

**Chapter 1 : Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)**

*Diversity has become the ruling ideology of the state, guiding its actions in a variety of areas, producing new laws and quasi-laws in a manner intended to restructure society and individual character.*

However, these rejoinders are less than convincing for reasons illuminated by Cheshire Calhoun. Calhoun reminds us that feminists are sensitive to ways in which the shape of discourse is influenced by non-epistemic considerations. In particular, Calhoun draws our attention to the cumulative effect of a whole tradition of moral reasoning that focuses on too narrow a range of moral problems and too narrow an understanding of people and the human condition. Following Calhoun, I show that criticism of their theory as ideology is not criticism of its logical implications, but something far more damaging, something without available rejoinders. Major proponents of the dominant conception of auto- Correspondence: Susan Sherwin raises two major concerns that some feminists have. First, feminists have questioned the conception of persons that the dominant theory of autonomy implies, a conception of persons that feminists typically believe to be false. These criticisms typically apply to stark, individualistic conceptions of autonomy that more balanced theories [like our own] avoid. Communal life and human relationships provide the matrix for the development of the self, and no defensible theory of autonomy denies this fact Beauchamp and Childress , pp. This dismissive response is unsatisfactory. It fails fully to appreciate the nature of the criticism. Such rejoinders attempt to show that feminist commitments are logically consistent with the dominant conception of autonomy. However, these rejoinders are less than convincing for reasons illuminated by Cheshire Calhoun in her analysis of gender bias in the ethics of justice. This feminist sensitivity to the nature of discourse has bearing on the debate about autonomy. Evaluation of the dominant theory of autonomy must include these non-epistemic ideological considerations. Such an evaluation changes the focus of the current debate away from matters of logical implication to critique of the ideologies upon which the dominant theory rests and also reinforces. In using this approach I do not claim that the feminist conceptual framework I use is free from ideological commitments. That is, their theory relies on the unacceptably narrow focus of vision that is its foundation. Then, using Calhoun, I show that a feminist critique goes beyond what is immediately apparent in the current debate. I show that criticism of the theory as ideology is not criticism of its logical implications, but something far more damaging. It is criticism of the basic assumptions upon which the theory depends. Because these criticisms cannot be adequately responded to without dismantling the theory, the theory is left without acceptable rejoinders. They are not solely independent, nor do they strictly follow reason. In fact, people sometimes act contrary to their best interests, which violates a liberal understanding of an autonomous person Sherwin, , p. It is sufficient, they believe, to be only substantially autonomous Beauchamp and Childress, , p. Moreover, women, as well as other oppressed people, have had their rationality and consequently their autonomy unjustly denied Cook, , p. This description best applies to educated, rational, independent persons. Some feminists are critical of the dominant conception of autonomy because it requires a high degree of independence in thought and action. They admit that most of us do live in communities and have relationships with other people, both of which affect how we develop, think and act. For instance, childhood socialization has a fundamental effect on independence by shaping the skills we develop that either enhance or limit our autonomy. Diana Meyers argues that boys tend to have a higher degree of autonomy than girls in part because boys, more so than girls, are socialized in ways that allow them to practice autonomy skills such as self-assertion in action Meyers, , p. Furthermore, they could consistently claim that that degree of autonomy could be achievable by girls were certain social practices changed, and that their conception of respect for autonomy as a moral principle provides justification for changing certain social practices in just the ways that feminists want them changed. More than mere influence and socialization, feminists are concerned with the repressive influence of social institutions and practices on persons. Their silence on the matter does not preclude accommodation within their theory. First, the factual ground: Second, the consequentialist ground: For instance, people can be harmed by social demands to meet the ideal. Other values and interests are morally important as well, and the particulars of the situation determine which values and interests and moral

principles take precedence. That some substantially autonomous decisions are overridden by others is a matter distinct from having substantial autonomy in the first place Beauchamp and Childress, , p. On such views, persons are always and necessarily socially situated, that is, they are always and necessarily in relationships with others. These alternative conceptions of autonomy emphasize just what these feminists have found lacking in the dominant conception of autonomy: They tend to understand autonomy grounded on this relational conception of persons as involving the competent exercising of skills, derived and constrained by social circumstances, that facilitate self-direction. Thus, as Sherwin claims, autonomy conceived this way is a social project residing in individuals Sherwin, , p. Numerous advantages obtain for these alternative conceptions of autonomy. They support richer and more acceptable notions of persons and, as a result, they support more comprehensive understandings of what counts as moral problems. Significantly, responsibility for choices and actions extends to society to the extent that society contributes to the development of the necessary skills for choice. These conceptions of autonomy make clear that having and respecting autonomy requires anticipation by others of what is needed to make the choice in question and facilitating that choice accordingly. Thus developing and enabling the skills of autonomy are more easily morally motivated from these conceptions of autonomy than the dominant conception of autonomy that is often thought to require only non-interference by others. Of special note, these conceptions of autonomy do not rely on or reinforce unacceptable ideology. This work of feminist theorists will no doubt go a long way to supplant the dominant conception of autonomy. However, the tasks set out for this paper preclude further discussion of these alternatives here. For the balance of this paper I want to shift the focus of the current debate. To do that, a different line of argument is necessary. Calhoun is concerned with the history of intellectual traditions. I suggest that we do just that in our evaluation of the dominant conception of autonomy. We come to believe that solving moral problems involves respecting autonomy, too often to the exclusion of other considerations. We come to see autonomy as a moral trump turning right action on competence even if autonomy theorists do not explicitly consider it such. We develop moral blinders so that other problems, problems of interconnectedness and interdependency, for example, seem to be peripheral and hence minor, or worse, absent and hence not problems at all. All such limited vision can work to the detriment of people, for example, with serious chronic impairments whose moral experience of impairment cannot be captured in rational, impartial, self-controlling, individualistic, or abstract terms and whose moral problems extend beyond those considerations as well. Their moral problems often involve the effect of the prevailing values of their community and the impact of their conditions on the financial, temporal, emotional, and physical resources of their intimates. Solving moral problems can involve such actions changing social programs, improving access to social spaces, and supporting or relieving in-home care givers. By repeatedly focusing our attention on a narrow, individualistic conception of people, our beliefs about people are similarly affected. We come to believe that people are as our theories describe them. Our own experiences of ourselves as otherwise are either not attended to or attended to as abnormal and flawed. We fail adequately to grasp people as, for example, necessarily interconnected and interdependent and unequal in many respects. Beauchamp acknowledges that he and Childress rely on paradigms to ground their moral principles, including the principle of autonomy: For if the paradigms they rely on are too narrow, then relying on them risks producing and reproducing ideologies of the moral life. Ideologies about rationality and impartiality are created by focusing too much on these two aspects to the near exclusion of other aspects of human experience. We fail to see and so fail to believe the whole picture. For instance, beliefs that rationality 1 distinguishes humans from other animals, 2 makes people responsible, and 3 is unaccompanied by emotion, incline us to forget or ignore that 1 there are other important features of human life aside from rationality, 2 responsibility is sometimes shared and includes factors other than rationality, and 3 our emotional experience attends all our experience and sometimes an emotional response is appropriate. Because of, or fearing, an emotional reaction to disclosure about poor diagnosis or prognosis, health care providers sometimes incorrectly assume that patients are not rational and thus ill-equipped to participate in care management decisions. As a result, these health care providers defer prematurely to involving proxy decision makers. For instance, beliefs that impartial decisions are always the best decisions are used to support conclusions that moral disputes are best solved by an impartial arbitrator.

