

Count Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky or Iswolsky (Russian: Александр Петрович Извольский; 18 March [O.S. 6 March] , Moscow - 16 August , Paris) was a Russian diplomat remembered as a major architect of Russia's alliance with Great Britain during the years leading to the outbreak of the First World War.

Early Years Europeans were fighting heavily on two fronts before the U. This assurance was confirmed in the week following the assassination, before William, on July 6, set off upon his annual cruise to the North Cape , off Norway. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, riding in an open carriage at Sarajevo shortly before their assassination, June 28, When the delivery was announced, on July 24, Russia declared that Austria-Hungary must not be allowed to crush Serbia. Though Serbia offered to submit the issue to international arbitration, Austria-Hungary promptly severed diplomatic relations and ordered partial mobilization. Home from his cruise on July 27, William learned on July 28 how Serbia had replied to the ultimatum. At once he instructed the German Foreign Office to tell Austria-Hungary that there was no longer any justification for war and that it should content itself with a temporary occupation of Belgrade. But, meanwhile, the German Foreign Office had been giving such encouragement to Berchtold that already on July 27 he had persuaded Franz Joseph to authorize war against Serbia. War was in fact declared on July 28, and Austro-Hungarian artillery began to bombard Belgrade the next day. Russia then ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary, and on July 30, when Austria-Hungary was riposting conventionally with an order of mobilization on its Russian frontier, Russia ordered general mobilization. On July 31 Germany sent a hour ultimatum requiring Russia to halt its mobilization and an hour ultimatum requiring France to promise neutrality in the event of war between Russia and Germany. Both Russia and France predictably ignored these demands. On August 1 Germany ordered general mobilization and declared war against Russia, and France likewise ordered general mobilization. The next day Germany sent troops into Luxembourg and demanded from Belgium free passage for German troops across its neutral territory. On August 3 Germany declared war against France. In the night of August 3â€”4 German forces invaded Belgium. Thereupon, Great Britain , which had no concern with Serbia and no express obligation to fight either for Russia or for France but was expressly committed to defend Belgium, on August 4 declared war against Germany. Romania had renewed its secret anti-Russian alliance of with the Central Powers on February 26, , but now chose to remain neutral. Italy had confirmed the Triple Alliance on December 7, , but could now propound formal arguments for disregarding it: Thenceforth, they could be called the Allied , or Entente, powers, or simply the Allies. The outbreak of war in August was generally greeted with confidence and jubilation by the peoples of Europe, among whom it inspired a wave of patriotic feeling and celebration. The war was welcomed either patriotically, as a defensive one imposed by national necessity, or idealistically, as one for upholding right against might, the sanctity of treaties, and international morality.

Page 1 of

Chapter 2 : Italy | First World War Hidden History

Suspicious of Isvolsky's pre-War activities, the German Weimar government commissioned Dr. Friedrich Stieve to produce a complete compilation of Isvolsky's diplomatic documents. Stieve did so and then produced a book based on this compilation entitled ISVOLSKY AND THE WORLD WAR.

