

Chapter 1 : Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy: - Google Books

*Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Volume 1 -) [Jane (Editor) Degras] on theinnatdunvilla.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.*

Information about other series not available at UCF. Series A, Russia, Call Number: General Collection - 3rd Floor -- JZ Over documents alone discuss the Revolution of , with considerable attention paid to the deeper social forces motivating the revolutionary movements. The first covers the critical period of - the years that witnessed two revolutions, Allied intervention, and the civil war. The final subseries chronicles the period , including the emergence of Stalinist centralized autocracy and the passage of the constitution. It also offers considerable material on the Soviet financial system, foreign trade, the development of Soviet industry, the Great Purges, and the direction of Soviet military and foreign affairs. This concentration is reflected in the volume of print dealing with its affairs, including official statements of Soviet foreign policy. British documents on foreign affairs--reports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. Part III, From through Soviet Union, December November -- v. Finland and the Baltic States, December September -- v. Soviet Union and Finland, January September -- v. Soviet Union and Finland, September March -- v. Soviet Union and Finland, January-December Part IV, From through Northern affairs, January June -- v. Northern affairs, July December -- v. Soviet Union, January-December -- v. North America Part I: The documents also thoroughly cover foreign affairs during this era, including U. The final 10 volumes 16â€”25 of Part II continue the broadly topical arrangement of selections established earlier. Volume 16 traces developments in shipping, trade, and tariff policies between and It covers the vast changes between the increasingly high-tariff and nationalistic years of the first decade to the reciprocal trade agreements and Good Neighbor Policy of the second. General Collection - 3rd Floor -- JZ McLeod and Maine, -- v. Oregon and Texas, -- v. The Irish problem and immigration, -- v. The Central American question, recruitment crisis, trade and fisheries, -- v. The Civil War years, -- v. The aftermath of the Civil War, -- v. Expansion and rapprochement, -- v. North American affairs, -- v. North American affairs, The Republican ascendancy, Jan. The Great Depression, July Feb. Enforcement of prohibition and immigration controls, Feb. Launching the New Deal, Mar. The New Deal peaks, Oct. The New Deal consolidates, Dec. The American press, -- v. Treaties and international negotiations, -- v. The Washington conference and its aftermath, -- v. Cables and mandates, -- v. Pecuniary claims and war debts, Nov. The failure of debt negotiations, Nov. Shipping, tariffs, and trade, -- v. Annual reports, -- v. Shipping, tariffs, and trade, December November -- v. Latin America and the Philippines, -- v. Arbitration, arms control, and Pact of Paris, -- v. International competition and naval rivalry, -- v. Strategic differences and arms control, -- v. Britain and the Commonwealth, -- v. World Court -- v. Heads of missions, , , , North America, January December -- v. Canada and United States, January June -- v. United States, July March -- v. United States, April March -- v. United States, January December United States, January-December -- v. United States, January December -- v. River Plate, -- v. Chile and Peru, -- v. Brazil, -- v. Mexico, -- v. Peru, -- v. Venezuela, -- v. Central America, -- v. The Latin American Republics, "Latin America, illuminates the internal and international affairs of Latin American countries from the midth century to the onset of the First World War. Revolutions and social policies and situations are monitored in detail. Government budgets or budget proposals are reported on for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and other countries. South America, -- v. Central America and Mexico, -- v. South America and Mexico, -- v. South and Central America, January December -- v. South and Central America, January June v. South and Central America, July December -- v. South and Central America, January June -- v. South and Central America, July December January June -- v. July December -- v. January-December -- v. January-December British documents on foreign affairs--reports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. From through Africa British documents on foreign affairs--reports and papers from the Foreign Office confidential print. Series G, Africa, Call Number: Relations with South African Republic, -- v. South African Republic, -- v. Anglo-Boer War I, -- v. Diplomacy of Imperialism, -- v. British East Africa, -- v. The Congo Free State, -- v. Foreign Office documents in this area are often too narrowly limited to diplomatic exchanges among

European powers to throw much light on events and issues within Africa itself. Combining the two Confidential Prints has given the editors an abundance of material for selection. Most of the African colonies of European powers receive only brief mention. Egypt and the Soudan -- v. Egypt and the Sudan -- v.

