

Chapter 1 : Natural resource conflicts escalate Darfur crisis | Oxfam International

Thank you, Peter, for the opportunity to speak at SAIS on the vitally important issue of the escalating crisis in Darfur. It is gratifying to see so many students in the audience, since student.

These have been compounded by a local drought and desertification, an expanding population and the manipulation of ethnic rivalry. The result has seen an escalation of fighting since early , leaving thousands of Sudanese dead, and hundreds of thousands displaced. Occurring within a vast region of northwestern Sudan, the conflict belies the popular myth that the country is divided along ethnic lines, between an Arab Muslim north and a Christian or animist, black south. The minority Arabs engaged in low level skirmishes with sedentary farmers until the s. But since the mids, following a prolonged drought in , skirmishes with subsistence farmers developed into larger-scale battles as the nomads were pushed further south. At the same time, successive northern governments began using Arab militias to crush rising dissent in the region, including an SPLA-led rebellion in . Analysts say this gave the Arab nomads leverage with the government, which rewarded them with local administrative positions, financial gains and arms, at the expense of the "African" tribes. The fiercely independent Fur - who had ruled the independent sultanate of Darfur which means homeland of the Fur until - along with the Zaghawa, Massalit and other tribes rebelled. The Sudan Liberation Army SLA rebels emerged in February as a response to years of government-sanctioned attacks, unpopular central governance, lack of development in the region, and an ever more precarious existence, say analysts. Calling for a "united, democratic Sudan", greater political autonomy and a greater share of resources, the rebels asked the people of Darfur "of Arab background" to join with non-Arabised indigenous forces in the struggle against Khartoum. This does not mean that the government is biased against one group. The Janjaweed are held responsible for much of the devastation in Darfur and have allegedly been given support by the government. Khartoum strongly denies the accusations. Hundreds of villages and neighbouring farmland have been completely destroyed. Food prices in western Darfur have increased dramatically from 1, Sudanese dinars to 7, for a bag of millet, while commercial traffic has all but stopped. Livestock have decreased in value as locals desperately try to sell off their cattle before they are looted. Extra resources are being set aside for Darfur, in an apparent recognition of problems associated with the lack of development. Peace conferences are being organised, and some of the Janjaweed have been recruited into the Popular Defence Forces government paramilitary units and border intelligence units in an attempt to give them a new role. But regional analysts say the essentially political nature of the conflict is not being addressed sufficiently. A western diplomat described the security-driven response to date as being "devoid of political or social dimensions". Another diplomat said there were "no signs of the government ceding power to Darfur". Only a handful of aid agencies have been allowed to operate in the region. Humanitarian sources said a "lack of transparency" regarding security information had led to travel permits being withheld for weeks. This had prevented badly-needed aid from reaching both rebel-held and government areas. But a nominal ceasefire agreement with the SLA which lasted for three months - from September to December - was accompanied by a massive escalation in militia attacks. But Khartoum has so far refused to allow the international community to observe the talks, resulting in a deadlock. Tribes from Chad are fighting in Sudan and they are affected politically so it cannot act independently," one Darfur MP said. He also reportedly deported about 35 Darfur intellectuals who arrived in Chad in October to advise the politically inexperienced SLA during ceasefire negotiations. Observers say immediate efforts must be made to rein in the attackers. The UN has called for an internationally monitored "humanitarian ceasefire" that would automatically lead to more international aid, a larger international presence on the ground, less insecurity, and space for further talks. A growing number of voices including the SLA say Darfur should be discussed as part of the wider Sudanese peace process. If they are given their autonomy, then it also has to be done to Darfur. The blueprints for the disputed areas of the Nuba mountains, Abyei and southern Blue Nile will likely serve to deal with the Darfur situation. SPLA leader John Garang has also warned that as a governing side during the interim period, it will not be a party to repression in the region. But while the debate continues, people continue to die. Even now, with 25, people

forced to flee in December alone into neighbouring Chad, Darfur is receiving relatively little international attention. One donor described reaction to the conflict as a "collectively mishandled crisis". A combination of a lack of accurate information on the conflict, exacerbated by few aid agencies being able to work on the ground and little media coverage have meant that the conflict has not received the attention it deserves, he said. The veracity of any claims made are the responsibility of the author not Sudan Tribune. If you want to submit an opinion piece or an analysis please email it to comment@sudantribune. Please include your full name, relevant personal information and political affiliations. Comments on the Sudan Tribune website must abide by the following rules. Contravention of these rules will lead to the user losing their Sudan Tribune account with immediate effect. There is now also a limit of words per comment. If you want to express yourself in more detail than this allows, please e-mail your comment as an article to comment@sudantribune.

Chapter 2 : SUDAN: The escalating crisis in Darfur

SUDAN: The escalating crisis in Darfur. EL FASHIR, 31 December (IRIN) - The decades-long conflict in Sudan's Darfur region has its roots in constant neglect and tensions between sedentary.

