

## Chapter 1 : Neoliberalism and its forgotten alternative | openDemocracy

*Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies [Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer] on theinnatdunvilla.com \*FREE\* shipping on qualifying offers. The collapse of Communism has created the opportunity for democracy to spread from Prague to the Baltic and Black Seas.*

Formal Democracy and its Alternatives in the Philippines: Except for the period of dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos between and , the Philippines has had a functioning democracy since independence from the United States in . At the same time, a small group of powerful families has dominated politics and kept the economic benefits of power to themselves. Many analysts use the modifier "elite" when referring to Philippine democracy. Bello and Gershman, Effective participation by citizens outside of elections is limited. Unlike Malaysia and Singapore much more obviously unlike the military dictatorship in Burma with their Internal Security Acts, the Philippine state does not impose too many formal limits to the self-organization of disadvantaged groups. But a combination of bureaucratic rules and informal means including violence continues to make organizing difficult. Without effective popular pressure, government is generally not accountable. While labor and peasant organizations remain weak, other civil society organizations, NGOs and new social movements groups including women and environmental groups are strong and continue to build significant political capability. Initiatives to build new kinds of political parties come from this section of Philippine society. They also constitute a strong base of support for initiatives to reform Philippine politics, to transform a weak, incompetent government dominated by rent-seeking elites. Democratization and International Capital We need to locate the process of democratization in the Philippines in the context of contemporary democratization discourse. The main source of "democratization" discourse in the s are multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD and Western governments led by the United States. Of the multilateral banks, the Asian Development Bank is a late comer. Given these sources, GD discourse cannot be understood outside of the interests and international agendas of international capitalism and the national and multi-national public institutions which support them. Although "democracy" has always been part of the ideological arsenal of international capital, "democratization" discourse in the s has been strongly influenced by post Cold War conditions. Western style liberal democracy, Fukuyama asserts, is the final goal of political evolution. History, therefore, has ended. Another source of Western pressure on governments of the South to "democratize" is the acceleration of Western penetration of the economies of the South usually labeled "globalization". To facilitate this thrust, specific elements in the Western conception of liberal democracy have been pushed, most importantly, its anti-state bias and the equation of "democracy" with "market". Trade and other forms of liberalization have been packaged as "democratization". Since governments are corrupt and inefficient, the argument goes, democracy can be advanced only if many of the economic functions of government are "privatized" - turned over to the "market". The global integration of economies and the spread of democracy have narrowed the scope for arbitrary and capricious behavior. Taxes, investment rules and economic policies must be ever responsive to the parameters of a globalized world economy. Technological change has opened new opportunities for unbundling services and allowing a larger role for markets. These changes have meant new and different roles for government - no longer a sole provider but as facilitator and regulator". After supporting authoritarian regimes throughout the world from Somoza to Marcos to Mobutu for decades, why has international capitalism shifted to support for democracy? Why is democratization in countries of the South in the interest of international capitalism? The attempt to equate democracy with capitalism by neo-liberal ideologues is only one part of the problem. Arguing against the proposition that markets lead to democracy should not be too difficult given the many examples of markets prospering under various forms of authoritarianism in the past and today. The question might be posed in the following manner. If globalization is the current stage of the expansion of capitalist relations into countries of the South, what is it about the particulars of this expansion that makes "democratization" the preferred political strategy of international capitalism? Is it part of the anti-state aspect of neo-liberalism? Does movement away from authoritarian states in the South mean weaker governments? Or is international