Welcome to the New Enlightenment Ayana Saturday, 25 April Gallipoli: The campaign was conceived in London as a grotesque, Machiavellian strategy to fool the Russians into believing that Britain was attempting to capture Constantinople for them. The paradox of its failure lay in its success. Gallipoli was purposefully designed to fail. A secret cabal of immensely rich and powerful men – the Secret Elite – was formed in England in with the explicit aim of expanding the British Empire across the entire globe. They planned a European war to destroy Germany as an economic, industrial and imperial competitor and, to that end, drew France then Russia into an alliance termed the Entente Cordiale. Their massive land armies were needed to crush Germany. France would be rewarded with Alsace and Lorraine, while Russia was conned into believing she would get Constantinople. They were rebuffed on each occasion. The French and British alliance with Russia was at the expense of the Turks, not an alliance with the Turks to save them from Russia. Britain and France planned to carve up the oil rich Ottoman Empire. To that end, the Turks had to be pushed into the German camp and defeated. In July the majority of the Turkish cabinet was still well disposed towards Britain,⁹ but their faith was shattered by the seizure of two battleships being built for them in England. As an essay in provocation it was breathtaking. Back in February, Russia laid plans for her Black Sea fleet to take Constantinople by landing , troops and heavy artillery from Odessa. Arrival of the dreadnoughts from England would destroy this plan. It kept Russia on board and helped drive Turkey into the German camp they signed a treaty on 2 August , but it created a major problem. How to prevent the Russian Black Sea fleet from seizing Constantinople? Two German warships provided the answer. On 4 August, while off the coast of Algeria, the battle cruiser Goeben and attendant light cruiser Breslau received orders to head for Constantinople. On 3 August, Kaiser Wilhelm telegraphed King Constantine to say that both warships would be proceeding to Constantinople. This information was transmitted to London,¹⁶ and to the British naval mission in Athens. Goeben and Breslau proceed to Constantinople. Foreign Secretary Sazonov was outraged that the Royal Navy had failed to prevent it. Turkey, although still neutral, closed and mined the Dardanelles. British and French fears that he would make peace with Germany if Constantinople was denied him gave the Tsar overwhelming diplomatic leverage, and it was agreed that Turkey must now be brought into the war. Britain and France followed suit three days later. In London, fear of Russia signing a peace treaty with Germany loomed large. How was Russia to be kept in the war with the promise of Constantinople, without actually allowing it? The solution, an attack on Gallipoli, was fraught with pitfalls. The Tsar had to be tricked into believing Britain was generously responding in his hour of need by mounting an all-out effort to take Constantinople for Russia. The Gallipoli campaign supposedly arose from an urgent call for help from the Russian commander-in-chief Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich on 31 December. Would Britain create a diversion to relieve pressure on Russian troops fighting in the Caucasus? Having already decided their strategy to keep the Russians out of Constantinople, the Secret Elite now cleverly made it appear that the idea came from Russia. Days later the military dynamic changed. The Turkish 3rd Army was decimated in the Caucasus and, irrespective of whose suggestion it had been, there was no need whatsoever for any British intervention to help Russia. Nonetheless, on 20 January Britain informed Russia that she would undertake not just a demonstration, but a complete operation to penetrate the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. The Russians desperately wanted to take part, but were told to concentrate all efforts against Germany on the Eastern Front. The Secret Elite moved into top gear. An objective that required long months of careful preparation was rushed ahead at breakneck speed with disregard for the basic prerequisites for success. Churchill assumed command and chose men for their ineptitude rather than ability. He turned to Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden, recently appointed commander of the Mediterranean Squadron after years in a desk-bound job, as superintendent of the Malta dockyards. Slow and ineffective,³¹ Carden was tasked with drawing up a plan for a naval attack on the Dardanelles, and relaying it

