

Chapter 1 : Context | Define Context at theinnatdunvilla.com

Context always matters in online deception. This study conceptualizes language-action cues as a dynamic and interactive representation of context, and explores indicators of interpersonal deception in spontaneous computer-mediated communication.

Clarke Language, Action and Context. And one may even list other American and British thinkers having contributed to the development of pragmatic thought. Now, the main problem in pragmatics is its conceptualization: Is pragmatics the only notion one has to deal with when one studies its development in scientific history? It seems plausible to assume that pragmatics cannot be the only concept. But a second point to consider is the geographical restriction of pragmatic thought. A third aspect, finally, is the domain-specific character of pragmatics: Is it only linguistics which is concerned with pragmatics or are there other disciplines where elements of pragmatic thought can be found, for instance in anthropology? The authors seem to have found a rather simple but efficient solution to the aforementioned problems in their book Language, Action, and Context. They restrict themselves to a terminology which seems to mirror the basic notions in pragmatic research. In their introduction NC go into several methodological problems concerning the definition of pragmatics, the need of a 1 H. Mounce , The Two Pragmatisms. Klaus Oehler , Charles Sanders Peirce. Journal of Pragmatics 25 , The Journal of Pragmatics 22 , And precisely these authors, according to Michael Dummett,6 should be considered to be the founders of British analytical philosophy next to thinkers like Gotlob Frege And this road they did not want to follow. The reason for this, as a matter of course, is its recent introduction into the linguistic curriculum - if one restricts oneself to this domain - and its extra-linguistic ramification in several other disciplines. I think that it is not far beyond the historical reality to make the statement that pragmatics is not a linguistic sub- discipline at all but that the status of language in pragmatic research has been overvalued. In fact, pragmatics is a higher level science than linguistics cf. Dummett criticizes the general opinion that analytical philosophy has its origin in America and Great Britain. This, he states, gives an inadequate, even wrong picture of the historical context of analytical philosophy. Many British and American students completed their study in Europe Germany, the Habsburg empire including cultural centres like Prague and Vienna during the 19th and 20th century. The result of the emigration of many scientist to America during World War II is another chapter in the history of the transmission of philosophical, psychological, and linguistic ideas. Without social conventions, codified in claims and obligations, a human society seems impossible. And, of course, language and the consequences of the use of language are important in the codification of claims and obligations. This sentence can be interpreted as representing a particular state of affairs - with the initial problem of reference, i. But it can also be interpreted as an intention of a speaker to inform someone else what is going on outside or it can be a request to close the window, to hand over an umbrella, etc. These developments have excluded the role of the interlocutors in human linguistic use. The act of speaking was inferior to the purely grammatical, the biological or purely logical analysis of linguistic structures. By the end of the book, in part Austin, and his followers p. In the table of contents, however, the section on Austin does have the number In the text p. They have limited themselves to among others linguists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists who really had something to say on the functions of language, on language use rs and the work is a Fundgrube for those interested in the history and historiography of pragmatic research. NC also give the original version of the English, translated quotations at the end of the book; they also add an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary literature and an index of names with dates. On the other hand, it would have been easier for a reviewer, if the authors would have made another choice, i.

Chapter 2 : Pragmatics - Wikipedia

In short, if language was studied as an organism in the 19th century and as a system in the 20th, there does not seem to be much room for the study of language in use or in context, or the study of the relationship between language and action.

