

# DOWNLOAD PDF LIVES OF ANIMALS, THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THE ANIMALS

## Chapter 1 : Animal Farm Summary - theinnatdunvilla.com

*The Lives of Animals consists of two chapters, "The Philosophers and the Animals" and "The Poets and the Animals," first delivered by Coetzee as guest lectures at Princeton on 15 and 16 October, part of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values.*

The Moral Considerability of Animals To say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being can make on those who can recognize such claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be wronged. It is often thought that because only humans can recognize moral claims, it is only humans who are morally considerable. However, when we ask why we think humans are the only types of beings that can be morally wronged, we begin to see that the class of beings able to recognize moral claims and the class of beings who can suffer moral wrongs are not co-extensive. In the 1970s, Richard Ryder coined this term while campaigning in Oxford to denote a ubiquitous type of human centered prejudice, which he thought was similar to racism. Peter Singer popularized the term and focused on the way speciesism, without moral justification, favors the interests of humans: Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. That humans are members of the species *Homo sapiens* is certainly a distinguishing feature of humans—humans share a genetic make-up and a distinctive physiology, we all emerge from a human pregnancy, but this is unimportant from the moral point of view. Species membership is a morally irrelevant characteristic, a bit of luck that is no more morally interesting than being born in Malaysia or Canada. As a morally irrelevant characteristic it cannot serve as the basis for a view that holds that our species deserves moral consideration that is not owed to members of other species. One might respond that it is not membership in a biological category that matters morally, but rather the social meaning of those categories, meanings that structure not only the institutions we operate within, but how we conceptualize ourselves and our world. Humans have developed moral systems as well as a wide range of other valuable practices, and by creating these systems, we separate the human from the rest of the animal kingdom. The most common way of understanding it is to suggest that there are distinctly human capacities and it is on the basis of these capacities that humans have moral status and other animals do not. But which capacities mark out all and only humans as the kinds of beings that can be wronged? A number of candidate capacities have been proposed—developing family ties, solving social problems, expressing emotions, starting wars, having sex for pleasure, using language, or thinking abstractly, are just a few. As it turns out, none of these activities is uncontroversially unique to human. Both scholarly and popular work on animal behavior suggests that many of the activities that are thought to be distinct to humans occurs in non-humans. For example, many species of non-humans develop long lasting kinship ties—orangutan mothers stay with their young for eight to ten years and while they eventually part company, they continue to maintain their relationships. Less solitary animals, such as chimpanzees, baboons, wolves, and elephants maintain extended family units built upon complex individual relationships, for long periods of time. Meerkats in the Kalahari desert are known to sacrifice their own safety by staying with sick or injured family members so that the fatally ill will not die alone. All animals living in socially complex groups must solve various problems that inevitably arise in such groups. Canids and primates are particularly adept at it, yet even chickens and horses are known to recognize large numbers of individuals in their social hierarchies and to maneuver within them. One of the ways that non-human animals negotiate their social environments is by being particularly attentive to the emotional states of others around them. When a conspecific is angry, it is a good idea to get out of his way. Animals that develop life-long bonds are known to suffer from the death of their partners. Some are even said to die of sorrow. Darwin reported this in *The Descent of Man*: Coyotes, elephants and killer whales are also among the species for which profound effects of grief have been reported Bekoff and many dog owners can provide similar accounts. While the lives of many, perhaps most, non-humans in the wild are consumed with struggle for survival, aggression and battle, there are some

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non-humans whose lives are characterized by expressions of joy, playfulness, and a great deal of sex Woods Because human behavior and cognition share deep roots with the behavior and cognition of other animals, approaches that try to find sharp behavioral or cognitive boundaries between humans and other animals remain controversial. For this reason, attempts to establish human uniqueness by identifying certain capacities, are not the most promising when it comes to thinking hard about the moral status of animals. The notion of personhood identifies a category of morally considerable beings that is thought to be coextensive with humanity. Historically, Kant is the most noted defender of personhood as the quality that makes a being valuable and thus morally considerable for a contemporary utilitarian discussion of personhood, see Varner On the other hand, rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves. By this he is a person. This problem emerges because of the reflective structure of human consciousness. Do these impulses represent the kind of things I want to act according to? In stepping back we gain a certain distance from which we can answer these questions and solve the problem of normativity. When we determine whether we should take a particular desire as a reason to act we are engaging in a further level of reflection, a level that requires an endorseable description of ourselves. This endorseable description of ourselves, this practical identity, is a necessary moral identity because without it we cannot view our lives as worth living or our actions as worth doing. Korsgaard suggests that humans face the problem of normativity in a way that non-humans apparently do not: Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, on to our own mental activities, and we are conscious of them. That is why we can think about them. And this sets us a problem that no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Since non-humans do not act on reasons they do not have a practical identity from which they reflect and for which they act. So humans can be distinguished from non-humans because humans, we might say, are sources of normativity and non-humans are not. Personhood is not, in fact, coextensive with humanity when understood as a general description of the group to which human beings belong. And the serious part of this problem is not that there may be some extra-terrestrials or deities who have rational capacities. The serious problem is that many humans are not persons. Many beings whose positive moral value we have deeply held intuitions about, and who we treat as morally considerable, will be excluded from consideration by this account. There are three ways to respond to this counter-intuitive conclusion. One, which can be derived from one interpretation of Kant, is to suggest that non-persons are morally considerable indirectly. Though Kant believed that animals were mere things it appears he did not genuinely believe we could dispose of them any way we wanted. In the Lectures on Ethics he makes it clear that we have indirect duties to animals, duties that are not toward them, but in regard to them insofar as our treatment of them can affect our duties to persons. If a man shoots his dog because the animal is no longer capable of service, he does not fail in his duty to the dog, for the dog cannot judge, but his act is inhuman and damages in himself that humanity which it is his duty to show towards mankind. If he is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We disrespect our humanity when we act in inhumane ways towards non-persons, whatever their species. But this indirect view is unsatisfying. It fails to capture the independent wrong that is being done to the non-person. When someone rapes a woman in a coma, or whips a severely brain damaged child, or sets a cat on fire, they are not simply disrespecting humanity or themselves as representatives of it, they are wronging these non-persons. Insofar as a being stands in this relation to rational nature, they are the kinds of beings that can be wronged. This response is not unlike that of noted animal rights proponent, Tom Regan, who argues that what is important for moral consideration are not the differences between humans and non-humans but the similarities. Regan argues that because persons share with certain non-persons which includes those humans and non-humans who have a certain level of organized cognitive function the ability to be experiencing subject of a life and to have an individual welfare that matters to them regardless of what

others might think, both deserve moral consideration. Regan argues that subjects of a life: And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely deathâ€”all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the same is true of animals they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own. She writes, what we demand, when we demand recognition, is that our natural concernsâ€”the objects of our natural desires and interests and affectionsâ€”be accorded the status of values, values that must be respected as far as possible by others. And many of those natural concernsâ€”the desire to avoid pain is an obvious exampleâ€”spring from our animal nature, not from our rational nature. Insofar as these needs and desires are valuable for agents, the ability to experience similar needs and desires in patients should also be valued. But all animals, infants and adults, are not legal persons, but rather, under the law they are considered property. There have been a few attempts to change the legal status of some nonhuman animals from property to persons. The Nonhuman Rights Project NhRP founded by Steven Wise, has filed a series of cases in the New York courts seeking to establish legal personhood for particular chimpanzees being held in the state, with the goal of protecting their rights to bodily integrity and liberty, and allow them to seek remedy, through their proxies, when those rights are violated. Chimpanzees are a good test case for establishing nonhuman legal personhood as they are, according to the documents filed by NhRP, autonomous beings with sophisticated cognitive abilities including episodic memory, self-consciousness, self-knowing, self agency, referential and intentional communication, mental time-travel, numerosity, sequential learning, meditational learning, mental state modeling, visual perspective taking, understanding the experiences of others, intentional action, planning, imagination, empathy, metacognition, working memory, decision-making, imitation, deferred imitation, emulation, innovation, material, social, and symbolic culture, cross-modal perception, tool-use, tool-making, cause-and-effect. Turning to empirical work designed to show that other animals are really similar to those considered legal persons, primatologists submitted affidavits attesting to what they have learned working with chimpanzees. Mary Lee Jensvold suggests there are numerous parallels in the way chimpanzee and human communication skills develop over time, suggesting a similar unfolding cognitive process across the two species and an underlying neurobiological continuity. Autonoetic consciousness gives an individual of any species an autobiographical sense of it self with a future and a past. Chimps and other great apes clearly possess an autobiographical self, as they are able to prepare themselves for future actionsâ€”they likely can, just as humans, be in pain over an anticipated future event that has yet to occur. For instance, confining someone in a prison or cage for a set time, or for life, would lose much of its power as punishment if that individual had no self-concept. Every moment would be a new moment with no conscious relation to the next. Our lives can go better or worse for us. Utilitarians have traditionally argued that the truly morally important feature of beings is unappreciated when we focus on personhood or the rational, self-reflective nature of humans, or the relation a being stands in to such nature, or being the subject of a life, or being legal persons. What is really important, utilitarians maintain, is the promotion of happiness, or pleasure, or the satisfaction of interests, and the avoidance of pain, or suffering, or frustration of interests. Bentham, one of the more forceful defenders of this sentientist view of moral considerability, famously wrote: Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the ossacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse? Any being that has an interest in not suffering deserves to have that interest taken into account. And a non-human who acts to avoid pain can be thought to have just such an interest. Even contemporary Kantians have

