

# DOWNLOAD PDF CONDITIONS AND ANALYSES OF KNOWING ROBERT K. SHOPE

## Chapter 1 : The Analysis of Knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

*In "Conditions and Analyses of Knowledge", Robert Shope focuses on the conditions that must be satisfied for a person to have knowledge, specifically knowledge that something is so. Traditionally, knowledge has been analyzed in terms of justified true belief. Shope addresses philosophers.*

According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge: S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—“to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. Outright belief is stronger see, e. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down he sees that it has , but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: E Elizabeth died in Radford makes the following two claims about this example: Albert does not believe E. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts. Since he takes a and b to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of a and b might be resisted. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer take this route. The justification condition is the topic of the next section. Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—“on no particular basis—“that it will land tails. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. Given their not unsubstantial assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition;[ 9 ] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification but see Lowy This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p, or wonder which of a group of people know that p, often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one. Although most agree

that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be sufficient. There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example: Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. The 14th-century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case: Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. No False Lemmas According to one suggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick: There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition iv is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes There is a dog in the field. Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone. Given these assumptions, d is of course false. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with iv , gives us the wrong result that James knows d. Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county. This time, his belief is justified and true. Yet condition iv is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that iv does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem. Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation: Given a Lewisian Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not-p, the subject does not believe that p. One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances. This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same groundsâ€”viz. However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up. Relatedly, as Kripke has also indicated We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant. Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only

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handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases. Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands.

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## Chapter 2 : Robert K. Shope, Conditions and analyses of knowing - PhilPapers

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## Chapter 3 : Gettier problem - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy

*Robert K. Shope, Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Boston Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.*

Philosophers who believe that Gettier-style arguments pose a substantial problem for the tripartite theory of knowledge vastly outnumber those who do not. I will argue that while Gettier arguments do surface some problems in epistemology, they do not undermine JTB. Specifically, I will argue that JTB describes the justification of beliefs while Gettier arguments merely show the limitations of language that reference beliefs. I will argue that most Gettier-style counterexamples fail to make a distinction between a proposition or a statement that exemplifies a proposition and beliefs about or of propositions. Treatments of the Gettier problem are expansive, complex, and varied. Causal theories attempt to demonstrate that the justification condition is unnecessary by arguing that knowledge consists of beliefs that are directly caused by the object of the belief. Others have attempted to analyze Gettier cases in terms of reliability requirements. These models have the belief being formed by way of reliable processes but not necessarily starting from the event or state of affairs that the belief is about. Shope then considers analyses done in terms of defeasibility. This class and the two that follow attempt to add a fourth condition to the standard account. Before providing his own analysis, Shope reviews two more approaches the first of which are analyses in terms of virtue epistemology. Reliabilist theories would fall under virtue analyses on this read. Shope carefully explains that each approach above deals with a certain subset of cases but no approach deals with all variants of Gettier-style examples. As he unpacks each view, he isolates a variant that each solution fails to address. Index [1] In this paper, Shope explores the various responses to the Gettier Problem as well as surveys the critiques of the tripartite theory of knowledge in general. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology Oxford: Oxford University Press, For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that the three conditions, justification, truth and belief, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge. My only claim at this point is that whatever belief, truth, and justification turn out to be, one does not have knowledge without meeting all three conditions. When the three conditions are met, one has knowledge.

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## Chapter 4 : Conditions and Analyses of Knowing - Oxford Handbooks

*ROBERT K. SHOPE of the form, (13) 'S knows that P, if and only if Q', we cannot tell which of the above types of analysis is intended. And many articles on knowing have indeed left that.*

Additional Information In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: The Form of Standard Analyses of Knowing 5 2. Historical Comments regarding Attention to Standard Analyses 12 3. Some Questionable Attacks on Standard Analyses 19 4. Gettier-Type Examples 21 5. The Gettier Problem Is Genuine 26 6. Additions to Standard Analyses I: Subjunctive Conditionals 45 1. Defeasibility Analyses 45 1. Other Conditionals concerning Justification and Belief 75 2. Additions to Standard Analyses II: Limitations on the Presence of Falsehoods in Justification 81 1. Sosa on Trees of Knowledge and Epistemic Explanations 85 2. Limitations on the Justifying Power of Evidence or Grounds 96 1. Sosa on Epistemic Presuppositions 2. Early Causal Analyses 2. Conclusive Reasons Analyses 3. Deletions from Standard Analyses 1. Attacks on the Belief Condition 1. Attacks on the Justification Condition 2. Some Morals of the Preceding Discussion 2. Epistemic Explanations and Justification-Explaining Chains 4. A Rationale for this Solution to the Gettier Problem 4. Rationality, Science, and the Social Aspects of Knowing 6. You are not currently authenticated. View freely available titles:

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## Chapter 7 : Conditions and Analyses of Knowing - Oxford Scholarship

*[1] In this paper, Shope explores the various responses to the Gettier Problem (as well as surveys the critiques of the tripartite theory of knowledge in general). See Robert K. Shope, "Conditions and Analyses of Knowing" in Paul K. Moser, ed.*

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