to Churchill within days for presentation to a War Council meeting. The reluctant Carden was given no option other than to get on with it,³⁴ and was effectively set up to take the blame when it failed. For fail it must. Rear-Admiral Arthur Limpus, an eminently more experienced and knowledgeable man who had spent years in Turkey advising on all naval matters, including the defence of the Dardanelles, was overlooked. Outrageous stupidity or cold calculation? In , naval chiefs considered a naval assault too risky. Without long, detailed joint planning, and a sufficient number of troops, it was impossible. Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, refused to make troops available and Carden was ordered to proceed with a naval attack. The Russians were turning the screw. Tsar Nicholas agreed, informing the French ambassador that his people were making terrible sacrifices in the war without reward. Constantinople must be incorporated into his empire. And how could it have Constantinople as its objective? If this meant that the Fleet should capture and occupy the city, then it was absurd. Naval bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles began on 19 February and ran for six days. It caused some damage but destroyed all hope of surprise and merely led the Turks to strengthen their defences. On the previous day Vice-Admiral De Robek had to take charge when Carden suffered a nervous breakdown. It was no surprise. They were utterly essential but he was given only North Sea trawlers that could barely make headway against the strong knot current. Eight powerful destroyers, which could have been fitted with sweeps, remained idle that fateful day while the officers sat playing cards,⁵¹ and only two out of a total of mines were cleared. The Bouvet sank within two minutes with over men trapped inside. It was the disaster predicted as far back as Kitchener meantime had changed his mind and agreed to make troops available for a combined attack, but the naval assault had gone ahead before their arrival. All through our history such attacks have failed when the preparations have been inadequate. Military leadership, like naval, was barely functional. Indeed, it was a worse situation than preceded the naval operation. Raw Anzac troops and unseasoned French recruits were to be thrown into battle for the first time. Marshall Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, was profoundly opposed to the whole operation and initially refused to provide troops. Political expediency forced his hand. His detailed reports on the peninsula were never shown to General Hamilton. He immediately rejected his allocated ship because it lacked first class accommodation, and was transferred to the luxury liner Andania. Hamilton arrived to find his army scattered in confusion over much of the Mediterranean. Ships came from Britain with such poorly written orders that captains did not know their destination. Were troops to fight in trenches or the open? What sort of weapons were required? What was the depth of water off the beaches? What sort of boats were needed to get the men, the guns and stores ashore? What casualties were to be expected? How were they to be got off to the hospital ships? It was simply a case of taking whatever came to hand and hoping for the best. There was a shortage of guns, ammunition, aircraft and, above all, troops. The quality of preparation and leadership guaranteed it. These were the men chosen to fail. Despite the fleet now having some thirty powerful destroyers equipped to sweep the mines, and many officers totally confident that the fleet could now get through, no further attempt was made to force the Dardanelles. The navy would play no further part other than ferrying the men ashore, taking off the wounded, and providing a safe haven off-shore for the likes of Hunter-Weston. Successful mine sweeping had always been the key to a successful naval assault, and with the new minesweepers and a clear run through to the Straits, the fleet could have greatly assisted the army with controlled bombardments of Turk positions from within the channel. It would, of course, also have been able to cripple Goeben and Breslau. For the above stated reasons, that would not be allowed to happen. For years knowledgeable men had insisted that a well planned and resourced combined naval and military attack was the only type of operation that might succeed, but never at any point in the entire Gallipoli campaign was a joint assault carried out. The elites in London ordered the shambolic attack by the navy when they knew it was bound to fail, and now ordered an equally shambolic attack by the army in the full knowledge that it too could never succeed. Gallipoli was a lie within the lie that was the First World War. The campaign ended in military defeat, but geo-strategic victory for the British Empire. By late , with Russian forces pushed back on the eastern front and any likelihood of their intervention in Constantinople gone, the British government began planning withdrawal from the corpse strewn peninsula. The last Allied troops were taken off on 9 January , leaving behind 62, of their comrades. The majority of the dead on both sides have no known graves. Many of the 11, Australians and New

Zealanders who died⁷⁶ suffered unspeakable deaths, deliberately sacrificed on the altar of British imperialism. A Myth Obscures the terrible Truth Over the last century, in both Britain and Australia, Gallipoli has been turned into a heroic-romantic myth,⁷⁷ a myth promoted by court historians and pliant journalists in order to hide the stark truth.

