and the known cannot be separated. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge argues, "reality is socially constructed and. In other words, we content that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the social construction of reality. Reality is not constructed ex nihilo but rather constructed from something. The context of our everyday life, the social context in which we live, is socially constructed and that construction both guides and is guided by our knowledge. Thomas, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" Thomas, p. Kondrat and Rosen are part of continuing discussion that ultimately has to do with the nature of reality. Rosen, on the other hand, focuses on the discovery of an already existing, objective reality. He does not indicate a concern with the continual process of the creation of reality and hence does not see his actions as part of the construction of reality. The de facto result of actions guided by the perspective that Rosen supports is the creation of a social reality reflecting the logic of his methodological perspective. The Life-World Concept "Life-world" is a concept that is generally attributed to Husserl and frequently illustrated by his statement, "To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world The concept is strongly linked to the phenomenological perspective. The life-world is the world in which we live, experience, perceive; the life-world is both understandable and enigmatic.

Chapter 5 : Philosophical Hermeneutics - Hans-Georg Gadamer - Google Books

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Chapter 6 : Apollo 11 | Science | The Guardian

Looking back on it, the summer of was pretty interesting. Woodstock. Ted Kennedy and Chappaquiddick. The amazing New York Mets. Hurricane Camille.

Chapter 7 : Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth - Don Ihde - Google Books

A list of science fiction films released in the s. These films include core elements of science fiction, but can cross into other genres. They have been released to a cinema audience by the commercial film industry and are widely distributed with reviews by reputable critics.

Chapter 8 : Lifeworld - Wikipedia

The life-world is the world in which we live, experience, perceive; the life-world is both understandable and enigmatic. The term is further developed by Gurwitsch () who added that the life-world is "the world in which we pursue our goals and objectives, the world as the scene of all human activities" (p.).

Chapter 9 : Apollo 40 years on: how the moon missions changed the world for ever | Science | The Guardian

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