Communicative action The theory of communicative action is a critical project which reconstructs a concept of reason which is not grounded in instrumental or objectivistic terms, but rather in an emancipatory communicative act. This implies that any universalist claims can only be validated by testing against counterexamples in historical and geographical contexts – not by using transcendental ontological assumptions. This leads him to look for the basis of a new theory of communicative action in the tradition of sociology. This danger arises not simply from the creation of separate institutional entities but through the specialisation of cognitive, normative, and aesthetic knowledge that in turn permeates and fragments everyday consciousness. This disunity of reason implies that culture moves from a traditional base in a consensual collective endeavour to forms which are rationalised by commodification and led by individuals with interests which are separated from the purposes of the population as a whole. An antagonism arises between these two principles of societal integration – language, which is oriented to understanding and collective well being, and "media", which are systems of success-oriented action. They surface as widespread neurotic illnesses, addictions, psychosomatic disorders, and behavioural and emotional difficulties; or they find more conscious expression in criminal actions, protest groups and religious cults. Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. Mead also stressed the social character of perception: It then coordinates action towards social integration and solidarity. Finally, communicative action is the process through which people form their identities. After this process the lifeworld "is no longer needed for the coordination of action". Lifeworld communications lose their purpose becoming irrelevant for the coordination of central life processes. This has the effect of ripping the heart out of social discourse, allowing complex differentiation to occur but at the cost of social pathologies. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld assumes the form of colonisation". This prevented them from dissecting the effects of the intrusion of steering media into a differentiated lifeworld, and the rationalisation of action orientations that follows. According to Habermas, lifeworlds become colonised by steering media when four things happen: Traditional forms of life are dismantled. Social roles are sufficiently differentiated. There are adequate rewards of leisure and money for the alienated labour. Hopes and dreams become individuated by state canalization of welfare and culture. These processes are institutionalised by developing global systems of jurisprudence. Rationality is redefined as thinking that is ready to submit to criticism and systematic examination as an ongoing process. A broader definition is that rationality is a disposition expressed in behaviour for which good reasons can be given. Habermas is now ready to make a preliminary definition of the process of communicative rationality: This shift is fundamental to the Theory of Communicative Action. It is based on an assumption that language is implicitly social and inherently rational. Argument of some kind is central to the process of achieving a rational result. Contested validity claims are thematised and attempts are then made to vindicate or criticise them in a systematic and rigorous way. Non-verbal forms of cultural expression could often fall into this category. Habermas proposes three integrated conditions from which argumentative speech can produce valid results: The processes by which different validity claims are brought to a satisfactory resolution. The relations to the world that people take to forward validity claims for the expressions they deem important. Because these are not followed through in the Theory of Communicative Action the impression is given that these are secondary forms of discourse. Aesthetic discourses work by mediators arguments bringing us to consider a work or performance which itself demonstrates a value. This mediation is often locked into economic interests either directly or through state agency. When Habermas considers the question of context he does refer to culture. Every process of understanding takes place against the background of a culturally ingrained preunderstanding The relationship is dynamic and occurs in both directions. To see context as a fixed background or preunderstanding is to push it out of the sphere of communicative action. Therapeutic discourse is that which

serves to clarify systematic self-deception. Such self-deceptions typically arise from developmental experiences, which have left certain rigidities of behaviour or biases of value judgement. These rigidities do not allow flexible responses to present time exigencies. Habermas sees this in terms of psychoanalysis. A related aspect of this discourse is the adoption of a reflective attitude, which is a basic condition of rational communication. The most intractable illusions are surely embedded within our subconscious. Explicative discourse focuses on the very means of reaching understanding – the means of linguistic expression. Rationality must include a willingness to question the grammar of any system of communication used to forward validity claims. The question of whether visual language can put forward an argument is not broached by Habermas. Verbal language certainly has the prominent place in his model of human action. Oral contexts of communication have been relatively little studied and the distinction between oral and literary forms is not made in Theory of Communicative Action. As the System colonises the lifeworld most enterprises are not driven by the motives of their members. The bureaucratic disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion and will formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty and makes it easier to uncouple political decision making from concrete, identity forming contexts of life. Such conditions of public patronage invisibly negate the freedom that is supposedly available in the cultural field. Reception[edit] The Theory of Communicative Action was the subject of a collection of critical essays published in

Chapter 3 : Brandl, Communicative Language Teaching in Action: Putting Principles to Work | Pearson

Between and philosophers, psychologists, sociologists and linguists came to see that language could only be studied in the context of dialogue, in the context of human life and finally as being a kind of human action itself.