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Any investigation into crimes against truth should also include a consideration of suspicious and untimely deaths which silenced dangerous voices against the will of the Secret Elite. Strange deaths in the pre-war period include that of the Italian General Alberto Pollio. There was one fly in the proverbial ointment. While the Secret Elite could influence general policies and overarching treaties, they could not guarantee the actions of individuals. He did not belong to the diplomatic or ruling classes. He was loyal to the stated commitment to Germany. German-Italian military discussions took place in December shortly after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, and Pollio promised the German Chief of Staff, von Moltke that Italy would mobilise her forces if, and as soon as, war was declared. By March he had gone so far as to agree that the Italian third army would serve under direct German command. In February, the unwitting Pollio even assured the Germans that he would send two cavalry divisions and three to five infantry divisions into Germany through Southern Tyrol [2] to help them implement the Schlieffen Plan. The question was, would the Italian army follow Pollio or the government? Consider this, nine days later, Nicholai Hartwig, the Russian ambassador in Serbia dropped dead, allegedly from a massive heart attack during a visit to the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade. Hartwig was directly implicated in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, and his pivotal role will be fully explained in a subsequent posting. That fact alone accounts for the death by execution of another figure closely associated with the Sarajevo assassination. Some three years after the event Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, also known as Apis, and officers loyal to him, were indicted on various false charges unrelated to Sarajevo. Much to his own surprise, for Colonel Apis truly believed, right up to the moment of death that his contacts in England, France and Russia would intervene on his behalf, he was executed on 26 June. What price then the assassination of the French socialist party leader and anti-militarist, Jean Jaures? He publicly called on workers in France and Germany to take part in general strikes and thus stop both countries from going to war. Perhaps, but they were oh so convenient for the warmongers. Many of those with tales to tell did not live long enough to tell them. Alexander Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador to France and a man intimately associated with the Secret Elite, started to write his biography but was found dead, slumped over his desk with pen in hand before he could finish the first volume. The voice of reason with which Jean Jaures was influencing working class Europeans against war was brutally silenced. Each of these men could have affected both the war and our understanding of its causes. Each in his own way was a danger to the Secret Elite. There is no ambivalence in his accusation. The Secret Elite controlled the historical record through numerous avenues including the Northcliffe newspapers, but none more effectively than Oxford University. They controlled these colleges and, in turn, largely dominated the intellectual life of Oxford in the field of history. Their influence at Oxford was so powerful that they also controlled the Dictionary of National Biography, which meant that the Secret Elite wrote the biographies of its own members. In addition many of the official histories of the war were commissioned through these Oxford historians and widely disseminated. Popular magazine-types like *The Illustrated History of the First World War* were written by journalists closely associated with Lord Northcliffe who was in turn, deeply involved with the Secret Elite and their war to destroy Germany. The Oxford link goes ever on and undoubtedly will continue. We will be dealing with this connection in great detail in future postings. Some famous names may already be known to you. Taylor, lecturer in modern history at Oxford from 1911 to 1945, was a prolific and popular historian from the 1920s until his death in 1958. No evidence was offered by either of these learned authorities. They spoke ex cathedra, pronouncing the verdict of Oxford on the causes of the First World War like medieval popes, and God help the student that questioned their divine bull. In this, he was right. Berlin was waiting for the inevitable accident. His conclusion was that for those liberal countries struggling to defend their freedoms against Germany, the war was far from futile. The Oxford message remains clear: Histories of the First World War should be treated with critical caution, especially those emanating from Oxford University, the spiritual home of the Secret

Elite. A completely different tactic to suppress the truth emerged in the inter-war years. His conclusion, based on documents and statements that had been ignored by official histories, was that Germany and Austria were not to blame for the war. To his dismay, the book was suppressed. That was surely an unusual situation, unless of course, other influences – powerful, moneyed influences – wanted to restrict the circulation and squeeze the life from such work. Barnes expanded the historic debate by inviting major Triple-Alliance politicians who played key roles in July to provide eyewitness evidence for a special edition of the New York Times Current History Magazine in July. The result was a fierce rejection of German war guilt, [17] and the Secret Elite grew concerned. If this revisionist historical research was allowed to continue unabated, they faced the possibility of being unmasked. Their response was a sudden growth of anti-revisionist histories by Court historians in the s. A number of historians and authors who offered critical analysis which came to very different conclusions about the causes of the First World War appear to have been given very limited shelf-life. Even though sales were good, second and subsequent editions never went to print. Unknown persons removed *Tragedy and Hope* from the bookstore shelves in America, and it was withdrawn from sale without any justification soon after its release. What pressures obliged a major publishing house to take such extreme action? Quigley claimed that powerful people had suppressed the book because it exposed matters that they did not want known. Although we as authors were fortunate to be invited to address a sell-out audience at the Edinburgh International Book Festival in August, the book has been completely blanked, with no reviews whatsoever published in mainstream newspapers or journals. Our literary agent stated that he has never known anything like it in his 40 years in the publishing business. The dead hand of history weighs heavy on those who would speak truth to power. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, vol. A Very Short Introduction, p.