Chapter 2 : Foreign trade of the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

This first of three welcome volumes of selected Soviet documents on foreign policy for to brings together and translates much material not otherwise easily accessible. The variety of expression and style in the early years of revolutionary diplomacy is in striking contrast to the didactic.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Rowman and Littlefield, For the full citation, see Brecher in the References to Part A. Reflections on Many Paths to Knowledge. Brecher and Ben Yehuda Brecher and Wilkenfeld For the full citation, see James in the References to Part A. For the full citation, see James a in the References to Part A. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sydney Verba. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton University Press, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. Stress, Appraisal, and Coping. Wilkenfeld and Brecher Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Kathleen J. Quinn, and Victor Asal. Journal, 25 Juillet â€”Juin The War in Abyssinia. The Coming of the Italian-Ethiopian War. Harvard University Press, Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations. Hoover Institution Press, A History of the Italo-Ethiopian War of â€” References for Part B Note: Making of the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy. Cornell University Press, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, â€” The Conquest of an Empire. Eden, Anthony Earl of Avon. See United States Department of State. Giglio, Carlo, and Richard Caulk. Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia. Fascist Social and Political Thought. A Study in Power. Monthly Summary of the League of Nations. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The End of US. Stanford University Press, , pages. First, and most important, should foreign policy be understood as shaped primarily by the external environment or as shaped primarily by the internal environment of U. Political scientists are well-versed in these issues. On the latter see, of course, the academic cottage industry on bureaucratic politics, especially Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* Boston: Little, Brown, ; Morton H. Brookings Institution, ;and three critiques: Yet, to fully appreciate this work, in the sense both of recognizing its significance and of making a judgment about it, we need to understand the style of argument and the debates that have animated Cold War historiography. From this vantage, we will be able to see better what Leffler has achieved, what choices he has made, and what problems inhere in those choices. I argue that Leffler has achieved a powerful synthesis of competing explanations of U. Cold War policy and has strongly elucidated U. However, his approach entails an intellectual strategy that underemphasizes the role of domestic political economic interests and political conflict in generating and shaping foreign policy decisions. *A Preponderance of Power* is a highly ambitious, thoughtful, and important work of scholarship, indisputably the outstanding historical synthesis of U. The scope is enormous: The research is prodigious. Leffler spent almost a dozen years immersed in the archival documents of the Truman period You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

Chapter 4 : Project MUSE - International Political Earthquakes

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It set forth the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy, which encompasses both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, proletarian internationalism refers to the common cause of the working classes of all countries in struggling to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to establish communist regimes. Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, refers to measures to ensure relatively peaceful government-to-government relations with capitalist states. Both policies can be pursued simultaneously: Marxist-Leninist ideology reinforces other characteristics of political culture that create an attitude of competition and conflict with other states. After Mikhail Gorbachev became general Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, for instance, some Western analysts discerned in the ranking of priorities a possible de-emphasis of Soviet support for national liberation movements. Although the emphasis and ranking of priorities were subject to change, two basic goals of Soviet foreign policy remained constant: These analysts have assessed Soviet behavior in the 1950s and 1960s as placing primary emphasis on relations with the United States, which was considered the foremost threat to the national security of the Soviet Union. Third priority was given to the littoral or propinquitous states along the southern border of the Soviet Union: Regions near to, but not bordering, the Soviet Union were assigned fourth priority. Last priority was given to sub-Saharan Africa, the islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and Latin America, except insofar as these regions either provided opportunities for strategic basing or bordered on strategic naval straits or sea lanes. In general, Soviet foreign policy was most concerned with superpower relations and, more broadly, relations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but during the 1970s Soviet leaders pursued improved relations with all regions of the world as part of its foreign policy objectives. International relations between the Soviet Union and Germany before 1945 There were three distinct phases in Soviet foreign policy between the conclusion of the Russian Civil War and the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, determined in part by political struggles within the USSR, and in part by dynamic developments in international relations and the effect these had on Soviet security. Indeed, Lenin set out to "liberate" all of Asia from imperialist and capitalist control. His immediate priority was no longer a worldwide revolution, but protection of the revolution in Russia, which provided the basis for all future developments. The Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in November 1917 but they could not stop German armies which advanced rapidly deep into Russia. In early March 1918, after bitter disputes among Bolshevik leaders, they agreed to harsh German peace terms at Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. With Brest-Litovsk the spectre of German domination in Eastern Europe threatened to become reality, and the Allies now began to think seriously about military intervention [in Russia]. In April 1918 Britain sent in money and some troops to support the anti-Bolshevik "White" counter-revolutionaries. However, the Bolsheviks, operating a unified command from a central location, defeated all the opposition one by one and took full control of Russia, as well as breakaway provinces such as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Bainbridge Colby, the American Secretary of State, in 1918 announced an American policy of refusing to deal with the new regime. It is their [Bolshevik] understanding that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their governments and set up Bolshevik rule in their stead. They have made it quite plain that they intend to use every means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote such revolutionary movements in other countries. They changed to a new policy of both seeking pragmatic co-operation with the Western powers when it suited Soviet interests while at the same time trying to promote a Communist revolution whenever possible. After the failure of these efforts, Lenin, assuming that capitalism was not going to collapse at once as he had hoped, made a major effort in the early 1920s to lure German corporations into investing in the Soviet Union as a way of modernizing the country. These facilities operated until 1929. The foreign policy counterpart of Socialism in One Country was that of the United