Ambiguity The sentence "You have a green light" is ambiguous. For example, it could mean: Similarly, the sentence "Sherlock saw the man with binoculars" could mean that Sherlock observed the man by using binoculars, or it could mean that Sherlock observed a man who was holding binoculars syntactic ambiguity. As defined in linguistics, a sentence is an abstract entity—a string of words divorced from non-linguistic context—as opposed to an utterance, which is a concrete example of a speech act in a specific context. The more closely conscious subjects stick to common words, idioms, phrasings, and topics, the more easily others can surmise their meaning; the further they stray from common expressions and topics, the wider the variations in interpretations. This suggests that sentences do not have intrinsic meaning, that there is no meaning associated with a sentence or word, and that either can only represent an idea symbolically. The cat sat on the mat is a sentence in English. If someone were to say to someone else, "The cat sat on the mat," the act is itself an utterance. This implies that a sentence, term, expression or word cannot symbolically represent a single true meaning; such meaning is underspecified which cat sat on which mat? By contrast, the meaning of an utterance can be inferred through knowledge of both its linguistic and non-linguistic contexts which may or may not be sufficient to resolve ambiguity. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. April Learn how and when to remove this template message Pragmatics was a reaction to structuralist linguistics as outlined by Ferdinand de Saussure. In many cases, it expanded upon his idea that language has an analyzable structure, composed of parts that can be defined in relation to others. Pragmatics first engaged only in synchronic study, as opposed to examining the historical development of language. However, it rejected the notion that all meaning comes from signs existing purely in the abstract space of langue. Meanwhile, historical pragmatics has also come into being. This is when two different schools emerged; notably the Anglo-American pragmatic thought and the European continental pragmatic thought also called the perspective view. The study of the meaning in context, and the influence that a given context can have on the message. The study of implicatures, i. The study of what is not meant, as opposed to the intended meaning, i. Information structure, the study of how utterances are marked in order to efficiently manage the common ground of referred entities between speaker and hearer Formal Pragmatics, the study of those aspects of meaning and use for which context of use is an important factor, by using the methods and goals of formal semantics. Referential uses of language[edit] This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. April Learn how and when to remove this template message When we speak of the referential uses of language we are talking about how we use signs to refer to certain items. Below is an explanation of, first, what a sign is, second, how meanings are accomplished through its usage. A sign is the link or relationship between a signified and the signifier as defined by Saussure and Huguenin. The signified is some entity or concept in the world. The signifier represents the signified. An example would be: This relationship can be further explained by considering what we mean by "meaning. Semantico-referential meaning refers to the aspect of meaning, which describes events in the world that are independent of the circumstance they are uttered in. An example would be propositions such as: The meaning of this proposition does not rely on whether or not Santa Claus is eating cookies at the time of its utterance. Santa Claus could be eating cookies at any time and the meaning of the proposition would remain the same. The meaning is simply describing something that is the case in the world. In contrast, the proposition, "Santa Claus is eating a cookie right now," describes events that are happening at the time the proposition is uttered. Semantico-referential meaning is also present in meta-semantical statements such as: The meaning of the sign tiger is describing some animal in the world, which does not change in either circumstance. Indexical meaning, on the other hand, is dependent on the context of the utterance and has rules of use. By rules of use, it is meant that indexicals can tell you when they are used, but not what they actually mean. As mentioned, these meanings are brought about through the relationship

between the signified and the signifier. One way to define the relationship is by placing signs in two categories: Referential indexical signs are signs where the meaning shifts depending on the context hence the nickname "shifters. Another example would be: Close by A pure indexical sign does not contribute to the meaning of the propositions at all. It is an example of a "non-referential use of language. The components of the trichotomy are the following: If two people were in a room and one of them wanted to refer to a characteristic of a chair in the room he would say "this chair has four legs" instead of "a chair has four legs. The sorts of contexts that such indexes can mark are varied. Sex indexes are affixes or inflections that index the sex of the speaker, e. Deference indexes are words that signal social differences usually related to status or age between the speaker and the addressee. An Affinal taboo index is an example of avoidance speech that produces and reinforces sociological distance, as seen in the Aboriginal Dyirbal language of Australia. If any of those relatives are present, a Dyirbal speaker has to switch to a completely separate lexicon reserved for that purpose. In all of these cases, the semantico-referential meaning of the utterances is unchanged from that of the other possible but often impermissible forms, but the pragmatic meaning is vastly different.

Chapter 4 : The Theory of Communicative Action - Wikipedia

context that must be taken into account at a lower level of the agent's system in order for an action to be successfully carried out; for example, an action that required a path through several.

