

# DOWNLOAD PDF STRUCTURAL FLAWS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

## Chapter 1 : Camp David II | Middle East Research and Information Project

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## Chapter 2 : Ashrawi laments flaws in peace process, Israeli bad faith - The Arab Daily News

*Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have continued in one form or another for over a decade, through three Israeli administrations, the death of a King of Jordan, and through countless riots.*

Israel agreed to release convicted terrorists just to get the Palestinians to talk peace. Perhaps it was the price that Israel had to pay for a U. If so, is the U. This is the example. It is the model. Will the future Palestinian state be as hostile to religious minorities as other Muslim majority states are? Unfortunately, recent history gives little reason to hope otherwise. According to the Greek Orthodox Church in the Gaza Strip, at least five Christians have been kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam in recent weeks. Church leaders accused a prominent Hamas man of being behind the kidnapping and forced conversion of a Christian woman, Huda Abu Daoud, and her three daughters. Radical Islam, and not checkpoints or a security fence, remains the main threat to defenseless Christians not only in the Palestinians territories, but in the entire Middle East as well. Naim Khoury that his church lacked the authority to function as a religious institution under the PA. There is a sense among Christians in Bethlehem that anti-Christian animus has gotten worse in the city, Khoury said. How safe will non-Muslim holy sites be if there is no more Israeli presence in the West Bank? Will a future peace agreement specifically guarantee protection of and Israeli access to Jewish holy sites? There are about 2. Last Sunday, they rallied against peace until PA police violently suppressed the protest. Moreover, Abbas himself has no legal mandate, as his term of political office expired long ago yet he continues to rule with no elections in sight. At best, the PA can deliver only half of any peace that it promises, which lets Palestinians have their cake and eat it too: What if the Hamas-allied Muslim Brotherhood then takes over Jordan? If Jordanian-Palestinians – the largest ethnic group in Jordan – create a Palestinian state there as advocated by this Jordanian-Palestinian writer, would Palestinians effectively have two states? The range and severity of threats to Israel from the combination of a post-Abdullah Jordan and a Palestinian West Bank state are considerable. Is it even possible to address these Israeli security concerns in a way that leaves Palestinian negotiators satisfied enough to sign a peace treaty? With so many inherent defects in the current peace talks, why would the U. One explanation is the increasingly fashionable idea promoted by Arab governments that settlements are blocking a peace deal that would produce Mideast stability. But inconvenient facts completely contradict this idea:

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## Chapter 3 : Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process: Historical Contexts (Internat | eBay

*Structural Flaws in the Middle East Peace Process Historical Contexts Edited by J.W. Wright, Jr. American Association for the Advancement of Science Overseas Diplomacy Fellow.*