From the very outset, briefings to the Council characterised the events unfolding in Darfur as a crisis of protection, with large-scale atrocities and other human rights violations being at the root of the humanitarian emergency. Some commentators also started referring to the events in Darfur as genocide. Throughout this period, the upcoming tenth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide on 7 April loomed large in the minds of many, including Council members. Jan Egeland, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, described to the Council how a combination of atrocities against civilians, the forced depopulation of entire areas, and severe access restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government were resulting in a massive humanitarian crisis. Over the next four months, the Council discussed Darfur every few weeks and received a large number of briefings from senior humanitarian and human rights officials, as well as NGOs. Several of these briefings followed missions to Darfur; the picture presented in each of them was as devastating as it was consistent. Around the same time, the US circulated a draft resolution on Darfur. After several weeks of negotiations, on 30 July, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, calling on the Sudanese government to abide by its commitment to disarm the Janjaweed, and bring to justice those responsible for atrocities. This threat of sanctions, without using the term itself, was the most controversial provision of the resolution and a primary reason for the abstention of two Council members, Pakistan and China, a permanent member. This excluded the Sudanese government itself. The most important new provision was a request to the Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry on Darfur. Four Council members abstained, including two permanent members, China and Russia. At a historic meeting of the Council in Nairobi, a unanimous resolution was adopted on 19 November endorsing a commitment by the warring parties to reach a final settlement by the end of the year. Following the signature of the comprehensive peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Southern rebel group the SPLM on 9 January, attention again started shifting to Darfur. The report of the commission of inquiry reached the Security Council on 31 January. It described atrocities in Darfur in devastating detail, and strongly recommended a referral to the ICC. After two months of difficult negotiations, the Council accepted this recommendation, and on 31 March referred the situation to the ICC prosecutor. Three days earlier, it had also adopted targeted sanctions, including a travel ban and an asset freeze, against individuals accused of violating human rights and humanitarian law, and extended the arms embargo on Darfur to all parties to the ceasefire agreement, thus including the Sudanese government. This preliminary assessment of the impact of Council therefore looks at three key areas: These efforts bore fruit on 21 May, when the government announced a number of measures to facilitate access, including the issuing of visas within 48 hours and the waiving of permit requirements for travel to Darfur. A steady but ultimately dramatic increase in humanitarian capacity on the ground followed. By March, some 10,000 national and international relief workers were in Darfur. The impact of these measures has, however, been limited. The overall level of violence against civilians remained high throughout, with some variations. The same seems to be true for the flow of arms into Darfur, despite the imposition of the arms embargo in late July, for which no specific monitoring or enforcement mechanisms were established. Other measures and demands have also seen little if any compliance: There were also several periods of escalating violence that did not elicit any particular Council response; indeed, an upsurge in violence in late November may have been directly linked to the 19 November Security Council meeting, which apparently motivated both sides to adopt a more aggressive posture on the ground. Government and militia forces also undertook large-scale operations in early December and mid-January, displacing tens of thousands of people. Whenever the need for protection by international forces on the ground has been discussed, Security Council members have turned to the AU. In late May, the AU had been asked by the parties to monitor the 8 April ceasefire agreement, initially with 60 observers and some protection elements. By late April, six months on, about 2,000 of them had been deployed, and the Peace and Security Council decided to expand the mission further, to 7,000, by September. There has been a general

consensus that the AU mission, AMIS, has been remarkably effective wherever it has actually been deployed, while its actual size on the ground, level of mobility and pace of deployment have been regarded as insufficient. It has not given the AU mission a direct mandate, nor has it asked for regular briefings, as it could do under Article 54 of the UN Charter. Even some of the most vocal NGOs have been reluctant to argue against a lead role for the AU, despite frustrations about its lack of capacity and the slow pace of deployment. At the same time, the Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded the Security Council of its ultimate responsibility for international peace and security under the UN Charter. Impunity With the request for a commission of inquiry on 18 September, the Council set in motion a process that resulted in the ICC referral in Resolution on 31 March In retrospect, this may well be viewed as the most significant step taken by the Council in response to the Darfur crisis. It is too early to tell what precise impact the referral, together with the targeted sanctions, will have on the situation on the ground, and at what stage of the process. But there was a significant increase in tensions in Khartoum and Darfur following the resolution, and there is great concern that action by the ICC prosecutor or the sanctions committee could contribute to a deterioration in the security situation for humanitarian staff. Competing objectives There is a problematic interrelationship in the case of Darfur between the different objectives of access, protection and ending impunity. The security risks associated with international prosecutions and targeted sanctions in an ongoing conflict may well result in decreased access, as they already have in some cases in reaction to specific threats. Increased access also seems to have reduced the political pressure for action on protection: The relatively successful delivery of relief, in other words, has become a mixed blessing, both for those advocating for more effective protection, and for those exposed to the continuing violence. No doubt the large international humanitarian presence has had some positive impact on the level of protection, but it remains concentrated in too few locations, and can never be a substitute for an effective security presence that is mandated and equipped to protect civilians. Such a presence may finally become a reality when the expanded AU mission is deployed by September , 18 months after the Security Council first discussed Darfur. His email address is:

Chapter 3 : War in Darfur - Wikipedia

EL FASHIR, Dec 31, (IRIN) — The decades-long conflict in Sudan's Darfur region has its roots in constant neglect and tensions between sedentary farming communities and nomads.