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acknowledged the moral force of the experience of pain. When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. And you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a person.

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## Chapter 2 : Animals and Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*The Lives of Animals Homework Help Questions. What are the themes of The Lives of Animals? The Lives of Animals, by the South African novelist J.M. Coetzee, is a philosophical short novel.*

**Indirect Theories** On indirect theories, animals do not warrant our moral concern on their own, but may warrant concern only in so far as they are appropriately related to human beings. The implications these sorts of theories have for the proper treatment of animals will be explored after that. Finally, two common methods of arguing against indirect theories will be discussed. One of the earliest and clearest expressions of this kind of view comes to us from Aristotle. According to Aristotle, there is a natural hierarchy of living beings. The different levels are determined by the abilities present in the beings due to their natures. While plants, animals, and human beings are all capable of taking in nutrition and growing, only animals and human beings are capable of conscious experience. This means that plants, being inferior to animals and human beings, have the function of serving the needs of animals and human beings. Likewise, human beings are superior to animals because human beings have the capacity for using reason to guide their conduct, while animals lack this ability and must instead rely on instinct. It follows, therefore, that the function of animals is to serve the needs of human beings. This, according to Aristotle, is "natural and expedient." Regan and Singer, Following Aristotle, the Christian philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas argues that since only beings that are rational are capable of determining their actions, they are the only beings towards which we should extend concern "for their own sakes." Regan and Singer, Aquinas believes that if a being cannot direct its own actions then others must do so; these sorts of beings are merely instruments. Instruments exist for the sake of people that use them, not for their own sake. Since animals cannot direct their own actions, they are merely instruments and exist for the sake of the human beings that direct their actions. Aquinas believes that his view follows from the fact that God is the last end of the universe, and that it is only by using the human intellect that one can gain knowledge and understanding of God. Since only human beings are capable of achieving this final end, all other beings exist for the sake of human beings and their achievement of this final end of the universe. Remnants of these sorts of views remain in justifications for discounting the interests of animals on the basis of the food chain. On this line of thought, if one kind of being regularly eats another kind of being, then the first is said to be higher on the food chain. If one being is higher than another on the food chain, then it is natural for that being to use the other in the furtherance of its interests. Since this sort of behavior is natural, it does not require any further moral justification. Kant developed a highly influential moral theory according to which autonomy is a necessary property to be the kind of being whose interests are to count directly in the moral assessment of actions. According to Kant, morally permissible actions are those actions that could be willed by all rational individuals in the circumstances. While both animals and human beings have desires that can compel them to action, only human beings are capable of standing back from their desires and choosing which course of action to take. This ability is manifested by our wills. Since animals lack this ability, they lack a will, and therefore are not autonomous. According to Kant, the only thing with any intrinsic value is a good will. Since animals have no wills at all, they cannot have good wills; they therefore do not have any intrinsic value. Rather than simply relying on the fact that it is "natural" for rational and autonomous beings to use non-rational beings as they see fit, Kant instead provides an argument for the relevance of rationality and autonomy. A theory is a Kantian theory, then, if it provides an account of the properties that human beings have and animals lack that warrants our according human beings a very strong moral status while denying animals any kind of moral status at all. **Cartesian Theories** Another reason to deny that animals deserve direct concern arises from the belief that animals are not conscious, and therefore have no interests or well-being to take into consideration when considering the effects of our actions. However, since they lack a welfare, there is nothing to take directly into account when acting. One of the clearest and most forceful denials of animal consciousness is developed by Rene Descartes, who argues that animals are automata that might act as if they

are conscious, but really are not so Regan and Singer, Writing during the time when a mechanistic view of the natural world was replacing the Aristotelian conception, Descartes believed that all of animal behavior could be explained in purely mechanistic terms, and that no reference to conscious episodes was required for such an explanation. Since it is possible to explain animal behavior without reference to inner episodes of awareness, doing so is simpler than relying on the assumption that animals are conscious, and is therefore the preferred explanation. Descartes anticipates the response that his reasoning, if applicable to animal behavior, should apply equally well to human behavior. The mechanistic explanation of behavior does not apply to human beings, according to Descartes, for two reasons. First, human beings are capable of complex and novel behavior. This behavior is not the result of simple responses to stimuli, but is instead the result of our reasoning about the world as we perceive it. Second, human beings are capable of the kind of speech that expresses thoughts. Only human beings can engage in the kind of speech that is spontaneous and expresses thoughts. According to Descartes, there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive kinds of entities or properties: Although all people are closely associated with physical bodies, they are not identical with their bodies. Rather, they are identical with their souls, or the immaterial, mental substance that constitutes their consciousness. Descartes believed that both the complexity of human behavior and human speech requires the positing of such an immaterial substance in order to be explained. However, animal behavior does not require this kind of assumption; besides, Descartes argued, "it is more probable that worms and flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all have immortal souls" Regan and Singer, More recently, arguments against animal consciousness have been resurfacing. One method of arguing against the claim that animals are conscious is to point to the flaws of arguments purporting to claim that animals are conscious. For example, Peter Harrison has recently argued that the Argument from Analogy, one of the most common arguments for the claim that animals are conscious, is hopelessly flawed Harrison, The Argument from Analogy relies on the similarities between animals and human beings in order to support the claim that animals are conscious. The similarities usually cited by proponents of this argument are similarities in behavior, similarities in physical structures, and similarities in relative positions on the evolutionary scale. In other words, both human beings and animals respond in the same way when confronted with "pain stimuli"; both animals and human beings have brains, nerves, neurons, endorphins, and other structures; and both human beings and animals are relatively close to each other on the evolutionary scale. Since they are similar to each other in these ways, we have good reason to believe that animals are conscious, just as are human beings. Harrison attacks these points one by one. He points out that so-called pain-behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for the experience of pain. It is not necessary because the best policy in some instances might be to not show that you are in pain. It is not sufficient since amoebas engage in pain behavior, but we do not believe that they can feel pain. Likewise, we could easily program robots to engage in pain-behavior, but we would not conclude that they feel pain. The similarity of animal and human physical structures is inconclusive because we have no idea how, or even if, the physical structure of human beings gives rise to experiences in the first place. Evolutionary considerations are not conclusive either, because it is only pain behavior, and not the experience of pain itself, that would be advantageous in the struggle for survival. Harrison concludes that since the strongest argument for the claim that animals are conscious fails, we should not believe that they are conscious. Peter Carruthers has suggested that there is another reason to doubt that animals are conscious Carruthers, , Carruthers begins by noting that not all human experiences are conscious experiences. For example, I may be thinking of an upcoming conference while driving and not ever consciously "see" the truck in the road that I swerve to avoid. Likewise, patients that suffer from "blindsight" in part of their visual field have no conscious experience of seeing anything in that part of the field. However, there must be some kind of experience in both of these cases since I did swerve to avoid the truck, and must have "seen" it, and because blindsight patients can catch objects that are thrown at them in the blindsighted area with a relatively high frequency. Carruthers then notes that the difference between conscious and non-conscious experiences is that conscious experiences are available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious experiences are not. A

higher-order thought is a thought that can take as its object another thought. He thus concludes that in order to have conscious experiences one must be able to have higher-order thoughts. However, we have no reason to believe that animals have higher-order thoughts, and thus no reason to believe that they are conscious.