Introduction In the Autumn of there was a widespread perception that conflicts in the Near East - both the Israeli-Palestinian and Lebanese conflicts - were becoming less and less relevant, in a certain sense almost marginal to global international politics. The situation changed dramatically with the outbreak of intifada in December After the outbreak of the intifada, and as the weakening Soviet Union retreated from Middle Eastern politics, a sequence of dramatic events affected the region. From the outbreak of the intifada to the Second Gulf War, the peace process, the assassination of Itzhak Rabin, a sequence of dramatic - sometimes tragic - events changed the face of politics and life in this part of the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of different elements on the peace process in the Middle East, especially focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. It is clear that several different elements contributed to the unblocking of the stalemate in the Middle East. First, the international system and the changes in its structure that occurred since the end of the s; second, a more restricted "circle" of the "Middle East security complex," 2 i. This strategic position was obviously dramatically altered by the change in the international system which took place between and i. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of the "end of the Cold War," those of the crisis and war in the Gulf, and those of the eventual splitting up of the Soviet Union, closely interrelated events that took place in rapid succession. A further difficulty is provided by the not easily definable structure of the international system. The hypothesis of unipolarity, which was fashionable during and immediately after the Second Gulf War, has proven to be of limited meaning with the decline of the the United States as an economic power even while remaining the biggest military power. The feared or desired "New World Order" has not emerged, partly because of the unwillingness of the US to use its ground forces in crisis situations, and its unwillingness or inability to undertake the risks which are unavoidable if one wants to lead the governance of the international system. Rather, transnational interdependence, different forms of power, and complexity in the international system make definitions of power and interest, and consequent forecasts, far less reliable than in the past. One can expect that we will face a combination of the increasing importance of international institutions together with an interaction of balances of different types of power, often split into sub-systems. In this world of differentiated and sometimes fragmented powers, the conflictual heterogeneity of values, i. Regionalization of the international system Buzan, is a useful hypotehsis here. Fragmentation with respect to the globalization of security structures which characterized the Cold War, 3 is postulated, and the appearance of a "central coalition" of states, formed by the Atlantic Community and Japan, among which there are no threat perceptions. Regional subsystems such as the Middle East are only partially connected to this central region: The presence of a single "non-ruling" global power has two consequences. First, a regional configuration providing stability and security is necessary both for US economic "vital interests" and for traditional US allies Israel first of all, but also the so-called Arab moderate states. Second, the necessity of steadfast alliances and loyalties is less relevant than in the era of global bipolar rivalry. While the special relationship between the US and Israel continues to be a determinant element in Middle East policy, this factor is nonetheless often overestimated by most Arab analysts. The decline of the Soviet Union as a global power and its eventual disappearance had a direct impact on the Middle Eastern arena. This process was made clear by the marginal role the Soviet foreign minister Kozyrev played in the Madrid Conference. Actually, Gorbachev had initiated a withdrawal from the Middle East as early as However, the Soviet leadership tried to maintain a certain degree of influence in the area during the last phases of the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, during the years , and especially during the Gulf crisis and war, differences and strains could be observed in the Kremlin on the issue of Middle East policy. The marginalization of the Soviet Union in spite of efforts to influence events, and its de facto withdrawal from the Middle East had - paradoxically - similar consequences

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for Israel and Syria. On one hand, Syria could no longer enjoy the Soviet umbrella, which had certainly been an important component of the overall deterrent capabilities enjoyed by Damascus: Israeli fear of Soviet countermeasures Eban, Moreover, Syria lost not only its "protector," but also its main supplier of advanced weaponry. On the other hand, Soviet withdrawal and the crushing defeat of Iraq in the war made a steady "strategic alliance" with Israel more entangling than profitable for the United States. Thus, in some situations e. From the regional system perspective, each of the last decades was characterized by well defined ideological trends and polarizations , corresponding to power confrontations between Middle Eastern states. The s were marked by the so-called "Arab Cold War" between pan-Arabism lead by Nasser on one side, and Arab "moderate" states on the other. The Six-Day War was the first blow to pan-Arabism, and the end of the s and the s saw the rise of radical nationalism especially Palestinian. This failure was made apparent by the inability of the Arab League to find an inter-Arab solution to the crisis, and by the massive and decisive foreign above all US military intervention in inter-Arab affairs. Moreover, in the mids, Islamic radical movements are a transnational factor of instability and a threat to all regimes or elites in the Arab Middle East with the exception of Sudan and perhaps Libya , but, as yet, they have not consolidated into an ideology motivating the foreign policy of a state or of a group of states. The theory of regionalization has to take into consideration two partially conflicting factors;. The fragmentation that characterizes the international system affects the Middle East as a region as well. While the partial destruction of the Iraqi military machine in the Second Gulf War brought calm to the Gulf, minor conflicts are not disappearing - from the short civil war in Yemen to the Erithrea-Yemen friction regarding the Hanish Islands, to the Egypt-Sudan crisis. Nevertheless, they do not appear to have the escalatory potential that other conflicts such as Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, seemed to have in the previous decades. No single issue or even main questions define Middle Eastern politics. The Maghrebi states and particularly Algeria, which used to play a significant inter-Arab role are now looking inward because of their domestic problems. This means that the precarious process of integration which should have been institutionalized by means of the Union of the Arab Maghreb is totally stagnating. In the East, the total isolation of Iraq and the partial isolation of Syria have sidelined two of the most important actors among Arab states. Three points regarding Syria need to be made: Second, President al-Asad playing the tough in the negotiations with Israel puts him, at least temporarily, outside the game of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Another element of uncertainty in the region is the unclear position of Saudi Arabia, beset by domestic problems and decreasing oil revenues. Note, for example, the diplomatic confrontation with Israel concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the mediation in the peace process, and different mediations in Arab world conflicts. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the result of a general weakness and fragmentation of the Arab countries. However, it should not be forgotten that the Arab states had long requested an international conference as a diplomatic means for a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Even though the process itself was half way between a conference and bilateral talks preferred by Israel , the possibility to have bilateral talks in a more comprehensive framework could not be dismissed. The peace process required the participation all the parties involved. Earlier certain Arab states had tried a separate peace, with differing degrees of success. However, the effect of the intifada on the Palestinian and on the international public opinions were not nullified. On the contrary, they were one reason why the US leadership intended to establish a peace in the area that was acceptable to all the parties. The intifada had proved to the Palestinians themselves that it was possible to organize their own society independently and autonomously with respect to the occupation. It has also proved to Israeli public opinion that it was not possible to rule a people against its will, and to the international public opinion and decision makers that the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be neglected. By means of the peace process and of participation in multilateral conferences and summits, Israel is becoming an actor in the Middle Eastern subsystem. The Palestinian Arena Generally speaking, we have factors of continuity and change in the evolution of the Palestinian attitude towards Israel Gresh, Continuity is to be found in the increasing focus on Palestinian issues by the PLO, in particular by the Fateh. Radical nationalist groups, with a more or less pronounced