These have been compounded by a local drought and desertification, an expanding population and the manipulation of ethnic rivalry. The result has seen an escalation of fighting since early 2003, leaving thousands of Sudanese dead, and hundreds of thousands displaced. Occurring within a vast region of northwestern Sudan, the conflict belies the popular myth that the country is divided along ethnic lines, between an Arab Muslim north and a Christian or animist, black south. The minority Arabs engaged in low level skirmishes with sedentary farmers until the s. But since the mids, following a prolonged drought in 2003, skirmishes with subsistence farmers developed into larger-scale battles as the nomads were pushed further south. At the same time, successive northern governments began using Arab militias to crush rising dissent in the region, including an SPLA-led rebellion in 2003. Analysts say this gave the Arab nomads leverage with the government, which rewarded them with local administrative positions, financial gains and arms, at the expense of the "African" tribes. The fiercely independent Fur - who had ruled the independent sultanate of Darfur which means homeland of the Fur until 1916 - along with the Zaghawa, Massalit and other tribes rebelled. The Sudan Liberation Army SLA rebels emerged in February 2003 as a response to years of government-sanctioned attacks, unpopular central governance, lack of development in the region, and an ever more precarious existence, say analysts. Calling for a "united, democratic Sudan", greater political autonomy and a greater share of resources, the rebels asked the people of Darfur "of Arab background" to join with non-Arabised indigenous forces in the struggle against Khartoum. This does not mean that the government is biased against one group. The Janjaweed are held responsible for much of the devastation in Darfur and have allegedly been given support by the government. Khartoum strongly denies the accusations. Hundreds of villages and neighbouring farmland have been completely destroyed. Food prices in western Darfur have increased dramatically from 1, Sudanese dinars to 7, for a bag of millet, while commercial traffic has all but stopped. Livestock have decreased in value as locals desperately try to sell off their cattle before they are looted. Extra resources are being set aside for Darfur, in an apparent recognition of problems associated with the lack of development. Peace conferences are being organised, and some of the Janjaweed have been recruited into the Popular Defence Forces government paramilitary units and border intelligence units in an attempt to give them a new role. But regional analysts say the essentially political nature of the conflict is not being addressed sufficiently. A western diplomat described the security-driven response to date as being "devoid of political or social dimensions". Another diplomat said there were "no signs of the government ceding power to Darfur". Only a handful of aid agencies have been allowed to operate in the region. Humanitarian sources said a "lack of transparency" regarding security information had led to travel permits being withheld for weeks. This had prevented badly-needed aid from reaching both rebel-held and government areas. But a nominal ceasefire agreement with the SLA which lasted for three months - from September to December - was accompanied by a massive escalation in militia attacks. But Khartoum has so far refused to allow the international community to observe the talks, resulting in a deadlock. Tribes from Chad are fighting in Sudan and they are affected politically so it cannot act independently," one Darfur MP said. He also reportedly deported about 35 Darfur intellectuals who arrived in Chad in October to advise the politically inexperienced SLA during ceasefire negotiations. Observers say immediate efforts must be made to rein in the attackers. The UN has called for an internationally monitored "humanitarian ceasefire" that would automatically lead to more international aid, a larger international presence on the ground, less insecurity, and space for further talks. A growing number of voices including the SLA say Darfur should be discussed as part of the wider Sudanese peace process. If they are given their autonomy, then it also has to be done to Darfur. The blueprints for the disputed areas of the Nuba mountains, Abyei and southern Blue Nile will likely serve to deal with the Darfur situation. SPLA leader John Garang has also warned that as a governing side during the interim period, it will not be a party to repression in the region. But while the debate continues, people continue to die. Even now, with 30,000 people

forced to flee in December alone into neighbouring Chad, Darfur is receiving relatively little international attention. One donor described reaction to the conflict as a "collectively mishandled crisis". A combination of a lack of accurate information on the conflict, exacerbated by few aid agencies being able to work on the ground and little media coverage have meant that the conflict has not received the attention it deserves, he said. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post any item on this site, please retain this credit and disclaimer. Quotations or extracts should include attribution to the original sources. All graphics and Images on this site may not be re-produced without the express permission of the original owner.

Chapter 4 : UNMIS Background - United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the vitally important issue of the escalating crisis in Darfur.