Front , with foreign Communists urged to enter into alliances with reformist left-wing parties and national liberation movements of all kinds. The high point of this strategy was the partnership in China between the Chinese Communist Party and the nationalist Kuomintang , a policy favoured by Stalin in particular, and a source of bitter dispute between him and Trotsky. The Popular Front policy in China effectively crashed to ruin in , when Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek massacred the native Communists and expelled all of his Soviet advisors, notably Mikhail Borodin. After defeating opponents from both the left led by Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev and the right led by Nikolai Bukharin , Stalin began the wholesale collectivization of Soviet agriculture, accompanied by a major program of planned industrialization. Attack social democratic parties[edit] This new radical phase was paralleled by the formulation of a new doctrine in the International, that of the so-called Third Period , an ultra-left switch in policy, which argued that social democracy , whatever shape it took, was a form of social fascism , socialist in theory but fascist in practice. All foreign Communist parties " increasingly agents of Soviet policy " were to concentrate their efforts in a struggle against their rivals in the working-class movement, ignoring the threat of real fascism. There were to be no united fronts against a greater enemy. The Third Way and social fascism were quickly dropped into the dustbin of history. Popular Front Communists and parties on the left were increasingly threatened by the growth of the Nazi movement. Hitler came to power in January and rapidly consolidated his control over Germany, destroyed the communist and socialist movements in Germany, and rejected the restraints imposed by the Versailles treaty. Stalin in reversed his decision in to attack socialists, and introduced his new plan: The new slogan was: Under this policy Communist Parties were instructed to form broad alliances with all anti-fascist parties with the aim of both securing social advance at home and a military alliance with the USSR to isolate the fascist dictatorships. The Popular Front approach played a major role in Resistance movements in France and other countries conquered by Germany after the war it played a major role in French and Italian politics. The new policy led to the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations in and the subsequent non-aggression pacts with France and Czechoslovakia. In the League the Soviets were active in demanding action against imperialist aggression, a particular danger to them after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria , which eventually resulted in the Soviet-Japanese Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Ignoring the agreement it signed to avoid involvement in the Spanish Civil War , the USSR sent arms and troops and organized volunteers to fight for the republican government. Communist forces systematically killed their old enemies the Spanish anarchists, even though they were on the same Republican side. In the face of continually dragging and seemingly hopeless negotiations with Britain and France, a new cynicism and hardness entered Soviet foreign relations when Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov in May Diplomats purged[edit] In , Stalin took total personal control of the party, by purging and executing tens of thousands of high-level and mid-level party officials, especially the old Bolsheviks who had joined before The entire diplomatic service was downsized; many consular offices abroad were closed, and restrictions were placed on the activities and movements of foreign diplomats in the USSR. About a third of all foreign ministry officials were shot or imprisoned, including 62 of the most senior officials. Key ambassadorial posts abroad, such as those in Tokyo, Warsaw, Washington, Bucharest, and Budapest, were vacant. The effort failed, and the last stage unfolded to the astonishment of the world: Stalin and Hitler came to terms. It was presented as an alliance and not just a nonaggression pact. Stalin quickly came to terms with Britain and the United States, cemented through a series of summit meetings. Militarily it was one of the two major world powers, a position maintained for four decades through its hegemony in Eastern Europe see Eastern Bloc , military strength, involvement in many countries through local Communist parties, and scientific research especially into space technology and weaponry. The military counterpart to the Comecon was the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union concentrated on its own recovery. It used trading arrangements deliberately designed to favor the Soviet Union. Moscow controlled the Communist parties that ruled the satellite states, and they followed orders from the Kremlin. Historian Mark Kramer concludes: In addition to military occupation and intervention, the Soviet Union controlled Eastern European states through its ability to supply or withhold vital natural resources. The KGB "Committee for State Security" , the bureau responsible for foreign espionage and internal surveillance, was famous for its effectiveness. A massive network of informants throughout the Soviet Union was used to monitor dissent from

