

Chapter 1 : Indiaâ€™United States relations - Wikipedia

The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's oceanic divisions, covering 70,, km 2 (27,, sq mi) (approximately 20% of the water on the Earth's surface).

Physiography and geology Origin The origin and evolution of the Indian Ocean is the most complicated of the three major oceans. Its formation is a consequence of the breakup, which began about million years ago, of the southern supercontinent Gondwana or Gondwanaland ; by the movement to the northeast of the Indian subcontinent beginning about million years ago , which began colliding with Eurasia about 50 million years ago; and by the western movement of Africa and separation of Australia from Antarctica some 53 million years ago. By 36 million years ago, the Indian Ocean had taken on its present configuration. Although it first opened some million years ago, almost all the Indian Ocean basin is less than 80 million years old. Southeast of Madagascar the ridge branches: Most striking is the aseismic virtually earthquake-free Ninetyeast Ridge , which is the longest and straightest in the world ocean. Other important meridional aseismic ridges include the Chagos-Laccadive, Madagascar, and Mozambique plateaus, which are not part of the global oceanic ridge system. The fracture zones of the Indian Ocean offset the axis of the oceanic ridges mostly in a north-south direction. Prominent are the Owen, Prince Edward, Vema, and Amsterdam fracture zones along the ridges, with the immense Diamantina Fracture Zone found to the southwest of Australia. Seamounts Seamounts are extinct submarine volcanoes that are conically shaped and often flat-topped. They rise abruptly from the abyssal plain to heights at least 3, feet 1, metres above the ocean floor. Bardin, Kohler, Nikitin, and Williams seamounts are examples. From roughly north to south they include the Arabian, Somali, Mascarene, Madagascar, Mozambique, Agulhas, and Crozet basins in the west and the Central Indian the largest , Wharton, and South Australia basins in the east. Continental rise, slope, and shelf The continental shelf extends to an average width of about 75 miles km in the Indian Ocean, with its widest points miles [km] off Mumbai Bombay on the western coast of India and off northwestern Australia. The island shelves are only about 1, feet metres wide. The shelf break is at a depth of about feet metres. Submarine canyons indent the steep slope below the break. Their sediment loads extend far beyond the shelf, form the rises at the foot of the slope, and contribute to the abyssal plains of their respective basins. The portion of that system adjacent to Sumatra was the centre of a massive undersea earthquake in magnitude 9. Page 1 of 5.

Chapter 2 : India - United States

The United States has a definite strategic approach to the Indian Ocean Region. Washington seeks to ensure the free passage of raw materials and manufactured goods, keep watch over the choke points that provide access to the ocean and ensure that its objectives in the region are not impeded.