However, this approach is often counterproductive. Acceptable resolutions to moral disputes necessarily involve partiality because what is sought is a good outcome, the right solution, which depend on the particulars of a situation. Hence, arbitration techniques alone are typically insufficient to yield a good outcome in clinical ethics consultations. Ideologies about rationality and impartiality draw on and reinforce a notion of objectivity. It is assumed that there are objective perspectives from which one can properly understand the world and make moral judgments. Many ethical theories e. Nagel reveals an absurdity of perspectives, two contradictory perspectives that we concurrently have. Significantly, our external perspective is not completely outside ourselves. That external view seems both to give us grounds for action and choice and assure us that we are parts of the world determined by its history. Contradictorily, in order to do anything we must already be something. We all see the world from very specific perspectives, through our own specific lenses. Our understanding of morality must take this feature of human life into account. On this view, we adopt or reject at will our moral commitments. We are free to choose our beliefs and change them also. Likewise, a voluntariness bias is found in assumptions that people freely choose their relationships and their actions. According to these biases, people are themselves responsible for their actions and their relationships because, significantly, they choose those actions and relationships. Feminist analysis debunks these assumptions, but feminist analysis also takes this conclusion further. By focusing too narrowly on the choices we do make and feel responsible for and by not attending to the choices that are closed to us or the choices that are not made freely, we come to believe that we are always responsible because we could have chosen otherwise. By focusing too much on our capacity for choice, we ignore features of our social lives that inhibit voluntariness and where responsibilities are shared. Society is conceived as if constituted by equally situated autonomous, self-interested individuals. This view of autonomy also draws on this same ideology that it reinforces. It is clear that these ideologies are sets of beliefs that do not rest on logic. They are beliefs that arise because of the way a discourse is practiced. It is clear also that these ideologies fold in on each other creating or revealing one huge organic ideology. A feminist critique will move our analysis of intellectual theories beyond logical structure and entailments to an analysis of the effects of those theories on history and the effects of history on those theories. A feminist critique will encourage us to correct the deficiencies in our social institutions and practices brought about by ideologies of the moral life.

**Chapter 2 : Ideology - Wikipedia**

*Autonomy and Ideology is a self-congratulatory collection of the presentations made at a conference held by the Dept. of Architecture at Columbia University in The event pivoted around the excuse of analyzing the architectural avant-garde in the USA from to*

Antoine Destutt de Tracy The term "ideology" was born during the Reign of Terror of French Revolution , and acquired several other meanings thereafter. The word, and the system of ideas associated with it, was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in , [3] while he was in prison pending trial during the Terror. The coup that overthrew Maximilien Robespierre allowed Tracy to pursue his work. He devised the term for a "science of ideas" he hoped would form a secure foundation for the moral and political sciences. He based the word on two things: He conceived "Ideology" as a liberal philosophy that would defend individual liberty, property, free markets , and constitutional limits on state power. He argues that among these aspects ideology is the most generic term, because the science of ideas also contains the study of their expression and deduction. In the century after Tracy, the term ideology moved back and forth between positive and negative connotations. He describes ideology as rather like teaching philosophy by the Socratic method , but without extending the vocabulary beyond what the general reader already possessed, and without the examples from observation that practical science would require. Taine identifies it not just with Destutt De Tracy, but also with his milieu, and includes Condillac as one of its precursors. Destutt de Tracy read the works of Locke and Condillac while he was imprisoned during the Reign of Terror. The term "ideology" has dropped some of its pejorative sting , and has become a neutral term in the analysis of differing political opinions and views of social groups. Some have described this kind of analysis as meta-ideologyâ€”the study of the structure, form, and manifestation of ideologies. Recent analysis tends to posit that ideology is a coherent system of ideas that rely on a few basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have any factual basis. Ideas become ideologies that is, become coherent, repeated patterns through the subjective ongoing choices that people make, serving as the seed around which further thought grows. According to most recent analysis, ideologies are neither necessarily right nor wrong. Believers in ideology range from passive acceptance through fervent advocacy to true belief. This accords with definitions, such as by Manfred Steger and Paul James , that emphasize both the issue of patterning and contingent claims to truth: Ideologies are patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas and concepts, including particular representations of power relations. These conceptual maps help people navigate the complexity of their political universe and carry claims to social truth. Charles Blattberg offers an account that distinguishes political ideologies from political philosophies. Minar describes six different ways the word "ideology" has been used: As a collection of certain ideas with certain kinds of content, usually normative As the form or internal logical structure that ideas have within a set By the role ideas play in human-social interaction By the role ideas play in the structure of an organization As meaning, whose purpose is persuasion As the locus of social interaction For Willard A. Mullins an ideology should be contrasted with the related but different issues of utopia and historical myth. An ideology is composed of four basic characteristics: Terry Eagleton outlines more or less in no particular order some definitions of ideology: In his work, he strove to bring the concept of ideology into the foreground, as well as the closely connected concerns of epistemology and history. In this work, the term ideology is defined in terms of a system of presentations that explicitly or implicitly claim to absolute truth. In the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of society, base denotes the relations of production and modes of production , and superstructure denotes the dominant ideology religious, legal, political systems. The economic base of production determines the political superstructure of a society. Ruling class-interests determine the superstructure and the nature of the justifying ideologyâ€”actions feasible because the ruling class control the means of production. For example, in a feudal mode of production , religious ideology is the most prominent aspect of the superstructure, while in capitalist formations, ideologies such as liberalism and social democracy dominate. Hence the great importance of the ideology justifying a society; it politically confuses the alienated groups of society via false consciousness. Some explanations have been presented. Antonio Gramsci uses cultural hegemony to explain why the