ReSharper provides the following context actions for C: Add block braces to switch section statements Adds braces to switch section statements Add braces Add explicit name of anonymous property Adds explicit name specification to anonymous type property declaration. Add name to argument Adds name to selected argument. Add string formatting method argument Adds new format item to format string and corresponding argument to formatting method invocation For more information, see code analysis and helpers for string literals. Add string interpolation argument Adds new argument to string interpolation expression. For more information, see Using Context Actions to add annotation attributes. Change member visibility Available on an access modifier keyword and allows changing access rights of a declaration. Check all string parameters for nulls or empty strings Checks all string parameters for nulls or empty strings Check all string parameters for nulls or whitespace strings Checks all string parameters for nulls or whitespace strings Check array index value Checks index value for arrays Check collection index value Checks index value for collections and lists Check dictionary key value Checks key value for dictionaries Check every parameter for null Checks all function parameters for null. Check if enum parameter is defined by enum type Checks that function parameter is defined by enum type Check if numeric parameter is out of range Checks numeric parameter for specified range Check if parameter is an empty collection Checks function parameter for empty collection Check if parameter is not valid Checks function parameter for validity Check if parameter is null Checks function parameter for null. Check if string parameter is null or empty string Checks string parameter for null or empty string Check if string parameter is null or whitespace string Checks string parameter for null or whitespace string Check if variable is null Checks variable for null. Configure null-check assertion pattern Opens ReSharper options page to configure null-check pattern. Configure parameter null-check pattern Opens ReSharper options page to configure null-check pattern. Configure variable null-check pattern Opens ReSharper options page to configure null-check pattern. Convert anonymous method to lambda expression Converts anonymous method expression to lambda expression. Convert anonymous type to named class Converts anonymous type to named class replacing its usages in selected scope. Convert explicit to implicit implementation Converts explicit implementation of an interface method to implicit one. Convert implicit to explicit interface implementation Converts implicit implementation of an interface member to explicit one. Convert integer literal to binary form Converts integer literal to binary form. Convert integer literal to hexadecimal form Converts integer literal to hexadecimal form. Convert integral literal to decimal form Converts integer literal to decimal form. Convert method group to anonymous method Converts method group to anonymous method. Convert method group to lambda Converts method group to lambda expression. Convert object initializer into assignment statements Replaces object initializer with the series of assignment statements. For more information, see code analysis and helpers for string literals. Convert to regular string literal Converts verbatim string ".. Convert to verbatim string literal Converts regular string literal ".. Create return from expression Creates return statement with value that is taken as an expression statement Deconstruct variable Deconstructs single variable into multiple variables.

Chapter 5 : Language in Thought and Action - Wikiquote

This article is a reaction to Nerlich's and Clarke's article "Language, action, and context: Linguistic pragmatics in Europe and America"; in: The Journal of Pragmatics 22 (), 4 It has become clear by now that NC have restricted themselves to the Western world.

Written for Interactions magazine by Peter H. Peter Jones responded, noting that there are other models of conversation and prior work in bringing conversation to human-computer interaction in particular Winograd and Flores work with The Coordinator. We agree on the importance of The Coordinator and invited Peter to outline the history of models of conversation and their relationship to HCI. Three historically parallel pathways can be shown as influenced by a common circle of systems theorists: Distinctions between these three perspectives are readily apparent in the embodiments of their design languages in software, with very different routines for conversation modeling. They also share a central concern with the role of generative conversation for design outcomes. The current article series attempts to coordinate common elements and concerns among perspectives in the attempt to establish a workable common ground. This article focuses on the theory of conversation embodied in LAP—“an influential framework of phenomenology, pragmatics, and speech act theory. While LAP has received significant attention in prior ACM publications, the framework deserves further consideration in light of renewed interest in the systemic view of conversation in design. The emergence of massive social media networks has inspired interest in social design and social systems, particularly in applications to network systems, including business models, online social activism, and organizational systems. A Conversation about Conversation What are the contexts for conversation? Most theories of communication assume a dyad model of information exchange: Conversation is seen as a form of communication in which a particular exchange takes place between at least two people at a time, representing individual interests or intentions, or collective interests represented by individuals. In everyday parlance, we subscribe to a more inclusive view. In fact, many and perhaps most conversations occur as or start with small talk. While its power to reinforce relationships should not be minimized, here we focus on purposeful conversations that enable the coordination of multiple perspectives in the activity of designing. Any design activity is guided by the intention to change a situation in accordance with a communicated desire or intention. Conversations for design must reflect and preserve the positions and contributions of multiple participants included and excluded in the model of change. By extension of this assumption, the way we converse may also be seen as, perhaps unwittingly, reflecting our working philosophy of designing. Several implicit models of conversation can be identified that guide participation in very different ways. Three epistemological orientations include the rational, pragmatic, and phenomenological. The rational perspective may be viewed as an instrumental and purposive individual communications system used by designers to achieve sophisticated design outcomes. Conversation can be understood as a set of patterns employed as skillful means in facilitating the relationship between designers, stakeholders, and product or materials. This is the mainstream perspective in our technological culture, and perhaps the way most readers view conversation in design. This perspective is observable in practices that employ a well-defined set of methods and communications with every problem situation. A pragmatic perspective considers design an inherently communicative practice, where design activities enact the creation of a linguistic system of meanings applicable to a problem in context. In practice, we create a unique coupling of appropriate language to the design situation, following stakeholders and their lifeworlds rather than promoting our own language of design. A phenomenological perspective acknowledges that all meaning arises in language, that human activity is not separate from language. This view suggests that design itself is a conversation, products and services are networks of other conversations, and designing acts are performed and recognized by language. Conversation is not a tool for outcomes; rather, language uses us, shaping and constraining our work and experience. These are not mutually exclusive perspectives; designers may adopt different perspectives to calibrate responses to a situation, while scholars may be adherents of one school of thought. And while not an inclusive list, perspectives from sense making and constructivism, for example, range beyond this current focus of conversation for design. Elements