Chapter 4 : On Power: The Independent Institute | U. S. History | World War I

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He gave serious consideration to how the different countries within the British Empire would react to war with Germany. It was vital that the Empire was wholly organised for war, and shared the Secret Elite vision. In fact it was an unholy association of the secret society. Carroll Quigley confirmed that this was the overriding purpose of the Round Table: They preferred to remain behind the curtain and exercise power through political puppets whom they funded and endorsed. All was to be managed in secret, hidden from the electorate and unreported in the press. Closer ties with the United States were considered of crucial importance and a Round Table group was established in New York to encourage links between Westminster and Washington, and high finance in the City of London and Wall Street. Secret Elite ties to the United States were exceedingly strong. If Rhodes original dream had taken effect, America would have returned to the Empire and played a subsidiary role to the mother of parliaments, [8] but by the turn of the twentieth century that was an impossible aspiration. However the growth of transatlantic commerce and investment and the U. Rich and powerful Anglo-centric eastern establishment elites on Wall Street who shared the values of the Secret Elite in London sold their souls and their services. A semi-secret organisation, the Pilgrims Society, was established on both sides of the Atlantic to promote the friendships and mutual interests, and pave the way for war. Ostensibly it claimed to seek everlasting peace. Members of the JP Morgan-Rockefeller trusts and Wall Street financiers controlled the elections of pliable candidates to Congress and the Presidency itself. As if by magic a minor college president and political nonentity called Woodrow Wilson was conjured by the Democratic Party, launched into a Governorship in and propelled into the White House within two years. President Wilson was not the only head of state whose high office had been bought with Secret Elite money. Over the short but critical years of his reign , King Edward VII played an important role with his Secret Elite compatriots, wooing the Czar, misleading the Kaiser, and building friendships with important European politicians and diplomats who happily committed themselves to the destruction of Germany. The Secret Elite bribed the French press to support Raymond Poincare, firstly as prime minister in and then as President of France in It is no mere co-incidence that by the Secret Elite controlled the key men in the British cabinet as well as the presidents of France and the United States. King Edward had spoken to his cousin the Czar in favour of Alexander Isvolsky, the Russian foreign minister and later ambassador to France, whom he had befriended on a trip to Denmark in He hated Austria-Hungary for almost ruining his career in , and stirred the Balkan countries against the Austrian Empire. It was an effective but empty promise by perfidious Albion. As we will explain in detail later, the Secret Elite planned to carve up a Middle East that did not include Russia. Vast wealth lay in oil-rich sands of Persia and Mesopotamia, while Egypt guarded the vital sea-artery at Suez and the future of Palestine lay in the balance. The surrender of Constantinople to Russia was absolutely out of the question. No government in London would have survived such a disastrous concession to a nation that was distinctly unpopular with the British public. But Isvolsky believed his masters in London and loyally promoted their cause. Together, Delcasse, Poincare and Isvolsky were key figures in the lead-up to war and their influence over the Russian and French mobilisations in was crucial. All three owed their positions to the Secret Elite whose slush funds were made available to buy public opinion through the press. We have demonstrated how they had long controlled the political world through placemen and back-room machinations. Their control of the press was a more modern power-play. Milner above all knew how to manipulate newspapers and influence editorials. From his earliest years as a journalist working at the Pall Mall Gazette, his influence had been critical. His association with the crusading journalist W H Stead in the s, brought him into contact with a number of other aspiring young journalists who went on to become major figures in the newspaper industry His personal network of journalist friends included Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, Edmund Garrett at the Westminster Gazette, and E T Cook at the Daily News and Daily Chronicle. All were named by Professor Quigley as members of the secret society. The Times, considered by

Professor Quigley to be the public voice of the Secret Elite, [17] had an intimate connection with the Foreign Office. The newspaper proprietor, Alfred Harmsworth, who was most supportive of Alfred Milner during the Boer War, was closely linked to the Secret Elite, given a peerage as Lord Northcliffe, and was supported by them in his takeover of The Times in 1902. Editors could be changed but the essence of control always remained within the ranks of the Secret Elite. Thus in the years leading up to war a large and influential section of the British press was working to the rabid Secret Elite agenda of poisoning the minds of the British public against Germany. Secret Elite control of the press was relatively straightforward and while the writing of history might appear more difficult, they shamelessly exerted control over academic historians and journalists to ensure that their version of the history of the war was the only one. Invited to revise and rewrite history? It may sound incredible, but it is certainly true. The Secret Elite engineered their war against Germany with detailed precision and unrivalled cunning. What lay ahead was devastating but in their eyes, entirely necessary. There was a new Carthage. Germany had to be destroyed; not beaten, destroyed. Milner and his Round Table built up their connections with the press across the British Empire and infiltrated American newspapers through the Pilgrims and the Round Table. Lee Thompson, *A Wider Patriotism*, p. Ewart, *The Roots and Causes of the Wars*, vol.

Izvolsky and the world war, based on the documents recently published by the German Foreign office.