official Soviet politics and morals. The Middle East[edit] Main article: This was the first breach in diplomatic relations that Israel had experienced with a superpower. The new Soviet Prime Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov , presented a new policy of openness and peacefulness. Moscow began to support the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to use this conflict for its own confrontation with the West. The United Arab Republic. The Suez Crisis occurred in the second half of By June 10, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene militarily if Israel did not stop its advance towards Syria. At this point, Egypt was neutral towards the Soviet Union and made the deal to manipulate the United States into giving it financial aid. In spite of his alliance with the Soviet Union, Nasser would not sign a military alliance pact with the nation; made efforts to prevent the spread of Communism and other foreign influences throughout the Arab region by forming a civil union with Syria known as the United Arab Republic UAR "a nation which he had hoped other Arab states would eventually join as well" in ; and was a founding father of the Non-Aligned Movement in ; though the union with Syria collapsed in , Egypt would still be officially known as the United Arab Republic for a while longer. The attacks were directed at an Israeli tractor working land in the demilitarized area on the Syrian-Israeli border. At the end of the battle, Israel had shot down seven Soviet-made Syrian aircraft. Syria did not hesitate to act because it believed that the other Arab states would support it and Israel was not capable of defeating it. Syria believed that, with the help of the UAR, it could beat Israel. During the war, the UAR asked the Soviet Union for more arms, but the Soviet Union denied its request because it wanted the war to end. Once the war was over, though, the Soviet Union was satisfied with the state of the Middle East and gave weapons to the Arabs in order to repair relations with them. For the Soviet Union, defeat meant that its position in the Middle East was impaired and its weapons and military training were given a poor reputation. Though Sadat sought to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, he was also willing to consider economic assistance from nations outside the Arab region and the Eastern Bloc as well. In , however, the direction of Soviet-Egypt relations changed dramatically when Sadat ordered Soviet military personnel to leave the country. The Soviet Union now focused on building relations with its three other principal allies in the Middle East: In September , however, Soviet influence over the Arab-Israeli peace progress weakened significantly after Egypt and Israel agreed to make peace with one another during the Camp David Accords. In January , the Soviet government criticised the Iraqi government decision to join the Baghdad Pact , which led to Iraq cutting diplomatic relations with the Soviets. In February , Syria signed a peace and security pact with the Soviet Union as a means to strengthen its defense capability. The Soviet Union was among the first group of nations to recognize the Yemen Arab Republic following its independence from Britain in On December 27, , two treaties were concluded between the two countries, for setting up a study for economic projects and using soil and ground waters. Unaccepted by Muslim nations in the region, South Yemen relied on aid from Communist nations and allowed the Soviets to keep naval bases in the country. In , after a war broke out between the two neighboring Yemen states, [52] the Yemen Arab Republic and South Yemen agreed to eventually unify.

Chapter 5 : Project MUSE - The End of U.S. Cold War History?: A Review Essay

Oxford University Press, - Soviet Union. 0 Reviews Soviet documents on foreign policy, Volume 1 Jane Tabrisky Degras Snippet view -