working-class have a false ideological conception of what are their best interests. Marx argued that "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production. Moreover, Mannheim has developed, and progressed, from the "total" but "special" Marxist conception of ideology to a "general" and "total" ideological conception acknowledging that all ideology including Marxism resulted from social life, an idea developed by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. A number of propositions, which are never untrue, suggest a number of other propositions, which are. In this way, the essence of the lacunar discourse is what is not told but is suggested. For example, the statement "All are equal before the law," which is a theoretical groundwork of current legal systems, suggests that all people may be of equal worth or have equal "opportunities". This is not true, for the concept of private property and power over the means of production results in some people being able to own more much more than others. This power disparity contradicts the claim that all share both practical worth and future opportunity equally; for example, the rich can afford better legal representation, which practically privileges them before the law. Althusser also proffered the concept of the ideological state apparatus to explain his theory of ideology. His first thesis was "ideology has no history": For Althusser, beliefs and ideas are the products of social practices, not the reverse. His thesis that "ideas are material" is illustrated by the "scandalous advice" of Pascal toward unbelievers: Ideology and the Commodity in the works of Guy Debord[ edit ] The French Marxist theorist Guy Debord , founding member of the Situationist International , argued that when the commodity becomes the "essential category" of society, i. Relevant discussion may be found on Talk: Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably sourced. July Learn how and when to remove this template message The German cultural historian Silvio Vietta described the development and expansion of Western rationality from ancient times onwards as often accompanied by and shaped by ideologies like that of the "just war", the "true religion", racism, nationalism, or the vision of future history as a kind of heaven on earth in communism. He said that ideas like these became ideologies by giving hegemonic political actions an idealistic veneer and equipping their leaders with a higher and, in the " political religions " Eric Voegelin , nearly God-like power, so that they became masters over the lives and the deaths of millions of people. He considered that ideologies therefore contributed to power politics irrational shields of ideas beneath which they could operate as manifestations of idealism. The proselytizing zeal of propagandists derives from "a passionate search for something not yet found more than a desire to bestow something we already have. Hoffer asserts that violence and fanaticism are interdependent. Without the leader, there is no movement. Often the leader must wait long in the wings until the time is ripe. He calls for sacrifices in the present, to justify his vision of a breathtaking future. The skills required include: Original thoughts are suppressed, and unity encouraged, if the masses are kept occupied through great projects, marches, exploration and industry. Results indicate that where people live is likely to closely correlate with their ideological beliefs. In much of Africa, South Asia and the Middle East, people prefer traditional beliefs and are less tolerant of liberal values. Protestant Europe, at the other extreme, adheres more to secular beliefs and liberal values. Alone among high-income countries, the United States is exceptional in its adherence to traditional beliefs, in this case Christianity.

**Chapter 3 : Autonomy Theory Ideology - [PDF Document]**

*Autonomy and Ideology has 4 ratings and 0 reviews. This is the documentation -- transcripts, essays, and images -- of the proceedings of an influential c.*

Introduction A central tenet to much ethical argument within medical law is patient autonomy. We therefore give an account of what respecting autonomy means and how it contrasts with the protection of other related and important concepts. This enables us to critique the existing legal picture. Although we are content with the general direction of medical law in this area, we discuss causes for concern with the current situation. Our primary criticism is that there may be an excessive commitment to ostensible rather than substantive protection of autonomy. We map these concerns by exploring developments in medical jurisprudence and the Mental Capacity Act. Our analysis exposes troublesome issues, but we argue that positive changes can be effected within the existing system. Legal change is not needed provided that judges, policy-makers, and practitioners understand the import of their actions and the bearing of existing principle. Government within a Shared System Autonomy is a familiar concept within legal, moral, and political philosophy. While it has, in many respects, attained a supreme status,<sup>8</sup> there is considerable variation in how the concept is understood. At its most simple, autonomy denotes self-government. In this basic sense, it is not so much a normative concept as an empirical question: Rather we ask whether autonomy exists in any situation: If yes, she is being autonomous, if no, she is not. This does not tell us that she should be self-governing. Whether it is good that people govern themselves, or to what extent they should do so, are many-layered questions. Differing problems present themselves. Is being autonomous an absolute matter, meaning either one is or is not autonomous, or is it graded or context-specific, meaning one can be more or less autonomous? Is there a special normative concern due to something, such as an adult human being, simply by virtue of her capacity for autonomy? If so, does it apply also to someone with the potential to become autonomous? Consideration of such matters has dominated ethical debates on doctor-patient interactions, leading to more practically focused normative questions. Thus, we need to clarify what our focus on autonomy entails to enable meaningful discourse. Jennings<sup>14</sup> and Griffin<sup>15</sup> highlight the important distinction between autonomy as it refers to matters concerning the freedom of the will, and as it relates to political freedom within a society to act unencumbered by the interference of third parties or the State. Importantly, interference with liberty can, in principle, obtain in omissions as well as actions. For example, although the controllers of a public building with no wheelchair access have not actively interfered with the liberty of wheelchair-users to enter, there is nevertheless an interference with liberty. This presents itself markedly when reference is made to ideas based on Kantian autonomy<sup>18</sup> as something that can be straightforwardly juxtaposed with Millian liberty. The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: Those interested in Kantian autonomy are concerned with the essence of a decision and how it is reached. Those interested in Millian liberty are concerned that a decision is made by the person whose right it is to make it, be that an individual on her own behalf or a third party deciding for her, rather directly than the rationality underpinning it. This is of interest to our legal analysis insofar as the questions become ones of political, as opposed to purely moral, philosophy. By wedding autonomy with rationality, as Kantian theory does, and then wedding this to prescriptive social norms, we leave ourselves with a concept that is unassailably entrenched in an exclusive rationality. There are two associated effects of this, which are the root of problems in the law on mental capacity. First, a practical truth is created about what choices may be deemed free, hinting towards paternalistic concerns that people be free only to do right, and political systems and legal mechanisms instituted to ensure this. These effects are tempered when we look at the practical legal reality, but their urgency should not be underestimated. Where theories suggest that the bedrock of privileged decision-making is rationality, and the derivation of normative protection of human agents is their rationality, it proves difficult to avoid “yet still to reconcile” conflicts between Kantian-type appeals to autonomy as rationality and Millian-type claims to liberty as the safeguard of either plural goods, or anyway the best means for people to achieve what is best for themselves. Too great a