of all three perspectives, and more, could inform responses to a single problem. Flores demonstrated successes in software *The Coordinator* and *Action Workflow*, education *Logonet* and *Landmark*, and management *Business Design* based on an integral philosophical system. Today we may consider the irony of how the LAP, a critique of the micro-cognitive and rationalist view of AI, was itself critiqued as socially deterministic macro-cognitive and insensitive to natural human interaction. However, LAP reenvisioned cognition and agency as responsive to action in the world, a humanistic concern. Ontological design was construed as a practice of formulating conversations to invent new modes of being and co-create action. Conversation was deemed the appropriate way not only to explore the possibilities invented in design activity, but also to generate those possibilities in reality by intentional speech acts. Performative speech acts instantiate the action referred to in speech itself. Five basic speech acts, called illocutionary points, are specified as: Assertives commit a speaker to the truth of an expression. Directives such as requests, commands, and advice cause the listener to follow a requested action. Commissives such as promises and oaths commit the speaker to future actions. Declarations change the circumstances of reality to accord with a proposition *e*. And since conversation and hermeneutics is recursive, continuous, and correctable, the interpretive critique seems overwrought. Conversations that lead to action exhibit intentionality, and differences in conversational structure are apparent. Winograd describes three types of purposeful conversations based on the LAP model. Orientation Possibility Action Orientation is maintained by conversation that mutually regards a shared referent object *e*. A conversation can be observed as moving through progression of stages, where an opening affords the potential for action. The coordination of action requires meeting what Searle calls conditions of satisfaction [8]. Conditions may include some agreed outcome, and agreements about necessary quality and future dates. While some may consider these conditions goals, LAP does not refer to goals in the objective sense. This difference is crucial, as LAP suggests that we honor the commitment, as if spoken between persons, not the objectives. This model has much in common with the discovery orientation in design practice. The skills for mediating conversations for possibility are learned through the experience of navigating different frames of possible visions or outcomes in conversation. Conversations for understanding or dialogue and for clarification convergence are two that might be further distinguished. Conversation for Possibility

Figure 2: The ability to move stakeholders in social design situations is not seen as a rhetorical, persuasive skill, but one that turns on what Searle identifies as illocutionary force. The variable capacity to move together toward action is embodied by the speaker at the time of utterance. During the years *The Coordinator* was available, early conventional email systems were used for sporadic and discretionary communications. The ubiquitous acceptance of email required a span of five years to alter communicative practices, even in dedicated organizations. While *The Coordinator* did not fit the cognitive style or tasks of existing organizations, even unstructured electronic communications were fraught with resistance and halting advances. Since *The Coordinator* also required a commitment to managing accountable communications, its use was limited to fairly small and dedicated networks. The design and flaws of *The Coordinator* might still teach us about structuring conversations and accountable communicative actions. Yet this critique focuses on the functions of *The Coordinator*, as originally designed. Speech act theory was certainly not perfectly matched to the intended domains of conversation. As a conversation theory, it retains constructive power for formulating social and therefore design commitments as acts by their very communication. LAP-structured conversations might enhance communications in complex, high-reliability organizations. In regulated environments the coordination of commitments is as important as data quality. Consider the audacity of introducing a dedicated, tightly structured email system in the late s. For it or any email system to be of value, all participants in an action network had to agree to use it consistently. As Web-based systems have greatly enabled the ability to collaborate, people are easily overloaded by multiple communication channels. Managing commitment and attention remains the weak link in our technology panorama. A conversation design perspective can enhance our coordination of attention as well as action. With respect to *The Coordinator*, I would make the personal observation that successful software systems are rarely treated as newsworthy in scholarly publications, and failures are typically ignored. Successful software products are discussed only peripherally. With no venue for cooperative constructive critique of social and interactive