Indian students more than ever sought higher education in the United States, especially in the areas of science and engineering. Moreover, the presence of the more than 1 million Indians and Indian Americans residing in the United States was a factor in the relationship. Despite the asymmetrical relationship that had existed since the 1940s, the areas of common interest converged in the early 1950s as the benefits of good relations were perceived on both sides. Some Indian observers, however, felt that the United States had a "negative agenda" concerning India with respect to human rights, the nuclear program, and the pace of economic reforms. Nevertheless, some opinion makers believed that an India-United States strategic alliance later in the 1950s was a possibility. Until 1947, nonalignment had a dual effect on United States policies in South Asia. On the one hand, Washington considered Indian economic and political stability necessary to prevent that important regional player from succumbing to communism and Soviet influence; hence the United States gave economic assistance and support to India during its war with China see External Aid, ch. Eisenhower to Nehru that the arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used in any aggressive war. When Pakistan and India went to war in 1965, the United States government refused to support India and suspended military transfers to both countries. Relations between India and the United States verged on the antagonistic throughout the 1960s. The Indian government also restricted the flow of American scholars and students to India. When the United States expanded its naval base on the island of Diego Garcia and engaged in naval exercises with Pakistan in the Indian Ocean in 1968, India saw its security further threatened. Both governments, however, attempted to limit the damage to bilateral relations. An agreement defused a dispute over United States rupee holdings by writing off more than 50 percent of the debt and directing use of the remainder to mutually acceptable programs. In the Indo-United States Joint Commission was established to insulate bilateral dealings in education and culture, economics, and science and technology from political controversy and to provide mechanisms for regular exchanges at high levels of public life. Hopes for improved relations were expressed in 1977 when Jimmy Carter became president of the United States and the Janata Party government led by Morarji Desai took over in India see Political Parties, ch. These expectations came to an abrupt end two years later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The personal rapport between Indira Gandhi and United States president Ronald Reagan, established during a series of meetings in the early 1980s, enabled the two countries gradually to begin improving bilateral relations. The Reagan administration reassessed its policy toward India and decided to expand areas of cooperation, particularly in the economic and scientific realms, as a means of counteracting Soviet influence in the region. For her part, Gandhi realized that India was unable to block United States arms sales to Pakistan, but that improved dialogue with the United States could open other areas of interaction that could benefit Indian interests. In addition, in 1985 the two sides resolved their dispute concerning supplies of fuel and spare parts for the nuclear power plant at Tarapur. In 1988 the United States decided to expand technology transfers to India. In the mid- and late 1980s, visits exchanged by the United States secretary of defense and the Indian minister of defence symbolized a modest but growing program of cooperation in military technology and other defense matters. Cooperation between India and the United States in a variety of scientific fields followed the signing of a bilateral agreement on scientific and technological exchanges in 1988. Nonmilitary technology transfers also accelerated, and in 1990 India purchased a Cray supercomputer for agricultural research and weather forecasting and accepted stringent United States safeguards to preclude military uses. Furthermore, economic liberalization measures paved the way for increased trade and United States investment in India. In 1991 the improved economic climate resulted in the conclusion of a deal for a Pepsi-Cola plant and the signing of a bilateral tax treaty. In the 1990s, the Indian and United States governments had divergent views on a wide range of international issues, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Middle East, and Central America. Serious differences also remained over United States policy toward Pakistan and the issue of nuclear proliferation.

India was repeatedly incensed in the 1970s when the United States provided advanced military technology and other assistance to Pakistan. For its part, Washington continued to urge New Delhi to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, after the successful test launch of the Indian Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile in May 1982, called on New Delhi to refrain from developing a ballistic missile capability by adhering to the restrictions of the Missile Technology Control Regime. India rejected these appeals on the grounds that it had a right to develop such technology and that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the United States-sponsored Missile Technology Control Regime discriminated against nonnuclear states. Bureaucratic and private-sector resistance to foreign participation in the economy, infrastructure problems, bureaucratic red tape, and legal problems remained formidable obstacles to significant Indian-United States economic cooperation. In the late 1970s, India had differences with the United States over improving its legal protection of intellectual property rights, opening its markets to American service industries, and liberalizing its foreign investment regulations. In the early 1980s, economic reforms permitted a qualitative breakthrough in relations between India and the United States. In 1980 and the United States signed a double taxation pact designed to facilitate American investment in India, further breaking a thirty-year deadlock in economic relations. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 had led Washington to reassess its relationship with Pakistan, with positive ramifications for New Delhi. New Delhi appreciated this action and was relieved in summer 1989 when the United States Congress voted not to include India in the Pressler Amendment, which forbade United States assistance to Pakistan if it violated nuclear nonproliferation criteria. Washington also took a more evenhanded approach to the Kashmir problem in 1989, urging both antagonists to resolve their dispute peacefully under the terms of the Simla Accord. Furthermore, the United States began pressuring Pakistan to end its support for Kashmiri and Punjabi Sikh separatists. This pressure was in addition to efforts initiated in the 1970s to prevent assistance to Sikh terrorists from the Sikh expatriate community in the United States see Rajiv Gandhi, ch. In the wake of terrorist bombings in Bombay in March 1993 widely believed in India to have been instigated by Pakistanis--and stepped-up activities among Kashmiri militants, Indian politicians and the media reveled in the possibility that the United States might declare Pakistan a practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism. Military cooperation also grew. Exchanges of senior military officials became frequent, a high-level bilateral conference on regional security affairs was held, and Minister of Defence Sharad Pawar journeyed to Washington in April to discuss arms supplies and military technology. Not only did United States navy ships make occasional ports calls in India, but the two navies conducted their first-ever joint exercise in May 1993 Indian officials came to have a greater appreciation of United States interests in maintaining a military presence on Diego Garcia and in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, Washington directed its efforts to creating a climate of restraint between New Delhi and Islamabad in order to freeze or roll back their nuclear weapons programs. Some Indian political analysts criticize the United States for following a "two-track policy. Moreover, many Indians have expressed worries that, with the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and as the leader of a Western-dominated coalition after the Persian Gulf War, Washington might attempt to impose its own standards for democratic values, human rights, and free markets. In the midst of increasing anti-United States political rhetoric and newspaper headlines, Indian and United States officials have seemed to agree on only one thing, that bilateral relations had reached their lowest point in two decades. Six memorandums of understanding were signed with the intent of expanding official contacts, reviewing and updating a understanding on high-technology transfer, enhancing defense cooperation, stimulating bilateral ties, and establishing a business partnership initiative. High-level visits to India in early 1993 portended greater stability in India-United States relations. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry visited New Delhi in January to sign a "landmark agreement" on military cooperation that was seen by some local observers as a convergence in India-United States security perceptions after nearly fifty years of divergent viewpoints see National Security Challenges, ch. Brown that also occurred in January. Some of the deals consummated were intended to build the infrastructure needed by foreign firms to do business in India.