concern for rationality essentially debar many people from having the power of choice and narrows further the available options from amongst which to choose. Too great a concern with liberty, by contrast, leaves everyone hostage to unwisdom. The trick in political philosophy, and in its practical instantiations such as medical jurisprudence, is to mediate between these competing ideals. Information, understanding, and the use of reason all contribute to the exercise of autonomy in this sense, even if, as judges of autonomy, we do not exhibit a commitment to any particular overarching rationality. This does not debar the propriety of questioning fundamental values, or demand a relativist framing. Rather, it founds autonomy on reflective, rational decision-making, with no pre-analytic substantive commitments to the good or the right. If we have doubts, however, about the strength of her autonomy, we will not respect the refusal. Doubts may arise because of one of three agency flaws and each of these potentially opens the doors to cynical value-despotism. Belief in autonomy allows us to engage with ourselves as moral concepts; we can apply to ourselves concepts such as praise, blame, just desert, and just reward. It allows accountability, with all the goods and all the burdens that carries. Although abnegation or denial of autonomy is sometimes considered desirable, 39 as a rule free will is a good thing to take for granted. It allows individuals to assume responsibility, or have it imposed on them, and for society to develop and maintain institutions based on concepts such as justice. And for most people, it seems to be something that is reasonably taken for granted. We consider these issues further below, particularly in Part IV. To respect the value of autonomous agents, we must permit people to act freely, not merely to reason freely. Liberty describes the scope of this freedom to act. Liberty is open to legitimate limitation in a way that autonomy is not. To allow a cohesive, functioning society, some external law is required. The value-agnosticism and value-deference that obtain in liberal societies cannot result in out-and-out abdication of claims about good and bad. We may thus work from a presumption that people should be free to act autonomously provided they do not breach well grounded external laws that legitimately limit their actions. The grounding of these laws might find itself in one of many conflicting legal or political philosophies. It may be not causing harm to others; 44 positive obligations derived directly from the receipt of benefits inherent in membership of a stable political system, 45 in being part of a system of civic republicanism, 46 or any of countless other theories. Whatever the overarching normativity, liberty is the freedom within it to act. Liberty marks the bounds of the laws required to mediate the co-existence of people who should be free to act autonomously. At the level of policy, this necessarily allows for situations where people are left free to act in ways that are, at times, not autonomous; by their blanket nature, many policies are bound not to apply perfectly for each individual in each case. It would be unreasonable to expect all and only autonomy-enhancing, liberty-respecting decisions to exist in society. Instead, policies will be geared to optimisation of each. Although theorists disagree on where and why the line is drawn, the key lies in reaching the appropriate pay-off between allowing so much liberty that an excess of harm results, and such restricted liberty that people have too little control of their lives to make them worthwhile. Furthermore, mediating between the demands of each is made harder with a commitment to value-pluralism. Respecting pluralism need not represent some form of moral relativism, 48 but can make it hard to judge the quality of a decision. Although we might seek to enhance autonomy, and have good reason to ensure that decisions “especially serious decisions” are reached in accordance with a maximum of autonomy, we must limit autonomous actions that impinge on the deserved liberty of others. That a person has the mental capacity to evaluate a situation and come to some decision of what is right does not automatically entail that she should be at liberty have the legal capacity then to act on her decision. However, the purported normative underpinnings of the direction of the move are various. There is general agreement on what was wrong but less agreement on what is right. In the remainder of this paper, we consider how the law protects and improves the exercise of autonomy and the scope of liberty for patients, and show that despite the welcome focus on and concern for autonomy, there are trends in legal developments that are a cause for concern. First, there are autonomous persons who seek to extend their liberty. The leading medical law case in this regard is *Burke v.* Although he was mentally competent to decide, he did not have legal capacity to decide. To claim otherwise would be to undermine civil and criminal liability for wrongful acts. Consider the case of *Dianne Pretty*. A different manner of concern is raised in cases such as *Chester v.* At issue was respect for her autonomy. In order

autonomously to exercise her liberty, she argued successfully that she ought to have been given more information by her surgeon. In Chester the courts were not faced with the task of reappraising the limits of liberty; their role was to assess the proper demands of respect for autonomy. Having detailed the important conceptual distinctions between autonomy and liberty, and explained how they present themselves in medico-legal cases, we are now in a position to evaluate relevant developments in medical law. Positive Affirmations of Autonomy Autonomy is partly protected in medical law through the concept of informed consent. Before any treatment is given or procedure performed on a patient, she must, if competent, give consent. Since then, a series of cases has examined the issue. Their treatment of autonomy has been a process whereby they have taken one step forward, before retreating another two or three, then marching forwards again and not looking back. However, we will show how, in their desire to prioritise autonomy, the courts have supported liberty instead, with counterproductive results. Before considering the case law, the legal issues inherent in informed consent need to be explained. The courts have held that almost all cases involving the inadequate disclosure of information should be dealt with by the law of negligence rather than that relating to trespass; the exceptions are where consent was obtained by fraud or where, due to administrative error, the procedure carried out was different to that consented to. Finally, the breach of duty must have caused harm, but this does not mean that had she been informed of the material risk she would not have consented to the procedure. The House of Lords first considered this in the landmark case of *Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital*. One of the questions was whether this constituted a material risk. Unfortunately, the legal principle of the case is difficult to fathom because in the four substantive speeches, there are three different definitions of a material risk, ranging from what the reasonable doctor would disclose to what the reasonable patient would expect to be informed of. However, the way the law has been changed to implement the principle is flawed, as demonstrated by a recent case, which we discuss below. Almost all of the relevant cases heard by the courts have concerned patients complaining that they should have received information relating to a specific risk or alternative. The end result is a misconceived attempt to prioritise a principle that may at times be counterproductive for patients. Despite modifications to the definition of the materiality of risk, the way in which the courts have imagined the doctor-patient interaction has remained constant; the doctor imparts to the patient a list of risks, which the patient then processes and utilises to form her autonomous decision. This approach has led to the courts confusing autonomy and liberty and prioritising the latter while claiming to champion the former. This protection of liberty, as we demonstrate below, can come at the expense of autonomy. The core problem is that the courts have emphasised the passing of information to the patient while ignoring her understanding what she has been told.

**Chapter 4 : Autonomy and ideology : positioning an avant-garde in America (Book, ) [theinnatdunvilla.com]**

*One of Leonid Brezhnev's primary goals when he acceded to party leadership in the Soviet Union was to restore Moscow's control over the world communist movement, severely undermined by the Sino-Soviet dispute.*

Ramachandra Guha Reviewed work s: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. And it is necessary to go the whole hog. The position must be advertised, and each candidate proposed and seconded by a member of the institute. The precise distribution of the votes must be revealed of course. This was done with much effect with respect to the student union in my college in Madras and I do not see why it should not work elsewhere. Open elections to have the effect of disarming expected academics from couraging indifferent themselves forward or power monputting them in that direction. Choosing a head by election signals that it cannot be the reward for loyalty demonstrated in an in by mere presence stitution for long enough. Perhaps more it would leave the successful important candidate free of obligation to any section and thus unconstrained in the pursuit of his or her task. In any case, the present of imposing heads on the arrangement small bodies, which are the icssr institutes only breed sullen acceptance. On the other hand, the norms of democracy would require of the verdict of acceptance a free and fair election. To conclude, while the Report of the Fourth Review Committee of the icssr is to be welcomed and debated, it is important not to spend too much time in debating the "state of social science research" in India, as opposed to getting business of revitalising it. To illustrate with an example from the public sphere, our objective is to expand the diversity of the institutions of our governance, we should pursue it by appointing women, dalits and Muslims to top positions in the administration and the police. Similarly, if we want a vigorous and independent social science practice in this country, we should credible academics to lead appoint as I have in the context, ership positions. Multi-disciplinary research is even more so. No serious effort has been made to deor institutional, velopand pursue long-term even individual, agendas There is also reason to be less than satisfied with the quantum and quality of professional publications relative to their staff professional strength. The nature, and scope of quality social science research in India have fallen short of expectations. How can we have free and informed discussion in social sciences and humanities? It collates a great deal of information on the and pattern of research quantity funding, on work done in universities as well as in research institutes, on the publishing records of different and on the disciplines, contributions of scholars based in India and overseas. Valuable as the documentation is, what will be of special interest to scholars are the analytical and prescriptive sections of the report. Criticisms On the analytical side, the committee in its criticisms. One reason is the optimum limitation of individuals or institutions, their inability or unwillingness to forge research long-term, multi-disciplinary, and strategies. A second programme reason identified is in by the committee Thus, state governadequacy of funding. All told, "there is a reluctance to support conspicuous open, research in social sciences, independent which does not produce valuable material and processes like scientific and products research". As the committee "lack of observes, in the and several transparency process instances where the basic principles have been ignored or violated in making these selections have further eroded the capacity of the council to function in effectively its basic promoting objectives". Most funds for research. The committee believes in my public funds, variously of science and the department that there has been too much through view, rightly of human rethe ministry and bureaucrats technology, interference by politicians sectoral and specific of social source development, and directing in the funding environs such as atomic science research in India. Make more and schemes available to so- politicians and bureaucrats, the committee grammes money cial scientists, for one. On the other that the icssr should be renamed decided by scientists teerecommends and that Rs crore of pub- the Indian Academy of Social Sciences. These choices This would amount to legium of fellows, eminent scholars all, lobbying 10 times the present is done down the line. If annual budget of the representing the different social science ence how research icssR. Some of this money could come disciplines. The col- point select satisfactory. From this However, agendas and modalities larger body