capitalism mainly interested in moving against protectionist, nationalist ruling class fractions to enable "modernizing elites" to come to power and make way for the expansion of capitalist relations into new areas of the economies of the South? We might begin to answer these extremely complex questions with some initial clarifications. To start with, the kind of democracy that is being pushed by the North is very specific. It is formal, constitutional, Western-style democracy. It is a form of democracy that separates politics from the structures of power in the economy. Ideologically, it is very much part of the "anti-state aspect of neo-liberalism". Harking back to Lockian arguments, but with a more modern Thatcherite patina, democracy here is understood in the simplest of ways as "less government". In more direct, political terms the same argument might be restated as "OK, you can have democracy but only if you leave the economy alone". For a foreign investor, a crucial condition to assure relatively free entry and exit and the least possible intervention in profit making while in-country. It is no accident that the intensification of Western demands for "democratization" go hand-in-hand with demands for trade liberalization, privatization and financial and other forms of deregulation. What is less often pointed out is that an anti-state interpretation of "democracy" comes down to roughly the same thing. Here it is important to make a distinction between "democratization" in former socialist states and in countries in the non-socialist Third World. In the latter, especially in the relatively newly independent countries of Africa, ruling elites tend to be economically weak. The process of state formation in many countries in the South, whether those decolonized in the nineteenth century in Latin America or only in the s in Africa, created a situation where ruling elites tended to come out of the civilian and military bureaucracies created by colonial governments. Economically weak, bureaucracy-based elites working in the unsettled political conditions of post-colonial countries often easily availed of authoritarian means. This authoritarian tendency was buttressed by external players, often American, anxious to prevent Marxist liberation movements from winning. With the collapse of the USSR and the socialist bloc, one of the major reasons for Western support for authoritarian regimes in the South also disappeared. To make way for accelerated entry of goods and services, most importantly financial services, protectionist and authoritarian regimes have had to be removed or forced to democratize. We might now ask a question made earlier: From the vantage point of the West, why then is the anti-authoritarian thrust of Western pressure accompanied by "governance" programs meant seemingly paradoxically to strengthen government capacity? The seeming paradox exists if we look only at the ideology of Western-style democratization. If we look at the process from the vantage point of the requirements of international capitalism, there is no contradiction. Authoritarian governments in the South have, in fact, tended to be controlled by elite groups based in agro-exports or in manufacturing built up during the heyday of import-substitution industrialization in the s and s. The "modernizing" elites in these countries are in the financial sector or in import-dependent non-traditional exports. These "democratizing" elites, not surprisingly are also the class fractions most needed by international capital as local partners in the ongoing acceleration of globalization. Governments in the South, whether authoritarian or not, also tended to have limited governmental capacity, in the current political science jargon, to be "weak states". For foreign business, this creates problems in both the political and economic realm. Weak governments also have weak capacity to assure political stability, a major requirement of investors. At a minimum, governments have to have a monopoly over the legitimate uses of violence to assure peace and order and end armed challenges to the government. The velocity of these financial flows is such that fund managers require up-to-the-minute data on monetary and fiscal accounts. Authoritarian governments, - usually accompanied by "crony capitalism", by cozy relationships between government officials and their business clients - require hiding or often doctoring this kind of data. As one American scholar said of the Philippines: The historical development of laissez-faire, explains Polanyi, required "an enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state". Overwhelmed by the myriad particularistic demands of powerful oligarchic interests, the Philippine state is unable to provide anything approximating the "political and procedural predictability" necessary for the development of more advanced forms of capitalism". Decentralization programs need not be seen as necessarily weakening central governments if they strengthen the capacity of local government units to implement central government programs. This is particularly true for government economic services such as infrastructure. In the same vein, corruption is seen as an added "cost"

for investors that distort local factor markets. For our purposes, there are three major intellectual biases in Western discourse on democracy that affect the way we look at politics in countries of the South. First, that formal democracy, not popular participatory democracy is the goal. Lastly, that external factors do not play a significant causal role in politics in the South. In a world increasingly dominated by the international capitalist system, national politics in the South - or in any other part of the world for that matter - cannot be properly understood in national isolation. External factors, ranging from IMF-World Bank conditionalities, to foreign military assistance, to more direct forms of foreign military, political and economic intervention are often decisive in determining the outcome of sociopolitical conflicts in countries of the South.

**The Roots of Philippine Politics** From the time of the municipal governments formed by the Americans at the turn of the century through various constitutional and extra-constitutional changes to the present, Philippine politics has operated within institutional parameters limiting and shaping interaction to factions of the elite within a presidential form of government. The most important aspect of the Philippine political system is elite domination. It is crucial to point this out first because it relates directly to two characteristics of the political system, its ineffectiveness, what analysts call a "weak state", and the low level of effective political participation. Defined by Lynch, refined by Lande, and modified by Machado, this analysis excludes considerations of coercion and exploitation in favor of an imagined symbiosis between landlords and tenants or between mill owners and laborers". Although some planters may have cleared unoccupied lands, several expropriated vast tracts from peasant pioneers through a combination of fraud, corruption, and violence". What has kept the Philippine state weak is that no one class has been strong enough to bend the state to its will. Instead, our upper classes are divided into class fractions dependent on government. Their competing demands on government have made it impossible to formulate and implement a coherent economic development policy or to develop political institutions capable of providing a reliable regulatory framework for the economy. The underdeveloped and dependent character of the economy, especially at the time our political institutions were given its characteristic shape in the s provides some of the explanations. Subsistence agriculture and share tenancy do not provide adequate structures of capital accumulation. Commerce and trade were in the hands of Chinese. Because the central government controlled access to export agriculture, and could generate financial resources, it became the main target of local elites. Even if they are not so inclined, elite families are forced to cultivate alliances with the state, particularly its executive branch, if only to defend their established interests from unfair competition by ambitious courtiers. On the other side of this symbiosis, successive Philippine presidents have used their discretionary authority over the state resources to punish enemies and reward allies. By denying established elites access to rents, an administration can quickly reduce the wealth of a family. Similarly, a president can create vast wealth for a favored few by granting a de facto monopoly or approving low-interest loans". Without stable political parties, presidential candidates have to piece together coalitions of provincial politicians to win elections. Without programmatic coherence, political parties cannot facilitate the formulation of long term economic policy. They merely act as brokers for deals with the bureaucracy. The other side of the coin of elite dominance is low level of effective political participation. It is important to emphasize the modifier "effective" because the high turnout in elections might mislead observers into believing that political participation levels are high. People participate in Philippine elections for the same reason they go to cockfights, it is highly entertaining as spectator sports. The apparatus of exclusion of popular groups from the formal political system extends to legal and extra-legal limits on their ability to organize themselves.