**Contractualist Theories** Contractualist Theories of morality construe morality to be the set of rules that rational individuals would choose under certain specified conditions to govern their behavior in society. In that work, Rawls argues for a conception of justice as fairness. Arguing against Utilitarian theories of justice, Rawls believes that the best conception of a just society is one in which the rules governing that society are rules that would be chosen by individuals from behind a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance is a hypothetical situation in which individuals do not know any particular details about themselves, such as their sex, age, race, intelligence, abilities, etc. However, these individuals do know general facts about human society, such as facts about psychology, economics, human motivation, etc. Since they do not know who exactly they are, they will not choose rules that benefit any one individual, or segment of society, over another since they may find themselves to be in the harmed group. Instead, they will choose rules that protect, first and foremost, rational, autonomous individuals. Although Rawls argues for this conception as a conception of justice, others have tried to extend it to cover all of morality. Since the contractors are self-interested, but do not know who they are, they will accept rules that protect rational individuals. However, the contractors know enough about themselves to know that they are not animals. They will not adopt rules that give special protection to animals, therefore, since this would not further their self-interest. The result is that rational human beings will be directly protected, while animals will not.

**Implications for the Treatment of Animals** If indirect theories are correct, then we are not required to take the interests of animals to be directly relevant to the assessment of our actions when we are deciding how to act. This does not mean, however, that we are not required to consider how our actions will affect animals at all. Just because something is not directly morally considerable does not imply that we can do whatever we want to it. For example, there are two straightforward ways in which restrictions regarding the proper treatment of animals can come into existence. Consider the duties we have towards private property. I cannot destroy your car if I desire to do so because it is your property, and by harming it I will thereby harm you. Also, I cannot go to the town square and destroy an old tree for fun since this may upset many people that care for the tree. Likewise, duties with regard to animals can exist for these reasons. I cannot harm your pets because they belong to you, and by harming them I will thereby harm you. I also cannot harm animals in public simply for fun since doing so will upset many people, and I have a duty to not cause people undue distress. These are two straightforward ways in which indirect theories will generate duties with regard to animals. There are two other ways that even stronger restrictions regarding the proper treatment of animals might be generated from indirect theories. First, both Immanuel Kant and Peter Carruthers argue that there can be more extensive indirect duties to animals. These duties extend not simply to the duty to refrain from harming the property of others and the duty to not offend animal lovers. Rather, we also have a duty to refrain from being cruel to them. Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity.

## Chapter 3 : The Lives of Animals - Wikipedia

*The Moral Lives of Animals Sep 15, From Aristotle and Kant to Hume and Darwin, philosophers and scientists have long denied the idea that animals are capable of acting for moral reasons.*

Diamond begins with a descriptive account of a poem by Ted Hughes, "Six Young Men", wherein the speaker describes a photo of six smiling young men seated in a familiar spot. This is the difficulty of reality with which Diamond is concerned. Then, drawing on the theme of deflection in the work of Stanley Cavell, Diamond questions what philosophy can say of these experiences. But can philosophy practice itself without deflection? He McDowell rehearses his own peculiar methods of resolution, which come through in performance not by way of unfolding new and grand systems in place of the old, but by attention to the delicate and the situation of obstacles that still, and have stilled, our flow of thought. According to McDowell, Cavell, in his own obtrusive way, "does not do justice to the wonderful way Diamond has found to throw light on Cavellian themes". And yet, his vision is never hazy after a jump. He focuses, illuminates something the foregoing authors had missed in each other, and re-says in order to be faithful to them. He seems to capture, in his somewhat deliberate performance, the ordinary that had gone out of the world. The essays collected here are not overly-technical i. This is a book I can This is a thought-provoking, slim, gem of a book on the questions of animal life and philosophical thinking about animal life. This is a book I can see coming back to again and again for its ability to trouble my own thinking about nonhuman animals. When I reflect on my own actions and responses, I see that I occasionally do something good for some other people who are far from m "Is there any difficulty in seeing why we should not prefer to return to moral debate, in which the livingness and death of animals enter as facts that we treat as relevant in this or that way, not as presences that may unseat our reason? When I reflect on my own actions and responses, I see that I occasionally do something good for some other people who are far from my circle of friends, family, or even countrymen, and perhaps beyond the call of any common duty. But I do not do so because they have interests or because I respect their interests or because they are sentient--nor because they have rights. I often do not understand why I do it. It is partly what I have been trained to do, and childhood training does not readily wear off. It is also something else, a certain kind of sharing, of sympathy between myself and another, what Hume claimed was the basis of moral action. The title is misleading. The essays are, rather, about our relation to death, the world, and each other, about skepticism, and about the limitations of logical argument, particularly its ethical limitations; they are also about the other essays, since each is twined argumentatively with the other. As Wolfe argues, Diamond differs from Derrida on at least one chief point, viz. As is well known, Derrida discovers in this relation an analog--or another manifestation--of the relation to language, to our name, and to other iterable operations whose finitude is always beyond us. For Derrida, then, our relationship is to the impossibility itself. This particular essay, however, is about the limits of thoughts and the limitations of philosophy in the face of our mutual vulnerability. She sees our reliance on argumentation as a way we may make unavailable to ourselves our own sense of what it is to be a living animal" The problem is probably mine, but I got very little from Cavell whose essay is less about animals than it is about guilt and McDowell whose contribution, if I read it correctly, devotes itself to enumerating the ways Cavell gets Diamond wrong. The Ian Hacking, however, is a triumph. He argues, above all, for the wonderousness of reality, and, in this reminder of the non-linguistic nature of reality, accords implicitly with phenomenology which makes, by the way, no appearance in this volume, which is, throughout, largely innocent of the "continental" contributions to the animal question. Information, pace Cavell, matters: Coetzee realizes that flesh comes from living animals; Hacking realizes that commercially farmed turkeys cannot breed naturally for more on human surveillance of animal sexuality, see the article on the Missiplicity Project in Representing Animals , that Harvard breeds copyrighted mice whose particularity is their susceptibility to cancer , and that a slaughterhouse is successful if only 1 in 4 animals requires electric shock to move forward to its death. It did not add much to my store of

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grisly facts about meat packing. But I experienced it strongly. We now need to torture only one beast in four before it is killed"

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## Chapter 4 : BBC - Ethics - Animal ethics: Animal rights

*The Nobel-prize winner's novella, *The Lives of Animals*, is a central text for literary theorists working in the field of animal studies. The book was originally written as the novelist's contribution to the Tanner Lectures at Princeton in*