artifacts, we collectively risk losing the value of learning from the wisdom embodied in such artifacts and their adoption by real users. We also suffer the loss of shared meaning from collective memory by not sustaining an academic tradition of a balanced interpretive review and critique of artifacts we design and endorse. Perhaps interactions might host such a critique as a shared conversation toward creating a critical discourse, in support of creating a constructive shared memory. These and other proposals ought to be considered in the emerging reconfigurations of design thinking and practice. About the Author Peter Jones, Ph. Redesign, specializes in information and process strategies for scientific, organizational and healthcare practices. Jones is writing Design for Care Rosenfeld Media. Find Peter at Design Dialogues.

Get this from a library! Language, action, and context: the early history of pragmatics in Europe and America, [Brigitte Nerlich; David D Clarke] -- The roots of pragmatics reach back to Antiquity, especially to rhetoric as one of the three liberal arts.

Hitler is gone, but if the majority of our fellow-citizens are more susceptible to the slogans of fear and race hatred than to those of peaceful accommodation and mutual respect among human beings, our political liberties remain at the mercy of any eloquent and unscrupulous demagogue. I have also drawn heavily upon the works of other contributors to semantic thought: I am also deeply indebted to the writings of numerous psychologists and psychiatrists with one or another of the dynamic points of view inspired by Sigmund Freud, Karl Menninger, Trigant Burrow, Carl Rogers, Kurt Lewin, N. How are all these separate insights to be brought together and synthesized? This is a task which I cannot claim to have performed here, but I have examined the problem long enough to believe that it cannot be done without some set of broad and informing principles such as is to be found in the General Semantics of Korzybski. Language and Survival[edit] People who like to think of themselves as tough-minded and realistic, among them influential political leaders and businessmen as well as go-getters and hustlers of smaller caliber, tend to take it for granted that human nature is "selfish" and that life is a struggle in which only the fittest may survive. According to this view, the basic law by which people must live, in spite of his surface veneer of civilization, is the law of the jungle. The "fittest" are those people who can bring to the struggle superior force, superior cunning, and superior ruthlessness. Obviously the more an individual can make use of the nervous systems of others to supplement his own, the easier it is for him to survive. Societies, both animal and human, might almost be regarded as huge cooperative nervous system. Even in a primitive culture he can make use of the experience of his neighbors, friends, and relatives, which they communicate to him by means of language. Therefore, instead of remaining helpless because of the limitations of his own experience and knowledge, instead of having to discover what others have already discovered, instead of exploring the false trails they explored and repeating their errors, he can go on from where they left off. Language, that is to say, makes progress possible. Dogs and cats and chimpanzees do not, so far as we can tell, increase their wisdom, their information, or their control over their environment from one generation to the next. But human beings do. The cultural accomplishment of the ages, the invention of cooking, [These gifts, which none of us has done anything to earn, offer us not only the opportunity for a richer life than our forebears enjoyed but also the opportunity to add to the sum total of human achievement by our own contributions, however small they may be. From the warning cry of primitive man to the latest newsflash or scientific monograph, language is social. Cultural and intellectual cooperation is the great principle of human life. One is often tempted to say that conflict, rather than cooperation, is the great governing principle of human life. We may indeed as individuals compete for jobs, but our function in the job, once we get it, is to contribute at the right time and place to that innumerable series of cooperative acts that eventually result in automobiles being manufactured, in cakes appearing in pastry shops, in department stores being able to serve their customers, in the trains and airlines running as scheduled. And what is important for our purposes here is that all this coordination of effort necessary for the functioning of society is of necessity achieved by language or else it is not achieved at all. Mits -- The Celebrated Man In The Street, creation of Lillian Rosanoff Lieber] switches on an early-morning news broadcast until he falls asleep at night over a novel or a magazine, he is, like all other people living in modern civilized conditions, swimming in words. Newspaper editors, politicians, salesmen, disc jockeys, columnists, luncheon club speakers, and clergymen; colleagues at work, friends, relatives, wife and children; market reports, direct-mail advertising, books, and billboards -- all are assailing him with words all day long. Mits is representative not only of the general public, but also of many scientific workers, publicists, and writers. Like most people, he takes words as much for granted as the air he breathes, gives them about as much thought. Mits, like the rest of us, also adjusts himself automatically to changes in the verbal climate, from one type of discourse to another, from one set terms to another, from the listening habits of one kind of social occasion to those of another kind of social occasion,