## Chapter 2 : Is there an alternative to Democracy? - Quora

*Democracy and Its Alternatives has 2 ratings and 0 reviews. The collapse of communism has created the opportunity for democracy to spread from Prague to.*

Updated Oct 27, Actually yes, The alternative to democracy - what we mean today when we say democracy - is randomization which actually is the real definition of democracy. Draw people to govern by a lottery! At first this sounds crazy but the old meaning of the word democracy is to select by lottery. There are many historical examples of states thriving for hundreds of years by this method. The meaning of the word democracy has shifted since the beginning of the 18th century. The revolutionary fathers of France and the United States actually abhorred the word democracy and preferred speaking of republics and suchlike, but an influential gentleman named de Tocqueville popularized the U.S. Democracy is today synonymous with public elections. This means not even we westerners live in real democracies. The revolutionary fathers of yore were actually rich businessmen and academics that were scared to death of giving power to the uneducated masses, which was the reason for introducing public elections election of well spoken, well dressed, educated men from their own class of course. Governance is about two things edited: There can be several types of adverse reaction when these three are in decline or threatened in a state. Populism - The populist party wants to keep the system but want the power for themselves. They say they and only they truly represent the people which is an obviously false claim. Technocracy - Proponents of technocracy meritocracy wants to keep the system, but not where it matters. Let experts rule in the name of efficiency! But then legitimacy is lost. Not so very legitimate or efficient in practice when most vote with their spinal reflex euphemistically spoken, not their brain and heart after intense reflection and discussion might Brexit be an example? Anti-democracy - Want to remove the elective aristocracy entirely and replace it with something other. Communism, capitalism, nazism and other types of dictatorships and oligarkies have in common that they want to replace democracy, whether they call it the will of the people, the right of free choice, the free market, a righteous leader or a mandate from heaven. I first came in contact with true democracy in my youth when I read about a monastery where the leader was selected by lot, leading to some unexpected choices of leader. Something that apparently worked very well. Here was a book that seriously proposed a system that I had jokingly advocated all my life. And he backed it up to my satisfaction! The definition of true democracy is selecting a statistically representative number of people from every grown up citizen by lot, and then letting them rule a couple of years. It becomes a civic duty to partake in governancy. There are two main obstacles to old style democracy apart from those in power not wanting to let go: One is that the ruling class in an elective aristocracy perceive themselves which has been scientifically demonstrated as more principled, having a higher standard of values and being more able to rule than the masses. Modern experiments with selection from the whole population by lot, shows that in actuality common people do an admirable job when given responsibility and access to experts from various factions, and given time to deliberate. Spin-offs are that the participants gain a much greater respect for politicians, and appreciation for the difficulties in ruling, and the politicians on the other hand gain an appreciation of the capacity of ordinary people. When having one or more representative levels of leaders elected atop the population, each new level shifts more and more away from the views of the people at the bottom until nothing remains, so in a representative democracy, legitimacy would become more or less lost automatically. The other obstacle to true democracy is surprisingly enough the free press. They ridiculed and shot down these modern experiments, and found the deliberations dead boring. Which shows that the press is either firmly a part of the established power structure or that they are junkies for the drama in confrontation, elections and pompous statements from political celebrities. True democracy is a drawn out, mostly dignified business with no need for dramatic press-releases or elections to steal their time and energy every fourth year or so. In fact the long view of things could finally get the attention it desperately needs. My personal view is that old style democracy - selecting parliament and other bodies of governance by lottery - would work extremely well in a relatively homogenous population. But what if you have minorities? I believe minority cultures, people and languages are worth preserving. We would get a poorer world otherwise. Maybe it comes

from living in a small, rather vulnerable, country and realizing we often know better than the big countries and that our culture is valuable and our language can express things not possible in e. Maybe prejudice and mob thinking would disappear in the small ruling body when everybody has to get to know each other - but maybe not. So my suggestion would be that every culture in a country with a long historical presence, whether minority or majority, get an equal number of voting power as every other, at least whenever a question that would affect the minority is on the agenda! I believe true democracy by lot is a good start when fixing the problems of the world. Whether using the old athenian system, the venetian system or something more updated I would trust those so selected! Even if in some cases minorities would get equal representation with the rest.

**Chapter 3 : Democracy and its alternatives : understanding post-communist societies (Book, ) [theinnatdun**

*The collapse of Communism has created the opportunity for democracy to spread from Prague to the Baltic and Black Seas. But the alternativesâ€”dictatorship or totalitarian ruleâ€”are more in keeping with the traditions of Central Europe.*