On 23 August a CID meeting attended only by those ministers who had prior knowledge of the staff talks was held. Both Churchill and Lloyd-George had been courted by Haldane for over two years and both were briefed on the plans to send the BEF to France sometime before the August meeting. Lloyd-George was anti Prussian militarism rather than anti-German and had underlined his stance in the Mansion House speech he delivered on 21 July. Following a lack luster naval presentation the general consensus of the meeting was that the option of sending the BEF to France in the event of war was the only viable strategy. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, dismayed at the inequitable hearing ensured that the remainder of the Cabinet was made aware of the staff talks. The CID meeting ultimately resulted in three things; the subject of the staff talks being debated by the full cabinet during November, an acrimonious debate that almost cost Grey his job. The result was a stalemate with Asquith agreeing that no further talks should take place without Cabinet approval. It brought forward and legitimised the continental nature of the Anglo-French military planning presenting it as a viable alternative to the traditional purely naval options. It proved the catalyst that moved Asquith to replace McKenna with Churchill at the Admiralty with the mandate to: Macmillan, , p. The construction of Dreadnought class battleships by both Italy and Austro-Hungary had rendered the British battleships in the Mediterranean obsolete. Britain unilaterally opted for withdrawal. Almost simultaneously the French decided to realign their fleet and reinforce the Mediterranean leaving their Atlantic and Channel coasts exposed. This French decision came following naval discussions during which Churchill had suggested the Mediterranean reinforcement idea as the best way to serve French interests. To German eyes this was more than a coincidence and Berlin assumed a deal had been signed. No deal had been signed although the French clearly wished for one. The years of military conversations, which had lacked British political oversight and direction, had built up French expectations but had not resulted in any defined British obligation to France. In a twist of irony the talks that came closest to a formal agreement were those conducted by Churchill in with full cabinet knowledge. The naval arms race with Germany had been won by Britain and both countries knew it. Russia had initiated a programme to add an additional , men to her standing army. To many in Britain the July crisis when it came was just another Balkan crisis that should be handled like the previous ones. By the 27 July Grey realized that his earlier strategy of working with Germany would fail. Grey believed that although no treaty had been signed support for France had become a matter of honor. David Lloyd George in and Was Belgium an Issue? Between the 30 July and 4 August the Liberal Cabinet walked a tightrope of indecision, unwilling to face the final question, the question that would have split the cabinet and handed power to a pro-war Conservative party. On 4 August Britain stumbled into war with Germany. In August the Cabinet had been free to make the choice between peace and war.

A translation of an able German account of war origins, based largely upon Russian documents.

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Thoughtful men have been eager to study dispassionately the causes of the greatest conflict in history. Nor have there been lacking materials on which to form a judgment. Since the armistice, there has appeared from official sources an astonishing amount of evidence for the study of the European scene before; and we know probably more about the factors causing the war of than any past generation knew of its triumphs or defeats. The Austrian Republic has published the full texts of the Triple Alliance and a Red Book in three volumes containing a complete account of Austrian negotiations after the murder of the Archduke. From the Russian archives have come collections of documents published by Soviet leaders or selected authors or pre-war governmental officials. Von Romberg has shown the falsifications in the Russian Orange Book; Schilling has produced the Foreign Office journal, Hoeniger and Frantz the mobilization telegrams, and Stieg the correspondence of Isvolsky. As early as , Laloy was able to publish a collection of secret documents. Sir Charles Oman was allowed a similar privilege by the British government in for his Outbreak of the War. At the present time Gooch and Temperley are editing a collection of British documents on the war for publication. Yet in spite of all these disclosures, the Russians have still much to offer, and the British, French, and Italian governments are far behind the Central Powers in their revelations. To the victors belong the spoils--and secrecy as well. With memoirs, diaries, correspondence, and reminiscences the student of war origins has been almost overwhelmed. For obvious reasons, the Kaiser and the Crown Prince have been alone among royalty in publishing war books. Lord Grey, Viviani, Sazenov, and Jagow have attempted to vindicate the policies which they pursued while in charge of their respective Foreign Offices. From the military and naval leaders have come important revelations of pre-war tactics: The best work in untangling the twisted threads of pre-war intrigues has been done by scholars who were not active participants in the game of diplomacy. Naturally, among so many writers of so many countries there have been widely divergent views expressed on the question of war responsibility, varying with the nationality of the writer, his political affiliations and connections and the amount of material available when writing his book. Each year a new criminal has been branded and denounced for causing the war, but still the search continues. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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Get this from a library! Isvolsky and the world war: based on the documents recently published by the German Foreign Office. [Friedrich Stieve; E W Dickes].

