

Chapter 1 : Hippias Minor - Wikipedia

Hippias Minor (Greek: Ἡπίαιος ἡμιλογος, ἡμιλογος, ἡμιλογος), or *On Lying*, is thought to be one of Plato's early works. Socrates matches wits with an arrogant polymath, who is also a smug literary critic.

It is inferior to all the others. For one thing, we have the return of Hippias, the great and wonderful, who in the course of his conversation with Socrates unabashedly calls himself a great arithmetician, geometrician, and astronomer. You began with your ring, which was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the short tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things[. We can also sympathise with his frustration in dealing with Socrates. Progressing a few steps, they also agree that those skilled in something, geometry or arithmetic or whatever, can speak truly or falsely just as easily about those subjects. For example, after determining that the arithmetician is best able to speak falsely about calculation, they say: Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the true man. Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about the same matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining. And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. Not without consideration, Socrates. Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be. I do not know what you mean, Socrates. If Odysseus is false he is also true, and if Achilles is true he is also false, and so the two men are not opposed to one another, but they are alike. Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles? Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary? And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than those who err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those who lie or do evil, voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily. We then move on to some sports analogies. Is the runner who loses a race intentionally a better runner than one who loses unintentionally? Same basic idea with a wrestling match, playing a musical instrument, riding a horse, and several other activities. That is the common sense answer, but Socrates continues. What is Socrates getting at, here? The dialogue ends with him saying this: Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you. It is, I take it, a satire on over-reasoning, and also a lesson for Hippias that, like Socrates, he knows nothing. Oh, and what about that conclusion, that the good man is one who does wrong voluntarily? Gorgias, though he does say he can teach virtue, places most of his emphasis on teaching his students rhetoric, the art of persuasion. There is, however, one way in which the able man is more virtuous than the incapable, or rather, is capable of more virtue. Right and wrong, as Hippias understands through common sense despite getting turned about in dialectics, consists largely in the will. To practice virtue in choosing right over wrong, though, we must have a choice to make in the first place. For example, a young, attractive celebrity is notably virtuous when he practices chastity; a homely loser who no woman wants to be

anywhere near in the first place does not. This is not to say, of course, that power is required for virtue. I plan to continue prioritising the dialogues over other things I want to read so that I get through them in a reasonably timely manner, so that review should be coming up relatively soon.

Chapter 2 : Plato's Dialogues: Lesser Hippias "Everything is Oll Korrekt!

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Posted on April 9, Views: The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyric orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished from that of a later age see above ; and has various degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian 1 credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of 2 length, 3 excellence, and 4 accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads only: Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject them. Some difference

of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First Alcibiades. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be

altogether spurious;â€”that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight chiefly of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine. On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy see above. That twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader.

Chapter 3 : Plato, The Dialogues of Plato - PhilPapers

Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates.