tions should be left to be decided by the committee constituted for the issue of an executive committee, the committee ignores altogether council on the basis of advice obtained which would be more with ideology. As compared to the natural involvement of eminent scholars in indifferent fields. The committee increased and the would have a discounting possibility of a return, academy presiding non-political from other than public sources. The most scientific that are productivity profitability. However, prestigious the recent surge in the Indian economy body in the country in India. It is a self-governing are not so These ideological rivalries society broad-minded At least some as are with act much intellectual a thousand fellows. In the immense the community of social scientists a divided and, more prestige importantly, have played this role; near-total It is a body of science in India - the role of religion in public past, the Tata trusts autonomy. But I suspect based populism. How that in contemporary In this respect the report of the icssr India, these selection does it propose to insulate the constitution of fellows to an academy of this kind Review Committee is timely. It is time that of the collegium of the Indian Academy of would be more more to we seriously about the state contentious, prone introspected Social Sciences from the din and clamour be viewed through the lens of ideology. I am not for a achievements and its failures, its aims and moment that it is impossible Crisis in Social Sciences? It is time that we more suggesting to devise non-ideological forums - Many years ago, the American scholar honestly criteria this it judged ourselves against wrote a book called The nation in other not setting a specific piece of social science Alvin Gouldner countries, just in the west research or the career of an individual Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. In this Asian race we started social scientist. The different social science "Crisis" is certainly an over-used word or at an advantage; based on work done by have evolved and tested certain trope in popular Indian social scientists in the last decades disciplines - judging by its ubiquity one can have a reason - and scholarly decades of protocols by which discourse, Indian nation - of colonial rule, and in the first able sense of the depth and rigour of a hood has been in "crisis" since August we were comfortably ahead 15, independence, has been in of the Chinese in , the year the icssr particular piece of research. Still, these , and global capitalism assessments would be far more open to "crisis" at least since the middle decades was setup. We maintained this lead at least than would be of the 19th But in this case the term up to the. More our dispute and refutation century. The is well merited, for the "crisis" of Indian great has begun to gain upon us. It is The Chinese have come to believe that their unlike most natural social many years since any new institutes of ambition to achieve status will scientists, many "great power" scientists are public who of - quality were set up. Contrast this with require massive investments in knowledge intellectuals, comment in the press on matters the natural sciences, where institutes of - knowledge of the social as well as natural quently of policy and politics. The positions such as history they excellence are being set up all the time. Although disciplines taken in a newspaper article are naturally There are no social science equivalents and anthropology remain constrained by less nuanced than those they for Cellular and Molecular the totalitarian nature of the Chinese may articulate - of the Centre polilate in a longer, more considered such as economics piece of Biology in Hyderabad and the National tical system, disciplines research aimed at a scholarly audience. It Centre for Sciences in Bangalore, and international relations have made Biological thus becomes individu- world-class institutes strides. In these fields, and of both, and of recent impressive easy to pigeonhole al scholars in ideological as poor vintage. Older institutions of renown course in the natural sciences, there is a terms, anti mandir, brain drain at work, as dozens of pro or anti mandai, pro or have declined rapidly in recent years reverse anti market. Institute of Politics Chinese scholars leave their the fate of the Gokhale job in the west The process of electing fellows of the In- and Economics is well known, but it is by to live and work in their own country. To be sure, there sciences, is embracing the social sciences China ours is an ancient like civilisation; would be disputes at the margins, accusa- and humanities. But Many of the best Indian China ours is a modern tions that a particular fellow had been pro- economists, historians unlike China our political is based anthropologists, system moted for scientists now live and work not on rule by a single party. Unlike in by a powerful patron, example. It is becoming in- China, our citizens have the freedom of social scientists would be far more recon- creasingly difficult to recruit or retain live where want and to say what they they troversial. Each selection would be subject good doctoral students. The rise in private feel. The icssr Review Committee out points to close scrutiny, to gossip and innuendo, sectors salaries has made a career in re- that discussion "free, open and informed to derision and abuse. There are certainly lower salary-

butnota farlowersalary. I think one-tenthor one-fifteenth. And even discussion byideological possible.

## Chapter 5 : Juche - Wikipedia

*Autonomy and Ideology* Author(s): Ramachandra Guha Reviewed work(s): Source: *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 43, No. 5 (Feb. 2 - 8, ), pp. Published by.

Written by Michael Kabuni Coalition governments are popular feature of parliamentary democracy. Since , PNG has had coalition governments. As explained in this survey , one theory is that to minimise the bargaining cost of coalitions with different policies, parties with the smallest ideological differences tend to form a coalition. This group would restrict the number of political parties in an attempt to maximize their portfolio numbers. However, if MPs from a few parties are not sufficient to form government, numerous parties can combine, with the major party in the coalition negotiating and controlling the distribution of portfolios. These two areas were chosen because they seem to be the only ones where parties have relatively clear policy positions. Table 1 below shows the number of parties currently in parliament, their MPs, and whether they are in government or the opposition. Pangu has MPs in both the government 15 and opposition 3. Political parties and MPs as of July 25 Source: The other parties do not have a clear position on whether there should be tuition fees or not. Parties supporting free or subsidised education Source: PPP has advocated for autonomy as a policy since It became a key element in attracting PPP to the coalition. The other parties do not have a clear position on autonomy. Table 3 shows what a coalition would look like if based on pro-autonomy policies. However, as Table 1 shows, NA is in fact in the opposition. Ideal coalition partners based on policies supporting autonomy Source: The role of education policy in determining a coalition is therefore not clear. There are 31 ministries, 12 vice-ministries, and 31 permanent committee chairmen positions that the government distributes. The major party in the coalition, PNC, acts as the centripetal force, distributing these portfolios. The portfolios are roughly proportional to the number of MPs each party has except Pangu, which has two portfolios despite having the second largest MPs in the coalition. This is because Pangu joined the coalition late. Based on this analysis, their interest is in government portfolios rather than government policies. Since this post was published, an error in Table 3 has been corrected to reflect the actual number of MPs in the National Alliance NA who support autonomy “ nine.