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India is also a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), of which the United States is a dialogue partner. Bilateral Representation Principal U.S. embassy officials are listed on the embassy website and in the Department's Key Officers List.

Mark Twain visited India in [16] and described it in his travelogue *Following the Equator* with both revulsion and attraction before concluding that India was the only foreign land he dreamed about or longed to see again. In the 1850s and early 1860s the United States gave very strong support to the Indian independence movement in defiance of the British Empire. Tens of thousands of American servicemen arrived, bringing all sorts of advanced technology, and money; they left in 1857. Serious tension erupted over American demands, led by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that India be given independence, a proposition Prime Minister Winston Churchill vehemently rejected. The American position was based on principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-colonial era. However, in 1942 when the Indian National Congress launched a Quit India movement, the British authorities immediately arrested tens of thousands of activists. Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base for aid to China. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt pushed too hard, so Roosevelt backed down. America under the Truman administration leaned towards favouring India in the late 1940s as a consequence of most U. S. Grady told then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the United States did not consider neutrality to be an acceptable position. Grady told the State Department in December that he had informed Nehru "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately. His tour of the US was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides. India tried to act as a broker to help end that war, and served as a conduit for diplomatic messages between the US and China. Meanwhile, poor harvests forced India to ask for American aid for its food security, which was given starting in 1945. The Soviet Union provided about half as much in monetary terms, however made much larger contributions in kind, taking the form of infrastructural aid, soft loans, technical knowledge transfer, economic planning and skills involved in the areas of steel mills, machine building, hydro-electric power and other heavy industries especially nuclear energy and space research. In 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first US President to visit India to strengthen the staggering ties between the two nations. He was so supportive that the *New York Times* remarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian-American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary. Kennedy, Vice-President Lyndon B. Kennedy said, Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. The Kennedy administration openly supported India during the Sino-Indian war and considered the Chinese action as "blatant Chinese Communist aggression against India". Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation. Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India. As an economist, he also presided over the at the time largest US foreign aid program to any country. Following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, Indo-US relations deteriorated gradually. Richard Nixon shifted away from the neutral stance which his predecessors had taken towards Indo-Pakistani hostilities. He established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, now under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was seen as leaning towards the Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close. Later in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, *Smiling Buddha*, which was opposed by the US, however it also concluded that the test did not violate any agreement and proceeded with a June shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor. The Reagan Administration provided limited assistance to India. India sounded out Washington on the purchase of a range of US defence technology, including F-5 aircraft, super computers, night vision goggles and radars. There were also unpublicised transfers of technology, including the