Inasmuch as Liberal Democracy is the system which has intentionally caused and ensures the continuance of our present problems of neo-liberal capitalism, individualism, and latterly globalisation and its accompanying universalistic suppression of the particular ethnic diversity of nations and exploitation of workers wherever possible, it is in our interest not only to critique it, but also to look for alternatives to replace it. What has obscured the fact that there are other legitimate forms of government and even of democracy than what is presently put forward as the only possible one is that the predominant political regimes of the last years or so have been Statist in nature, namely: Liberal Democracy has also had the good fortune to be the best of these Statist alternatives merely in a strictly comparative sense, so that while Bolshevik Communism was presenting itself as the wave of the future the lesser of the two evils was certainly Liberal Democracy. However, the fall of Communism now allows us to re-examine our own system of government without the charge being laid against us that we are enemy agents working on behalf of a foreign power, nor that what we want for our own country is manifestly worse than what is being presently provided for us. Nor should we meekly accept the commands of others on what we can or cannot find objectionable, just because the Left thinks that it has a monopoly on political issues. Yet, Macklin remains unaware that his position is not at all persuasive. Criticism of Globalisation â€” its causes and inherent features â€” is not the privileged prerogative of self-appointed spokesmen on the Left. In fact, it is more important for those who oppose Globalisation in toto to speak out against it and to organise activism against the injustices that necessarily â€” and not accidentally â€” follow in its wake. With regards to the most notable feature of Statist political regimes â€” the separation of State and Society â€” which all Statist political regimes embody, it is neither the only possible political arrangement nor the only legitimate one. The political writings of the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, can be of use in formulating how and why this is so. Further, the Liberal element in Liberal Democracy takes precedence over or supersedes its democratic element: It is that of an identity of the ruled and ruling, where there is a shared common good â€” achievable through homogeneity of the populace. This leads to the separation of the political rulers from the constituency that they are meant to represent and the creation of an impersonal system of bureaucratic rule indifferent to the content or interests of the society over which it presides. Party rule predominates â€” where representatives of the people rule and the people themselves do not rule nor do they rule in turn. And the entire reason for the rotten edifice in the first place is brought undone by considering its own claim to legitimacy: We will compare Carl Schmitt and Aristotle on this point in a moment. Is there anything to be said for Liberal Democracy? Plato and Aristotle, in particular. These founders emerged in a sequence and relied on earlier developments upon which the further articulation of their own positions was founded, while having a beginning and source which presented itself as a revolt from the thought of the past. This provides us with the following schema: Kant, Hegel and Marx and therefore Communism find their basis here. Friedrich Nietzsche and his successors. In another work, Liberalism, Ancient and Modern, Strauss repeats and amplifies some of these contentions. By being a closed society, it protects and favours its own, and is opposed to universalism which threatens both its ethnic identity or particularity and its homogeneity. On the basis of this closed society which antedates the distinction between State and Society concomitant with Liberal Democracy, the political thinkers of classical antiquity favoured the following solution to the political problem: A variation of this thought is the notion of the mixed regime, in which the gentlemen form the senate and the senate occupies the key position between the popular assembly and an elected or hereditary monarch as head of the armed forces of society. The political and social interaction of the average citizen is quite extraordinary for us to behold: Citizens not only deliberated and took decisions in the Assembly, Council, and the courts, but they chose leaders, made decisions about foreign policy and war, judged the credentials of officeholders, issued decrees, and much more. To this should be added the flourishing local political cultures centered in the demes. How to obtain a viable modern equivalent

to the ancient achievement of republican government in the small, closed society which does not separate State and Society, and is neither Statist nor Liberal Democratic. *The Politics of Progress: The Origins and Development of the Commercial Republic*, University of Florida Press. *The End of History and the Last Man*. *A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States*, ed. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*. *The Concept of the Political*. University of Chicago Press, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern*. Indianapolis and New York. *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. Even though Carl Schmitt is compromised by his later opportunistic submission to Statist Fascism, this need not retro-spectively invalidate his analysis “ at least for those of us who wish to avoid the charge of committing the logical fallacy of argumentum ad hominem.

**Chapter 4 : DEMOCRACY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: Understanding Post-Communist Societies**

*Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* by Richard Rose, William Mishler, Christian Haerpfer  
*The collapse of Communism has created the opportunity for democracy to spread from Prague to the Baltic and Black Seas.*

Share2 Shares Most people in liberal republics or constitutional monarchies consider the slow march to freedom over tyranny to be a laudable and inevitable historical process. Current alternatives to the democratic system exist, like Islamism or various authoritarian regimes, but they hold little ideological appeal to people outside those societies and sometimes even to people within them. When people say that democracy is in crisis, it sounds as if there are no alternatives other than repressive autocracy. Jyrki Kasvi 10 Zapatista Democracy Photo credit: By encouraging a continual consultation and debate process between the governors and the governed, they try to ensure that the government respects the wishes of the community at large. They also want legal recognition for traditional indigenous practices of governance to be carried out autonomously from the state and a politicization of civil society to a degree usually absent in liberal democracy. This committee CCRI is made up of at least one male and one female representative of each indigenous ethnic group plus mestizos. However, all CCRI decisions must pass through a consultation process involving over 1,000 Zapatista communities. These communities are represented by assemblies, which involve mandatory attendance except in the case of illness or work obligations. Despite a continued Mexican counterinsurgency campaign, the Zapatistas have governed communities across five regions of the state of Chiapas for over 20 years. Although opponents refer to the Zapatistas as a politically spent force that is becoming irrelevant, supporters note widespread local support and positive results in terms of reducing violence and drug abuse while empowering the role of women in society. They believe that several factors call for the development of a global civil society to supersede state-based democracies, which are often weak when dealing with global issues. These factors include economic globalization, the growing power of international corporations and supranational bodies, and the disproportionate power of a few states on the international scene. As the issues of globalization reduce the efficiency of nation-states, these nation-states need to be replaced by a broader and more comprehensive system. Some have called for a two-tiered approach to creating new political institutions that would coexist with the nation-state system but would be able to override the decisions of these nation-states in certain areas of international scope and importance. This can be done by enhancing the power and representation of the United Nations or increasing the number of global mechanisms that constrain the power of nation-states to act alone. Others promote the need for a hierarchical relationship of governance with levels of local, state, interstate, regional, and global governance. After all, for issues such as financial flows, immigration, the environment, human rights, and aid to developing countries, effective decisions can only be made on a global level. Yet some kind of democratic accountability is still needed. The main issue with the concept of cosmopolitan democracy is that it seeks to undermine the concept of national sovereignty, which has been the bedrock of the international system for centuries. Criticism of cosmopolitan democracy has emerged from various schools of political thought. These include the Realists who are skeptical about political viability, the Marxists who believe that a new economic system is a necessary prerequisite, and the American hegemony theorists who believe that cosmopolitan democracy would merely reflect the ideology and preferences of the US. There are also more general fears of the emergence of a global technocracy or totalitarian world government if democracy fails. But some thinkers, particularly in East Asia, assert the greater importance of the community and the family. This is based on the notion that so-called universal values of equality, liberty, and fraternity are based on the Western cultural experience and not easily transferred to contexts in East and Southeast Asia. Instead, values of family, respect for hierarchical authority, diligence, consensus, education, community, order, and moral persuasion are the better building blocks for Asian democracy. Advocates often argue that the communitarian state is more harmonious, promoting social control through morality rather than legal structures. In Confucian communitarian democracy, power is constrained by ritual aka li. Meanwhile, all social relationships become de facto personal relationships.

