

# DOWNLOAD PDF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

## Chapter 1 : Project MUSE - Slaying the Nuclear Dragon

*Download Nuclear Disarmament In The Twenty First Century written by Wade L. Huntley and has been published by theinnatdunvilla.com this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with Political Science categories.*

Mushroom-shaped cloud and water column from the underwater nuclear explosion of July 25, 1946, which was part of Operation Crossroads. November nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site, from Operation Buster, with a yield of 21 kilotons. It was the first U.S. nuclear test in the New Mexico desert. American scientists conducted "Trinity," the first nuclear weapons test, marking the beginning of the atomic age. Also involved in the debate about nuclear weapons policy was the scientific community, through professional associations such as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. Its purpose was to test the effect of nuclear weapons on naval ships. Pressure to cancel Operation Crossroads came from scientists and diplomats. Manhattan Project scientists argued that further nuclear testing was unnecessary and environmentally dangerous. The incident caused widespread concern around the world and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries". History of the anti-nuclear movement and List of peace activists Peace movements emerged in Japan and in they converged to form a unified "Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs". Japanese opposition to the Pacific nuclear weapons tests was widespread, and "an estimated 35 million signatures were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear weapons". The "Baby Tooth Survey," headed by Dr Louise Reiss, demonstrated conclusively in that above-ground nuclear testing posed significant public health risks in the form of radioactive fallout spread primarily via milk from cows that had ingested contaminated grass. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev. He was president of the scientific advisory board of the World Union for Protection of Life and also one of the signatories of the Dubrovnik-Philadelphia Statement. In the 1960s, a movement for nuclear disarmament again gained strength in the light of the weapons build-up and statements of US President Ronald Reagan. Reagan had "a world free of nuclear weapons" as his personal mission, [23] [24] [25] and was largely scorned for this in Europe. It was the largest anti-nuclear protest and the largest political demonstration in American history. In 1968, Cominform directed that peace "should now become the pivot of the entire activity of the Communist Parties", and most western Communist parties followed this policy. The campaign won support, collecting, it is said, million signatures in Europe, most from socialist countries, including 10 million in France including that of the young Jacques Chirac, and million signatures in the Soviet Union – the entire adult population. These numbers include warheads not actively deployed, including those on reserve status or scheduled for dismantlement. Stockpile totals do not necessarily reflect nuclear capabilities since they ignore size, range, type, and delivery mode. After the Reykjavik Summit between U.S. and U.S.S.R. When the extreme danger intrinsic to nuclear war and the possession of nuclear weapons became apparent to all sides during the Cold War, a series of disarmament and nonproliferation treaties were agreed upon between the United States, the Soviet Union, and several other states throughout the world. Many of these treaties involved years of negotiations, and seemed to result in important steps in arms reductions and reducing the risk of nuclear war. Prohibited all testing of nuclear weapons except underground. An international treaty currently with member states to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty has three main pillars: Created a global ban on short- and long-range nuclear weapons systems, as well as an intrusive verification regime. Limited long-range nuclear forces in the United States and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to 6, attributed warheads on 1, ballistic missiles and bombers. A very loose treaty that is often criticized by arms control advocates for its ambiguity and lack of depth, Russia and the United States agreed to reduce their "strategic nuclear warheads" a term that remained undefined in the treaty to between 1, and 2, by Was superseded by New Start Treaty in The CTBT is an international treaty currently with state signatures and state ratifications that bans all nuclear explosions in all environments. While the

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treaty is not in force, Russia has not tested a nuclear weapon since and the United States has not since. Only one country has been known to ever dismantle their nuclear arsenal completely—the apartheid government of South Africa apparently developed half a dozen crude fission weapons during the 1970s, but they were dismantled in the early 1990s.