American Israel Public Affairs Committee [50] The following institutions have not declared the conflict in Darfur a genocide related statements included: Stated that mass murders of civilians have been committed by the Janjaweed , but not genocide [51] African Union: There is mass suffering, but it is not genocide. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no systematic target "targeting one ethnic group or another one. Fighting breaks out in Darfur between government forces and rebels. Refugees start fleeing into Chad January UN officials describe Darfur as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world 7 May: Annan described the trips as constructive. On 22 July , the United States Senate and House of Representatives passed a joint resolution declaring the armed conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur to be genocide and calling on the Bush administration to lead an international effort to put a stop to it. On 30 July, the United Nations gave the Sudanese government 30 days to disarm and bring to justice the Janjaweed, in UN Security Council Resolution ; if this deadline is not met in 30 days, it "expresses its intention to consider" sanctions. Resolution also imposed an arms embargo on the Janjaweed and other militia. They were joined by Nigerian troops later that month. The talks reopened amid acrimony, with the SLA accusing the government of breaking promises [66] that it made for the little-respected April ceasefire. According to him, the situation "has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall". Stopping attacks against civilians and ensuring their protection is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. The Government has not met this obligation fully, despite the commitments it has made and its obligations under resolution Attacks against civilians are continuing and the vast majority of armed militias has not been disarmed. Similarly, no concrete steps have been taken to bring to justice or even identify any of the militia leaders or the perpetrators of these attacks, allowing the violations of human rights and the basic laws of war to continue in a climate of impunity. After 18 months of conflict and 30 days after the adoption of resolution , the Government of Sudan has not been able to resolve the crisis in Darfur, and has not met some of the core commitments it has made. However, he did not threaten or imply sanctions, which the UN had expressed its "intention to consider" in Resolution This position was strongly rejected by the Sudanese foreign affairs minister, Najib Abdul Wahab. If it does constitute an act of genocide, international law is considered to allow other countries to intervene. This was adopted, in modified form, on 18 September as Resolution see below. On 13 September , WHO published a Darfur mortality survey, which was the first reliable indicator about deaths in Darfur. It reported that 6,000 people were dying each month in Darfur. Many were related to diarrhoea , but the most significant cause of death was violent death for those aged 15+ The Darfur mortality rates were significantly higher than the emergency threshold, and were from 3 to 6 times higher than the normal African death rates. Both candidates agreed that what was happening in Darfur was genocide. On 17 October in a meeting between leaders of Libya , Sudan, Egypt , Nigeria and Chad, the idea of foreign intervention was rejected. They stated that they believe it to be a purely African matter. Egyptian presidency spokesman Magued Abdel Fattah said that the international community should "provide Sudan with assistance to allow it to fulfil its obligations under UN resolutions on Darfur rather than putting pressure on it and issuing threats. The European Union mobilised the remainder, an additional EUR 80 million on 26 October from their African Peace Facility to support the deployment and operations of the strong AU observer mission which will monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. However, rebels showed up late and the talks did not begin until 25 October. Two more rebel groups now want in on the negotiations, and an existing cease-fire agreement is considered shaky. The talks are still in progress, but a humanitarian agreement is expected to be hammered out during the course of the talks. November [edit] A village health post destroyed by a Janjaweed militia attack On 2 November the United Nations reports that Sudanese troops have raided the Abu Sharif and Otash refugee camps near Nyala in Darfur, moving a number of inhabitants and denying aid agencies access to the remaining inhabitants inside. The second accord granted international humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur

region. The accords were the product of African Union sponsored peace talks in Abuja that began 25 October. Delegates stated that a later round of negotiations expected to begin in mid-December would work on a longer-term political accord. The talks may have produced the breakthrough accords because of a looming meeting of the UN Security Council, which many expected would have imposed oil sanctions on the Sudanese government if progress had not been made. On 10 November—one day after the accords—the Sudanese military conducted attacks on Darfur refugee villages in plain sight of UN and African Union observers. The Sudanese military retaliated on 23 November by bombing the town. But the Commission stopped short of calling it genocide. The Commission identified 51 individuals responsible for the violation of human rights and recommended immediate trial at the International Criminal Court. An African-run tribunal has been proposed as a countermeasure, and proposals have been made for trials to be held in Tanzania and Nigeria. The current resolution has also been criticized, as it is unclear as to whether the peacekeepers will be deployed to Darfur or to monitor peace in the south of Sudan. It was agreed that war criminals will be tried by the International Criminal Court. It has not attempted to estimate the number of violence-related deaths. The list may include high government officials of Sudan. The Sudanese Government has said it will not hand over the suspects. Bush had forged a "close intelligence partnership" with the Sudanese government despite their presence on the U. This sentiment has led him to invite the leaders of Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Chad and Eritrea to a summit in Tripoli regarding the conflict in Darfur. The two main rebel groups in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, announced they wanted to resume peace talks. Previous negotiations were to be disbanded in favor of new dialogue hoping to solve their differences. It seems that a possible hinge of the negotiations is compliance or refusal of handing over war crime suspects to organizations such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The claim asserted that Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh who is said to have been involved in training the Janjaweed, was flown to Washington for high-level talks with his United States counterparts, related to global terrorism. July [edit] Security in the region is improving, according to the commander of the African Union peacekeeping force. There are currently around 3, troops there to keep the peace, and more are due to arrive in the coming months, expecting to reach 7, troops in September. In keeping with a decision made by the Peace and Security Council, Nigeria sent a battalion of troops on Wednesday, 13 July with two more coming soon thereafter. Rwanda will send a battalion of troops, Senegal, Gambia, Kenya and South Africa will send troops as well. Canada is providing armoured vehicles, training and maintenance assistance, and personal protective equipment in support of the efforts of the African Union Mission in Sudan AMIS. Representatives of the Sudanese government and the two major rebel groups are participating in the talks, however the Sudan Liberation Movement faction refused to be present and according to a BBC reporter the SLM "will not recognise anything agreed at the talks". West Darfur is reportedly too dangerous for aid-agencies to operate. The seventh round of peace talks began on 21 November. Sudan was blamed for the attack, which was the second in the region in three days. The appeal is part of the Work Plan for Sudan, which outlines the activities to be carried out by the UN and its partners in the country in the coming year. The Save Darfur Coalition, representing over humanitarian, faith-based, advocacy, and human rights organizations, launches its "Million Voices for Darfur" campaign to urge President Bush for a larger, more robust multinational peacekeeping force in Darfur. The Security Council agreed unanimously to begin the planning process to send the troops, with a final decision to come later. It called for a 12, to 20, troop presence in Darfur with the 7, African Union troops already there being given new weapons and being incorporated into the UN mission. Furthermore, they would have a greater mandate to protect civilians. Nevertheless, difficulties are expected to arise in finding states willing to contribute troops to the UN mission. Although the United States offered the motion, the U. Also, Omar al-Bashir, the leader of Sudan who is widely believed to be backing the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, has also frequently stated his opposition to UN peacekeepers in Sudan further complicating the problem. Assuming these problems are overcome, UN troops are still not likely to appear in Darfur for nearly a year. A series of rallies [] were held to call for more aid and an increased role for international peacekeepers. The largest one was held on 30 April in Washington D. Darfur and dozens of others, where celebrities and lawmakers came together with nearly a hundred-thousand protesters. Students from at least 46 states attended the rally in Washington DC. Eric