engagement of a US company, Continental Electronics, to design and build a new VLF communications station at Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu, which was commissioned in the late s. The United States strongly condemned this testing, promised sanctions, and voted in favour of a United Nations Security Council Resolution condemning the tests. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid, freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies, prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases, prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India, and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies. Only Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. Afterward, the Clinton administration and Prime Minister Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help rebuild relations. India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region, and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent Great Power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China. In March , U. Bush collaborated closely with India in controlling and policing the strategically critical Indian Ocean sea lanes from the Suez Canal to Singapore. Bush administration , relations between India and the United States were seen to have blossomed, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism , energy security, and climate change. Bush commented, "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. The world needs India". Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history. According to Laskar , the UPA rule has seen a "transformation in bilateral ties with the US", as a result of which the relations now covers "a wide range of issues, including high technology, space, education, agriculture, trade, clean energy, counter-terrorism, etc". Since , Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that is based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives "including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation" are underway. This latter initiative, first launched in , reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in , the United States and India signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India were concluded. According to Michael Kugelman, South and Southeast Asia expert at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, the US was unprepared to meet new challenges in India because of its "inability to keep pace with the transformations. He also said that both countries are strengthening the relations between their defence and research organisations. Narayanan , criticised the Obama administration for linking the Kashmir dispute to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and said that by doing so, President Obama was "barking up the wrong tree. It also suggested that India take a more proactive role in rebuilding Afghanistan , irrespective of the attitude of the Obama Administration. Calling India and the United States "natural allies", [85] Blake said that the United States cannot afford to meet the strategic priorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan at "the expense of India". She also rebuked protectionist policies, saying that "[United States] will not use the global financial crisis as an excuse to fall back on protectionism. We hope India will work with us to create a more open, equitable set of opportunities for trade between our nations. Krishna, visited Washington, D. As leader of the US delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensable partner and a trusted friend". Eisenhower in to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. Marshals Service and held in the general inmate population. Embassy in New Delhi. American diplomats were asked to show work contracts of all domestic help cooks, gardeners, drivers and security staff employed within their households. State Department had told Khobragade to leave the country. Blackwill , the former U. President Obama visited India in January Attorney in Manhattan Preet Bharara , in the Khobragade case, said: That is why career agents in the State Department asked career prosecutors in my office to approve criminal charges. Opinions in India shifted, however, after Khobragade was the subject of two inquiries by the Indian government. Human rights activists accused Modi of fostering anti-Muslim violence. Bush, spoke at length about India"U. He is candid and frank. I also worked with him during the Gujarat earthquake when I was posted as the US ambassador to India. It was mistake by the current Obama

administration to delay engagement with Mr Modi. I do not know why they did so but definitely, this did not help in building relationship. The old formula and stereotypes will not work if the US administration wants to engage with Mr Modi. The Indian prime minister is candid, direct and smart. He speaks his mind. They have to do something innovative to engage with him. It is based on the fact that, as head of the State government in Gujarat between February and May , he was responsible for the performance of state institutions at that time. Both reports document the violence in Gujarat from February to May and cite the Indian National Human Rights Commission report, which states there was "a comprehensive failure on the part of the state government to control the persistent violation of rights of life, liberty, equality, and dignity of the people of the state. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from to , has spoken about the visa denial by saying: The visa refusal came after some Indian-American groups and human rights organizations with political view campaigned against Modi, including the Coalition Against Genocide. President Barack Obama At present, India and the US share an extensive and expanding cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship [] [] [] [] which is in the phase of implementing confidence building measures CBM to overcome the legacy of trust deficit â€” brought about by adversarial US foreign policies [] [] [] [] and multiple instances of technology denial [] [] [] [] â€” which have plagued the relationship over several decades.

Chapter 4 : India, Japan, U.S. plan naval exercises in tightening of ties in Indian Ocean

On the other hand, while China justifies its growing presence in the Indian Ocean as a necessary attempt to secure its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), this explanation does not convince either the US or other states, notably India, that border the ocean.