Although scholars have different opinions on how to achieve this, many feel that there should be separate political representation for elite groups. This is often based on the idea that democratic participation from below should be tempered by a meritocratic system above. One problem with this model is that it relies on a single system of ethics that must be accepted by all members of the community. Specifically, that system is the wulun, comprised of the five cardinal relationships in society between ruler and ruled, father and son, husband and wife, seniors and juniors, and equal friends. It completely ignores the possibility of people in society holding different or contradictory moral beliefs. Others argue that this model merely justifies paternalistic and authoritarian structures. They also point out that equality, liberty, and fraternity, while important in modern European political cultures, are neither unique nor unknown to other cultures, including those in East Asia. For those who fell asleep in math class, the square of any number is that number multiplied by itself. The advantage of this system is that people can vote according to the strength of their preferences. Some argue that this would increase the influence of the rich, who can afford to purchase more votes. However, the quadratic increase in cost reduces the benefit of buying votes relatively quickly. But votes may swing a small local race. Weyl argues that the influence of the rich to buy votes under a quadratic system would be less than what already exists under current systems that permit lobbying. When combined with restrictions on campaign financing, he believes that quadratic voting may be fairer than our current systems. Any advantage for the rich of purchasing votes would be theoretically offset by increasing costs and the redistribution of those costs to society at large. The system was tested by Jacob K. Goeree and Jingjing Zhang in laboratory conditions in Participants generally preferred it to the current model. Under these conditions, the quadratic system gave more socially optimal outcomes when there were two voting choices without a clearly obvious winner. The remaining order of candidates reflects levels of societal preference for them. Supposedly, this system gives voters more flexibility because people can vote for both their favorite candidate and the candidate most likely to win. The system is geared toward producing the candidates who are most acceptable to the community overall. It would reduce the spoiler effect of a third candidate splitting the vote and allow an overall less popular candidate to win. Negative campaigning should be reduced because it may be less useful and potentially more alienating. This system may cause greater voter turnout, and minority candidates should receive the votes that better reflect their support. Paradoxically, approval voting has been shown to be of benefit to both minority and majority parties by more clearly showing their actual levels of support. It is also claimed that the system would be simple to implement, easily understood by voters, and require minimal changes to ballot systems already in existence. Laoeuaou Range voting aka score voting is similar to approval voting but somewhat more complicated. The candidate with the highest overall average score would be the winner. Range voting is the system used to determine Olympic champions. It was used in ancient Spartan elections though expressed and calculated through shouting. In fact, some people argue that similar systems are used by honeybees and ants to determine new hive locations. There are a few advantages to using a range voting system. Voters can be more expressive and exact in their preferences. The system is biased toward centrist positions rather than extremist positions while promoting more democratic outcomes. One study even suggested that switching from current plurality voting methods to range voting could improve the outcome of elections as much as switching from a dictatorship to a democracy. Some distrust this concept. Instead, a single vote is chosen at random to determine the winner. Therefore, a candidate with 70 percent of the vote has a roughly 70 percent chance of winning. This system is a form of sortition, much like demarchy. However, rather than having representatives chosen at random, the votes of the people still influence the probability of a particular outcome. But theoretically, if it were applied on a broad enough scale, it would be subject to the law of averages and produce results that better reflect the choices of the electorate. In current voting models, such a party might not get any representatives at all. Similarly, a party getting 10 percent of the vote over all districts would have a higher chance of getting more seats than a party with 60 percent of the votes over only a few key districts. The system seems ridiculous but has some advantages. Gerrymandering would become irrelevant. This system also eliminates strategic voting, in which voters choose a candidate more likely to win over a candidate they actually prefer. Each voter would always have an incentive to vote for their most preferred candidate without fear of weakening their second choice. Political and social