without conscious effort. He has yet, however, to acknowledge the effect of his verbal climate on his mental health and well-being. Mits is affected every hour of his life not only by the words he hears and uses, but also by his unconscious assumptions about language. Words -- the way he uses them and the way he takes them when spoken by others -- largely shape his beliefs, his prejudices, his ideals, his aspirations. They constitute the moral and intellectual atmosphere in which he lives -- in short, his semantic environment. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf Whenever two or more human beings can communicate with each other, they can, by agreement, make anything stand for anything. For example, here are two symbols: We are, as human beings, uniquely free to manufacture and manipulate and assign values to our symbols as we please. Indeed, we can go further by making symbols that stand for symbols. The more we dress up in fine clothes, the more we restrict our freedom of action. We often choose our residences on the basis of a feeling that it "looks well" to have a "good address. A friend of his, a repairman who knew the condition of the car, kept urging him to make it for a new model. Apparently it means a car that has no symbolic or prestige value and is good only for getting you there and bringing you back -- a miserable kind of vehicle indeed! But the symbolic process, which makes possible the absurdities of human conduct, also makes possible language and therefore all the human achievements dependent upon language. The fact that more things can go wrong with motorcars than with wheelbarrows is no reason for going back to wheelbarrows. Similarly, the fact that the symbolic process makes complicated follies possible is no reason for wanting to return to a cat-and-dog existence. A better solution is to understand the symbolic process so that instead of being its victims we become, to some degree at least, its masters. It has been pointed out that human beings, by agreement, can make anything stand for anything. Now, human beings have agreed, in the course of centuries of mutual dependency, to let the various noises that they can produce [We call that system of agreements language. For example, we who speak English have been so trained that, when our nervous systems register the presence of a certain kind of animal, we may make the following noise: Furthermore, just as social rank can be symbolized by feathers in the hair, by tattooing on the breast, by gold ornaments on the watch chain, or by a thousand different devices according to the culture we live in, so the fact of being hungry can be symbolized by a thousand different noises according to the culture we live in: Symbols and things symbolized are independent of each other; nevertheless, we all have a way of feeling as if [This feeling exhibits itself most strongly in those tourists who seem to believe that they can make the natives of any country understand English if they shout loud enough. Like the little boy who was reported to have said, "Pigs are called pigs because they are such dirty animals," they feel that the symbol is inherently connected in some way with the thing symbolized. Then there are the people who feel that since snakes are "nasty, slimy creatures" incidentally, snakes are not slimy , the word "snake" is a nasty, slimy word. An actor is one who symbolizes other people, real or imagined. Robinson, who used to play gangster roles with extraordinary vividness, visited Chicago, local hoodlums would telephone him at his hotel to pay their professional respects. But this kind of confusion does not seem to be confined to unsophisticated theatergoers. Roosevelt in Sunrise at Campobello, was invited by several colleges to speak on Roosevelt. Also, there are those astonishing patriots who rushed to the recruiting offices to help defend the nation when, on October 30, , the United States was "invaded" by an "army from Mars" in a radio dramatization. They need to be systematically aware of the powers and limitations of symbols, especially words, if they are to guard against being driven into complete bewilderment by the complexity of their semantic environment. The first of the principles governing symbols is this: Science and Sanity Maps and Territories[edit] Now, to use the famous metaphor by Alfred Korzybski in his Science and Sanity , this verbal world ought to stand in relation to the extensional world as a map does to the territory it is supposed to represent. If a child grows to adulthood with a verbal world in his head which corresponds fairly closely to the extensional world that he finds around him in his widening experience, he is in relatively small danger of being shocked or hurt by what he finds, because his verbal world has told him what, more or less, to expect. He is prepared for life. If, however, he grows up with a false map in his head [He will not be adjusted to the world as it is: But the cultural heritage of our civilization that is transmitted to us -- our socially pooled knowledge, both scientific and humane -- has been valued principally because we have believed that it gives us accurate maps of experience. The analogy of verbal words to maps is an important one [It should be