However, only Alexander of Aphrodisias ascribes it to Plato. Some contend that it may have been written by Antisthenes. Socrates says in the Crito that a man should never intentionally commit injustice. In this dialogue, he says that a man who does wrong intentionally is better than the man who does it unwittingly. Known throughout ancient Greece, he was reputed to have mastered mathematics, astronomy and rhetoric; he boasted that he could speak on any subject at Olympia without preparation. Plato presents him as setting himself up as an expert on Homeric criticism, and over-reaching his expertise. Hippias is exactly the sort of man Socrates complains about in the Apology, a man who develops expertise in one or more areas, and then imagines he knows everything. He admires Hippias, and his role in the dialogue is as a facilitator. A conversation about lies[edit] In Hippias Minor, Socrates argues with Hippias about which kind of liar is the best, the man who deliberately contrives a lie, or the man who lies unwittingly, from not paying attention to what he is saying, or changing his mind. Socrates argues that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary lie. The debate is rooted in a literary question about whom Homer intended to portray as the better man, Achilles or Odysseus. The men do not pursue this thesis, that the moral status of the characters in a work of literature has some bearing on its artistry. Socrates says that they ought to be rewritten to this effect. Introductory scene[edit] The sophist Hippias is visiting Athens from his home city of Elis on the occasion of the Olympic festival. An artisan, poet, rhetor, astronomer and arithmetician, Hippias has also appointed himself an expert on Homer. He has been favoring the crowds with displays of his literary opinions. Socrates says that he could not follow his argument, but did not want to interrupt. Now that the three men are separated from the crowd, Socrates, encouraged by Eudicus, quizzes Hippias on the particulars of his opinion. Socrates asks Hippias if Homer has not portrayed Achilles as a wily man. Hippias counters that Achilles is the most straightforward of men, simple and true, and cites a passage where Achilles declares his hatred for men who think one thing and say another, or who do not do what they say they will do. He tells Hippias that because he agrees with Homer that a simple and true man is better than a wily and cunning one, he will let him speak for Homer. Wise liars[edit] Socrates gets Hippias to agree that the more a man knows about a subject, the better position he will be in to lie about it. He argues that the man who knows the subjects about which he tells lies, whether arithmetic, geometry, or astronomy, is twice as powerful as the man who does not know his subjects. Socrates never indicates what a man might stand to gain from lying about such matters, but brings the conversation back around to Achilles, and what kind of man Homer intended to portray. Achilles is an expert liar[edit] Socrates argues that Achilles is such a good liar in the Iliad that he fools even Odysseus, who never notices his duplicity. Citing the scene where Achilles tells Odysseus that he will not rejoin the war but will sail away with the early dawn, and Ajax a different story, Socrates says this is a cunning man Iliad, IX, If Achilles is so shifty that even Odysseus, whose middle name is cunning, cannot spot it, Achilles must be the better liar. Achilles, of course, never carried out his threat to leave, but remained at his camp. Hippias, quite foolishly, insists that Achilles told two different stories "in innocence. Socrates insists that those who injure people, tell deliberate lies, and err voluntarily are better than people who simply make mistakes. Hippias suspects at this point that Socrates is being dishonest in the debate. Socrates counters that if he is troublesome, it is unintentional, that if he were being difficult deliberately, then he would be wily, which he is not. Debate and athletics compared[edit] Socrates invokes a comparison between athletic competitions and debate. He argues that a runner or wrestler who throws the contest by doing worse than he is capable of doing is a more skillful combatant than the one who does his best and loses. Socrates multiplies the analogy, adding that, whether it is a singer off key, a gymnast who appears ungraceful, or a man who pretends to be lame, it is always better to have the power to do it right and pretend to do it wrong than to be helpless to do it right. Justice is power and knowledge[edit] Socrates convinces Hippias that Justice is a matter of both power and

knowledge, and that the powerful i. Socrates tells Hippias that he does not agree with himself, and is perplexed about his own conclusion. Criticism of the dialogue[edit] The dialogue is much dismissed because it seems to recommend clever evil over witless evil. Socrates, who pretends to be a lover of good reasoning, is widely thought to be what he says he is, a rational man. Socrates is the literary equivalent of Achilles, whose speech against dissembling seems to fool everyone. Socrates is no more "rational" than Achilles is "honest and simple". The moral argument of the dialog, a kind of red herring, can be summed up simply: One who is able to lie about any subject must know the subject in depth, thus is able to tell the truth. One who lies knowingly is superior to one who lies unwittingly. They argue that Socrates is uncharacteristically lacking in righteousness, and that this puts the dialog at odds with the main body of Socratic dialogs. The opinions of Socrates in any given dialog not only often contradict conventional morality, they also contradict his own previous opinions. Socrates invocation of Achilles as a model for his own fearlessness is misplaced because Achilles is a coward in the scene. In the Republic Socrates has a different opinion of Achilles. He calls him emotionally overwrought, and greedy for taking bribesâ€”which, according to Homer, he did not do. Socrates famously argues that the Iliad needs to be rewritten. What must not be overlooked, however, is that Plato is the mastermind, and must be given full credit for arranging the match. Socrates wins the debate with Hippias, and then throws the trophy back at the sophist, who never knew what hit him. Readers for centuries have been hard pressed to judge the match.

Chapter 4 : Hippias Minor - Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core

The Menexenus (/ m ɛˈnɛks ɛˈnɛks ɛˈnɛks /; Greek: Ἰωνοῦ καὶ Μενέχμου ἑρμηνεία) is a Socratic dialogue of Plato, traditionally included in the seventh tetralogy along with the Greater and Lesser Hippias and the Ion.

Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from Jowett For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is virtue: Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to define them. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far better. The definition repeats the word defined. Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect Jowett When he talks with other persons he has plenty to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts desert him. Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, Jowett But the puzzle has a real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavour to find a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge: For nature is of one kindred; and Jowett The theorem that Jowett The first step in the process of teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. But he is willing to argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume that if virtue is knowledge, Jowett This was the stage of the argument at which the Protagoras concluded. Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, Jowett But where are the teachers? There are none to be found. This is extremely discouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable. To any Athenian gentlemanâ€”to the great Athenian statesmen of past Edition: Socrates replies here, as elsewhere Laches, C foll. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong cp. The mention of Jowett But there is another point which we failed to observe, and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance of right Jowett This is the sort of instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue, Jowett This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved. The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, Edition: Virtue is knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found than it vanishes away. This is the gift which our statesmen have, as is proved by the circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to their sons. Those who are possessed of it cannot be said to be men of science or philosophers, but they are inspired and divine. There may be some trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the concluding portion of the Dialogue. But Plato certainly does not mean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the Edition: To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the most divine. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach others, because he has no principles, and is incapable of collecting or arranging his ideas. He

has practice, but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas. Also here, as in the *Ion* and *Phaedrus*, Plato appears to acknowledge an unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the *Symposium*, or of oracles in the *Apology*, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the *daemonium* of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it. This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight, even slighter than in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Because men had abstract ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls therefore must have always existed 86 A. For they must always have been either Edition: The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. *Phaedo* D, D. It may be observed, however, that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, and exists not in the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be appropriated by strenuous exertion. The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything but the duty of enquiry 86 B. Modern philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the association of ideas cp. Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic Edition: The character of *Meno*, like that of *Critias*, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which *Xenophon* has recorded, as he is also silent about the crimes of *Critias*. He is a Thessalian *Alcibiades*, rich and luxurious—a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the hereditary friend of the great king. Like *Alcibiades* he is inspired with an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to *Gorgias* as *Hippocrates* in the *Protagoras* to the other great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, just as in the *Charmides*, the *Lysis*, and the *Euthydemus*, ingenuous boyhood is made the subject of a similar experiment. He is treated by Socrates in a half-playful manner suited to his character; at the same time he appears not quite to understand the process to which he is being subjected. For he is exhibited as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His answers have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical incapacity to grasp a general notion. *Anytus* is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher. He seems, like *Aristophanes*, to regard the new opinions, whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is of the same class as *Callicles* in the *Gorgias*, but of a different variety; the immoral and sophistical doctrines of *Callicles* are not attributed to him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the accuser of Edition: Or he may have been regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of *Meno* and *Critias*. In the *Meno* the subject is more developed; the foundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. There is a progression by antagonism of two opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles upon us and passes out of our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide.

Chapter 5 : List of speakers in Plato's dialogues - Wikipedia

Authenticity. Despite Hippias Minor's relative unpopularity, its authenticity is the subject of virtually no doubt: Aristotle (in Metaphysics, V,), Cicero (in De Oratore, III, 32) and Alexander of Aphrodisias all reference it as genuine.

It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyric orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished from that of a later age see above ; and has various degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian 1 credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of 2 length, 3 excellence, and 4 accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads only: Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of

language or philosophy we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First Alcibiades. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the

reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight chiefly of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine. On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy see above. That twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. The Menexenus has more the character of a rhetorical exercise than any other of the Platonic works. The writer seems to have wished to emulate Thucydides, and the far slighter work of Lysias. In his rivalry with the latter, to whom in the Phaedrus Plato shows a strong antipathy, he is entirely successful, but he is not equal to Thucydides. The Menexenus, though not without real Hellenic interest, falls very far short of the rugged grandeur and political insight of the great historian. The fiction of the speech having been invented by Aspasia is well sustained, and is in the manner of Plato, notwithstanding the anachronism which puts into her mouth an allusion to the peace of Antalcidas, an event occurring forty years after the date of the supposed oration. But Plato, like Shakespeare, is careless of such anachronisms, which are not supposed to strike the mind of the reader. The effect produced by these grandiloquent orations on Socrates, who does not recover after having heard one of them for three days and more, is truly Platonic. Such discourses, if we may form a judgment from the three which are extant for the so-called Funeral Oration of Demosthenes is a bad and spurious imitation of Thucydides and Lysias, conformed to a regular type. They began with Gods and ancestors, and the legendary history of Athens, to which succeeded an almost equally fictitious account of later times. The Persian war usually formed the centre of the narrative; in the age of Isocrates and Demosthenes the Athenians were still living on the glories of Marathon and Salamis. The Menexenus veils in panegyric the weak places of Athenian history. The war of Athens and Boeotia is a war of liberation; the Athenians gave back the Spartans taken at Sphacteria out of kindness-- indeed, the only fault of the city was too great kindness to their enemies, who were more honoured than the friends of others compare Thucyd. These are the platitudes and falsehoods in which history is disguised. The taking of Athens is hardly mentioned. The author of the Menexenus, whether Plato or not, is evidently intending to ridicule the practice, and at the same time to show that he can beat the rhetoricians in their own line, as in the Phaedrus he may be supposed to offer an example of what Lysias might have said, and of how much better he might have written in his own style. The orators had recourse to their favourite loci communes, one of which, as we find in Lysias, was the shortness of the time allowed them for preparation. But Socrates points out that they had them always ready for delivery, and that there was no difficulty in improvising any number of such orations. To praise the Athenians among the Athenians was easy,--to praise them among the Lacedaemonians would have been a much more difficult task. Socrates himself has turned rhetorician, having learned of a woman, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles; and any one whose teachers had been far inferior to his own--say, one who had learned from Antiphon the Rhamnusia--would be quite equal to the task of praising men to themselves. When we remember that Antiphon is described by Thucydides as the best pleader of his day, the satire on him and on the whole tribe of rhetoricians is transparent. The ironical assumption of Socrates, that he must be a good orator because he had learnt of Aspasia, is not coarse, as Schleiermacher supposes, but is rather to be regarded as fanciful. Nor can

we say that the offer of Socrates to dance naked out of love for Menexenus, is any more un-Platonic than the threat of physical force which Phaedrus uses towards Socrates. Nor is there any real vulgarity in the fear which Socrates expresses that he will get a beating from his mistress, Aspasia: Socrates is not to be taken seriously in all that he says, and Plato, both in the Symposium and elsewhere, is not slow to admit a sort of Aristophanic humour. How a great original genius like Plato might or might not have written, what was his conception of humour, or what limits he would have prescribed to himself, if any, in drawing the picture of the Silenus Socrates, are problems which no critical instinct can determine. On the other hand, the dialogue has several Platonic traits, whether original or imitated may be uncertain. Thus in the Cratylus he is run away with; in the Phaedrus he has heard somebody say something-- is inspired by the genius loci; in the Symposium he derives his wisdom from Diotima of Mantinea, and the like. But he does not impose on Menexenus by his dissimulation. Without violating the character of Socrates, Plato, who knows so well how to give a hint, or some one writing in his name, intimates clearly enough that the speech in the Menexenus like that in the Phaedrus is to be attributed to Socrates. The address of the dead to the living at the end of the oration may also be compared to the numerous addresses of the same kind which occur in Plato, in whom the dramatic element is always tending to prevail over the rhetorical. The remark has been often made, that in the Funeral Oration of Thucydides there is no allusion to the existence of the dead. But in the Menexenus a future state is clearly, although not strongly, asserted. Whether the Menexenus is a genuine writing of Plato, or an imitation only, remains uncertain. In either case, the thoughts are partly borrowed from the Funeral Oration of Thucydides; and the fact that they are so, is not in favour of the genuineness of the work. Internal evidence seems to leave the question of authorship in doubt.

Chapter 6 : Plato and his dialogues: a list of Plato's works

Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one (76 D); or (2) the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made.