Washington seeks to ensure the free passage of raw materials and manufactured goods, keep watch over the choke points that provide access to the ocean and ensure that its objectives in the region are not impeded. These objectives drive its Indian Ocean policy and its relationships with several key actors to a large degree. It is accessed by nine routes passages, including five key sea lines of communication SLOCs that are used mainly to transport energy from the Middle East. This situation was an extension of its also de facto role as the predominant power in the Middle East, upon which it depended for its energy security. Its vision was limited in the main, however, to the Middle East, no matter that it established at least one base within the Indian Ocean outside of that region. This construct has been changed to granting oversight of the region to Pacific Command, Central Command and Africa Command, each maintaining responsibility for approximately one-third of the region. A fourth body, European Command, is responsible for the oversight of the Gulf of Aqaba, among other geographical areas, which provides access to the western reaches of the Indian Ocean. This command will be ignored for reasons of convenience in this paper. These demarcations do not coincide with those of the Department of State, either, but this, too, will be left unaddressed since it has no real bearing upon this paper. As one study notes, the United States has: Three geostrategic factors, maintaining an open Indian Ocean highway, defending chokepoints at either end of the Indian Ocean and sanitising the Indian Ocean as a secondary front in broader Asian regional competition – the same factors that have animated US policy towards the region for more than a century. That in itself is a useful test of the enduring nature of those particular geostrategic definitions of US interests and a starting point for considering future strategy. Additionally, from a strategic point of view, the US remains aware of the importance of the choke points that provide access to the Indian Ocean and, finally, is aware that this ocean could be a theatre of competition between China and India, two of the largest economic and military powers in Asia. China, for example, imported an estimated 7. In , according to another source, China imported around 3. China, however, is not the only major Asian country that is dependent upon its energy SLOCs to keep its economy moving along. There is a dawning realisation in Washington that the US economy is not as robust as it used to be. This realisation, when coupled with the rise of China, has forced the US to seek to develop relationships in the Indian Ocean Region in order that it divest some of its security responsibilities in the Indian Ocean but retain its overall importance in it. It was in recognition of this fact that Admiral Michael Mullen, ex-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained as long ago as that: The most significant threat to our national security is our debt. And the reason I say that is because the ability for our country to resource our military – is going to be directly proportional – over time, not next year or the year after, but over time – to help our economy. While Mullen drew a direct link between the US economy and its military, there is an indirect link between US foreign policy and the Indian Ocean Region. If the US wishes to continue its strategic priority, which has existed since the end of the Second World War, of ensuring that a hostile competitor does not dominate East Asia, it must take all necessary steps to ensure that the energy SLOCs from the Middle East are under its control. Given its current economic constraints, however, the US will remain unable to create and sustain military facilities, a major element of its security policy previously, within and around the Indian Ocean Region. It becomes imperative, therefore, that the US draw partners and allies who are not inimical to its overall strategies and policies from the Indian Ocean Region and give them the ability to undertake those tasks that it can no longer undertake itself. By this reasoning, countries such as Singapore and India are prime partners and allies, which explains to an extent the reasons for the strong and growing ties between the US and those countries. Essentially then, the US seeks to create a network of formal and informal alliances in the Indian Ocean Region that is sufficiently robust to deter or withstand any actions by competitors to reduce its influence or impede its access to this ocean, just as it seeks to do so elsewhere in the broader Indo-Pacific