noticed at this point, however, that there are two ways of getting false maps of the world into our heads: We may not always be able to verify them ourselves, since we cannot track down the evidence for every piece of history we know [But if we are roughly agreed on the names of things, on what constitutes a "foot," "yard," "bushel," and so on, and on how to measure time, there is relatively little danger of our misunderstanding each other. We ask directions of total strangers when we are traveling. We follow directions on road signs without being suspicious of the people who put them up. We read books of information about science, mathematics, automotive engineering, travel, geography, the history of costume, and other such factual matters, and we usually assume that the author is doing his best to tell us as truly as he can what he knows. And we are safe in so assuming most of the time. With the interest given today to the discussion of biased newspapers, propagandists, and the general untrustworthiness of many of the communications we receive, we are likely to forget that we still have an enormous amount of reliable information available and that deliberate misinformation, except in warfare, is still more the exception than the rule. The desire for self-preservation that compelled men to evolve means for the exchange of information also compels them to regard the giving of false information as profoundly reprehensible. Inferences may be carelessly or carefully made. They may be made on the basis of a broad background of previous experience with the subject matter, or no experience at all. For example, the inferences a good mechanic can make about the internal condition of a motor by listening to it are often startlingly accurate, while the inferences made by an amateur if he tries to make any may be entirely wrong. But the common characteristic of inferences is that they are statements about matters which are not directly known, statements made on the basis of what has been observed. In other two instances, we may substitute such expressions as, "Jerry was convicted of theft and served two years at Waupun," and "Tommy plays the violin, leads his class in school, and is captain of the debating team. Even to say, "He has stolen," is to make an inference and simultaneously to pass a judgment on an act about which there may be difference of opinion among those who have examined the evidence upon which the conviction was obtained. But to say that he was "convicted of theft" is to make a statement capable of being agreed upon through verification in court and prison records. Our concern, instead, is with language in action -- language in the full context of the nonlinguistic events which are its setting. The making of noises with the vocal organs is a muscular activity and, like other muscular activities, often involuntary. Our responses to powerful stimuli, such as to things that makes us very angry, are a complex of muscular and physiological events: We are a little too dignified, perhaps, to growl like dogs, but we do the next best thing and substitute series of words, such as "You dirty double-crosser! The reader is probably familiar with the fact that students almost always have difficulty in writing themes of the required length because their ideas give out after a paragraph or two. The reason for this is that those early paragraphs contain so many judgments that there is little left to be said. When the conclusions are carefully excluded, however, and observed facts are given instead, there is never any trouble about the length of papers; in fact, they tend to become too long, since inexperienced writers, when told to give facts, often give far more than are necessary, because they lack discrimination between the important and the trivial. Therefore, even if the writer feels sure at the beginning of a written account that the man he is describing is a "real leatherneck" or that the scene he is describing is a "beautiful residential suburb," he will conscientiously keep such notions out of his head, lest his vision be obstructed. Slanting gives no explicit judgments, but it differs from reporting in that it deliberately makes certain judgments inescapable. Let us assume for a moment the truth of the statement "When Clyde was in New York last November he was seen having dinner with a show girl. We are assuming that what seems important or unimportant to us seems equally important or unimportant to them, and on the basis of that assumption we infer that the editors "deliberately" gave the story a misleading emphasis. Is this necessarily the case? Can the reader, as an outsider, say whether a story assumes a given form because the editors "deliberately slanted it that way" or because that was the way the events appeared to them? If you happen to be pro-labor, pro-Catholic, and a stock-car racing fan, your ideas of what is important or unimportant will of necessity be different from those of a man who happens to be indifferent to all three of your favorite interests. Such newspapermen are reporters indeed. The avoidance of slanting is not only a matter of being fair and impartial; it is even more importantly a matter of making good maps of the territory of experience.

Chapter 7 : The Language/Action Model of Conversation: Can conversation perform acts of design?

I ask this because a book on Legal English says "claim" is the modern equivalent for "action", but doesn't explain it. If the book's right, then I could argue that "file a claim" means exactly the.

Chapter 8 : Need a synonym for "action" in a specific context - English Language & Usage Stack Exchange

Communicative Language Teaching in Action: Putting principles to work is designed as a basic text that demonstrates principles and practices of communicative language teaching and task-based instruction. Its primary purpose is to serve as a guide for second and foreign language teachers in.

Chapter 9 : ActionContext Class (theinnatdunvilla.com) | Microsoft Docs

Our concern, instead, is with language in action -- language in the full context of the nonlinguistic events which are its setting. The making of noises with the vocal organs is a muscular activity and, like other muscular activities, often involuntary.