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## Chapter 2 : nuclear disarmament and non proliferation | Download eBook PDF/EPUB

*This work provides a comprehensive examination of the current state and future prospects for nuclear disarmament at the turn of the century. The work juxtaposes a sober review of progress made during the last decade with a proactive agenda of proposals for new disarmament initiatives in the next decade.*

In the closing stages of the Second World War, a series of terrible blows rained down on the Japanese homeland. City after city was attacked and civilian casualties were measured in the tens of thousands. Still, the Japanese did not surrender – any more than had the Germans, under a similar weight of bombardment, until overrun by the Allied armies. The real change brought about by the atomic bomb was not the scale of the destruction it could inflict, but the absolute certainty that that destruction would be inflicted and could not be avoided. By contrast, when the thousand-bomber raids had been launched against German and Japanese cities, a whole variety of possible outcomes might have resulted. At one end of the spectrum, the mass bomber formations might have achieved their aim, destroyed their target and returned to base with very few losses. At the other end of the spectrum, the bombers might have been intercepted and attacked, diverted from their target, which remained unscathed, and forced to suffer very heavy losses themselves, as happened on the infamous Nuremberg raid. There was no way of knowing in advance how such encounters would work out – prior to the coming of the atomic bomb. Let us imagine that the Germans and the Japanese had known in advance that their potential victims, the democracies, would develop nuclear weapons before the end of the wars they were about to unleash. Is it likely that they would have proceeded to do so in the certain knowledge of total destruction? The theory that they would not had already been formulated before the atomic bomb was tested. In a report for the Chiefs of Staff in June, Professor Sir Henry Tizard concluded that the only answer which he and other senior defence scientists could see to the atomic bomb was to be prepared to use it in retaliation: Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood twenty paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. Alfred Nobel – of Peace Prize fame – was likewise convinced that his invention of dynamite would make war too destructive for countries to contemplate. Earlier explosives, like dynamite, and earlier means of delivery, like manned bombers, still left the outcome of the encounter in doubt. Even where both sides were similarly armed, there remained enough of a chance that one of them would suffer total defeat whilst the other enjoyed total victory to make the gamble of waging war seem worthwhile. There was, in short, too much uncertainty as to what the outcome would be. The Ethical Paradox The dawning of the atomic age was thus accompanied by what seemed to be an extreme ethical paradox: Simply because nuclear weapons, if used, would cause hideous destruction and loss of life, it has often been argued that there is something immoral in their very possession. Yet no weapon is moral or immoral in itself. Ethics enter the equation only when one considers the motivation for possessing weapons and the uses to which they are put. If the consequence of possessing a lethal weapon is that nobody uses lethal weapons, whilst the consequence of not possessing a lethal weapon is that someone else uses his lethal weapons against you, which is the more moral thing to do: The central problem which has to be faced by those who argue that the mere possession of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons in retaliation is morally unacceptable, is the extreme level of destructiveness which conventional warfare had reached before the atomic bomb was invented. If it is the case that possessing a deadly weapon or being willing to threaten to use it in retaliation will avert a conflict in which millions would otherwise die, can it seriously be claimed that the more ethical policy is to renounce the weapon and let the millions meet their fate? Even if one argues that the threat to retaliate is itself immoral, is it as immoral as the failure to forestall so many preventable casualties? This is, in reality, a variation on the argument against absolute pacifism which the late Leonard Cheshire illustrated when such issues were being debated twenty years ago. He set out the scenario of a security guard who is the only person in a position to prevent a terrorist from opening fire on a queue of passengers in an airport lounge. Moral choices are, as often as not, choices to determine the lesser of two evils.