They are not only in the world, they are aware of it. What happens to them matters to them. Each has a life that fares better or worse for the one whose life it is. That life includes a variety of biological, individual, and social needs. The satisfaction of these needs is a source of pleasure, their frustration or abuse, a source of pain. In these fundamental ways, the nonhuman animals in labs and on farms, for example, are the same as human beings. And so it is that the ethics of our dealings with them, and with one another, must acknowledge the same fundamental moral principles. At its deepest level, human ethics is based on the independent value of the individual: The moral worth of any one human being is not to be measured by how useful that person is in advancing the interest of other human beings. To treat human beings in ways that do not honor their independent value is to violate that most basic of human rights: The philosophy of animal rights demands only that logic be respected. For any argument that plausibly explains the independent value of human beings implies that other animals have this same value, and have it equally. And any argument that plausibly explains the right of humans to be treated with respect, also implies that these other animals have this same right, and have it equally, too. It is true, therefore, that women do not exist to serve men, blacks to serve whites, the poor to serve the rich, or the weak to serve the strong. The philosophy of animal rights not only accepts these truths, it insists upon and justifies them. But this philosophy goes further. By insisting upon and justifying the independent value and rights of other animals, it gives scientifically informed and morally impartial reasons for denying that these animals exist to serve us. Once this truth is acknowledged, it is easy to understand why the philosophy of animal rights is uncompromising in its response to each and every injustice other animals are made to suffer. It is not larger, cleaner cages that justice demands in the case of animals used in science, for example, but empty cages: For when an injustice is absolute, one must oppose it absolutely. It was not "reformed" slavery that justice demanded, not "re-formed" child labor, not "reformed" subjugation of women. In each of these cases, abolition was the only moral answer. Merely to reform injustice is to prolong injustice. The philosophy of animal rights demands this same answer-- abolition--in response to the unjust exploitation of other animals. It is not the details of unjust exploitation that must be changed. It is the unjust exploitation itself that must be ended, whether on the farm, in the lab, or among the wild, for example. The philosophy of animal rights asks for nothing more, but neither will it be satisfied with anything less. The philosophy of animal rights is rational Explanation: It is not rational to discriminate arbitrarily. And discrimination against nonhuman animals is arbitrary. It is wrong to treat weaker human beings, especially those who are lacking in normal human intelligence, as "tools" or "renewable resources" or "models" or "commodities. To think otherwise is irrational. The philosophy of animal rights is scientific Explanation: The philosophy of animal rights is respectful of our best science in general and evolutionary biology in particular. This is no fantasy, this is fact, proven by our best science. The philosophy of animal rights is unprejudiced Explanation: Racists are people who think that the members of their race are superior to the members of other races simply because the former belong to their the "superior" race. Sexists believe that the members of their sex are superior to the members of the opposite sex simply because the former belong to their the "superior" sex. Both racism and sexism are paradigms of unsupportable bigotry. There is no "superior" or "inferior" sex or race. Racial and sexual differences are biological, not moral, differences. For there is no "superior" species. To think otherwise is to be no less prejudiced than racists or sexists. I cannot justify either one. The philosophy of animal rights is just Explanation: Justice is the highest principle of ethics. We are not to commit or permit injustice so that good may come, not to violate the rights of the few so that the many might benefit. Child labor allowed this. Most examples of social injustice allow this. But not the philosophy of animal rights, whose highest principle is that of justice: The philosophy of animal rights is compassionate Explanation: A full human life demands

feelings of empathy and sympathy -- in a word, compassion -- for the victims of injustice -- whether the victims are humans or other animals. The philosophy of animal rights calls for, and its acceptance fosters the growth of, the virtue of compassion. The philosophy of animal rights is unselfish Explanation: The philosophy of animal rights demands a commitment to serve those who are weak and vulnerable -- those who, whether they are humans or other animals, lack the ability to speak for or defend themselves, and who are in need of protection against human greed and callousness. This philosophy requires this commitment, not because it is in our self-interest to give it, but because it is right to do so. This philosophy therefore calls for, and its acceptance fosters the growth of, unselfish service. The philosophy of animal rights is individually fulfilling Explanation: All the great traditions in ethics, both secular and religious, emphasize the importance of four things: The philosophy of animal rights is no exception. This philosophy teaches that our choices should be based on knowledge, should be expressive of compassion and justice, and should be freely made. It is not easy to achieve these virtues, or to control the human inclinations toward greed and indifference. But a whole human life is impossible without them. The philosophy of animal rights both calls for, and its acceptance fosters the growth of, individual self-fulfillment. The philosophy of animal rights is socially progressive. The greatest impediment to the flourishing of human society is the exploitation of other animals at human hands. This is true in the case of unhealthy diets, of the habitual reliance on the "whole animal model" in science, and of the many other forms animal exploitation takes. And it is no less true of education and advertising, for example, which help deaden the human psyche to the demands of reason, impartiality, compassion, and justice. In all these ways and more, nations remain profoundly backward because they fail to serve the true interests of their citizens. The philosophy of animal rights is environmentally wise. The major cause of environmental degradation, including the greenhouse effect, water pollution, and the loss both of arable land and top soil, for example, can be traced to the exploitation of animals. This same pattern exists throughout the broad range of environmental problems, from acid rain and ocean dumping of toxic wastes, to air pollution and the destruction of natural habitat. In all these cases, to act to protect the affected animals who are, after all, the first to suffer and die from these environmental ills, is to act to protect the earth. The philosophy of animal rights is peace-loving. The fundamental demand of the philosophy of animal rights is to treat humans and other animals with respect. To do this requires that we not harm anyone just so that we ourselves or others might benefit. This philosophy therefore is totally opposed to military aggression. It is a philosophy of peace. But it is a philosophy that extends the demand for peace beyond the boundaries of our species. For there is a war being waged, every day, against countless millions of nonhuman animals. To stand truly for peace is to stand firmly against speciesism. It is wishful thinking to believe that there can be "peace in the world" if we fail to bring peace to our dealings with other animals. That is the way of a whole human being.

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## Chapter 5 : Animal Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*Interest in the intimate lives of animals has waxed and waned throughout the history of western thought. Now, philosophers Leon Niemoczynski and Stephanie Theodorou want to make amends with a.*

Brief Summary of Philosophy and Animals Alissa Branham By Jebulon Own work [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons Contemporary animal rights and animal welfare advocates often make use of philosophers in the articulation and advancement of their movement. The works of Immanuel Kant an eighteenth-century philosopher and John Stuart Mill a nineteenth-century philosopher have been used more substantively in animal advocacy movements, though. He believed that in any given situation the right action would be the action that tended to minimize the suffering and pain, and maximize the pleasure and happiness, of all interested parties. He further thought that the suffering, pain, pleasure and happiness of animals should be included in this calculus. Another philosopher often discussed within animal advocacy movements is Immanuel Kant. Kant himself did not think that we had any direct ethical duties to animals. He believed that the only reason we should avoid being cruel to animals is that in doing so we might develop cruel habits that we would inflict on other people. According to Kant, we only owe ethical duties to rational beings, and animals are not included in that group. Kant posited that rational beings have inviolable rights, owed to them because of their rational nature, and that each must be treated as an end in herself. Animal rights advocates often argue that animals too have these sort of rights, and that they should never be sacrificed under the auspices of the greater good, either as food or as the subjects of medical experimentation. Overview of Animals and Philosophy Alissa Branham While Western philosophy has not historically been concerned with animal rights or animal welfare, it has more recently become an important part of animal advocacy conversations and movements. While contemporary animal advocates have voiced concerns with the ways in which each of these figures dealt with animals in their works, many advocates have also found these thinkers to be helpful in defining our ethical relationship to animals. In this overview of the topic, the views of each of these thinkers and their place in contemporary animal welfare and rights movements will be briefly set out. That is to say, Descartes is almost invariably set up as a philosophical villain in discussions of animal rights--and understandably so. Descartes was a dualist, which is to say, he believed that humans are composed of two separate substances: Sensations, like the sensation of pain, are only possible in beings that are composed of both mind and body because sensations emerge from the commingling of these two substances. Animals, according to Descartes, are, however, composed of only one of the two substances: Hence animals are sophisticated machines that are capable of making the physical motions and grimaces that would in humans accompany the sensation of pain; but, possessing no minds themselves, animals are incapable of possessing the accompanying sensation. While it does not necessarily follow from the proposition that animals cannot experience pain and do not possess minds that we have no ethical duties to them, it does make for a difficult starting position. The obvious objection, however, is that if neither a dog nor a rug has any sensation, then beating a dog should be no more likely to desensitize one to human pain than would beating a rug to get the dust out of it. After all, if you are not inflicting pain on the dog, how could beating it be more likely to cause you to hurt another person than chopping down a tree or skipping a stone across water? Consequently, if one adopts the philosophy of mind that Descartes did, it seems especially difficult to take issue with acts upon animals such as scientific experimentation—acts that are done without cruelty and for arguably at least good purpose. And indeed, Descartes did not take issue with scientific experimentation on animals and even vividly depicts vivisection in his work. Immanuel Kant Kantian ethical philosophy has proven attractive to many animal rights advocates, in large part because his ethical theory incorporates the idea that ethical duties owed to a person are absolute ; they cannot be overridden or dismissed based on other circumstances and considerations. Animal rights advocates find this way of thinking about ethical obligations attractive because while many people agree that we have duties and obligations of some sort to animals, they think that these