*Ideological Views in Emerging Adulthood: Balancing Autonomy and Community with respect to developing an ideology or worldview. Erikson (, ) was the i-rst.*

Relative autonomy perspective assumes that the state can and does play a limited independent role in the maintenance and stabilization of capitalist society. Relative autonomy differs from pluralism in viewing state power as strongly constrained by the ideological and structural characteristics of capitalism and capitalist society. In an effort to contribute to the further development of educational relative autonomy theory, this article raises a few basic issues with regard to the relationships between the internal structuring of schooling and educational functions of social reproduction and change. Commodity Form and Legal Form: However, insofar as Professor Trubek also refers briefly in his essay to my "more recent," and until now unpublished, work, it seems appropriate to present a sample of this work, especially since Trubek himself argues that it entails a "major refinement" which "allows Balbus to explain what remains unexplained in *The Dialectics*. The British school system has relative autonomy, and therefore, could be potentially transformative--used to change existing economic and social relations. The correspondence thesis, which states that the schools perpetuate existing capitalist economic and social relations and serve as agents of reproduction, was the dominant paradigm of the last decade within the British sociology of education. This thesis has been bitterly contested, and, in recent years, substantially modified. Four developments within British social science over the last decade suggest a form of relative autonomy that grants considerable freedom to the educational system within British society to act either in a reproductive or transformative fashion. Evaluates drug abuse prevention programs, sex education programs, and programs to change gender stereotypes in schools using theoretical framework of critical sociology of education. Notes that all types of programs had limited effectiveness. Marxism and economic determination: Economic determination is a principle of causation or explanation which involves the claim that "politics" is "explained" by "economics" in a relevant sense of those three terms. Economic determination is defined as a strong tendency but consistent with a notion of the relative autonomy of the state. A Review of Contemporary Media, , One of the key problems confronting Marxist film theory, as well as Marxist aesthetics in general, is the status of ideology as a determined product of social, and specifically economic, relations. It is a fundamental and unavoidable premise of any Marxist enquiry that ideology, the "consciousness" of people in society and the material cultural products in which this consciousness is embedded is, in fact, determined. In consequence, our understanding of economic determination which is a condition for an understanding of autonomy remains in essence the same as in "vulgar determinism ," while relative autonomy becomes a sort of ongoing exception. That is, we continue to see the economic base as mission control, which beams out commands to passive agents in the superstructure. With our magic protective shield of relative autonomy, we are safe from these commands until they catch up with us in the dreaded last instance. And, as Althusser somewhat cryptically assures us, the lonely hour of the last instance never arrives. The character of that determination, piled onto the last instance, remains a mystery. We often present it as some kind of antithesis of relative autonomy, as if it were a version of the antithesis of freedom and necessity.

*This chapter explains the normative basis of New Labour's policy claim that citizens owe duties of reassurance. It argues that this idea arises from an axiomatic proposition of three theories that had a major influence on New Labour – "The Third Way, communitarianism, neoliberalism" – and that this proposition remains significant in the civic conservatism underlying the Big Society thinking.*

When used, "Juche years" are often accompanied by the Gregorian equivalent, i. Many prominent party and government officials, public figures, representatives of revolutionary and progressive organizations, scientists and journalists from more than fifty countries attended. An excerpt from the opening speech says: Regardless of the opposition forces, the determination of the people and their strength and conviction are not measured by territorial dimensions, possession of advanced technology, still less, opulence or riches. For those who wish to forget the lesson of history so easily and so quickly, Algeria, Viet Nam, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola – and closer to us – Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Azania are excellent examples which make them deeply reflect on. What we want is not the perfection of political independence alone. The evil forces craftily manipulate the economic levers in order to perpetuate their supremacy and reduce us to vassals and eternal mendicants. It is interchangeable with the juche [ sic ] idea". The idea of Juche, which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism, is an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind". On the basis of Juche idea , the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national liberation , class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era of Juche. Guided by Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President and the General. In our socialist society, the leader, the Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and united leadership. Instead of a strict social hierarchy, North Korea had in theory divided the union into three classes, namely peasant, worker and samuwon intellectuals and professionals , where each was just as important as the other. The samuwon class consisted of clerks, small traders, bureaucrats, professors and writers. Normally, Communist nations would value only the farmers or laborers, thus in the Soviet Union the intelligentsia was not defined as an independent class of its own, but rather as a "social stratum" that recruited itself from members of almost all classes: However, a "peasant intelligentsia" was never mentioned. Correspondingly, the "proletarian intelligentsia" was exalted for bringing forth progressive scientists and Marxist theoreticians whereas the "bourgeois intelligentsia" was condemned for producing "bourgeois ideology", which were all non-Marxist worldviews. They believed in rapid industrialization through labor and in subjecting nature to human will. By restructuring social classes into a mass of people who are theoretically all equal, the North Korean government claimed it would be able to attain self-reliance or Juche in upcoming years. This is questionable, because the country suffers massive food shortages annually and is heavily dependent on foreign aid. However, it soon asserted its independence from both the Soviet Union and China. Though it rejected de-Stalinization , it avoided taking sides in the Sino-Soviet split. As the Communist bloc split, introduced market reforms and collapsed, North Korea increasingly emphasized Juche in both theory and practice. It fostered diplomatic relations with developing countries and promoted Juche as a model for others to follow. After the devastation of the Korean War, North Korea began to rebuild its economy with a base in heavy industry, with the aim of becoming as self-sufficient as possible. It is currently developing its own nuclear ballistic missile.

**Chapter 8 : Ideology of Vulnerable Autonomy - Oxford Scholarship**

*Ted Atkinson THE IDEOLOGY OF AUTONOMY: I FORM AND FUNCTION IN AS / LAY DYING in the early sections of William Faulkner's As / Lay Dying, Cash Bundren remains in the background urgently working to construct his mother's.*