Reeves released a report arguing that the number of deaths in Darfur had likely surpassed , The government of Sudan distanced themselves from his statements, but continued their vociferous condemnations of any potential deployment of UN troops. However, the agreement was rejected by two other, smaller groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and a rival faction of the SLA. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. The accord calls for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army. Research by the UN indicated that violence in Darfur after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement actually increased. Within days of the deal, most sides continued hostilities reaching new levels of violence. The under-funded mission acknowledged the potential effectiveness of a fully equipped UN force. Sudan, which was the first country south of the Sahara to gain independence, cannot now be the first country to be recolonized. If we return to the last demonstrations in the United States, and the groups that organized the demonstrations, we find that they are all Jewish organizations.

Chapter 5 : US Concerned About Escalating Tribal Violence in North Darfur - NewsBlaze News

Serial No. Escalating Crisis in Darfur: Are There Prospects for Peace? Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, February 8, [open pdf - KB].

Over two million people died, four million were uprooted and some , people fled the country as refugees. Over the years, there were many attempts by neighbouring States, concerned donors, other States and the parties themselves to bring peace. Adding impetus to peace efforts, the Secretary-General visited the Sudan from July . On 20 July , the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, in which they reached specific agreement on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. They agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire. UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation. The UN role in Darfur As a response to the escalating crisis in Darfur, the Security Council, by its resolution on 30 July , assigned some additional tasks to UNAMIS relating to Darfur Darfur had long experienced localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political tensions and competition over scarce resources. The cycle of terror inside Darfur also threatened regional peace and security. For several years, the African Union AU led international political efforts to seek a solution to the crisis in Darfur. In July , the AU launched negotiations at the inter-Sudanese peace talks, also known as the Abuja talks. At the same time, the United Nations and a collection of non-governmental organizations launched a massive humanitarian operation in Darfur, constantly expanding activities to respond to the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by violence. The CPA included agreements on outstanding issues remaining after the Machakos Protocol and had provisions on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil. While the parties established the unity of the Sudan as a priority under the agreement, they decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim period during which interim institutions would govern the country and international monitoring mechanisms would be established and operationalized. The UN Mission in the Sudan would be headed by his Special Representative and would include components focusing on the following four broad areas of engagement: The Mission would be headquartered in Khartoum and would be widely represented in the South, including in Rumbek, the provisional capital of Southern Sudan. Darfur Even as the civil war in the south concluded with the signing of the CPA , conflict continued in the Darfur region. In this regard, it was essential that the work of the United Nations and the African Union in the Sudan be complementary. AMIS had enhanced its numbers in October , bringing it to a total of 3, personnel, including 2, military personnel and civilian police, as well as complementary civilian personnel. The Security Council further decided that UNMIS would consist of up to 10, military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to civilian police personnel. Deployment of UNMIS Following the establishing resolution, the deployment of UNMIS military elements commenced, enabling the force headquarters in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Office in Juba to achieve an initial operating capability, but a number of factors resulted in delays in the deployment rate of some military and police elements. In the following months, UNMIS continued its deployment at a steady pace, albeit behind schedule, and assisted the parties in implementing the CPA and resolving ongoing conflicts. At the same time, the deployment of UN human rights monitors to Darfur accelerated. In a parallel development, on 28 April , the AMIS force in Darfur was increased by the AU Peace and Security Council to a total authorized strength of 6, military personnel and 1, civilian police. By September , UNMIS military and police components were close to full strength at 8, troops, military observers, staff officers, and police officers. The Secretary-General said that the DPA , signed after more than three years of conflict, had given hope that the parties might be prepared to lay down their weapons. At the same time, he noted that the Agreement still faced formidable challenges. Following the signing of the Agreement, there was an escalation of clashes between those who supported it and those who did not. The Secretary-General urged the Government of the