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"marxist" flavor, have - or at least originally had - a distinct inclination towards pan-Arabism. Nevertheless, the recognition of Israel was a stepwise and long process, from the proposal of a bi-national non-confessional state in Palestine, 9 to the Washington ceremony in September. The stalemate in the Madrid process and the victory of the left-wing coalition in the Israeli election gave the PLO, at that time in a crisis of legitimacy and in a situation characterized by lack of perspective, a window of opportunity. Radical critics of the peace process have always stressed the existence of unequal conditions between Israelis and Palestinians negotiators, caused not only by the unfavorable ratio of forces, but also by the pro-Israeli stance of the US. The secular opposition as opposed to radical Islam does not openly criticize the process as such: They can only criticize either the method of decision making, or acquiescence in negotiations. A further problem within the nationalist camp is represented by the revision of the Palestinian National Covenant. In the letter that Arafat wrote before the signing of the Declaration of Principles, he undertook to amend those parts of the Palestinian National Covenant calling for the destruction of the state of Israel, or any reference denying the legitimate right of existence of the Jewish state. There is no real objection to the change of the Covenant, or to the adoption of a new covenant, because it is universally acknowledged that the text of the Covenant, adopted on May 28, , is by and large outdated. Everybody knows that the declarations adopted by the Palestinian National Council PNC in Algiers, on November 15, , which recognized the terms of the UN Resolution , implied the recognition of Israel and practically superseded the National Covenant. Thus, the criticism points, as usual, to the lack of democracy and to the fact that the change is not a result of free intra-Palestinian discussion, but the outcome of Israeli and American pressures. The real alternative to Fateh in Palestine is represented by radical Islamic movements, in particular the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas. The Charter of Hamas says: It is not right to give up it or any part of it. There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Yet, few people really believe that the liberation seen from an Arab or Islamic perspective of the whole Palestine, from the river to the sea, is a politically sensible objective. On the one hand Hamas has repeatedly launched terrorist offensives, on the other has put conditions to Israel for a settlement of the conflict. Terrorist offensives have taken place in waves, marked by periods of truce in between. An exceptionally bloody campaign took place after the Palestinian elections. As far as "peace initiatives" are concerned, Hamas has offered Israel a cease fire as early as March 23, . The conditions put forth by Hamas can be synthesized as follows: Israel should withdraw from all Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem; The Territories should be placed under neutral control; The Palestinians can choose their representatives without Israeli interference or objections; The representatives have the right to lay down all the issues, without any previously decided limitation. Also, neither the agenda nor the conditions are different from those put forward by both the PLO and the national leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. The meaning of this is not clear. Yet, the first aim of Hamas is the disruption of the peace process, at least in the form it has taken in its first phases. Two hypotheses can be put forward. The first is that terrorism and "peace initiatives" are two components of a unique strategy, which aims to force Israel to negotiate with Hamas. If Hamas used terrorism as a means to force Israel to accept the movement as a negotiating partner, it would be a dubious strategy: Moreover, according to a poll in March , only 5. This hypothesis seems to be supported by the establishment of the Islamic National Salvation Party on March 21, , in Gaza, and by an initiative signed by representatives of Islamist, Fateh, and nationalist opposition figures, calling for national dialogue, stopping of military activities, and pluralism Kanaana, . The lack of support for suicide operations and the presumable division within the radical Islamic camp make it clear that the peace process has gained a strong momentum, and that it has introduced irreversible effects both in the Palestinian public opinion and in Palestinian political groups. The Israeli Arena If we analyze the ideological roots of the rightist parties and of the parties of the center-left government coalition that initiated the second phase of the peace process , we can see that the differences between the two opposite groups are not only tactical, but derive from their cultural roots, and from the different approaches that socialist Zionism, on the one hand, and revisionist Zionism and later rightist parties, on the other one, have had with respect to interior and foreign policies. Socialist Zionism, and, even before