theatre. There is, additionally, a second approach to the issue: The Nixon Doctrine provided unconditional security guarantees to less powerful allies but required that those who were able to cater to their own defence requirements do so, facilitated by US technical aid and advice. The choice of allies rested upon their relationship with the US; thus, even an autocratic state like pre Iran was seen as an ally because Reza Shah Pahlavi had close ties to Washington. The neo-Nixon Doctrine, on the other hand, seeks to create a similar relationship with countries that are democratic and economically able to act as security providers in their regions. It is based upon this reasoning that Australia in addition to the other geo-strategic advantages it offers, India, Indonesia and South Africa become strategically important to US strategy in the Indian Ocean Region. There are, additionally, a few mid-sized actors, such as Australia, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia. While India is the most strategically situated state of the major players in this ocean, it is China that is currently making the greatest impact upon it. No matter that its immediate interests are concentrated in the East and South China Seas, its growing presence in the Indian Ocean and its deepening relationships with states along its littoral, coupled with its interests and concerns, bring it into direct competition with the objectives of the US. On the one hand, it is entirely natural that China would wish to secure its energy SLOCs in order to keep its economy moving. To this extent, it is necessary that it position naval ships in the Indian Ocean. It is the establishment of a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean – the naval bases at Djibouti and Gwadar in Pakistan come to mind immediately – that cause the US concern. These bases, moreover, could also have an impact upon the strategic spaces of India and Japan. The growing perception in Washington that India could admirably fulfil all the functions it seeks in a regional ally has seen a distinct shift in its relationships with that country and Pakistan. Whereas India previously was non-aligned and remains so, at least officially, today but leaned towards the then Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, for a variety of reasons, Pakistan has long been a close partner, if not outright ally, of the US. When India and Pakistan fought their various wars since their independence in , Washington invariably came down on the side of Pakistan in word and, often, deed. India has gradually but increasingly become more closely aligned with the US. Iran poses a different challenge to US Indian Ocean policy. Washington has viewed Tehran as a major enemy since While domestic opinion on Iran remains divided in the US, Tehran has used the opportunity to re-cast its relations with India, China and Russia. Its relationship with Pakistan continues to remain troubled and its reluctance to fall too far into the Chinese camp has seen it provide strategic opportunities to India. Coupled with these associations is its long-standing rivalry with the major Arab states. Above all else, Washington must ensure that Tehran does not pose a threat to the regional objectives of the US. In order to meet those objectives and, in light of its economic situation, it needs to form coalitions with regional powers whose interests are, preferably, aligned with its own but generally not opposed to them. It is this outlook that will add further impetus to its surging relationship with India, see a further deterioration in its relationship with Pakistan and that has the potential to turn a distinctly inimical relationship with Iran into one that is cautiously pragmatic. Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.

Chapter 5 : India and United States to Launch Ocean Dialogue

The United States Air Force flew in arms, ammunition and clothing supplies to the Indian troops and the United States Navy even sent the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier from the Pacific Ocean to protect India, only to recall it back before it reached the Bay of Bengal.

In order not to lose its influence in the Indian Ocean Region, it has sought to create partnerships and coalitions with regional democracies and states whose objectives are aligned with its own. This, the concluding part of the study, will analyse the security aspect. The US has two major security concerns in the Indian Ocean and several comparatively minor ones. Given its historic relationships in the Middle East, Washington is duty-bound to ensure that its allies there are not unfavourably affected by events in the region. On the other hand, while China justifies its growing presence in the Indian Ocean as a necessary attempt to secure its sea lines of communication SLOCs, this explanation does not convince either the US or other states, notably India, that border the ocean. Again, the US will wish to retain a military presence in the Indian Ocean to safeguard its own trade and energy SLOCs and, no less importantly, to ensure its primacy and to cater to future security requirements in the region. Other major bases are located at Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, and in Ethiopia. Each of these bases can cater to between five hundred and five thousand personnel. Strategically placed, they could host rapid reaction forces that could cater to virtually any circumstance quickly. The locations of these bases frees the US from the necessity to pursue more ambitious goals in the region as the potential power inherent in them is sufficient to stabilise it. It is in the Persian Gulf, however, that the most US military bases and personnel are situated. While the US has withdrawn the bulk of its troops from Saudi Arabia, there is no information on how many are still stationed there. In Oman, US personnel numbers now hover around two hundred because Omani facilities are no longer used for air support operations. There are no permanent military bases in Jordan but the US conducts many training exercises with Jordanian forces. Lastly, while troop numbers in Iraq had dropped to around the personnel who guarded the US embassy in Baghdad, that number has since shot up to around 1, with the influx of US military personnel who are employed in training Iraqi forces in their fight against the Islamic State terrorist group. The US bases in the Persian Gulf are home, collectively, to large numbers of fighter and other aircraft and naval ships, including facilities to cater to modern aircraft carriers. As the map below demonstrates, Iran, which is still perceived as an aggressive regional power, nuclear agreement or not, is surrounded by these bases. Given the nature of the bases and their usefulness in securing the region, it is doubtful if they will be closed anytime soon, even if the US military budget continues to decrease. It must be understood, however, that Iran was not the primary target when these bases were established. That function was to secure the energy resources in allied countries, to protect Israel and to eliminate threats to US interests in the region. The general level of distrust of Iran by the US, however, suffices by itself to keep the bases operational for the foreseeable future. It was even alleged late last year that the Pentagon, with the sanction of the Obama Administration, planned to create a network of these bases in the Middle East to battle the Islamic State terrorist network. Another military base is situated in the tiny African state of Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier is the largest US military base in Africa officially, at least, it is the only such facility on the continent, and hosts around four thousand personnel. The volume of traffic attracts pirate attacks, mostly from Somali pirates, hence a major function of this base lies in countering those attacks in conjunction with French and Japanese personnel who are also based in Djibouti. More recently, China has begun constructing its own base there. The US base in Djibouti is ideally situated to keep an eye on the war in Yemen, which lies a little over thirty kilometres across the strait, and also on a restless Somalia to the south. The secretive, albeit controversial, military base at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory, which forms part of the Chagos Archipelago see map below, enables the US to keep a close watch on the major trade and energy SLOCs from and to China, as well as maritime traffic between the base and the east coast of Africa. This base, named Camp Justice the name is ironic given the manner in which the base was acquired, was also used to keep watch over South Asia during the Cold War. There could also be, in addition to the established military bases noted above, plans for future bases. One of the more important of