duties can be trumped by other considerations. For instance, while many people think it is wrong to hurt animals, they concede that hurting animals should be permitted under certain circumstances. For instance, they might think that it is permissible to hurt them for the sake of making clothing and shoes, or at the very least, it is permissible to hurt them to turn them into food or to use them to find cures for human diseases. To establish that animals have inviolable rights would hence offer a great deal of protection to animals, and bar such concessions. Kant himself, however, did not include animals amongst those beings that had these sorts of inviolable rights. He did not therefore maintain that we have any direct ethical duties to animals. Kant held that the basis of such ethical duties was respect for heightened cognitive capabilities—capabilities which animals, he held, do not possess. Some characterize this heightened cognitive capability as self-consciousness. Current animal rights thinker Steven Wise, responding to Kant, argues that some animals do have the level of cognitive ability that Kant demands, and Wise claims that contemporary science can help us to identify which animals those are. In this fashion, Wise hopes to establish that there are some animals to whom we do have direct ethical duties. It should be noted, that while Kant did not believe that we owed ethical duties to animals, he did believe that there are ethical restraints on our treatment of animals based on our ethical duties to ourselves. Granting that animals are capable of feeling pain, and hence are qualitatively different from inanimate objects like rugs, Kant had more resources for making such an argument than a Cartesian would have. Kant argued that we should not be cruel to animals because desensitizing ourselves to causing them pain could make us more insensitive and more likely to inflict pain on other people. He believed that ethical acts are those acts that tend to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. Animals, according to Mill, can experience both pain and pleasure and so they should be taken into consideration in all ethical decisions. Peter Singer, a contemporary philosopher that advocates ethical treatment of animals, famously expounded on the place of animals within a utilitarian framework in his book *Animal Liberation*. While both Mill and Singer would agree that it can be ethically permissible to inflict harm on animals if enough overall happiness would tend to result from that act, Singer adamantly maintains that many of the ways we use animals today are not ethically permissible under utilitarianism given the triviality of the pleasure attained and the great magnitude of the suffering endured.

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## Chapter 6 : The Lives of Animals Summary - theinnatdunvilla.com

*The Lives of Animals is a moral argument within a fictional framework But fiction has the power to disturb and inspire strong emotions, and this book, thoughtfully argued and committed, is certainly a case in point.*

Stephen Mulhall, *The Wounded Animal*: Reviewed by Gerald L. Coetzee was invited to give the annual Tanner Lectures at Princeton University. Hers is a bitter critique of reason as a distancing factor that insulates us against animal suffering. Costello thinks Nagel is just withholding himself and his concepts of subjective experience from the bat. What happens to you when you inhabit the lives of animals in this imaginative fashion? She is, to put it mildly, a difficult case. A later formal debate between Costello and a genial Appleton philosopher on the question of the animal is a study in cross-purposes. Costello cannot make sense of herself in a culture of argument. In general these philosophers not only give the text careful attention, they take up where Coetzee and the original Princeton cast of respondents left off, developing further and even multiplying the aporias and disagreements that Elizabeth Costello put into play. Coetzee himself has added to the mix by expanding *The Lives of Animals* into a novel of sorts, Elizabeth Costello Penguin Books, , in which his heroine continues her travels, to the dismay of nearly everyone whom she encounters, including a Kafkaesque committee guardians of rationality in all their severity who stand athwart the gates of the hereafter. This accumulation of texts and intertexts reads like nothing so much as the case history of a complex system. For which Elizabeth Costello has a well-prepared line: We see her as wounded by this knowledge, this horror, and by the knowledge of how unhaunted others are. The wound marks and isolates her" p. What kind of knowledge is this, and what can philosophy say about it? Not much, it appears. The difficulty, Diamond says, is that such knowledge "pushes us beyond what we can think. Our concepts, our ordinary life with our concepts, pass by this difficulty as if it were not there; the difficulty, if we try to see it, shoulders us out of life, is deadly chilling" p. At all events, for her Costello is a portrait of someone in a condition of undeflected exposure to the world and to others in it -- a true realist. Press, , especially its notorious fourth part, "Between Acknowledgment and Avoidance," which explores among other things the paradoxes of human separateness -- for example, that the humanness of another is not something that I know, but rather something for which I am responsible, which is basically what the idea of acknowledgment comes down to. As Cavell says, "Being human is the power to grant being human. Something about flesh and blood elicits this grant from us, and something about flesh and blood can also repel it. It is not something we know about our pets, or about the birds and squirrels that we feed, that keeps most of us from eating them; it is something about ourselves -- our need for or enjoyment of the company of non-human animals. As a vegetarian, Diamond takes this company to include not just dogs and cats but all non-human animals it is curious, as Barbara Smuts points out, that Elizabeth Costello has little to say about her interest in pets. In his contribution, "Companionable Thinking," Cavell wonders what it is about those of us, in which Cavell includes himself, who are carnivores without compunction. Elizabeth Costello suffers this knowledge all the more deeply because of what she takes to be her own complicity in the fate of non-human animals, namely that she wears leather shoes and carries a leather handbag. Our relation to the difficulty of life is in a state of ongoing negotiation, without whose compromises our humanity would come as it does for Elizabeth Costello at great cost to itself. One might take this to mean that "inordinate knowledge" is the stuff of tragedy, whereas side-stepping, hedging, and splitting the difference are what keep the roguish heroes of comedy on their feet. The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism University of Chicago Press, , where perfectionism is not perfectibility but is rather the reason why the Emersonian is by nature dissatisfied and unsatisfiable, perpetually goaded by an open-ended call to change his or her life. One would think that perfectionism would be one of the difficulties of life, but for Cavell it seems to be the thing that makes life purposeful and even interesting. Our experience of belonging with human others, and hence of being human, is what is "unhinged" when words fail us, as they do Elizabeth Costello, a "wounded animal" whose wound consists precisely in the loss of that which is said to distinguish us from

non-human creatures. To which he adds: The book is in two parts. The first, devoted to *The Lives of Animals* and the various philosophical responses to it, is most importantly an attempt to enlarge our view of what counts as a philosophical argument. Mulhall disagrees with the view that Elizabeth Costello is out of her element in a culture of argument, because hers are "forms of discourse that philosophy need have no qualms about admitting as modes of thought or ways of reflecting about the world, hence as possible ways of meeting its own distinctive burden -- that of acknowledging the claims of reason" p. To appreciate this possibility we need to understand more fully what it means to philosophize by way of examples, a form of thinking traditionally credited to Wittgenstein, and of which both Cavell and Diamond are major exemplars. Consequently, these examples must not be schematic or sketchy, but rather detailed, elaborate, and fully worked out; and it is natural therefore to derive them from the domain of literature, and in particular from classics in the genres of the novel and short stories p. Philosophy needs to be weaned away from its reliance on thought-experiments, which proceed by eliminating the particulars of which, among other things, the difficulties of life are constituted. In addition to his reading of Elizabeth Costello and her difficulties, Mulhall takes up each of her respondents, real and fictional, with whom his agreements and disagreements are often quite subtle, but mainly he is interested in how far they are willing to read *The Lives of Animals* as a work that tests -- and extends -- the limits of philosophical thinking. The apes after all did not respond to her as a primatologist doing field work but as a fellow creature. Oddly Mulhall draws his conception of modernism from the art historian, Michael Fried, whose interests are in painting rather than in literature. Fried is someone whom I would call a conservative theorist for whom the modernist foregrounds the artifice of his or her work without as Mulhall puts it giving up on the idea that the work "gives us access to important and valuable truths about the human experience of the world" p. A more radical modernist would be the artist whom Adorno takes up in his *Aesthetic Theory*, namely someone whose aim is "to make things of which we do not know what they are" trans. University of Minnesota Press, ], p. However, like Kafka although Brecht would be a better example Coetzee breaks the realistic frame of the fiction, particularly in Elizabeth Costello, sufficiently to defeat our absorption in it, since what he is after is like Brecht to put us in a critical frame of mind. In *The Claim of Reason* pp. My body or, as Cavell sometimes puts it, my flesh is just what I am. Elizabeth Costello seems to share this way of thinking. Disembodied concepts and arguments -- concepts and arguments detached or detachable from the one who professes them -- are for her without force. Likewise the writing of fiction is a matter of inhabiting not just lives and experiences but the bodies of non-existent beings. She goes so far as to claim that she can imagine herself as a corpse. The body soma is a Greek and heroic concept: Flesh is for eating and being eaten. Its distinctive feature is the wound which, perhaps until now with the volumes we have here, does not appear to have ever been a subject for philosophy.