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There are, however, significant numbers who believe that what was necessary then no longer applies now. This brings us to the central problem of predictability. From time to time wars break out in circumstances which were anticipated; but, more often than not, they arise totally unexpectedly. The Yom Kippur War in took even hypersensitive Israel by surprise. The Falklands War, nine years later, took Britain by surprise. The invasion of Kuwait in took everyone by surprise. There was nothing new in any of this “ as a detour into the archives strikingly illustrates: This had a dangerously adverse effect on necessary rearmament when the international scene darkened. In , a fortnight before the event, we were not in the least expecting the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. The same was true in A fortnight after the murder of the Austrian Archduke, a debate took place in the House of Commons on foreign affairs. The European situation was hardly referred to at all. More attention was given to the preparations for the next Peace Conference! This is why it makes sense to keep in being an army, a navy and an air force during long periods of peace. The same applies a fortiori to the nuclear deterrent. Investment in armed forces in apparently peaceful times is analogous to the payment of premiums on insurance policies. No one knows when the accident or disaster may happen against which one is insuring; if one did, one could probably avoid it and save oneself the cost of the premiums. With the benefit of hindsight, the Second World War is often regarded as a disaster predetermined by mistakes made at the end of the First World War. In those days, the choice of possible enemy would seriously affect the nature of the defence policy designed to meet the threat. Fortunately, the British strategic nuclear deterrent is less dependent than conventional armed forces upon the correct identification of the enemy in advance. Any country which emerges as a potential aggressor with mass-destruction weapons, in the next three or four decades, will be vulnerable to retaliation from Trident or its successor “ and this is the sort of time-scale which we have to consider. Each generation of the strategic nuclear deterrent functions for a period of thirty years or more. The actual replacement of the Trident system, if it occurs, will not even begin for at least another fifteen years. No one can possibly foretell what dangers will face us between the years and , just as the threats facing us today would have seemed bizarre to politicians and military planners at the height of the Cold War. During periods of peace, democratic states naturally tend to scale down their conventional fighting services, but they try to do so in a way which is reversible should the international scene deteriorate. This option does not apply to the nuclear deterrent, which has always been set at the minimum level regarded as essential for credibility. There can be no more assurance that a nuclear or major chemical or biological threat will not arise in the next half-century than that major land, sea or air threats will not have to be faced. If it is right to insure against the latter, it is essential to insure against the former. New Threats Apart from those who have always opposed British nuclear weapons, irrespective of the level of threat, some politicians, some churchmen and commentators, and even some military figures who used to support it, have now changed their minds. This is primarily because the Cold War is over, America appears to be the dominant world power and the principal threats today emanate from rogue regimes and stateless terrorist groups. Let us consider each of these in turn. First, the ending of the Cold War removes the danger of nuclear confrontation with Russia for as long as that country continues to tread, however hesitantly, the democratic path. This illustrates the fact that it is not the weapons themselves which we have to fear but the nature of the governments that possess them. As soon as Russia turned away from totalitarianism, the main concern about her nuclear arsenal shifted from those devices under the control of the Kremlin to those which might leach out from Russian stockpiles and fall into the hands of other regimes which remained more hostile. One concept which advocates of nuclear disarmament have traditionally ignored is the propensity for dictatorships to go to war with dictatorships, and for democracies and dictatorships to clash, whilst few “ if any “ examples exist of liberal democracies attacking each other. This suggests that it is quite right to have fewer qualms about the possession of deadly weapons by democracies, though regarding their possession by dictatorships as wholly unacceptable. There is no comparison between the two, and it is a constant failing of the disarmament lobby to try to ascribe values of reasonableness, tolerance, goodwill and peaceful intent to states under the control of despots, fanatics and dictators. Nuclear weapons, by their very nature, have devastating potential even in very small numbers. Quite