The Peiping regime accepts Moscow leadership in the world Communist movement, and is becoming increasingly dependent on the USSR economically and militarily. However, we believe that the Peiping regime retains some capability for independent action, and is in a position to influence the formulation of Communist policy in the Far East. We believe that Moscow will try to extend and intensify its control over Communist China. However, we believe it unlikely that, at least during the period of this estimate, the Kremlin will be able by nonmilitary means to achieve a degree of control over Communist China comparable to that which it exercises over the European Satellites. We believe it is almost certain that the Kremlin will not attempt to achieve such control by military force. We believe that during the period of this estimate these factors will be far outweighed by close ideological ties and continuing mutual involvement in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly the elimination of Western influence from the Far East. Although the Peiping regime will undoubtedly continue to attempt to gain legal recognition internationally, to secure Formosa, and to resume trade and commerce with the West, we do not believe that the existing Sino-Soviet solidarity can be weakened by non-Communist concessions to Communist China. Moreover, as we have previously estimated, we believe that Western pressures against Communist China, while weakening her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate. Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime in there has been no reliable indication that either country has adopted any important course of action of joint concern without the consent of the other. In February , the Chinese Communists and the USSR signed a year treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, and this treaty provides the formal basis for current relations between the two states. The Chinese Communist claims of independent achievement which allow the USSR credit only for ideological and moral support until the formation of the Peiping regime in October , have some basis in fact although they underestimate the assistance given by the USSR during the period from to . The high command of most Communist parties in the world has undergone frequent and violent changes, which are believed to have been dictated from Moscow. In contrast, the CCP has exhibited unique stability and continuity in its leadership. This leadership undoubtedly takes pride in its independent rise to power and recognizes that it possesses a capacity for independent action. The Chinese Communists claim for Mao Tse-tung authority in his own right as a Communist theoretician. This claim has been accepted in part by Moscow, and the prestige accorded Mao in this respect goes far beyond that accorded any other contemporary non-Soviet Communist. However, even those Chinese who would place Mao near Stalin in authority profess allegiance to the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine held by the rulers in Moscow. Common ideology is thus a strong force binding together the Chinese and Soviet regimes. Peiping and Moscow both aim at expelling all Western influence from Asia and at extending Communist control over the entire area. Both desire to spread the Communist world revolution. Other Soviet Influences in Communist China We do not believe that these advisors issue direct orders, but the Chinese have been receptive to their advice, which seems to be given through Chinese intermediaries. Soviet advisors are not only attached to the government and the party and to certain economic and security organs, but are also assigned to specific engineering, industrial, and cultural projects. Neither these advisors nor the Kremlin has criticized, at least publicly, the internal policies of Communist China or the implementation of these policies. The Korean war appears to be directed from joint Sino-Soviet military headquarters. The Chinese Communists are undoubtedly strongly influenced by Soviet military advisors, and it is probable that no major decisions are made in the Korean war without Soviet approval. Situation in the Border Areas In Manchuria, the influence of Chinese Communist political and military leaders appears to outweigh that of the Soviet personnel in the area. Economic policies also reflect the central planning and directives of Peiping. Nevertheless, the USSR exerts great influence over economic and strategic developments in the area through its military and economic advisors, its intelligence activities, its supervision of rail lines, and its control of the Port Arthur naval base area. However, Peiping has at least

administrative control, and the strength of Chinese influence appears to be growing. In Sinkiang, Peiping has stationed 70,000 troops and appears to exercise effective administrative control. The USSR exerts great influence through three Sino-Soviet companies and through Soviet citizens in the service of the provincial government. Soviet influence in the border areas, political as well as economic, is extensive. At the same time, Chinese Communist political and territorial interests have apparently not been sacrificed in the interest of Soviet expansion. The trend since appears to be towards an increase in Chinese Communist administrative control. From a consideration of the available evidence, we conclude that the Peiping regime "unlike the European Satellites" is not directly and completely controlled by the Kremlin. Sino-Soviet cooperation is based upon Chinese Communist acceptance of Moscow leadership in the world Communist movement, a common ideology, and the common objective of eliminating Western influence from the Far East. This relationship is further solidified by common hostility to a resurgent and non-Communist Japan and to US power in the western Pacific. We believe also that the size and potential of China, the strength and cohesion of the Chinese Communist Party, the traditional Chinese xenophobia, and the inherent difficulties encountered by foreigners in exercising control in China, have permitted the Chinese Communists to retain some capability for independent action and a capability to exert an influence upon the shaping of Communist policy in the Far East. The Kremlin appears to recognize that Communist China now possesses the determination and some capacity to pursue its own interests. Moreover, the Kremlin almost certainly sees in the present relationship the opportunity to use Communist China to [Page] weaken the Western position in Asia. On the other hand, the Kremlin probably views the relationship also as an opportunity to extend Soviet domination over Communist China by subversion, by making Communist China economically and militarily dependent upon the USSR, and by Soviet pressure upon the borderlands. Furthermore, a friendly Communist China provides the USSR with a defense in depth, constitutes a valuable potential source of manpower and other resources, and is an important political and psychological asset.