minorities would have better representation, but the chance of an extreme fringe party taking power would be mathematically minute. Theoretically, term limits would be built into the system because no matter what a politician does during his term, he may find himself booted out by fate. This would declare your registration as a citizen of a political group of your own choosing. So you could choose to be a tax-and-spend monarchist while your neighbor is a laissez-faire fascist. Your interactions would be the same as interactions between members of differing governments. Zach Weinersmith, the creator of Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal, wrote a work of political science fiction called *Polystate: A Thought Experiment in Distributed Government*. For example, if an American wished to live in a Scandinavian system of high taxes and free health care, he would simply go to the local bureau and register a new political allegiance. There are a number of practical issues with this concept. First, it ignores how the private and unregulated behavior of people affects those around them. For example, it would be difficult to live in a pacifist anthrostate if your neighbors were members of an anthrostate that has legalized home invasion. It would also be easy for any existing geostate to attack and destroy anthrostates within its territory. Finally, there is no clear indication as to how anthrostates would be able to collect taxes or exert authority over their members. Foldvary believes that many of the problems with modern democratic institutions, like the influence of special interest groups and dodgy campaign financing, are the result of having a mass democracy. He suggests multilevel voting. Neighborhoods would elect representatives to a local council. Then these councils would elect a member within their own body to go to the next higher level, likely the city or county council. These councils would choose a single member from among themselves to join the state legislative council. From there, the members of the state legislative council choose the state representative for Congress. The members of Congress then elect the president. As each of these elections is held among a relatively small group, the ability of special interest groups to run mass advertising campaigns or control politicians through strategic campaign financing should be limited. Foldvary also argues that the neighborhood cells of his system should not be imposed on people.

**Chapter 5 : Democracy and its alternatives | Danijel Turina blog**

*One hybrid form of democracy is Hired Representative Democracy, where you have specific and general directives to your representative(s), and he/she must follow your directives, or be dismissed. So your vote counts on all legislation.*

Let us first define what a system of government is, what democracy is, and what makes a good system of government. This is important because I want us to avoid conflating political and economic systems to the point where we can no longer separate their individual effects. Also, we need to separate the concept of general scientific and technological advancement from our estimates of political systems. Also, we need to separate the natural and circumstantial wealth from our equation. I will first explain why, so that you can follow my line of thinking more easily. An example of separating the system of government from the economic system are the Asian technological giants, such as South Korea, Japan, Singapore and China. However, they all adopted some form of a capitalist, free market economy, and as soon as they did, their overall economic condition has improved significantly, to the point of transforming them into world powers. Why is it important to separate government from economy? Because we might feel tempted to ascribe the success of the economy to a system of government, and that would be a fallacy. The reason why we need to separate the overall level of scientific and technological progress from the system of government is because those two things are also independent values, in a sense that you can have a technologically inferior democracy of ancient Greece, and technologically superior dictatorship of ancient Persia. You can also have a technologically inferior America and technologically superior Nazi Germany. Soviet Union was a communist dictatorship, and was technologically either the most advanced on Earth or on par with the most advanced. Essentially, technology and science are as separate from government as is economy, but of course government can significantly influence them both if it chooses to do so. We also need to remove natural and circumstantial wealth from our equations. Some other country, like Singapore, can be located on a major trade route, and can derive a part of its economic success from that. Others, like the Arab countries, can have vast natural reserves of oil, which provide incredibly high income, independently from their economic or political system. A country can, therefore, derive substantial wealth from simply being at the right place at the right time. So, we now have quite a problem: Let us first see what forms of government were actually in use throughout history. We had tribal meritocratic democracy, as probably the first form of government over small populations. This is probably the optimal form of government for humans, and probably the only one that has been around so long it has the strong backing in human genetics; it is probably as old as the use of fire and tools, if not older. This system has one major flaw: You needed to order them around in some logical, efficient arrangement. This worked remarkably well, and is the second most stable form of government known to mankind. However, with mass feeding and mass living it also introduced mass murder, in form of wars. This is the first form of government that made possible the organization of large scale military expeditions, either for defense or conquest. It also made it possible to advance science, technology and architecture on levels not seen before. This form of government was independently invented on different continents, and is apparently a normal phase of development from tribalism into civilization. One might now mention ancient Greece as an example of democracy, but I disagree. The Greeks were on the tribal, pre-civilized or proto-civilized stage of social development, and their civilization is more of a tribal agglomerate than anything else. They were no more or less democratic than the Lakota or the Cheyenne. It just means they were small enough to be able to manage their affairs efficiently in a tribal manner. This is a different, more defined form of hierarchy compared to the meritocracy present in the smaller communities, and was usually hereditary. Greece and Rome are an excellent example of such social divisions. The interesting thing with such social stratifications is that they lessen the requirement for broad popular support in the process of election of leadership. Essentially, in small social groups you have to govern by consent. As the community grows bigger, and as the society is stratified, the highest social stratum can elect leadership with little or no input from the lower strata. In some cases, when leadership becomes hereditary, the democratic input is reduced to zero. Even in Roman times it was common knowledge that the best emperors were in fact adopted, basically hand-picked as heirs to the throne, and the