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apart from the prospect of unpredictable major threats in the longer term, the current enmity towards Britain by near-nuclear regimes like Iran suggests that unilateralism would be fraught with danger. It used to be pointed out that the British Polaris fleet had done nothing to deter Argentina from invading the Falkland Islands. Certainly, there was never a prospect of democratic Britain threatening to use its ultimate weapon except in response to a mortal threat against the cities of the United Kingdom. What would have been the case, though, if the Argentine junta had possessed even a few atomic weapons or other mass-destruction devices? Without a nuclear force of her own, would Britain then have dared to respond to the occupation militarily, despite her superiority in conventional forces? Time and again, the United Kingdom and the United States have stood side by side in international conflicts. If this pattern continues, the prospect could arise of a nuclear-armed enemy regarding it as safer to threaten or attack the smaller of the two allies. The danger would then arise of a possible miscalculation by an aggressor thinking that the US would not respond in kind to an attack with mass-destruction weapons on British cities. If this were a miscalculation, the attacker would discover it only when it was too late for all concerned, instead of having been deterred at the outset by the knowledge that Britain could respond in kind on her own behalf. These considerations clearly bear on the third issue: Several of them are already nuclear powers or on the verge of becoming so. The notion that they will abandon such a course indefinitely in response to unilateral British nuclear disarmament is totally unrealistic. Those who subscribe to it continually make the error of projecting civilized values onto extremist governments which actually hold them in contempt. Turning, fourthly, to the current emergence of non-state terrorist groups, it is absolutely correct that strategic nuclear weapons are of no relevance whatsoever. Neither are aircraft carriers, main battle tanks, guided-missile destroyers or any other heavyweight military equipment. The presence of a serious terrorist threat is clearly an argument in favour of expanded counter-insurgency forces and security and intelligence services. It is no argument at all for the abolition of those military capabilities which are designed to meet other types of threat which this country has faced in the past and may well face again in the future. There might be a case for arguing this if it could be shown that there were a causal link between our continued possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent and the decision of one or more identifiable countries to acquire nuclear weapons. During the Cold War era, the proliferation argument was often used by one-sided nuclear disarmers in their campaign against Polaris, Trident and the deployment of cruise missiles. Yet, whenever asked to name a specific nuclear or near-nuclear country which would be likely to abandon its nuclear ambitions if we unilaterally renounced ours, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and its fellow-travellers were notably unforthcoming. Countries make the decision whether or not to seek to acquire mass-destruction weapons according to hard-headed calculations of their own strategic interests. A quixotic renunciation by democratic Britain is not very likely to encourage any undemocratic state to follow suit. On the contrary, it is more likely to encourage any such state which views Britain as a potential enemy to redouble its efforts to join the WMD club, given that we would no longer have the means to threaten retaliation against nuclear, biological or chemical aggression. This is what it states: Given that the United Kingdom "and, for that matter, France and China" have never engaged in a nuclear arms race, their policy of each having a minimum strategic nuclear deterrent does not fall foul of this provision. None of these countries has ever sought to match the nuclear stockpiles of Russia or the United States. Each has been content to possess a much smaller nuclear capability, provided that it is adequate to threaten an unacceptable level of retaliation if attacked. The same would apply to any replacement system for Trident. This utopia would require several things to happen: Conclusion During the inter-war years, the process of disarmament was taken to new heights of complexity, but it achieved only this: After the final defeat of the Nazis, the democratic states faced a new challenge and a variation on an old dilemma. The challenge was that of confrontation with Soviet communism; the dilemma was whether to try to defuse it by disarmament or to contain it by deterrence. The fact that the Third World War did not break out is not, of itself, conclusive proof that containment by deterrence was successful.

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## Chapter 3 : Search results for `nuclear disarmament` - PhilPapers

*Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century [Kazumi Mizumoto, Wade L. Huntley, Mitsuru Kurosawa] on theinnatdunvilla.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. This work provides a comprehensive examination of the current state and future prospects for nuclear disarmament at the turn of the century.*