Future Course of Sino-Soviet Relations We believe that the following factors will tend to ensure the continuation of Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate: The cohesive force of common ideology will probably continue to bind the two regimes together. The military and economic dependence of Communist China upon the USSR will increase, at least for as long as the Korean war continues without settlement. Neither the USSR nor Communist China now appears capable of altering the current relationship to its advantage without jeopardizing the attainment of its own objectives. A Chinese Communist effort unilaterally to revise the relationship or to leave the Bloc would result in the cessation of Soviet economic and military aid and support and in serious dissension within the Chinese Communist Party and the armed forces. It might lead to armed conflict with the USSR. Similarly, a Kremlin effort to reduce Communist China to the status of the European Satellites might lead to armed conflict with Communist China and would divide and confuse the international Communist movement. On the other hand, the following factors may, sooner or later, weaken Sino-Soviet solidarity: During the last century there has been almost continuous Russian encroachment on Chinese interests in those areas. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of temporarily ended such border disputes. It is difficult to believe, however, that such long-standing disputes have been permanently settled. We think that they are likely to recur, in one form or another, and that they must be considered in assessing the probable course of Sino-Soviet relations in the future. At present, the interests of China are for the most part confined to the Far East; those of the Kremlin are world-wide. Hence, the Chinese Communists may view the accomplishment of Far Eastern objectives with more urgency and impatience than do the Soviets, who might postpone action in the Far East because of situations elsewhere in the world. This is applicable to the Korean conflict which is a potential source of friction to the two regimes. The Chinese Communist program of industrialization and military modernization increasingly depends on Soviet material and technical assistance. Frictions might arise because of Soviet inability or disinclination to supply capital equipment. Soviet conditions for such supply might be offensive to Chinese national pride. We have estimated that the ultimate objective of the Kremlin is the establishment of a Communist world dominated from Moscow. We do not believe, however, that the leaders of Communist China would accept complete Soviet domination of China. Whether future leaders of China will do so is a question; if they do not, a serious clash of interests is certain. The military conquest of China would be a long, difficult, and expensive

process. We believe that for the period of this estimate the factors tending to divide the USSR and Communist China will be far outweighed by close ideological ties and continuing mutual involvement in the pursuit of common objectives, particularly the elimination of Western influence from the Far East. Moreover, as we have previously estimated, we believe that Western pressures against Communist China, while weakening her, would not disrupt Sino-Soviet solidarity during the period of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 4 September. See, however, the reservation of the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, to paragraphs 5 and 6. He therefore reserves judgment on the validity of paragraph five, preferring to state simply that a significant weakening of Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the period of this estimate. The text of the treaty, signed at Moscow on Feb. 11, 1950. The text of the agreement, signed at Moscow on Feb. 11, 1950. He therefore reserves judgment on the validity of paragraph twenty-six, preferring to state simply that a significant weakening of Sino-Soviet solidarity is unlikely during the period of this estimate.

Chapter 6 : Foreign relations of the Soviet Union - Wikipedia

In addition to the Statement of Policy, NSC /1 included a Summary of the Report by the Special Committee on Soviet Vulnerabilities, dated November 30, , and a copy of a memorandum from John K. Gerhardt, the JCS Adviser, to the NSC Planning Board, dated January 6, , giving his views on the Summary of the Special Committee's Report.