worst ones were born to the position. The few examples to the contrary, such as Titus, were the exceptions that made the rule. Essentially, what that means is that you can have a very good and effective system of government as long as the leader or the aristocracy has to pick the successor from the number of those who rose through the ranks and are therefore competent. But if leadership is hereditary, the probability of getting an idiot for a king is exceedingly high. This is why such primitive feudal societies are hardly more than an armed gang of thugs which exploits the population of illiterate peasants. In order for a society to advance, it must be inclusive, in a sense that the general population has a stake in it, in a sense that it will be willing to defend its government, and not just move out of the way if a rival gang of thugs wishes to take over. Also, for the society to be stable the general population must willingly finance it, and not just be forced to pay taxes. Apparently, this is the real use of the entire show of democracy, in which the general population is allowed to pick one of the leadership candidates presented to them by the higher social strata. If you want people to obey you, you basically have only two options. You can employ the pharaonic model, where the ruler is presented as someone who has the heavenly mandate and it is therefore a religious duty of all citizens to obey him as they would obey the gods. Alternatively, you can attempt to emulate the tribal meritocratic democracy, where the people elect their leader among the most effective social organizers, someone whom they feel as their own, and would obey him because they trust him. You can, of course, skip the requirement of popular support, and rule by naked force, but historically such rule lacks stability and is quickly deposed by some alternative militant fraction. Essentially, what we can safely conclude is that real democracy works only in smaller tribal communities, which are small enough for all the members to know each other, to have a say in the choice of leadership, and to have the ability to depose leadership if it goes astray. So, instead of trying to say whether Churchill was right saying that democracy was the best system of government, we would be better off asking a different set of questions – for instance, what methods did different systems of government historically use to assure broad popular support, and with what results? If we judge on the stability of a society, our current model of government can only be seen as a recent experiment which produced mostly disastrous results, from the slaughterhouse that was the French revolution, through American independence which meant buying slaves from African markets in order to grow cotton on land that was stolen from the native tribes, through colonialism, two world wars, eugenics, racism and genocide. Essentially, if you think we fare better than the pharaonic despotisms of antiquity, you are deluding yourselves. Our political system is very volatile and historically proved likely to result in bloody conflicts. What masks this reality is the huge advancement in science and technology, and a rather broad access to the benefits of modern technology, where a common citizen can enjoy functionality that used to be beyond the wildest dreams of kings. This, however, has nothing to do with democracy; Singapore is not a democracy in any conventional meaning of the word and is among the wealthiest countries. South Korea is at best an elitist hierarchical society, and has extremely advanced technology. Do we even need to mention China? Essentially, what makes a society work is some strange mixture of the popular support for the government, a sense of inclusion of the general population, a feeling of sharing the common goals with the leadership, a feeling that the laws of the society are just and fair, and a Darwinian meritocracy of economy and science. It needs to be democratic only in the broadest sense, that the general population identifies with the government and recognizes it as its own. This entry was posted in politics , society by danijel. Leave a Reply Your email address will not be published.

**Chapter 6 : Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies by Richard Rose**

*"The definitive definition of democracy is inadequate and misleading. If all it means is that everyone can vote then anyone could adopt it as an ideology. What did the GDR stand for other than the.*

Autocracies now constitute a smaller share of regimes than ever before. Autocratic regimes feel compelled to call themselves democracies and hold elections, flawed though they may be. As Krastev notes: Russia is faking democracy, while China is faking communism. Yet, while democracy has made unprecedented gains, anxieties about democracy are widespread. Representative Democracy and Alternative Models: Expansions of Executive Power To overcome political instability and legislative gridlock associated with democratic rule, some have called for expansions of executive power and, indeed, for limits on democratic freedoms. Yet there are reasons to be skeptical of this interpretation. Calls to expand executive power are common in democracies as well. In Venezuela, President Chavez abolished presidential term limits in , but economic performance has been poor and corruption rife. More generally, democratic regimes facing terrorist threats have seen expansions of executive power and the national security apparatus, yet evidence of the success of this strategy is hard to muster. Under what conditions do expansions of executive power occur? What impact does expanded executive authority have on democracy? How can we prevent executives from translating temporary advantages due to surges in commodity prices or national security threats into longer-term changes in institutions? Direct Democracy Direct democracy and plebiscites provide another option to cure the ailments of representative democracy. Thirty-seven countries currently have provisions for citizens to rule on policy outcomes and many more allow referenda at the subnational level Beramendi et al. In evaluating the impact of direct democracy, the devil is in the details and the great variation in institutional design hinders generalizations about it. On several occasions in the postcommunist world, incumbents expanded presidential power by using or threatening to use referenda. On the other hand, Frey and Stutzer find a positive correlation between direct democracy and perceived happiness. Does it bring policy outcomes closer to those of the median voter? In addition, the traditions or concepts cited above are elastic. Huntington sees Confucianism as incompatible with democracy, while Ackerly points to affinities between the two. Yet, two points are worth raising. These traditions are not exogenously given, but invented anew. We might think about identifying the conditions under which these appeals to democracy with adjectives resonate with the mass public. Second, skepticism toward democracy with adjectives is not to overlook ethnocentric strains in many discussions of democracy or to argue for institutional conformity. Indeed, democratic institutions will inevitably be tailored to fit local circumstances. Identifying how to bring adversaries to the table seems temporally prior to determining whether or not non-adversarial deliberation improves decision making and support for democracy. Autocratic Temptations The governance problems of democracies have led some to ponder the advantages of state capitalism and autocratic rule. China provides perhaps the clearest empirical example of performance legitimacy given its high rates of economic growth. One can dismiss China as an outlier given its size, but it is a very large outlier indeed. More generally, the performance legitimation so central to autocratic rule is a double-edged sword because many factors on which citizens judge regime performance are beyond the immediate controls of incumbents. For example, until recently, presidential approval ratings in Russia were correlated with economic performance to a stunning degree Treisman Finally, the problems of inequalities of participation and influence are likely greater in non-democracies. Following the Citizens United decisionâ€”which, among other things, expanded the rights of employers to engage in political advocacy in the workplaceâ€”there appears to have a sharp increase in such politicking. However, it is important to keep scale in mind. The quality of participation and influence is hard to measure systematically, particularly in non-democratic regimes, but surely they are causes for deep concern. Institutions and the Last Crisis of Confidence in Democracy In seeking to increase confidence in and support for representative democracy, our instinct as political scientists is to focus on institutions. Indeed, this strategy was central to democracy promotion during the Third Wave. Yet, we now have a better sense of the limits of institutional design due to concerns for endogeneity. Over the last decade, studies of democratization have focused more on structural