these could be situated on the Cocos Keeling Islands. This group of islands, situated approximately 2, kilometres north-west of Perth, already has an airstrip that is used by the Royal Australian Air Force. There have been reports that the islands could be used by the US to launch drones. If a military base is constructed on these islands, it could complement the one on Diego Garcia, the lease of which runs out later this year. It is, however, the maritime competition in the Indian Ocean between China and India that will, arguably, interest the US the most in the shorter term. Given its economic downturn, the US seeks like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific region to balance China. It has strong relationships with Australia, Japan and South Korea, all three of which, interestingly, have or will have US bases on their territories. It lacks a similar partner in the eastern Indian Ocean and, therefore, would like to have India join an informal coalition to balance China. India could, given its own economic rise, a growing sense of its importance in the region and beyond and, importantly, a rapidly developing navy, fill that role admirably. When a Chinese submarine docked in Sri Lanka in September, for instance, Indian analysts warned that this could herald closer ties between Sri Lanka and China. The Sri Lankan presidential election held soon afterwards saw Maithripala Sirisena take office. He halted several Chinese-backed projects and placed them under review. To offset this, Sirisena has agreed to let China recommence its port construction project, albeit to a reduced extent. This turn of events has caused concern once again in New Delhi. It is aware that China is slowly but surely increasing its footprint in the Indian Ocean. This concern can only be compounded by the news that a Chinese submarine docked in Pakistan for the first time in May and that China plans to sell Pakistan advanced submarines. It is, arguably, this which has forced New Delhi to develop its ties with Washington. Unsurprisingly, it seeks technology transfers from the US, including military technology related to drones, manned aircraft and aircraft carriers. Washington, for its part, has persuaded India to enter into a logistics agreement for the sharing of military facilities and it is likely that the two countries will sign two more agreements that relate to intelligence sharing sooner rather than later. It is likely that their converging interests will see India and the US become close partners, even if not outright allies, in the Indian Ocean. For India, the partnership will enable it to access technology that it would find difficult to procure elsewhere and enable it to further develop its own security strategies, including establishing a manufacturing sector that could produce weapons systems and platforms that utilise these technologies, thus reducing its dependence upon other countries. In effect, then, the Indian Ocean has become, from this perspective at least, an extension of the South China Sea. The US has been forced by economic circumstances to divest itself of many of the security responsibilities it carried since the end of the Second World War. That notwithstanding, it remains the most powerful economy in the world and, arguably, still possesses the strongest military. It has adapted to its changed circumstances by creating partnerships of varying degrees with regional stakeholders to ensure that its interests in the Indian Ocean, in this case, are not negatively affected. It is probable that its primacy in the Indian Ocean will continue for many years to come. Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.

Chapter 6 : Indian Ocean - Wikipedia

Japan will join India and the United States for joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean this October, which will mark the first time in eight years that New Delhi has hosted a multilateral war game. In , India invited Japan, Australia and Singapore to join its drills with the US navy in the.