Characters Socrates , who defends a thesis he explicitly rejects in Crito. Socrates says in the Crito that a man should never intentionally commit injustice. In this dialogue, he says that a man who does wrong intentionally is better than the man who does it unwittingly. Known throughout ancient Greece , he was reputed to have mastered mathematics , astronomy and rhetoric ; he boasted that he could speak on any subject at Olympia without preparation. Plato presents him as setting himself up as an expert on Homeric criticism, and over-reaching his expertise. Hippias is exactly the sort of man Socrates complains about in the Apology , a man who develops expertise in one or more areas, and then imagines he knows everything. He admires Hippias, and his role in the dialogue is as a facilitator. A conversation about lies In Hippias Minor, Socrates argues with Hippias about which kind of liar is the best, the man who deliberately contrives a lie, or the man who lies unwittingly, from not paying attention to what he is saying, or changing his mind. Socrates argues that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary lie. The debate is rooted in a literary question about whom Homer intended to portray as the better man, Achilles or Odysseus. The men do not pursue this thesis, that the moral status of the characters in a work of literature has some bearing on its artistry. Socrates says that they ought to be rewritten to this effect. Introductory scene The sophist Hippias is visiting Athens from his home city of Elis on the occasion of the Olympic festival. An artisan, poet, rhetor, astronomer and arithmetician, Hippias has also appointed himself an expert on Homer. He has been favoring the crowds with displays of his literary opinions. Socrates says that he could not follow his argument, but did not want to interrupt. Now that the three men are separated from the crowd, Socrates, encouraged by Eudicus, quizzes Hippias on the particulars of his opinion. Socrates asks Hippias if Homer has not portrayed Achilles as a wily man. Hippias counters that Achilles is the most straightforward of men, simple and true, and cites a passage where Achilles declares his hatred for men who think one thing and say another, or who do not do what they say they will do. He tells Hippias that because he agrees with Homer that a simple and true man is better than a wily and cunning one, he will let him speak for Homer. Wise liars Socrates gets Hippias to agree that the more a man knows about a subject, the better position he will be in to lie about it. He argues that the man who knows the subjects about which he tells lies, whether arithmetic, geometry, or astronomy, is twice as powerful as the man who does not know his subjects. Socrates never indicates what a man might stand to gain from lying about such matters, but brings the conversation back around to Achilles, and what kind of man Homer intended to portray. Achilles is an expert liar Socrates argues that Achilles is such a good liar in the Iliad that he fools even Odysseus, who never notices his duplicity a. Citing the scene where Achilles tells Odysseus that he will not rejoin the war but will sail away with the early dawn, and Ajax a different story, Socrates says this is a cunning man Iliad, IX, If Achilles is so shifty that even Odysseus, whose middle name is cunning, cannot spot it, Achilles must be the better liar. Achilles, of course, never carried out his threat to leave, but remained at his camp. Hippias, quite foolishly, insists that Achilles told two different stories "in innocence. Socrates insists that those who injure people, tell deliberate lies, and err voluntarily are better than people who simply make mistakes d. Hippias suspects at this point that Socrates is being dishonest in the debate. Socrates counters that if he is troublesome, it is unintentional, that if he were being difficult deliberately, then he would be wily, which he is not. Debate and athletics compared Socrates invokes a comparison between athletic competitions and debate. He argues that a runner or wrestler who throws the contest by doing worse than he is capable of doing is a more skillful combatant than the one who does his best and loses. Socrates multiplies the analogy, adding that, whether it is a singer off key, a gymnast who appears ungraceful, or a man who pretends to be lame, it is always better to have the power to do it right and pretend to do it wrong than to be helpless to do it right. Justice is power and knowledge Socrates convinces Hippias that Justice is a matter of both power and knowledge, and that the powerful i. Socrates tells Hippias that he does not agree with himself, and is

perplexed about his own conclusion. Criticism of the dialogue This dialogue is much dismissed because it seems to recommend clever evil over witless evil. This is not the real point however. Socrates is the impresario who sings off key, the boxer who throws the match not for money, but because he can. Socrates, who pretends to be a lover of good reasoning, is widely thought to be what he says he is, a rational man. Socrates is the literary equivalent of Achilles, whose speech against dissembling seems to fool everyone. Socrates is no more "rational" than Achilles is "honest and simple". The moral argument of the dialog, a kind of red herring, can be summed up simply: One who is able to lie about any subject must know the subject in depth, thus is able to tell the truth. One who lies knowingly is superior to one who lies unwittingly. They argue that Socrates is uncharacteristically lacking in righteousness, and that this puts the dialog at odds with the main body of Socratic dialogs. The opinions of Socrates in any given dialog not only often contradict conventional morality, they also contradict his own previous opinions. Socrates invocation of Achilles as a model for his own fearlessness is misplaced because Achilles is a coward in the scene. In the Republic Socrates has a different opinion of Achilles. He calls him emotionally overwrought, and greedy for taking bribesâ€”which, according to Homer, he did not do. Socrates famously argues that the Iliad needs to be rewritten. What must not be overlooked, however, is that Plato is the mastermind, and must be given full credit for arranging the match. Socrates wins the debate with Hippias, and then throws the trophy back at the sophist, who never knew what hit him. Readers for centuries have been hard pressed to judge the match. The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge University Press,