features, such as economic inequality and asset mobility, than on institutional design. If we are to offer policy prescriptions, we should take this knowledge into account. Understanding the impact of institutions is one task. Getting incumbents to adopt them is another. Selected References Beramendi, Nancy et al. *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*. Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace. A Reply to James Fishkin.

## Chapter 7 : 10 Alternatives To Conventional Liberal Democracy - Listverse

*Inasmuch as Liberal Democracy is the system which has (intentionally) caused and ensures the continuance of our present problems of neo-liberal capitalism, individualism, and (latterly) globalisation and its accompanying universalistic suppression of the particular ethnic diversity of nations and exploitation of workers (wherever possible), it.*

David Ridley 8 January The debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey throughout the s points to an alternative to the neoliberal world view, submerged in the subsequent war between capitalism and communism. Criticisms of neoliberalism are proliferating, not just within the political and academic left, but within mainstream public opinion as well. Liberal economists are pointing to the increasing inequality caused by 30 years of neoliberalism in the west. Aside from inequality, other critics have focused on how neoliberalism is incapable of solving the problem of climate change. Naomi Klein has, for a long time, pointed to how climate change intensified with the deregulation of markets in the s – for many people the beginning point of the rise of neoliberal hegemony in the west. As Monbiot and others have correctly pointed out, the move to financialise natural resources is not intended to save the world, but to create another source of capital accumulation and thus save an increasingly desperate capitalist system. Neoliberalism was an attempt by influential German economists, such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, and social theorists, such as Max Weber and Walter Lippmann in the US to rescue and reformulate liberalism in theory, a theory that had itself originated historically in the 17th and 18th centuries as a critique of the arbitrary power of church and state. According to these theorists, liberalism had become incapable of dealing with what they saw as the contemporary manifestation of arbitrary rule in fascist Germany and Italy and communist Russia. To understand the true origins of neoliberalism, and therefore be able to rescue a convincing alternative, however, we must return to the work of Walter Lippmann. Lippmann was very much influenced by the emerging critique of economic planning that was beginning to appear in the s, especially in the work of Ludwig von Mises, Boris Brutskus and Friedrich Hayek, reaching its high-point just before the outbreak of World War II. In this case, of course, the individual has limited access to knowledge, no matter how well educated or intelligent we are. Dewey drew a far more positive conclusion than Lippmann: These stereotypes and habits also give us access to social knowledge, as subconsciously we must have a deep understanding of how society works in order to act. This means that everything around us is a source of exploration and knowledge. Life itself is a learning process and the world is a classroom. What Lippmann and Hayek fail to see, due to their attachment to extreme individualism, is that by tapping into the social nature of knowledge through collaborative reflection, the limitations imposed on us by our individual perspectives can be overcome. And democracy, in the positive Deweyan sense, is the most effective way of putting these perspectives to work. Ironically, neoliberalism points to the way forward. The history of neoliberalism has taught us two things: Secondly, the public, like the perfect market, does not just spontaneously appear with negative freedom. However, without creating the material and social conditions for participation, these efforts at condescension will be rightly met with scorn. We may need to reduce the working week even further to enable people to have time for community activities and public research. We certainly need to prevent education from being turned towards a class-based, narrowly vocational process of training people to be profit-making machines. D in Sociology at the University of Birmingham. His research investigates the possibility of a pragmatist, grass-roots sociology for a post-neoliberal society.

## Chapter 8 : John Gordon, "Notes on Liberal Democracy and its Alternative" | Counter-Currents Publishing

*Election in Congo, 1 | 2. Even where democracy is not established or consolidated, most political systems ultimately consider democratic elections with competing parties necessary for state legitimacy.*

## Chapter 9 : What is democracy, and is there a better alternative? | Opinion | The Guardian

*How well have the east Europeans done in a decade of democracy-building? One indicator, these authors argue, is public opinion. From their in-depth polling data for nine states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, and Ukraine), the authors conclude.*