Although the commissariat remained the controlling center, the regime established other organizations to deal directly with foreign partners in the buying and selling of goods. These organizations included state import and export offices, joint stock companies , specialized import and export corporations, trusts, syndicates, cooperative organizations, and mixed-ownership companies. The government restructured foreign trade operations according to Decree Number , issued in February , which eliminated the decentralized, essentially private, trading practices of the NEP period and established a system of monopoly specialization. Stalin feared the unpredictable movement and disruptive influence of such foreign market forces as demand and price fluctuations. Imports were restricted to factory equipment essential for the industrialization drive that began with the first five-year plan. World War II virtually halted Soviet trade and the activity of most foreign trade corporations. After the war, Britain and other West European countries and the United States imposed drastic restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Thus, Soviet foreign trade corporations limited their efforts to Eastern Europe and China, establishing Soviet-owned companies in these countries and setting up joint-stock companies on very favorable terms. Comecon, founded in , united the economies of Eastern Europe with that of the Soviet Union. Postwar industrialization and an expansion of foreign trade resulted in the proliferation of all-union foreign trade organizations FTOs , the new name for foreign trade corporations and also known as foreign trade associations. The Ministry of Foreign Trade, through its FTOs, retained the exclusive right to negotiate and sign contracts with foreigners and to draft foreign trade plans. The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Gosudarstvennyi komitet po vneshnim ekonomicheskim svyaziamâ€™GKES , created in , managed all foreign aid programs and the export of complete factories through the FTOs subordinate to it. Certain ministries, however, had the right to deal directly with foreign partners through their own FTOs. These two organizations were merged into the newly created Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which had responsibility for administering foreign trade policy and foreign aid agreements. Other legislation provided for the establishment of joint enterprises. The government retained its monopoly on foreign trade through a streamlined version of the Soviet foreign trade bureaucracy as it existed before the January 17 decree. Gosplan formulated all import and export plans, coordinated the allocation of investment and other resources, and had final authority over all decisions concerning foreign trade, including trade levels and commodity composition. Gosplan coordinated the allocation of resources not handled by Gosplan and, as the central agency responsible for matching supplies with customers, played a major role in selecting and allocating imports. GKES negotiated technical cooperation agreements and monitored license and patent purchases and sales in order to introduce new technology into the Soviet economy. Goskomtsen established prices for all imports and some exports. The Ministry of Finance controlled the balance of payments and monitored the impact of foreign trade on the state budget. Finally, Gosbank set the exchange rate for the ruble and managed the system of exchange within the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Foreign Trade formulated draft import and export plans and regulated commodity trade. GKES supervised foreign aid programs and the export of complete plants. FTOs were generally organized by product, as had been the foreign trade corporations of the s. In addition, certain other agencies had their own FTOs: The lack of direct contact between Soviet enterprises and their foreign customers or suppliers frustrated both parties by unnecessarily delaying contract negotiations and the specification of technical details. Pushkin, reported that after an enterprise submitted a request for a foreign item, two to three years were required before it was included in the import plan and funds were allocated for its purchase. In the interim, the needs of the enterprise had often changed. Pushkin stressed the need to free enterprises from unnecessary petty supervision and excessive regulation. The staff was augmented, and the chairman acquired a rank equivalent to that of deputy prime minister. In the ministry lost control of 20 percent of Soviet foreign trade turnover. The government granted direct foreign trade rights to twenty-one ministries

and state committees, sixty-seven industrial enterprises, and eight interbranch scientific production complexes. Exporting enterprises gained the right to retain part of their hard-currency earnings. Each ministry or enterprise was to pay for its investment imports with its own hard currency, and the heads of ministries and enterprises became personally responsible for the efficient use of hard-currency funds. These measures gave enterprises more influence in import decision making. This legislation opened up enterprises inside the Soviet Union for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution, to foreign participation. Joint ventures were to facilitate the acquisition and assimilation of Western technology, managerial know-how, and marketing abilities. Optimistic about the economic effects of their new undertaking, Soviet officials declared that 85 to 90 percent of "the most important types of machinery" would meet world technical standards by August, more than fifty joint ventures were registered in the Soviet Union, and approximately three hundred were under negotiation. Complaints by Western partners dealt with uncertainties concerning Soviet trade regulations, problems with the supply of goods, the dilemma of the non-convertibility of the ruble, difficulties finding qualified Soviet managers, problems in projecting production costs as of Soviet domestic prices were administratively set and not based on market forces, and even complications finding office space in Moscow. Vneshtorgbank had branched out from the simple management of foreign trade transactions to provide currency, credit, and accounting services as well. In a change from its previous duties, Vneshekonombank was required to administer new procedures dealing with Soviet firms that had recently acquired direct foreign trade rights. According to this law, the government had the power to disband unprofitable businesses, and each ministry and its subordinate enterprises gained the responsibility for their own foreign trade activities. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Trade lost control of 15 percent more of its foreign trade turnover when fourteen additional enterprises and four other ministries acquired direct foreign trade rights. Katushev, former head of the GKES, assumed the duties of the two agencies. In general, the chamber monitored foreign trade conducted outside the new Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. In addition, the chamber assisted Soviet production enterprises in locating Western partners and learning foreign trade practices. The political and economic relationships between the Soviet Union and these countries determine the four groups into which these countries can be divided: Soviet oil exports to these countries bought machinery and equipment and industrial consumer goods, as well as political support without the expenditure of freely convertible foreign currency. In addition, Soviet aid programs, which took the form of direct loans or trade subsidies, almost exclusively involved socialist countries. Ostensibly, Comecon was organized to coordinate economic and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and the member countries. In Comecon comprised ten countries: Albania, although it joined in February, has not participated in Comecon activities since. In the Soviet Union sent 56 percent of its exports to and received 58 percent of its imports from Comecon members. From that time, the volume of this trade has steadily increased, but the proportion of Soviet trade with Comecon members decreased as the Soviet Union sought to increase trade with Western industrialized countries. In contrast to, trade with Comecon members accounted for only 42 percent of Soviet exports and 43 percent of Soviet imports in. Because of the peculiarities of the Comecon pricing system, throughout the s and early s Comecon prices for Soviet oil were lower than world oil prices. Western specialists have debated the political motivation of this implicit price subsidy to Comecon members. The cohesiveness within Comecon members seemed remarkable when in the fall in the world price left Comecon members paying above-market prices for Soviet oil. In general, the more economically developed European members have supported the three less developed members by providing a large market for their exports, often at above-market prices. In addition, the Soviet Union has established naval and air bases in Cuba and Vietnam. This program stressed the self-sufficiency of Comecon countries in five key areas: It also called for improvement of plan coordination, joint planning, Comecon investment strategy, production specialization, and quality of machinery and equipment exported to the Soviet Union. This relationship allowed Yugoslavia to maintain its nonaligned position while acquiring almost all the rights and privileges of a full Comecon member. The Soviet Union exported fuel, ferrous metals, plastics, and fertilizer to Yugoslavia. In addition, from well into the s actual trade with the Soviet Union exceeded planned trade volumes. Thus, in the Yugoslav government informed Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov of its desire to decrease trade with the Soviet Union in the mid-to-late