History[ edit ] Before World War I at the Hague Peace Conferences in and government delegations debated about disarmament and the creation of an international court with binding powers. The court was considered necessary because it was understood that nation-states could not disarm into a vacuum. A commonly held belief was that the cause of the war had been the escalating buildup of armaments in the previous half century among the great powers see Anglo-German naval arms race. Although the Treaty of Versailles effectively disarmed Germany, a clause was inserted that called on all the great powers to likewise progressively disarm over a period of time. Battleships being dismantled for scrap in Philadelphia Navy Yard , after the Washington Naval Treaty imposed limits on capital ships Martin Kobler addresses attendees at a disarmament ceremony in Goma , Democratic Republic of Congo One of the earliest successful achievements in disarmament was obtained with the Washington Naval Treaty. Signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, it prevented the continued construction of capital ships and limited ships of other classification to under 10, tons displacement. Proposals ranged from abolishing chemical warfare and strategic bombing to the limitation of more conventional weapons, such as tanks. A draft treaty was assembled in that made aggressive war illegal and bound the member states to defend victims of aggression by force. Since the onus of responsibility would, in practice, be on the great powers of the League, it was vetoed by the British, who feared that this pledge would strain its own commitment to police the empire. A further commission in , set up to explore the possibilities for the reduction of army size, met similar difficulties, prompting the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg to draft a treaty known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact , which denounced war of aggression. Although there were 65 signatories to the pact, it achieved nothing, as it set out no guidelines for action in the event of a war. Germany demanded the revision of the Versailles Treaty and the granting of military parity with the other powers, while France was determined to keep Germany demilitarised for its own security. Meanwhile, the British and Americans were not willing to offer France security commitments in exchange for conciliation with Germany. The talks broke down in , when Adolf Hitler withdrew Germany from the conference. These numbers include warheads not actively deployed, including those on reserve status or scheduled for dismantlement. Stockpile totals do not necessarily reflect nuclear capabilities since they ignore size, range, type, and delivery mode. Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated. In the United Kingdom, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament held an inaugural public meeting at Central Hall, Westminster , on 17 February , attended by five thousand people. After the meeting a few hundred left to demonstrate at Downing Street. The first Aldermaston March was organised by the CND and took place at Easter , when several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square , London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire , England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons. Kennedy gave a speech before the UN General Assembly where he announced the US "intention to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race, but to a peace race - to advance together step by step, stage by stage, until general and complete disarmament has been achieved. It would create machinery to keep the peace as it destroys the machinery of war. It would proceed through balanced and safeguarded stages designed to give no state a military advantage over another. It would assure that indispensable condition of disarmament - true inspection - and apply it in stages proportionate to the stage of disarmament. It would cover delivery systems as well as weapons. It would ultimately halt their production as well as their testing, their transfer as well as their possession. It would achieve under the eyes of an international disarmament organization, a

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steady reduction in force, both nuclear and conventional, until it has abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations Peace Force. And it starts that process now, today, even as the talks begin. In short, general and complete disarmament must no longer be a slogan, used to resist the first steps. It is no longer to be a goal without means of achieving it, without means of verifying its progress, without means of keeping the peace. It is now a realistic plan, and a test - a test of those only willing to talk and a test of those willing to act. There have been many large anti-nuclear demonstrations and protests. It was the largest anti-nuclear protest and the largest political demonstration in American history.

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## Chapter 4 : 'NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERSUS PEACE IN THE 21st CENTURY' - Rt Hon Dr Julian Le

*Slaying the Nuclear Dragon provides in-depth, objective analysis of current nuclear disarmament dynamics. Examining the political, state-level factors that drive and stall progress, contributors highlight the challenges and opportunities faced by proponents of disarmament.*