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that, cultural Zionism, always put a strong emphasis on moral values underlying the history of the Jewish people and Zionism itself. Ahad Ha-Am wrote in the year Ahad Ha-Am was certainly much more aware of the Arab problem than other early Zionist thinkers, and was conscious of the fact that conflict would arise when the number of Jewish settlers would go beyond a certain tolerable limit. Freedom and democracy cannot be considered as "optional" in political and social life in modern Israel. During the intifada, there was an increasing consciousness in the left of the Israeli political spectrum that the Zionist ideal of a democratic Jewish nation state was severely affected by the preceding year occupation.

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## Chapter 4 : Building Peace: Interview With Uri Savir

*Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have continued in several forms for over a decade, through three Israeli administrations, the death of a King in Jordan, and through countless riots and incidences of protest by Palestinians and Jews. The agreements that have been reached, and some.*

These concerned biased teaching, intimidation of pro-Israeli students, and inadequate grievance procedures. Dozens of cases of faculty misbehavior were finally exposed in the documentary *Columbia Unbecoming*, which was released in October by the David Project. This led to the appointment by the administration of an ad hoc faculty committee. None of the five members was unconnected to the matter they had to judge objectively. The issue of biased teaching was a priori excluded from their investigation. On the intimidation issue, only three cases were seemingly investigated of which one was dismissed. The faculty member found to be at fault, Professor Joseph Massad, was not punished. The report, immediately accepted by the administration, was only partially published. The department consists of twenty full-time faculty members; of those, two teach Hebrew literature and one, Hebrew language. In contrast, there are four professors of Arabic language, two of Arabic literature, and one of Arab politics. The recurrent problems that had come into the open mainly concerned three matters: Dozens of cases were exposed in the documentary *Columbia Unbecoming*,<sup>4</sup> which was released in October. The film was produced by Columbia students with the assistance of the David Project, a Boston-based grassroots organization dedicated to a fair and honest portrayal of the Middle East conflict. Students with complaints about MEALAC professors had tried, over at least a three-year period, to register formal grievances. After first raising their concerns with the teachers themselves, students then tried to convince deans and department chairs, and even higher levels of the administration, to intervene. All these efforts were in vain. The answer is that an institution, which proclaims that progress in knowledge is best fostered by academic freedom, had developed substantial skills in hiding unpleasant facts. Minimizing Damage Once the matter was in the open the university administration apparently decided, probably partly consciously and partly subconsciously, to engage in damage control rather than solve the problems. Its attitude toward the challenge thus reflected its own deficiencies. First, the administration created an ad hoc faculty committee comprising five professors from the School of Arts and Sciences. Of the five, two had signed the anti-Israeli divestment petition; one was the dissertation adviser for Joseph Massad, the professor most often accused of student abuse; one wrote in the *Financial Times* that America went to war in Iraq for the benefit of Israel and that Israel is responsible for global anti-Semitism;<sup>7</sup> and one was a university administrator who ignored student complaints for months. The man who handpicked the committee, current Vice-President for Arts and Sciences Nicholas Dirks, is married to a professor, Janaki Bakhle, who co-teaches a class with Massad. No assurances of professionalism can convince them that this is a safe environment to come out to. Despite hearing testimony of tens of instances of professorial misconduct, the committee focused only on the three that had received the most media attention. Similarly, the committee interpreted the evidence against Professor Saliba in a way that any objective observer would have found impossible to defend. To respond by saying there is no anti-Semitism is to erect and destroy a straw man. The report thus created the infrastructure for the next step in the process of obscuring the facts up the chain of command. Once the report was published, the question emerged: At Columbia both sides were dissatisfied with the report, which was the most negative outcome possible. The report by the Ad Hoc Grievance Committee protects the faculty, gives little credibility to the students, and comes up with no solutions at all to deal with the concerns about intimidation. First, the administration appointed a biased faculty committee, compromised by personal and professional relationships with the accused professors, then instructed it to deal only with some of the problems. Next, even within the purview of what it was supposed to investigate, the committee focused on only a fraction of the complaints. Furthermore, it continued to obfuscate matters by absolving the professors of something they were never charged with. Lastly, the committee turned the tables on the students by blaming