Rational beings make the moral law for themselves and can regard themselves as authors of the law. For Kant the moral law is a categorical, not a hypothetical, imperative. The act of formulating a categorical imperative, and hence the moral law, is an act of a pure autonomous will, because, unlike the formulation of a hypothetical imperative, it is untainted by the influence of the desires and interests that an agent may have relative to a particular situation. For example, in the original position, agents do not know their social status, natural abilities, or conceptions of the good Rawls , Such agents, like Kantian agents, are not influenced by the particular desires and preferences that are contingent on being embedded in an actual situation. Feminist philosophers typically reject the Kantian and Rawlsian conceptions of autonomy. Since these initial critical reactions, feminist philosophers have attempted to rehabilitate autonomy e. Some feminist philosophers have argued that articulating the conditions under which autonomous choice is exercised is vital to attempts to understand gender oppression. If relationships of care and interdependence are valuable and morally significant cf. One way to answer this question is to examine what might be considered failures of autonomy that appear to be linked to practices of gender oppression. This section describes three examples that have been widely discussed in the feminist literature on autonomy. She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it. She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the mood. She willingly moves to a new city in order for him to have a more attractive job, counting her own friendships and geographical preferences insignificant by comparison She does not simply defer to her husband in certain spheres as a trade-off for his deference in other spheres. Hill , 5 One would think that such excessive deference would be incompatible with autonomy. However, Westlund points out that on some popular accounts of autonomy, because the woman is willing to subordinate herself, or because she prefers deference and values her own opinions and interests less than she values those of her husband, she may be considered autonomous. For example, on one influential account, that of Harry Frankfurt, a preference is autonomous if it is one with which the agent wholeheartedly identifies Frankfurt As Westlund argues, the agent here seems to identify wholeheartedly with her preference for deference to her husband: The example is of interest to feminists in the first place because the deference and apparent preference for subservience it describes is gendered. It is an outcome of systems of gender oppression that women are expected to assume servile roles, and hence may come to endorse, prefer or willingly adopt them. Moreover, perhaps precisely because of the connection between these kinds of preferences and systems of gender oppression, many feminists resist the conclusion that the Angel and the Deferential Wife are autonomous. Thus Susan Babbitt argues that although the Deferential Wife appears to be have made a rational judgment about what she values, and appears therefore to be living according to her own life-plans, in fact the preference for subservience is incompatible with her autonomy: If this is right, influential accounts of autonomy, and those feminist positions influenced by them, will have to be revised. The fox adapts his preferences to what he perceives to be the options available to him. In order to distinguish adaptive preference formation from preference change due to learning and other processes, Elster proposes that the former is an unconscious process in which an agent turns away from a preference to avoid unpleasant cognitive dissonance that is associated with holding on to it. For example, Martha Nussbaum describes the case of poor working women in India who, though subjected to physical abuse by their husbands, choose to remain in the marriage. It is increasingly noticed that adaptive preferences are formed in the circumstances of oppression. Adaptive or deformed desires may be the result of the internalization of an oppressive ideology: The student has turned away from values that would afford her a healthier sense of self-worth; her desire for an excessive number of beauty treatments is deformed because it is the product of adopting values that are oppressive to her, and it is a desire that she would not have absent the oppressive conditions. For instance,

feminists working on rational choice theory tend to assume that deformed desires are damaging to both rational choice and autonomous choice, or at least that they are able to be produced only in contexts in which autonomy is already damaged. However, reactions to adaptive preferences vary in the feminist literature on autonomy. Marilyn Friedman suggests that women who choose to remain in abusive relationships may be autonomous. For Friedman, adapting to an abusive relationship is in principle compatible with the critical reflection that is sufficient for autonomy; such women may have reflectively endorsed the preference to remain and may have rejected competing options. Friedman, Other autonomy theorists argue along similar lines, leaving open the possibility that adaptive preferences could count as autonomous. Adopting practices of oppression need not be the result of accommodation or adaptation; it need not be the result of an attempt to resolve cognitive dissonance at an unconscious level, or of resigned habituation to oppressive circumstances. Rather, the practices in question can be the explicit requirements of a society or culture, and self-consciously promoted by women themselves. These women acknowledge that purdah severely limits their education and mobility, and has the effect of making them dependent on male members of the community. Some theorists of autonomy. We see, then, that feminist philosophers have responded to the hard cases in different ways. The following sections provide a more detailed elaboration of the theoretical positions behind these different responses. Sarah Buss, for example, advocates such a position: Narayan also suggests a thin conception of autonomy: Narayan, On minimalist conceptions of autonomy, most of the agents described in the hard cases would be autonomous because minimal conditions for flourishing obtain and there is no pathology, cognitive impairment, or direct coercion present. This characterization has its theoretical advantages. For example, Narayan is concerned to limit the justification for state interference in individual voluntary choice; a minimalist conception may indeed be acceptable for use in theories that regulate relations between the citizen and the state or to address issues of paternalism. Holroyd But minimalism is not the norm within the feminist literature on autonomy. It is true that oppressive social conditions do not typically produce pathologies or cognitive impairments; neither do the social conditions of oppression usually constitute direct coercion sufficient to erode autonomy. Yet it is not clear precisely how this happens. Before turning to these theories, some preliminary classifications should be made. Relational theories may be classified as either procedural, strongly substantive, or weakly substantive, versus causal or constitutive. Procedural theories have dominated the debate since the 1980s. Dworkin; Frankfurt They claim that autonomy is achieved when the agent undergoes, or has the capacity to undergo, an internal intellectual process of reflecting on her motivations, beliefs, and values, and then revising her preferences in the light of such reflection. Substantive theories claim that autonomy is a value-laden notion. A preference to be enslaved or to be subservient cannot be autonomous on strong substantive accounts. For example, some accounts require that agents exhibit moral attitudes to themselves such as self-respect or a robust sense of their own self-worth to count as autonomous. Govier; McLeod If social relationships cause autonomy to develop, a lack of appropriate social relationships can also stunt its development. Friedman Similarly, social and historical conditions such as oppressive gender socialization may promote or impede the capacity for autonomy. Suppose, for instance, that an agent is subject to severely constraining external conditions such as slavery. Severely constraining external conditions remove the de facto power required for autonomy. Other theorists who adopt constitutive accounts focus rather on local autonomy, namely, what is required for choices, preferences, or desires at particular times to count as autonomous. For instance, although the features required for autonomy on procedural accounts are content-neutral. An important feature of procedural theories, however, is their content-neutral or formal aspect. Therefore, content-neutral theories can be constitutively relational. Moreover, weak substantive theories can be causally relational. Weak substantive theories build in moral self-regarding attitudes such as self-respect as necessary conditions of autonomy. Procedural Conceptions This section outlines two versions of procedural and content-neutral conceptions that are well-known in the feminist literature: Procedural conceptions have been prominent in the standard literature on autonomy from the 1980s to the present day. These conceptions have been adopted in different forms by feminist theorists. The concept of content-neutrality has been an extremely important tool in the feminist rehabilitation of autonomy and procedural conceptions are attractive to feminists in large part due to their content-neutrality. However, on content-neutral conceptions, there is no value or set

of preferences that an autonomous person must endorse. Preferences for relationships of care and dependency such as those within marriage or other family structures can be just as autonomous as preferences for self-reliance or relative social isolation; preferences for cultural and religious norms into which agents are born can be just as autonomous as preferences to repudiate these norms, and so on. The device of content-neutrality also respects feminist attempts to preserve the differences among and the multiplicity of agents. Hence they argue that theories of autonomy must be neutral with respect to life-plans and conceptions of the good. Many theorists consider that a criterion of a correct theory of autonomy is that it distinguish between self-rule and right-rule Benson Content-neutrality ensures that self-rule does not collapse into right-rule, and further that agents are protected from paternalistic interference in their decisions. Procedural conceptions characterize autonomous agents—agents whose preferences and desires are genuinely their own—as those who critically reflect in the appropriate way to evaluate their preferences, motives, and desires. One well-known example of a hierarchical and structural approach is that of Harry Frankfurt. On structural accounts, this agent counts as autonomous when she appears not to be. The procedural conceptions defended by Friedman and Meyers exemplify an alternative approach in which autonomy is not tied to the structural features of an occurrent mental state but rather is achieved when the agent undergoes a historical process of critical reflection. John Christman is an important proponent in the standard literature of the historical approach Christman ; Christman ; see also Mele For Christman, as for many others who adopt procedural conceptions, autonomous agents must be both reflectively competent and authentic. The test for authenticity on his account is historical and counterfactual: In recent work, Christman develops the notion of nonalienation as the test of authenticity: Friedman employs the related idea of reflective endorsement: Agents acting on desires that satisfy this condition are acting authentically and on their deepest commitments. An example considered by Friedman is that of a preference to remain in an abusive domestic relationship due to adherence to religious or moral norms of marriage. Friedman , The agent may even recognize that choosing to remain in an abusive relationship is in effect to choose a situation in which her own future autonomy may be compromised. But, as Friedman points out, autonomy is not the only value, and, the case could be explained as the agent ranking her own future autonomy against other values of importance to her. Friedman nevertheless is reluctant to treat such agents as autonomous to the highest degree. Autonomous people exercise a repertoire of skills to engage in self-discovery, self-definition and self-direction, and Meyers , 49 She argues that the skills necessary for the authentic self to be realized can be damaged by gender socialization. One program invited women to explore their feelings about their sexuality—[and encouraged them] to acknowledge the complexity of their emotional lives and to take their own subjectivity seriously. Another—invited women to empathize with [women who had become infected] and the grief of the families of women and girls who had died— [Another invited] women to imagine the lives of women whose cultures are different but whose religion is the same as their own. Moreover, if agents lack self-respect due to being subjected to oppression, they may not achieve autonomy competency.