But in this piece, Mr. Macgregor give knowledgeable insight into the machinations of the global elite who continually squander innocent lives in pursuit of their own private gain. Since human nature has not changed much in thousands of years, we must all learn from history so as not to repeat it. Be wary of false flags and false exhortations to war. They died deceived, expendable, and in the eyes of the power-brokers, the detritus of strategic necessity. The campaign was conceived in London as a grotesque, Machiavellian strategy to fool the Russians into believing that Britain was attempting to capture Constantinople for them. The paradox of its failure lay in its success. Gallipoli was purposefully designed to fail. A secret cabal of immensely rich and powerful men – the Secret Elite – was formed in England in with the explicit aim of expanding the British Empire across the entire globe. They planned a European war to destroy Germany as an economic, industrial and imperial competitor and, to that end, drew France then Russia into an alliance termed the Entente Cordiale. Their massive land armies were needed to crush Germany. France would be rewarded with Alsace and Lorraine, while Russia was conned into believing she would get Constantinople. They were rebuffed on each occasion. The French and British alliance with Russia was at the expense of the Turks, not an alliance with the Turks to save them from Russia. Britain and France planned to carve up the oil rich Ottoman Empire. To that end, the Turks had to be pushed into the German camp and defeated. In July the majority of the Turkish cabinet was still well disposed towards Britain,⁹ but their faith was shattered by the seizure of two battleships being built for them in England. As an essay in provocation it was breathtaking. Back in February, Russia laid plans for her Black Sea fleet to take Constantinople by landing , troops and heavy artillery from Odessa. Arrival of the dreadnoughts from England would destroy this plan. It kept Russia on board and helped drive Turkey into the German camp they signed a treaty on 2 August , but it created a major problem. How to prevent the Russian Black Sea fleet from seizing Constantinople? Two German warships provided the answer. On 4 August, while off the coast of Algeria, the battle cruiser Goeben and attendant light cruiser Breslau received orders to head for Constantinople. On 3 August, Kaiser Wilhelm telegraphed King Constantine to say that both warships would be proceeding to Constantinople. This information was transmitted to London,¹⁶ and to the British naval mission in Athens. Goeben and Breslau proceed to Constantinople. Foreign Secretary Sazonov was outraged that the Royal Navy had failed to prevent it. Turkey, although still neutral, closed and mined the Dardanelles. British and French fears that he would make peace with Germany if Constantinople was denied him gave the Tsar overwhelming diplomatic leverage, and it was agreed that Turkey must now be brought into the war. Britain and France followed suit three days later. In London, fear of Russia signing a peace treaty with Germany loomed large. How was Russia to be kept in the war with the promise of Constantinople, without actually allowing it? The solution, an attack on Gallipoli, was fraught with pitfalls. The Tsar had to be tricked into believing Britain was generously responding in his hour of need by mounting an all-out effort to take Constantinople for Russia. The Gallipoli campaign supposedly arose from an urgent call for help from the Russian commander-in-chief Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolaevich on 31 December. Would Britain create a diversion to relieve pressure on Russian troops fighting in the Caucasus? Having already decided their strategy to keep the Russians out of Constantinople, the Secret Elite now cleverly made it appear that the idea came from Russia. Days later the military dynamic changed. The Turkish 3rd Army was decimated in the Caucasus and, irrespective of whose suggestion it had been, there was no need whatsoever for any British intervention to help Russia. Nonetheless, on 20 January Britain informed Russia that she would undertake not just a demonstration, but a complete operation to penetrate the Dardanelles and Gallipoli. The Russians desperately wanted to take part, but were told to concentrate all efforts against Germany on the Eastern Front. The Secret Elite moved into top gear. An objective that required long months of careful preparation was rushed ahead at breakneck speed with disregard for the basic prerequisites for success. Churchill assumed command and chose men for their ineptitude rather than ability. He turned to Vice-Admiral