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the victims rather than the perpetrators. Thereafter, only part of the report was published by the administration. Because it obfuscates more than it clarifies, the Columbia report raises much larger questions than it answers. Some that come to mind are: One question posed by the New York Sun<sup>41</sup> is, what is the responsibility of the university trustees? The problems raised are not specific to Columbia. Many more examples of flawed Middle East and other departments are known throughout the United States,<sup>42</sup> as are cases of intimidation of students, and not necessarily only Jewish ones. It seems that all the Columbia administration has achieved with its report is an unsatisfactory response to the first of more such campus battles to come.

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## Chapter 5 : Holdings : Structural flaws in the Middle East peace process : | York University Libraries

*Get this from a library! Structural flaws in the Middle East peace process: historical contexts. [J W Wright;] -- Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have continued in one form or another for over a decade, through three Israeli administrations, the death of a King of Jordan, and through countless.*

Particularly because we had to put an end, gradually, to the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinians had to put an end to the rejection of Israel—and that was achieved. It did not fully materialize; there were some problems, not with the agreement but with the implementation of the agreement. I think to some degree it was too much a peace of the elite, and the socioeconomic gaps in both societies grew rather than narrowed. The people who reaped the fruits of the peace revolution were more in affluent North Tel Aviv rather than in South Tel Aviv; or the people in the skyscrapers in Gaza rather than the people in the refugee camps. Peacemaking among governments alone today is not good enough, because you cannot simply implement it by having a document and a power game that leads to implementation. You need the motivation of constituencies. And there is too little in the peacemaking and peace-building efforts that is pushing the constituencies of the countries to be in favor of peace. So we have to mix peacemaking and peace building; government and civil society. To a large degree peacemaking has been done the way it was 50 or years ago, where you simply share assets or territories. This is not what is going to sustain peace. You have to create the culture of peace; you have to have people endorse peace, and you have to improve economic situations. Peace building is to create the future peace in terms of joint projects, in terms of people-to-people encounters, in terms of youth-to-youth encounters, in terms of tourism; because once the problems of the past are solved, there is a whole new reality that has to be built, which is a peace reality. How do you put those two things together? Much more has to be invested in economic development, and much more has to be invested in economic development under a peace-building umbrella, which means through joint projects between former enemies: Israel and Palestine received a lot of money after Oslo, but each for his own purposes; and almost nothing was earmarked for joint projects. This is not how things should be done. Things should be done by creative diplomacy, by increasing the gain of assets for both sides. Those two things seem like enormous hurdles. We will have to engage in mutual trade, diplomatic relations and cultural relations to link infrastructures. When I negotiated with Syria in Maryland in they clearly were ready for trade and tourism relations. The whole question of Lebanon and Hezbollah would depend on Syria. Two-thirds of our world is not reaping the fruits of globalization. To a large degree, the nonglobalized world feels, if you like, localized—enclosed in their own culture, not part of the Western media culture. I concluded that the bridge between the two could be the city and not the country. To a large degree, the cities match together global opportunities but also local cultures. We work between wealthy cities and poor cities. An ecology of peace is really very close to the notion of a culture of peace. Often peace is made, and the other side remains dehumanized and an enemy.