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## Chapter 7 : The Philosophy of Animal Rights, by Tom Regan

*The Lives of Animals Questions and Answers. The Question and Answer section for The Lives of Animals is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.*

Despite her stature as a celebrated novelist much like Coetzee, she opts not to give lectures on literature or writing, but on animal cruelty. Costello makes the point that, just as residents in the neighborhoods of the death camps knew what was happening at the camps, but chose to turn a blind eye, so it is common practice today for otherwise respectable members of society to turn a blind eye to industries that bring pain and death to animals. This turns out to be the most controversial thing that Costello says during her visit, and it causes a Jewish professor of the college to boycott the dinner held in her honor. In her first lecture, Costello also moves to reject reason as the preeminent quality that separates humans from animals and allows humans to treat animals as less than the equals of humans. She proposes that reason might simply be a species specific trait, "the specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition Her argument rests on the fact that, while science cannot prove that animals do abstract thinking, it also cannot prove that they do not. In support of this argument, Costello summarizes an ape experiment that was conducted in the s by Wolfgang Kohler. The principal player in the experiment was an ape named Sultan who was variously deprived of his bananas until he reasoned his way into obtaining them. Faced with the challenge of stacking several crates into a makeshift ladder, in order to reach the bananas that have been suspended above his reach, Sultan succeeds in demonstrating this elementary form of reasoning. The experiment, Costello objects, ignores any emotional hurt or confusion that the ape might be experiencing in favor of concentrating on what is, after all, a very elemental task. The ape might be thinking about the human who has constructed these tests: This is not a point of view shared by individual animals, all of whom will fight for their individual survival, she argues. Non-western cultures can, with justice, argue that their cultural and moral values are different and do not require them to observe the same respect for animals mandated by Western animals rights activists. To this assertion, Costello responds that "kindness to animals And she notes that children enjoy a particular closeness to animals: In response, Costello more or less restates her skepticism about the value of animal experiments. She refers to such experiments as "profoundly anthropocentric" and "imbecile. As an example, he uses the bat. Then she, once again, rejects reason as a valid basis for the animal rights argument, concluding that, if reason is all she shares with her philosophical opponents, then she has no use for it. Instead, Coetzee has, Peter asserts, hidden behind the veil of fiction and the alter ego of Elizabeth Costello and so has not fully committed himself to any particular animal rights platform. She goes on to suggest that Peter use the same fictional narrative device to respond to the Costello lecture. When have I ever written fiction? She talks about the Hindu prohibition on harming animals and argues that compassion for animals can be found in many non-Western cultures throughout history. Smuts starts her reflection noting that, as a lonely old woman, Costello is likely to live with cats. But Costello never mentions any personal relationship with animals. What she found was that she learned a great deal from the specialized knowledge of the animals. Specifically, they taught her how to find her way through the jungle without running amok of "poisonous snakes, irascible buffalo, aggressive bees, and leg-breaking pig-holes. As an example, she tells the story of visiting gorilla scientist Dian Fossey, and being hugged by a teenage gorilla. When she returned to civilization, Smuts adopted a rescue dog whom she named Safi. As an experiment, Smuts refrained from any traditional training of her animals, preferring to talk to her dog and make accommodations. She allows her dog the free use of its own toys, and her dog guards her when she takes a nap in the woods. Genre[ edit ] The Lives of Animals straddles the boundary between essay and fiction. Bernard Morris, writing in the Harvard Review, called it "part fiction, part philosophical discourse, wholly human and absorbing. Also making the book difficult to classify is its mixture of fiction, science and essay writing. Princeton University Press, Coetzee, Harvard Review, 18, Spring, pp.

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## Chapter 8 : Sentience - Wikipedia

*LECTURE I. THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THE ANIMALS* He is waiting at the gate when her flight comes in. Two years [COETZEE] *The Lives of Animals* he was a child, that.

First, if philosophy often begins with questions about the place of humans in nature, one way humans have attempted to locate themselves is by comparison and contrast with those things in nature most similar to themselves, i. At least in the West, the traditional “and perhaps still intuitive to many people” way of thinking about consciousness is as primarily an innate endowment of humans, which other animals may or may not share in virtue of being sufficiently like us. Within the traditional Biblical cosmology, while all animals were said to have arisen through divine intentional creation, humans were the only ones created in the likeness of the deity, and thus enjoyed a special, privileged role in the intended workings of the cosmos “including, for example, access to an eternal afterlife not overpopulated with fleas, ants and snails. See Lewis, Ch 9 for an in-depth treatment of the problem of animal consciousness in relation to Christian theology. However, within a modern biological worldview, while humans may be unique in certain perhaps quite important respects, we are only one species of animal among many “one tip of one branch of the phylogenetic tree of life, and enjoy no particular special status. From an evolutionary perspective, consciousness is a trait that some animals have at least humans have it. Is it a late evolved, narrowly distributed trait, or an older more broadly shared trait? And, did it evolve only once, or a number of times independently? In reality, rabbits are more closely related to humans than they are to bats Nishihara et al. Of course, it is consistent with an evolutionary perspective that humans are the only conscious animals. This would imply that consciousness was acquired through a recent evolutionary event that occurred since the split of our ancestral lineage from that of our closest non-human relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos see section 6 for discussion of such hypotheses. But such a view requires support; though perhaps intuitive to some, its choice as a default position is arbitrary. See article on the Moral Status of Animals. Many billions of animals are slaughtered every year for food, use in research, and other human purposes. Moreover, before their deaths, many “perhaps most” of these animals are subject to conditions of life that, if they are in fact experienced by the animals in anything like the way a human would experience them, amount to cruelty. Arguments that non-human animals are not conscious therefore effectively double as apologetics for our treatment of animals. When the question of animal consciousness is under consideration, our guilt or innocence as a civilization for an enormous body of cruelty may hang in the balance. However, some philosophers have argued that consciousness per se does not matter for the treatment of animals, and therefore either that a even if animals are not conscious, they may deserve moral consideration, or b even if animals are conscious, they may not deserve moral consideration. For more discussion of the ethical issues, see Singer []; Regan ; Rollin ; Varner , ; Steiner Third, while theories of consciousness are frequently developed without special regard to questions about animal consciousness, the plausibility of such theories has sometimes been assessed against the results of their application to animal consciousness and, similarly, to human infants. This raises questions about the relative epistemic weight of theoretical considerations e. For example, Searle argues that our intuitive, commonsense attributions of intentional and emotional states to dogs carries more epistemic weight than philosophically motivated skeptical concerns. In contrast, Carruthers asserts that his own arguments that nonhuman animals even dogs lack consciousness are sufficiently weighty that we are morally obligated to eradicate or ignore our sympathetic feelings toward such creatures. Should our theories of consciousness be constrained by our intuitive attributions of consciousness to animals or, e. Fourth, the problem of determining whether animals are conscious stretches the limits of knowledge and scientific methodology beyond the breaking point, according to some. The philosophical issues surrounding the interpretation of experiments to investigate perception, learning, categorization, memory, spatial cognition, numerosity, communication, language, social cognition, theory of mind, causal reasoning, and metacognition