Sudan to accept a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Darfur, arguing that the peace in southern Sudan could be put in jeopardy. The Council decided that UNMIS would be strengthened by up to 17, military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including up to 3, civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units. Following prolonged and intensive negotiations with the Government of the Sudan and significant international pressure, the Government accepted peacekeeping operation in Darfur. UNMIS continues its mission For its part, UNMIS has continued to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, by providing good offices and political support to the parties, monitoring and verifying their security arrangements and offering assistance in a number of areas, including governance, recovery and development. Referendum process The referendum to determine the status of Southern Sudan was held on schedule in January , with the overwhelming majority, The Secretary-General welcomed the announcement of the final results ,stating that they were reflective of the will of the people of southern Sudan. The Secretary-General said that the peaceful and credible conduct of the referendum was a great achievement for all Sudanese and he commended the Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA partners, the Government of Sudan led by President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, and the Government of Southern Sudan led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, for keeping their commitment to maintain peace and stability throughout this crucial period. The Sudanese authorities were responsible for the referendum process. On 17 May , the Secretary-General urged the parties and the Security Council to consider a three-month extension of UNMIS due to ongoing security concerns in South Sudan that were directly related to security issues that the North and South had to address together. The resolution mandated UNMISS to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours. New UN Mission in disputed Abyei A separate referendum to determine whether the future of the area of Abyei lies in northern or southern Sudan was not held in January as originally planned, as a result of a failure to establish a referendum commission and lack of agreement on who could vote. The Security Council was deeply concerned by the violence, escalating tensions and population displacement. The operation will monitor the flashpoint border between north and south, and is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian workers in Abyei.

Title The escalating crisis in Darfur: are there prospects for peace?: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, February 8,

Minni Minnawi with U. Bush after he signed the May agreement. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, AU representatives and other foreign officials operating in Abuja, Nigeria. When they had finished, the attackers stripped them naked and jeered at them as they fled. He was later released after direct negotiation with President al-Bashir. This right rests with the government of Sudan. The clay figures depict an attack by Janjaweed. She urged the Sudanese government to accept the UN proposal. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo spoke against "stand[ing] by and see[ing] genocide taking place in Darfur. Bush imposed further sanctions against those deemed complicit in the atrocities under the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2002. The measures were said to strengthen existing sanctions by prohibiting US citizens from engaging in oil-related transactions with Sudan although US companies had been prohibited from doing business with Sudan since 2002, freezing the assets of complicit parties and denying them entry to the US. Pronk, the senior UN official in the country, had been heavily criticized by the Sudanese army after he posted a description of several recent military defeats in Darfur to his personal blog. They were the latest of numerous Darfur Arab groups to oppose the government since 2003, some of which had signed political accords with rebel movements. The same period saw an example of a tribe-based split within the Arab forces, when relations between the farming Terjem and nomadic, camel-herding Mahria tribes became tense. Terjem leaders accused the Mahria of kidnapping a Terjem boy, while Mahria leaders said the Terjem had been stealing their animals. Ali Mahamoud Mohammed, the wali, or governor, of South Darfur, said the fighting began in December when the Mahria drove their camels south in a seasonal migration, trampling through Terjem territory near the Bulbul River. Fighting resumed in July 2003. Also on 18 November, the AU reported that Sudanese military and Sudanese-backed militias had launched a ground and air operation in the region that resulted in about 70 civilian deaths. The AU stated that this "was a flagrant violation of security agreements". The border villages of Tiero and Marena were encircled and then fired upon. Many of those who survived the initial attack, ended up dying due to exhaustion and dehydration, often while fleeing. Ahmed Haroun said he "did not feel guilty," his conscience was clear, and that he was ready to defend himself. It asserted that neither country would harbor, train or fund armed movements opposed to the other. Colin Thomas-Jensen, an expert on Chad and Darfur at the International Crisis Group think-tank expressed doubts as to whether "this new deal will lead to any genuine thaw in relations or improvement in the security situation". The agency cited inaction by local authorities from the Sudan Liberation Movement SLM, which controls the region, in addressing security concerns and violence against aid workers. Vehicle hijackings also made them consider leaving. This find could eliminate the competition for water resources. Most have been relocated by Sudanese government to former villages of displaced non-Arab people. His absence was damaging to the peace talks.

Chapter 7 : The UN Security Council's response to Darfur: a humanitarian perspective - ODI HPN

The escalating crisis in Darfur: are there prospects for peace?: hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, February 8,

Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed militias burned and destroyed hundreds of villages, caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths, displaced millions of people, and raped and assaulted thousands of women and girls. As of April , some 2. Rebel allegiances have shifted and split since the conflict began, most notably in November , when the SLA split into two factions, and once again following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement DPA in May . For a period in early , the number of government attacks on civilians decreased, partly because the majority of targeted villages were already destroyed and their inhabitants displaced from the rural areas. In late , however, the situation dramatically worsened, and deteriorated still further after the May Darfur Peace Agreement. Throughout and the situation gradually transformed due to the increasing fragmentation and changing allegiances of the parties. As both government and rebel factions jockeyed for position and pursued military gains, violent clashes and outright targeted attacks on civilians continued across Darfur. However, civilians also suffered harassment, beatings and rape even outside the context of large scale attacks, at the hands of government forces, militia, rebels and ex-rebel groups and bandits. What is happening in Darfur now? The government of Sudan in and continued its bombing campaign, carrying out massive air strikes on civilian areas purportedly under rebel control in all three Darfur states. Government-backed militias have also carried out large scale attacks on the civilian population across Darfur. In February , government forces and allied militia carried out a series of coordinated attacks on villages in West Darfur, purportedly in response to military gains by JEM in the preceding two months. On February 8, , three villages—Sirba, Silea and Abu Suroj—were attacked in a single day by the Sudanese Air Force with Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships, backed up by Janjaweed militia on horseback. The Janjaweed followed up the bombing with burning, looting, rape and killing. At least civilians died as a result of these attacks, and at least 10 women were raped or sexually assaulted. Government forces targeted civilians, some being sought out in their hiding places and shot. Abuses are also carried out by rebel and ex-rebel groups. These abuses against civilians, as well as clashes between SLA-Minni Minawi fighters and rebel groups, have also caused substantial displacement, especially of people from Korma and Tawila, to various camps in the area. However, some militia also have grievances against the government, particularly those whose promised salaries have not been delivered. This has led to some outbreaks of violence, most recently in El Fasher in April when militia protesting lack of pay attacked the market and other areas, leaving at least 15 people dead. In addition, some militia have switched allegiances to rebel groups, at least for a period. Since January there has also been an increase in violent clashes between Arab armed groups, particularly in South Darfur, which has left more than people dead and forced thousands to flee. Who is providing protection for civilians in Darfur? On July 31, , the United Nations Security Council, with the consent of Sudan, agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force of up to 26, international military and police personnel in Darfur. However, because of Sudanese government obstruction, few additional troops were deployed at the transfer of authority, and even by April the force was barely one third of its authorized strength. The government of Sudan threw up a series of bureaucratic obstructions to the force, including delaying allocating land for bases and the arrival of critical equipment. Khartoum has also insisted that the peacekeeping force be composed primarily of troops from African countries, although there are no equivalent African troops ready to deploy. Other governments have also failed to support the force. As of April , only five helicopters had been offered. Why has the situation in Darfur deteriorated? One of the key problems is that over the past four years the Sudanese government has continued to follow a policy of supporting ethnic militias, coordinating or tolerating attacks on civilians and permitting serious violations of international law to go unpunished—including attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers and their convoys. The continuing conflict and fragmentation of the rebel groups has also contributed to increasing lawlessness in parts of Darfur. This in turn has allowed bandits to flourish and rebels to attack aid convoys and kill civilians. How does the insecurity affect the humanitarian aid operation?

The deterioration in security, combined with targeted attacks on aid workers, has severely limited humanitarian access to large areas of Darfur. Between January and April four humanitarian workers were killed in Darfur, and humanitarian vehicles were hijacked, while 29 drivers contracted by World Food Program to deliver food aid were missing as of April 14. During the same period at least 14 humanitarian premises were attacked by armed persons and four humanitarian compounds were destroyed and looted. At least , people are currently cut off from humanitarian aid, and many more are accessible only by helicopter.

What is happening in Chad? Violence in Chad has been escalating since late as Chadian rebels backed by the Sudanese government established bases in Darfur and began carrying out attacks across the border. Darfur rebel groups have long had a presence in eastern Chad, including within refugee camps, which host more than , refugees from Darfur. The rebel faction JEM is a staunch ally of the Chadian government, acting as a proxy force against Chadian rebel groups in return for safe harbor, material and financial support. Hundreds more were killed in attacks on more than 70 villages in November. This is apparently an effort to reduce support for Chadian rebel groups that operate in the same zone, and to create a first line of defense against cross-border incursions.

What can be done to protect civilians? In the long term, a fundamental problem is that the Sudanese government continues to pursue policies that target civilians in Darfur, including through its military strategies, such as recruitment and use of abusive militias, and its providing impunity from prosecution to those responsible for crimes in Darfur. International institutions and governments must apply pressure on the Sudanese government to end these policies and practices, including through the application of targeted individual sanctions and other measures. Rebels and ex-rebels also need to be brought under pressure to end their abuses. UNAMID will need to be widely and strategically dispersed throughout Darfur, have strong rapid response capabilities, carry out regular daytime and nighttime patrols, including firewood and market day patrols, employ well-trained and well-resourced policing units, and contain human rights officers whose findings are publicly reported. UNAMID should also improve humanitarian access so that aid organizations can provide assistance to populations at risk. All of this will require substantial resources to support the force, including the provision of critical equipment such as helicopters. However, it will also require the political will to maintain pressure on Khartoum to actively facilitate the deployment of the force.