Sackville Carden, recently appointed commander of the Mediterranean Squadron after years in a desk-bound job, as superintendent of the Malta dockyards. Slow and ineffective,³¹ Carden was tasked with drawing up a plan for a naval attack on the Dardanelles, and relaying it to Churchill within days for presentation to a War Council meeting. The reluctant Carden was given no option other than to get on with it,³⁴ and was effectively set up to take the blame when it failed. For fail it must. Rear-Admiral Arthur Limpus, an eminently more experienced and knowledgeable man who had spent years in Turkey advising on all naval matters, including the defence of the Dardanelles, was overlooked. Outrageous stupidity or cold calculation? In , naval chiefs considered a naval assault too risky. Without long, detailed joint planning, and a sufficient number of troops, it was impossible. Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, refused to make troops available and Carden was ordered to proceed with a naval attack. The Russians were turning the screw. Tsar Nicholas agreed, informing the French ambassador that his people were making terrible sacrifices in the war without reward. Constantinople must be incorporated into his empire. And how could it have Constantinople as its objective? If this meant that the Fleet should capture and occupy the city, then it was absurd. Naval bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles began on 19 February and ran for six days. It caused some damage but destroyed all hope of surprise and merely led the Turks to strengthen their defences. On the previous day Vice-Admiral De Robek had to take charge when Carden suffered a nervous breakdown. It was no surprise. They were utterly essential but he was given only North Sea trawlers that could barely make headway against the strong knot current. Eight powerful destroyers, which could have been fitted with sweeps, remained idle that fateful day while the officers sat playing cards,⁵¹ and only two out of a total of mines were cleared. The Bouvet sank within two minutes with over men trapped inside. It was the disaster predicted as far back as Kitchener meantime had changed his mind and agreed to make troops available for a combined attack, but the naval assault had gone ahead before their arrival. All through our history such attacks have failed when the preparations have been inadequate. Military leadership, like naval, was barely functional. Indeed, it was a worse situation than preceded the naval operation. Raw Anzac troops and unseasoned French recruits were to be thrown into battle for the first time. Marshall Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, was profoundly opposed to the whole operation and initially refused to provide troops. Political expediency forced his hand. His detailed reports on the peninsula were never shown to General Hamilton. He immediately rejected his allocated ship because it lacked first class accommodation, and was transferred to the luxury liner Andania. Hamilton arrived to find his army scattered in confusion over much of the Mediterranean. Ships came from Britain with such poorly written orders that captains did not know their destination. Were troops to fight in trenches or the open? What sort of weapons were required? What was the depth of water off the beaches? What sort of boats were needed to get the men, the guns and stores ashore? What casualties were to be expected? How were they to be got off to the hospital ships? It was simply a case of taking whatever came to hand and hoping for the best. There was a shortage of guns, ammunition, aircraft and, above all, troops. The quality of preparation and leadership guaranteed it. These were the men chosen to fail. Despite the fleet now having some thirty powerful destroyers equipped to sweep the mines, and many officers totally confident that the fleet could now get through, no further attempt was made to force the Dardanelles. The navy would play no further part other than ferrying the men ashore, taking off the wounded, and providing a safe haven off-shore for the likes of Hunter-Weston. Successful mine sweeping had always been the key to a successful naval assault, and with the new minesweepers and a clear run through to the Straits, the fleet could have greatly assisted the army with controlled bombardments of Turk positions from within the channel. It would, of course, also have been able to cripple Goeben and Breslau. For the above stated reasons, that would not be allowed to happen. For years knowledgeable men had insisted that a well planned and resourced combined naval and military attack was the only type of operation that might succeed, but never at any point in the entire Gallipoli campaign was a joint assault carried out. The elites in London ordered the shambolic attack by the navy when they knew it was bound to fail, and now ordered an equally shambolic attack by the army in the full knowledge that it too could never succeed. Gallipoli was a lie within the lie that was the First World War. The campaign ended in military defeat, but geo-strategic victory for the British Empire. By late , with Russian forces pushed back on the eastern front and any likelihood of their intervention in Constantinople gone, the

British government began planning withdrawal from the corpse strewn peninsula. The last Allied troops were taken off on 9 January , leaving behind 62, of their comrades.

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