in animals are discussed in the entry on animal cognition. Despite this work on cognition, the topic of consciousness per se in animals has remained controversial, even taboo, among many scientists, while other scientists from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds e. While language may allow humans to cross this supposed gap by communicating their experience to others, this is allegedly not possible for other animals. Despite the controversy in philosophical and scientific circles, it remains a matter of common sense to most people that some animals do have conscious experiences. Most people, if asked why they think familiar animals such as their pets are conscious, would point to similarities between the behavior of those animals and human behavior – for example, animals seem to visibly express pleasure and displeasure and a variety of emotions, their behavior seems to be motivated by seeking food, comfort, social contact, etc. Similarity arguments for animal consciousness thus have roots in common sense observations. But they may also be bolstered by scientific investigations of behavior and the comparative study of brain anatomy and physiology, as well as considerations of evolutionary continuity between species. Neurological similarities between humans and other animals have been taken to suggest commonality of conscious experience; all mammals share the same basic brain anatomy, and much is shared with vertebrates more generally. Even structurally different brains may be neurodynamically similar in ways that enable inferences about animal consciousness to be drawn Seth et al. As well as generic arguments about the connections among consciousness, neural activity, and behavior, a considerable amount of scientific research directed towards understanding particular conscious states uses animals as proxies for humans. The reactions of many animals, particularly other mammals, to bodily events that humans would report as painful are easily and automatically recognized by most people as pain responses. High-pitched vocalizations, fear responses, nursing of injuries, and learned avoidance are among the responses to noxious stimuli that are all part of the common mammalian heritage, and similar responses are also observable in organisms from a wide range of taxonomic groups see section 7. Much of the research that is of direct relevance to the treatment of human pain, including on the efficacy of analgesics and anesthetics, is conducted on rats and other animals. The validity of this research depends on the similar mechanisms involved[ 1 ] and to many it seems arbitrary to deny that injured rats, who respond well to opiates for example, feel pain. Scientific demonstrations that members of other species, even of other phyla, are susceptible to the same visual illusions as we are e. It is often argued that the use of animals to model neuropsychiatric disorders presupposes convergence of emotional and other conscious states and further refinements of those models may strengthen the argument for attributing such states to animals. Even when bolstered by evolutionary considerations of continuity between the species, the arguments are vulnerable, for the mere fact that humans have a trait does not entail that our closest relatives must have that trait too. There is no inconsistency with evolutionary continuity to maintain that only humans have the capacity to learn to play chess. Perhaps a combination of behavioral, physiological and morphological similarities with evolutionary theory amounts to a stronger overall case[ 3 ]. However, a convincing argument will likely also require motivation in terms of a well developed theory of the structure and function of consciousness as a cognitive process – a route that many recent participants in the debate on animal consciousness have pursued see section 6. Nevertheless, several useful distinctions among different notions of consciousness have been made, and with the help of these distinctions it is possible to gain some clarity on the important questions that remain about animal consciousness. Two ordinary senses of consciousness which are not in dispute when applied to animals are the sense of consciousness involved when a creature is awake rather than asleep[ 4 ], or in a coma, and the sense of consciousness implicated in the basic ability of organisms to perceive and thereby respond to selected features of their environments, thus making them conscious or aware of those features. Consciousness in both these senses is identifiable in organisms belonging to a wide variety of taxonomic groups see, e. A third, more technical notion of consciousness, access consciousness, has been introduced by Block to capture the sense in which mental representations may be poised for use in rational control of action or speech. Block believes that many animals possess access consciousness speech is not a requirement. Indeed, some of the neurological evidence cited by Block in support of the global workspace is derived from monkeys. But clearly

an author such as Descartes, who, we will see, denied speech, language, and rationality to animals, would also deny access consciousness to them. Those who follow Davidson in denying intentional states to animals would likely concur. There are two remaining senses of consciousness that cause more controversy when applied to animals: Phenomenal consciousness refers to the qualitative, subjective, experiential, or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience, sometimes identified with qualia. Nagel disputes our capacity to know, imagine, or describe in scientific objective terms what it is like to be a bat, but he assumes that there is something it is like. Such theories will be discussed below, in sections 5 and 6. This list is far from exhaustive, and further, each listed notion is subject to further disambiguation. Hence, although on many theories self-consciousness is tightly related to phenomenal consciousness, proposals to this effect can vary greatly in their meaning and their implications for which animals might be conscious. It would be anachronistic to read ideas about consciousness from today back into the ancient literature. Aristotle asserted that only humans had rational souls, while the locomotive souls shared by all animals, human and nonhuman, endowed animals with instincts suited to their successful reproduction and survival. The argument about what is reasoning, and whether animals display it, remains with us 25 centuries later, as evidenced by the volume *Rational Animals?* Although his conception of animals treated them as reflex-driven machines, with no intellectual capacities, it is important to recognize that he took mechanistic explanation to be perfectly adequate for explaining sensation and perception aspects of animal behavior that are nowadays often associated with consciousness. He drew the line only at rational thought and understanding. Nevertheless, it may be a mistake to assimilate the two. First, a number of authors before and after Darwin have believed that conscious experience can accompany instinctive and reflexive actions. Second, the dependence of phenomenal consciousness on rational, self-reflective thought is a particularly strong and contentious claim although it has current defenders, discussed below. Although the roots of careful observation and experimentation of the natural world go back to ancient times, study of animal behavior remained largely anecdotal until long after the scientific revolution. Animals were, of course, widely used in pursuit of answers to anatomical, physiological, and embryological questions. Vivisection was carried out by such ancient luminaries as Galen and there was a resurgence of the practice in early modern times Bertoloni Meli Descartes himself practiced and advocated vivisection Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 , and wrote in correspondence that the mechanical understanding of animals absolved people of any guilt for killing and eating animals. Mechanists who followed him e. The idea that animal behavior is purely reflexive may also have served to diminish interest in treating behavior as a target of careful study in its own right. A few glimmers of experimental approaches to animal behavior can be seen in the late 18th century e. In the same vein of instinct vs. He devoted considerable attention in both the *Origin* and in the *Descent of Man* to animal behavior, with the obvious goal of demonstrating mental continuity among the species. Darwin also carried out experiments and was a keen observer, however. In his final work he describes experiments on the flexibility of earthworm behavior in manipulating leaves, which he took to show considerable intelligence Darwin ; see also Crist The idea of behavioral flexibility is central to discussions of animal mind and consciousness. Huxley reported a series of experiments on a frog, showing very similar reflexive behavior even when its spinal cord had been severed, or large portions of its brain removed. He argued that without a brain, the frog could not be conscious, but since it could still do the same sort of things that it could do before, there is no need to assume consciousness even in the presence of the entire brain, going on to argue that consciousness is superfluous. In his *Principles of Psychology* , William James promoted the idea of differing intensities of conscious experience across the animal kingdom, an idea that was echoed by the leading British psychologist of his day, Conwy Lloyd Morgan in his textbook *An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*. Morgan had been very skeptical and critical of the anecdotal approach favored by Darwin and Romanes, but he came around to the Darwinian point of view about mental continuity if not about methodology. The double induction consisted of inductive inferences based on observation of animal behavior combined with introspective knowledge of our own minds. Questions about quite what the canon means and how to justify it are active topics of historical

and philosophical investigation e. It was with the radical anti-mentalism of John B. Watson and B. Skinner , both of whom strongly rejected any attempts to explain animal behavior in terms of unobservable mental states, that American psychology became the science of behavior rather than, as the dictionary would have it, the science of mind and behavior. At the same time, things were progressing rather differently in Europe, where ethological approaches to animal behavior were more dominant. Ethology is part natural history with an emphasis on fieldwork and part experimental science conducted on captive animals, reflecting the different styles of its two seminal figures, Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen see Burkhardt According to Lorenz, it is the investigation of innate behaviors in related species that puts the study of animal behavior on a par with other branches of evolutionary biology, and he demonstrated that it was possible to derive the phylogenetic relations among species by comparing their instinctive behavioral repertoires Lorenz a. In pursuing this direction, Lorenz and Tinbergen explicitly sought to distance ethology from the purposive, mentalistic, animal psychology of Bierens de Haan and the lack of biological concern they detected in American comparative psychology see Brigandt In the s, Donald Griffin, who made his reputation taking careful physical measurements to prove that bats use echolocation, made a considerable splash with his plea for a return to questions about animal minds, especially animal consciousness. Fierce criticism of Griffin emerged both from psychologists and classically trained ethologists. However, the charge of over-interpretation of those results may be harder to avoid. This view is widely although not universally shared by neuroscientists. But such criticisms may have overestimated the dangers of anthropomorphism Fisher and many of the critics themselves rely on claims for which there are scant scientific data e. Whatever the shortfalls of his specific proposals, Griffin played a crucial role in reintroducing explicit discussions of consciousness to the science of animal behavior and cognition, hence paving the way for modern investigations of the distribution and evolutionary origins of consciousness. The topic of consciousness in nonhuman animals has been primarily of epistemological interest to philosophers of mind.