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the dialogues of plato translated into english with analyses and introductions by b. jowett, m. theinnatdunvilla.com of balliol college; regius professor of greek in the university of oxford.

If there is anything in the idea that Plato grouped his dialogues according to such an arrangement, it might explain why we sometimes hear of tetralogies, sometimes of trilogies. But more about that later. Note 3 also provides a selection of various editions of the dialogues in English. As is the case with the Letters, whether they are actually by Plato has to be decided on a case by case basis. All volumes are regularly reprinted. The English equivalent of this collection though with generally less developed introductions and apparatus criticus is the Loeb Classical Library, published by Harvard University Press. *Minos, Leges, Epinomis, Epistulae, Definitiones et Spuria* The same dialogues, in a different order, are available, with Greek text and English translation, in the 12 volumes edition of the already mentioned Loeb collection Vol. *Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, translated by W. Lysis, *Symposium, Gorgias*, translated by W. Theaetetus, *Sophist*, translated by H. Statesman, *Philebus*, translated by H. Translations are again by various hands, many of them published separately by the same publisher. This edition is truly a complete edition, starting with the 9 Thrasyllian tetralogies in the received order, followed by all spurious works, and even the Epigrams. Translators are as follows dialogues are again listed in alphabetical order for ease of search: *Alcibiades*, translated by D. Grube *Axiochus*, translated by Jackson P. Gonzalez *Cratylus*, translated by C. Grube *Definitions*, translated by D. Cooper *Epinomis*, translated by Richard D. Grube *Gorgias*, translated by Donald J. Zeyl *Halcyon*, translated by Brad Inwood this spurious little work which is most likely not by Plato has found its way in modern times in the works of Lucian, where he is usually printed. Because it was once in antiquity attributed to Plato, the editor of this edition has included it in the spurious works *Hipparchus*, translated by Nicholas D. Saunders *Letters*, translated by Glenn R. White *Statesman*, translated by C. Burnyeat *Theages*, translated by Nicholas D. Smith *Timaeus*, translated by Donald J. Translations are by various hands, most available in other editions, such as those by B. It includes here listed in alphabetical order: *Apology*, translated by Hugh Tredennick, *Charmides*, translated by B. Jowett, *Cratylus*, translated by B. Jowett, *Critias*, translated by A. Taylor, *Euthydemus*, translated by W. Jowett, *Laws*, translated by A. Taylor, *Letters*, translated by L. Post, *Lysis*, translated by J. Wright, *Menexenus*, translated by B. Jowett, *Meno*, translated by W. Guthrie, *Parmenides*, translated by F. Hackforth, *Philebus*, translated by R. Hackforth, *Protagoras*, translated by W. Cornford, *Statesman*, translated by J. Many English translations of various dialogues are available from different publishers, including, for most of them, paperback editions in economy collections. Here are the translations available in the Penguin Classics edition: *Saunders Protagoras and Meno*, translated by W. Waterfield *The Laws*, translated by Trevor J. *The Republic*, translated, with notes, an interpretive essay and a new introduction, by Allan Bloom, Basic Books, *The Republic*, translated, with introduction and notes, by Francis M. Theaetetus and *Sophist*, translated with commentary by Francis M. Copies of these pages must not alter the text and must leave this copyright mention visible in full.

Chapter 8 : Lesser Hippias | Awaken

The following is a list of the speakers found in the dialogues traditionally ascribed to Plato, including extensively quoted, indirect and conjured theinnatdunvilla.comues, as well as Platonic Epistles and Epigrams, in which these individuals appear dramatically but do not speak are listed separately.

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