As the youngest of the major oceans, [10] the Indian Ocean has active spreading ridges that are part of the worldwide system of mid-ocean ridges. The monsoonal wind forcing leads to a strong coastal and open ocean upwelling , which introduces nutrients into the upper zones where sufficient light is available for photosynthesis and phytoplankton production. These phytoplankton blooms support the marine ecosystem, as the base of the marine food web, and eventually the larger fish species. The Indian Ocean accounts for the second largest share of the most economically valuable tuna catch. The tuna catch rates have also declined abruptly during the past half century, mostly due to increased industrial fisheries, with the ocean warming adding further stress to the fish species. Riding the southern Indian Ocean Gyre , this vortex of plastic garbage constantly circulates the ocean from Australia to Africa, down the Mozambique Channel , and back to Australia in a period of six years, except for debris that get indefinitely stuck in the centre of the gyre. These new species were a "Hoff" crab, a "giant peltospirid" snail, a whelk-like snail, a limpet, a scaleworm and a polychaete worm. This spurred exploration, and a new sea route around Africa was found, triggering the Age of Discovery. First settlements The history of the Indian Ocean is marked by maritime trade; cultural and commercial exchange probably date back at least seven thousand years. The Sumerians traded grain, pottery, and bitumen used for reed boats for copper, stone, timber, tin, dates, onions, and pearls. Albeit the monsoon must have been common knowledge in the Indian Ocean for centuries. Civilizations soon arose in Persia beginning with Elam and later in Southeast Asia beginning with Funan. Returning ships brought gold and myrrh. The earliest known maritime trade between Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley c. Phoenicians of the late 3rd millennium BCE may have entered the area, but no settlements resulted. The powerful monsoons also meant ships could easily sail west early in the season, then wait a few months and return eastwards. The probably fictitious sailor Hippalus is said to have discovered the direct route from Arabia to India around this time. Like the Indonesian peoples above, the western sailors used the monsoon to cross the ocean. Among these trading settlements were Mosylon and Opono on the Red Sea littoral. Although there were numerous ancient civilizations in the coastal states of Asia and parts of Africa, the Maldives were the only island group in the Central Indian Ocean region where an ancient civilization flourished. The European ships, armed with heavy cannon, quickly dominated trade. Portugal achieved pre-eminence by setting up forts at the important straits and ports. Their hegemony along the coasts of Africa and Asia lasted until the mid 17th century. Later, the Portuguese were challenged by other European powers. France and Britain established trade companies for the area. From Spain established a major trading operation with the Manila Galleons in the Philippines and the Pacific. Spanish trading ships purposely avoided the Indian Ocean, following the Treaty of Tordesillas with Portugal. By , Britain became the principal power in the Indian Ocean. The last two tried to establish hegemony[citation needed] by negotiating for naval base sites. Developing countries bordering the ocean, however, seek to have it made a "zone of peace"[citation needed] so that they may use its shipping lanes freely. The waves resulted in more than , deaths and over 1 million people were left homeless. Despite an extensive search, the whereabouts of the remains of the aircraft are unknown. It carries a particularly heavy traffic of petroleum and petroleum products from the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Indonesia. Large reserves of hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of Saudi Arabia , Iran , India , and Western Australia. Aden is a major port in Yemen and controls ships entering the Red Sea. Major African ports on the shores of the Indian Ocean include: Zanzibar is especially famous for its spice export. Chinese companies have made investments in several Indian Ocean ports, including Gwadar , Hambantota , Colombo and Sonadia. This has sparked a debate about the strategic implications of these investments. The archipelago of Indonesia and the island nation of East Timor border the ocean on the east. Heading roughly clockwise, the states and territories in italics with a coastline on the Indian Ocean including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf are:

Chapter 7 : Malabar manoeuvres mark Modi's Indian Ocean strategy | East Asia Forum

Washington, United States: India and the US have decided to launch an Ocean Dialogue, which Secretary of State John Kerry said, is aimed at promoting sustainable development of blue economy. "We.

Chapter 8 : Wary of China's Indian Ocean activities, U.S., India discuss anti-submarine warfare | Reuters

To provide security in the Indian Ocean, we need multilateral cooperation from India, Japan, the U.S., and Australia.

Chapter 9 : OEC - India (IND) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners

India, like the United States, must protect the sea lanes it depends on for critical trade activities such as importing petroleum and refining it offshore. And much as it is doing in the South China Sea, China is beefing up its presence in the Indian Ocean.