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## Chapter 9 : Philosophy and Animals | Animal Legal & Historical Center

*mans and other animals and the "ancient quarrel" between philosophy and poetry. Indeed, as Ian Hacking notes, with The Lives of Animals Coetzee "shows.*

January 27, Mark H. Reviewed by Bernard Rollin, Colorado State University One of the greatest values inherent in philosophical activity is that it forces a reconsideration of many of the assumptions that we accept as axiomatic and take for granted. This is true throughout the history of philosophy: Parmenides and his disciple Zeno forced us to realize that we thoroughly did not understand the nature of motion by raising questions that remain in some senses still problematic today. Descartes and his mentor, Plato forced us, as against common sense, to question the degree to which sense experience provides a reliable basis for knowledge. Hume showed us that even our knowledge of the self could not be coherently explicated. And such forced re-examination of our assumptions is at least as operative in ethics as it is in metaphysics. In ethics, this process has had innumerable salubrious consequences for society. Massive amounts of non-rationally justifiable forms of exclusion and discrimination directed against other human beings have been rejected after being shown to be morally indefensible. Animal ethics, with some historical exceptions some going back to antiquity, is largely a product of the second half of the twentieth century. We may distinguish even within this short time a variety of approaches. The earliest attempts -- i. Peter Singer, Tom Regan, myself, Steve Sapontzis -- were primarily designed to show that animals deserve inclusion within the moral arena far beyond the traditional Thomistic injunction of avoiding cruelty to them. Various strategies were designed to achieve this result -- utilitarian, Kantian, or in my case, extraction of animal ethics from our social consensus ethic for humans. In the course of our work on moral status for animals, we were inevitably drawn to criticizing current uses. Here there occurred a bifurcation: I in turn believed, along with the great radical activist Henry Spira, that all social revolutions in the history of the United States had proceeded incrementally, and thus was inclined to work towards improving current practices. Bernstein has from the outset been a radical abolitionist. Now that most philosophers believe that animals are deserving of significant moral status, philosophers have engaged in looking at some of the more detailed questions that inevitably arise from this augmented status. Bernstein takes as his task two major questions: If he succeeds in demonstrating that animal interests are no less important than human interests and that animal lives are not worth less than human lives, he has gone a long way towards proving that all of the invasive uses upon which current human life depends -- be they for food and fiber, scientific discovery and advancement, or entertainment -- are patently unjustifiable and indefensible. Roughly the first third of the book is dedicated to the comparative importance of animal interests versus human interests. In a lively and dialectical way, Bernstein examines some of the stock reasons offered in support of the thesis that human interests are morally superior and thus deserve preferential consideration and prioritization in the actions of moral agents. He distinguishes three views of interests: His discussion aims at being valid regardless of which view of interests is considered. Bernstein goes on to consider some of the reasons that have been advanced to support the claim that human interests are of greater concern than those of other beings. After dismissing primitivism, i. Aside from the fact that we do not morally favor humans who have a higher degree of rationality than others, Bernstein points out that it is not the mere capacity that should bestow higher status, but rather its actualization. A being who fails to actualize a capacity is no different from a being lacking that capacity. Further, he argues that belonging to a certain species or kind is not something we are responsible for, or choose; rather it is as if it were bestowed upon us, as a gift from God, and thus we deserve no credit for being of that sort. He sees the situation as very much analogous to being born female or possessed of black skin; nothing in these traits makes us blameworthy and therefore entitled to negative differential treatment of the sort traditionally accorded to those classes. To the claim that we are naturally disposed to favor those of our own species, Bernstein accurately points out that such a presupposition does not make the behavior morally correct. We may well be biologically disposed towards

xenophobia -- that does not in itself morally justify xenophobia. Furthermore, membership in a species does not reside in a rationally chosen sense of common, noble purpose; such membership is more a biological accident than it is constitutive of a laudable *gemeinschaft* supporting such a purpose. To use a metaphor from chemistry, common membership in the species is more like a mixture than a compound. This is of course an unfortunate consequence of a brief review. Suffice it to say that he does a far better job than is captured in my discussion. But what is most important is that he makes us take pause and carefully re-examine our prejudices in favor of human interests. What emerges loud and clear from his analysis is the arbitrariness of assuming that human interests are inherently superior *sub specie aeternitatis*. We are left wondering to what extent giving pride of place to human interests is conceptually nothing more, to paraphrase Nietzsche, than turning our biases and hang-ups into a metaphysic. The majority of the book is devoted to an equally careful examination of the belief that human life is inherently more valuable than the lives of other animals, an assumption even more ubiquitous than the belief in the primacy of human interests. Much in the way that the early philosophers of animal ethics challenged those who would deny animals inclusion in the moral arena asked for the morally relevant characteristic that serves to exclude animals, Bernstein challenges us to specify the characteristic that makes human lives more valuable than animal. One of the most common arguments in this regard is the claim that animals live more or less in the moment, while human lives are inherently tied up with futural possibilities and plans. It is often argued that killing a person makes a mockery of much of their activities. We study hard not for its own sake, but in order to get accepted into medical school, which in turn derives its value from the future possibilities intrinsic to treating patients. An animal, on the other hand, lacking language and the attendant syntax that allows humans to transcend the current moment, has no such future plans, and thus death is not the misfortune for animals that it is for people. For this reason, human life is of greater significance than animal life. Humans lose more than animals do when their lives are cut short. It is certainly difficult to deny the distinction between human cognition and animal cognition inherent in the capacity of humans to project into the future. What Bernstein calls into question is whether this difference in fact marks the morally relevant difference between the respective values of human versus animal life. What, for example, prevents one from arguing that a life without future plans that can be thwarted and arbitrarily rendered meaningless by untimely death is more morally valuable than a life that is totally self-contained at each moment. From a subjective perspective, for example, the pleasure of human life must of necessity be constrained and tempered by the omnipresent possibility of death and lesser things that can go wrong. Why, in other words, is not a life unsullied by deep anxieties about the future not a more valuable life than one that is so tainted? And further, why can one not argue that the animal life is thus in one sense a more, rather than less, perfect life? Just because humans lose more than animals do by virtue of a truncated life, it does not follow that human lives are objectively more valuable. Also, what if the future plans of a human are dedicated to the promotion of thoroughgoing evil? Is such a life more valuable simply by virtue of its formal structure? He affirms that we do not value the lives of individual humans with highly complex plans or intellects more than those individuals whose aspirations are far more simplistic. I am not at all sure that such is the case but do not have the opportunity to construct the counterargument here. Mill affirms famously and inconsistently that, the key feature in ethical deliberation is the amount of pleasure and pain a given action generates. The more pleasure and the least amount of pain generated, the more morally valuable the action. But Mill also goes on to argue that there are "higher" and "lower" pleasures such that a lesser amount of a higher pleasure for example, reading philosophy is more valuable than a great amount of a lower pleasure such as guzzling beer, thereby committing him to the view that there are things more valuable than just pleasure. Since animals are incapable of the so-called "higher pleasures," animal life may be said to be of lower value. His discussion of this thesis is quite astute. It is by no means clear to me, or to common sense, that such people will invariably choose the higher pleasure. Many people, even philosophers, may well be inclined to choose beer-guzzling! Bernstein is an extremely clear and engaging writer. In particular, he tends to avoid the sort of philosophical jargon that is prohibitive for ordinary people even when they possess great interest in the issues addressed. Another stylistic

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advantage is represented by his making the same point in multiple ways and by using colorful and fanciful anecdotes as illustrative. My major complaint concerning his writing style is his tendency to use rather random abbreviations to stand for arguments he has developed at length. He is a good enough writer that he could simply allude to the argument in question and not impede readability. And this is what good philosophy should do.