How does the Sudanese government explain the situation in Darfur? The government has tried to limit media access to Darfur and has consistently harassed journalists and restricted press freedom in an effort to stop the information flow from Darfur. In the government detained the Al Jazeera correspondent in Khartoum for several weeks after the news agency transmitted reports about Darfur and in August , several western journalists were arrested in Darfur and turned over to Sudanese intelligence. Although these individuals were later released, in September the Sudanese government began cracking down on Sudanese media through pre-print censorship and arbitrary arrests, and imposing many bureaucratic restrictions on international journalists. Khartoum continues to massively understate the crisis in Darfur, maintaining that only 9, people have been killed in the five years of conflict. Despite passing more than a dozen resolutions over a period of four years demanding that the Sudanese government take certain steps, including disarming its militias and ceasing attacks on civilians, there has been little united effort by the UN Security Council to ensure these demands are implemented. The main reason is that the UN Security Council is divided on Sudan because different member states have divergent interests. Russia and China have often supported the Sudanese government because of ideological commitments non-interference in internal affairs of member states and both have economic interests in Sudan. China, for instance, imports between percent of its oil from Sudan and the Sudan oil project is its most successful international oil development endeavor. Two other important steps taken by the Council were the referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court ICC in The Hague because of crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, and the establishment of a sanctions committee and a panel of experts to investigate individuals who violate the arms embargo, commit abuses of human rights, or impede the peace process. They have to-date only imposed sanctions on four individuals, none of them senior government officials.

What kind of sanctions is the UN imposing on parties in the Darfur conflict? In December the UN panel of experts recommended that 17 people, including the Sudanese Minister of Defense, Major-General Abdel Rahim Mohammed Hussein, nine other government officials, two

Janjaweed militia leaders and five Darfur rebel commanders, be sanctioned for their role in committing human rights violations and impeding the peace process. These sanctions include travel bans and freezing foreign bank accounts and other assets. No active duty or serving Sudanese officials have been placed on the sanctions list. Since the imposition of targeted sanctions against these four fairly low-level individuals a year ago, the UN Sanctions Committee has failed to sanction further individuals due to objections by China, Russia and Qatar. In September the Panel of Experts submitted a new report to the UN sanctions committee that described breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights and blatant violations of the arms embargo by all the warring parties. However, as of April, there has been no action by the UN Security Council to extend sanctions to any of the senior figures responsible for past or recent attacks on civilians. What is the International Criminal Court doing on Darfur? The ICC has the mandate to investigate those individuals most responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and other crimes committed since July in accordance with the Rome Statute. The Sudanese government has publicly indicated it will not cooperate with the ICC and insists that it will try criminals in Darfur itself. Instead of fulfilling its obligations to hand Ahmed Haroun over to the court, Haroun remains State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs in Darfur, and in September the government appointed Haroun to co-chair a committee mandated to investigate human rights abuses. The second suspect, Kosheib, was reportedly released from Sudanese jail in October, where he had been held on other charges. What is the Sudanese government doing to prosecute war crimes? There is no indication that the Sudanese justice system is seriously investigating or prosecuting any of the government officials, militia leaders or other individuals responsible for serious crimes in Darfur. It established the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur in but has convicted very few persons and no leaders. All of the people in Darfur are Muslim. The Sudanese government and its Janjaweed militias are also Muslim. There have been many incidents, however, of government forces and Janjaweed destroying mosques, looting the contents of mosques, killing imams and others seeking refuge inside mosques and desecrating the Koran while attacking civilian villages. For example, in just one small area of West Darfur, Human Rights Watch documented the destruction of least 62 mosques by Sudanese government forces and militia during attacks in late and early There have been many subsequent attacks on mosques in different parts of Darfur. What are the ethnic divisions in Darfur? There are many different ethnic groups in Darfur with their own languages and customs. The rebel movements are drawn from three main ethnic groups: The Janjaweed militias recruited, armed and trained by the Sudanese government are mainly drawn from several small Arab nomadic tribes who historically have no access to land, many of whom migrated into Darfur from Chad as a result of civil wars in Chad in the ss. Historically these groups coexisted peacefully and settled disputes through mediation of their leaders or the colonial government, with payment of damages for casualties and property damaged or stolen. There was intermarriage between ethnic groups, despite clashes over resources. There are also many larger Arab communities in Darfur who have their own homelands or dars, and have not participated in the conflict, so it is an oversimplification to describe Darfur as an African-Arab conflict. How are people surviving in Darfur? In many areas they cannot go far from the camps because they continue to be attacked by the militias and women are frequently raped and assaulted when they try to collect firewood or go to market. People cannot return to their homes due to the continuing presence of government-backed militias in the rural areas. Because of the war-caused widespread displacement of subsistence farmers and disruption of trade and nomadic migration routes, the economy of Darfur has been severely disrupted. More than 4 million people in Darfur depend on humanitarian aid in some form. Hundreds of thousands of people in need are beyond the reach of aid workers due to insecurity and targeted attacks as well as interference from obstructive government officials, both civilian and military. Why would the Sudanese government organize the Janjaweed militias? Many of the members of the Sudanese armed forces are from Darfur, so the government may have been reluctant to use those troops in a conflict in their own region. In addition, the government of Sudan has often used ethnic militias as proxy forces, including in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains.

The Darfur region of Sudan has been volatile over the past 30 years, escalating into open rebellion in As of December , the fighting has left million Darfuris in need of humanitarian assistance, including 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Chapter 9 : (Darfur/Darfur)

the escalating crisis in darfur: are there. prospects for peace? hearing before the committee on foreign affairs house of representatives one hundred tenth congress.