s. Because of the huge foreign currency debt accumulated by Yugoslavia from to , however, the Soviet Union remained its most important trade partner in the late s. In fact, for some Yugoslav products, such as shoes, the Soviet Union was the sole foreign buyer. The political rift that developed between the two countries in the late s culminated in with the withdrawal of more than 1, Soviet specialists from China and an official break in trade relations in . Although it had been only an observer, China stopped attending Comecon sessions in . Economic relations between the Soviet Union and China resumed in . Primarily as a result of Soviet political concessions and pressures on the Chinese to expand trade, trade volume between the two countries increased tenfold between and . Likewise, the Soviet Union, producing dated technology that was difficult to market in more industrially advanced countries and acquiring a growing hard-currency debt, eagerly pursued the Chinese market. Each country would sell the other goods it could not market elsewhere, and each could conserve scarce hard currency by bartering. The Soviet Union possessed machinery, equipment, and technical know-how to help China develop its fuel and mineral resources and power, transportation, and metallurgical industries. China could offer a wealth of raw materials, textiles, and agricultural and industrial consumer goods. By mid Gorbachev was speaking of reducing Soviet troops on the Chinese border, Vietnam had removed half of its troops from Cambodia, and Soviet troops had begun their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Reforms of the Soviet foreign trade complex established free trade zones in the Soviet Far East and Soviet Central Asia, simplifying border trade between the two countries. Soviet trade officials persuaded the Chinese to expand business ties beyond border trade into joint ventures, co-production contracts, and the export of surplus Chinese labor to the Soviet Union. In approximately 85 percent of Soviet aid went to the communist Third World. By far the largest share of these funds was absorbed by Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. The rest was left to Cambodia, Laos, and North Korea. Pledges of Soviet aid increased steadily from through and were divided evenly between direct aid and trade subsidies. Soviet trade with industrialized countries, except Finland, consisted of simple purchases paid for on a cash or credit basis, direct exchange of one good for another Pepsi-Cola for Stolichnaya vodka, for example , or industrial cooperation agreements in which foreign firms participated in the construction or operation of plants in the Soviet Union. In the latter instances, payments were rendered in the form of the output of new plants. By contrast, trade with Finland, which did not have a convertible currency at that time, was conducted through bilateral clearing agreements, much like Soviet trade with its Comecon partners. In the s, the Soviet Union gave domestic priority to gas, coal, and nuclear power in order to free more oil reserves for export. This was necessary because of higher production costs and losses of convertible currency resulting from the drop in world oil price. The development of natural gas for domestic and export use was also stimulated by these factors. Between and , natural gas exports rose from 1 percent to 15 percent of total Soviet exports to the West. In only 18 percent of Soviet manufactured goods met world technical standards. As an illustration of these problems in quality, Canadian customers who had purchased Soviet Belarus tractors often found that the tractors had to be overhauled on arrival before they could be sold on the Canadian market. In less than 5 percent of Soviet exports to the West consisted of machinery. Other Soviet nonfuel exports in the s included timber, exported primarily to Japan, and chemicals, the export of which grew substantially in and . One-half of Soviet agricultural imports were from developed countries, and these imports made up a considerable portion of total imports from the West. Industrial equipment formed one-quarter of Soviet imports from the West, and iron and steel products, particularly steel tubes for pipeline construction, made up most of the rest. Over the course of the s, high-technology items gained in importance as well.