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## Chapter 6 : The 5 Flaws of Kerry's Middle East Peace Process | TheBlaze

*Structural flaws in the Middle East peace process: historical contexts / edited by J.W. Wright. DS S82 The struggle for sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, / edited by Joel Beinin and Rebecca L. Stein.*

Barak loudly announced that Israel would not return to its pre war borders. He sought to annex settlement blocs containing about 80 percent of the , Jewish settlers in the West Bank excluding Jerusalem to Israel. In remarks following the breakup of the talks, Clinton praised Barak for moving much farther from his initial positions than Arafat during the negotiations. Clinton apparently expected that both parties would meet midway between their opening positions at Camp David. This is a deeply flawed understanding of what can produce a just and stable Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. All international parties except the United States were excluded from an active role in the negotiations. The Oslo Declaration of Principles only nominally acknowledged the relevance of UN resolutions and requiring Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in . They agreed to abandon armed struggle against Israel and recognize a Jewish state occupying about 78 percent of their historic homeland of Palestine stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. In exchange, they expected that Israel would recognize a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and acknowledge some measure of responsibility for the Palestinian refugees. However, Israel refused, with support from the US, to codify any of these Palestinian expectations in any agreement signed by the two parties at Oslo or subsequently. Despite the Oslo agreement, both Labor and Likud governments continued to expropriate land in the West Bank, to build new settlements, to expand existing settlements, especially in and around Jerusalem, and to construct a vast network of bypass roads intended to divide Palestinian population centers from each other and facilitate the annexation of Jewish settlements. Until only weeks before the Camp David summit, no Israeli prime minister was willing to acknowledge that some Jewish settlements would be included in territory transferred to the Palestinians as part of a peace agreement. When Barak announced that some 20 percent of the settlers would not remain under Israeli sovereignty in the final status settlement he envisaged, he infuriated the Israeli right wing, leading to the collapse of his government the day he left for the summit. He agreed to recognize a Palestinian state on as much as 94 percent of the West Bank and to transfer some desert areas near the Gaza Strip to Palestinian control in exchange for annexing territory, including three large Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank, to Israel. He agreed to the resettlement of some , Palestinian refugees inside Israel proper in the framework of a family unification program, and to Israeli participation in an international fund to compensate the million other refugees. Certainly, no other Israeli leader has gone this far. Coming to Terms with History Both Barak and Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat agreed that the main sticking points were Jerusalem and the refugee question. Barak refused to accept any form of Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem. The Palestinians do not demand that a border be erected dividing Jerusalem. They are open to creative arrangements for joint administration and divided sovereignty of the city with open access to the holy places of the three religions. Barak announced that on the refugee issue the differences are "conceptual" and not "technical. The Palestinians do not insist that every refugee exercise the right to return. They do expect that Israel acknowledge that the creation of the Jewish state entailed the destruction of Palestinian society. Prime Minister Barak may well face a bruising political fight in the coming weeks and months. He will be attacked by hard-line settlers and their supporters for going as far as he did at Camp David. He will need to reconstruct his government or call new elections. Israeli opinion polls indicated that 59 percent of the public hoped that Barak would return from Camp David with a peace agreement, but only 42 percent would support an agreement that included a change in the status of Jerusalem. Is Israel ready for peace? The real debate has only now begun.