New York, New York Distributed at The Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, United Nations, New York, August "The threats posed by modern weapons of war -- particularly nuclear weapons -- are so grave that they jeopardize literally all of our collective cultural, political, and economic heritage and our natural environment. The issue is vital because disarmament is inextricably linked to human security. What makes disarmament so compelling a strategy for peace and development is that it would eliminate the gravest known threats, and eliminate them more reliably than any conceivable alternative. The moral imperative for disarmament is combined with its self-evidently practical need in terms of economic and social dividends. This is the heart of my message to you today. Many weapons present clear and present dangers, but none approaches the potential threats to humanity from nuclear weapons. In , the International Court of Justice issued its famous Advisory Opinion concerning the threat or use of such weapons. It has been the subject of countless resolutions ever since, from both the General Assembly and the Security Council. All the five nuclear-weapon states under that treaty endorse this goal. Thus nuclear disarmament does not just enjoy universal support as a goal of policy -- but it is an objective that has the status of law. In what has indisputably been the most blood-stained century it was a leader from my region of the world, Mahatma Gandhi, who espoused the cause of non-violence as a political tool. Hard-headed realists might object to the utility of ahimsa, citing another tradition of South Asian political philosophy dating back to Kautilya, whose crafty realism predated Machiavelli by almost two thousand years. Consider the legacies of nuclear weapons -- the awful destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the potential damage to the human and natural environment from regional or global nuclear war whether by design or accident ; the consequences of their production for the health of workers and the natural environment; and the diversion of trillions of dollars from treasuries around the world to produce and maintain them. None of these suggests that nuclear weapons offer a stable foundation for either a sound defense or wise foreign policy, whether one subscribes to the tradition of ahimsa or the realpolitik of Kautilya. The same arguments apply to conventional weapons arsenals beyond the legitimate requirements of national defense, when one considers the death and destruction of the wars fought since Of the States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT , have undertaken formal and verifiable legal obligations not to acquire such weapons. Three decades later, these countries reportedly possess about 36, of such weapons in various stages of readiness. Though the rate of elimination of such weapons has been slow, the cumulative costs of producing, storing, transporting, maintaining, and cleaning up the sites that produce such weapons have been truly astounding. Nevertheless, this weapons-usable material continues to accumulate in civilian stocks and in some unsafeguarded nuclear programs around the world. Though estimates vary, there are reportedly between four and five times the amount of plutonium in civilian nuclear programmes than in military inventories. All together, over 1, metric tonnes of plutonium exist in the world today, not all of it under safeguards or securely stored -- a sobering fact, given that less than 8 kilograms of this material can make a bomb, while a billionth of a gram can produce lung cancer. States that possess nuclear weapons do not appear to be in any hurry to give them up, despite the unpopularity of such weapons among the general public everywhere. Their leaders talk about ultimate disarmament goals, but balk at negotiating concrete measures to achieve such goals. This is a recipe for perpetual global disorder. Because of its urgency and complexity, the challenge of global nuclear disarmament demands immediate attention. It cannot be consigned to the never-never land of "ultimate goals. We recall well the shrill headlines announcing several nuclear tests in that region, followed by official words trumpeting the great security benefits from possessing nuclear weapons. We see new missile developments -- including

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flight tests -- in various regions. We read about the dangers from an emerging global black market in nuclear materials. This of course does not tell the whole story. Quite to the contrary, it is a goal of literally every government on Earth. Critics of disarmament point out that agreement on a goal is one thing, while reaching consensus on actions needed to achieve that goal is quite another. This is of course true. What they are demanding are not palliatives merely to reduce the danger of future nuclear wars. They want to eliminate nuclear threats, not simply to manage them. The twenty-first century must see its delegitimization and elimination if the human race is to survive and flourish for centuries to come. Let us together begin the task of converting the disarmament vision into a reality.

## Chapter 5 : Staff View: Slaying the nuclear dragon :

*Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century by Wade L. Huntley This work provides a comprehensive examination of the current state and future prospects for nuclear disarmament at the turn of the century.*

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## Chapter 7 : Disarmament - Wikipedia

*|a Slaying the nuclear dragon: |b disarmament dynamics in the twenty-first century / |c edited by Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro. |a Athens: |b University of Georgia Press, |c c*

## Chapter 8 : Download [PDF] disarmament

*Many who oppose Britain's retention and replacement of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century also advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament, despite the level of the Soviet threat, during the Cold War.*

## Chapter 9 : Nuclear disarmament - Wikipedia

*It won first prize in the Trench Gascoigne Essay Prize competition, an annual award given by RUSI for original essays on contemporary issues of defence, international security and national resilience.*