**Chapter 9 : Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-Garde in America by Robert E. Somol**

*Ted Atkinson. THE IDEOLOGY OF AUTONOMY: F O R M AND FUNCTION IN A S / LAY DYING I n the early sections of William Faulkner's As / Lay Dying, Cash Bundren.*

The Concept of Autonomy In the western tradition, the view that individual autonomy is a basic moral and political value is very much a modern development. For historical discussions of autonomy, see Schneewind , Lindley , Part I. As such, it bears the weight of the controversies that this legacy has attracted. The idea that moral principles and obligations, as well as the legitimacy of political authority, should be grounded in the self-governing individual, considered apart from various contingencies of place, culture, and social relations, invites skeptics from several quarters. Autonomy, then, is very much at the vortex of the complex re-consideration of modernity. Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable value, especially since its opposite – being guided by forces external to the self and which one cannot authentically embrace – seems to mark the height of oppression. But specifying more precisely the conditions of autonomy inevitably sparks controversy and invites skepticism about the claim that autonomy is an unqualified value for all individuals. Autonomy plays various roles in theoretical accounts of persons, conceptions of moral obligation and responsibility, the justification of social policies and in numerous aspects of political theory. It forms the core of the Kantian conception of practical reason see, e. It is also seen as the aspect of persons that prevents or ought to prevent paternalistic interventions in their lives Dworkin , – It plays a role in education theory and policy, on some views specifying the core goal of liberal education generally Gutmann , Cuypers and Haji ; for discussion, see Brighouse , 65 – Personal or individual autonomy should also be distinguished from freedom, although again, there are many renderings of these concepts, and certainly some conceptions of positive freedom will be equivalent to what is often meant by autonomy Berlin , – Autonomy concerns the independence and authenticity of the desires values, emotions, etc. Some distinguish autonomy from freedom by insisting that freedom concerns particular acts while autonomy is a more global notion, referring to states of a person Dworkin , 13 – 15, 19 – But autonomy can be used to refer both to the global condition autonomous personhood and as a more local notion autonomous relative to a particular trait, motive, value, or social condition. Addicted smokers for example are autonomous persons in a general sense but for some helplessly unable to control their behavior regarding this one activity Christman , 13 – In addition, we must keep separate the idea of basic autonomy, the minimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak for oneself, from ideal autonomy, an achievement that serves as a goal to which we might aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic and free of manipulative, self-distorting influences. Any plausible conceptualization of basic autonomy must, among other things, imply that most adults who are not suffering from debilitating pathologies or are under oppressive and constricting conditions count as autonomous. Autonomy as an ideal, on the other hand, may well be enjoyed by very few if any individuals, for it functions as a goal to be attained. The reason to construe basic autonomy broadly enough to include most adults is that autonomy connects with other status designators which apply or, it is claimed, should apply in this sweeping manner. Autonomy is connected, for example, to moral and legal responsibility, on some views e. Lacking autonomy, as young children do, is a condition which allows or invites sympathy, care, paternalism and possibly pity. One might argue that central to all of these uses is a conception of the person able to act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are somehow her own authentic in some sense. The idea of self-rule contains two components: However, the ability to rule oneself will lie at the core of the concept, since a full account of that capability will surely entail the freedom from external manipulation characteristic of independence. Indeed, it could be claimed that independence per se has no fixed meaning or necessary connection with self-government unless we know what kinds of independence is required for self-rule cf. Focusing, then, on the requirements of self rule, it can be claimed that to govern oneself one must be in a position to act competently based on desires values, conditions, etc. This picks out the two families of conditions often proffered in conceptions of autonomy: Competency includes various capacities for rational thought, self-control, and freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception, and so on.

Different accounts include different conditions: Young , Haworth , Meyers The most influential models of authenticity in this vein claim that autonomy requires second-order identification with first order desires. For Frankfurt, for instance, such second-order desires must actually have the structure of a volition: Either one identifies with an aspect of oneself in the sense of simply acknowledging it without judgment or one identifies with a desire in an aspirational, approving sense of that term. But approving of a trait is also problematic as a requirement of autonomy, for there are many perfectly authentic aspects of myself ones for which I can and should be held fully responsible for example which I do not fully approve of. Watson , Berofsky , 99

However, the view includes no stipulations about the content of the desires, values, and so on, in virtue of which one is considered autonomous, specifically there is no requirement that one act from desires independently of others. Some writers have insisted that the autonomous person must enjoy substantive independence as well as procedural independence e. The motivation for such a position is that autonomy should not be understood as consistent with certain constrained life situations no matter how the person came to choose such a situation cf. This claim, however, threatens to rob the attribution of autonomy of any claim to value neutrality it may otherwise carry, for if, conceptually, one is not autonomous when one freely, rationally, without manipulation chooses to enter conditions of severely limited choice, then the concept is reserved to only those lifestyles and value pursuits that are seen as acceptable from a particular political or theoretical point of view. I will return to this line of thought in a moment. One variation on the internal self-reflection model focuses on the importance of the personal history of the agent as an element of her autonomy Christman , Mele ; cf. On these views, the question of whether a person is autonomous at a time depends on the processes by which she came to be the way she is. This locates autonomy in the general capacity to respond to reasons, and not, for example, in acts of internal self-identification. However, even in these accounts, the capacity to think critically and reflectively is necessary for autonomy as one of the competences in question, even though the reflective thought required need not refer to external values or ideals Berofsky , ch. Further difficulties have been raised with the requirement of second order self-appraisal for autonomy. For it is unclear that such higher level judgments have any greater claim to authenticity than their first order cousins. Clearly if a person is manipulated or oppressed and hence non-autonomous , it could well be that the reflective judgments she makes about herself are just as tainted by that oppression as are her ground-level decisions Thalberg , Friedman , Meyers , 25

41, Noggle , and often our second order reflective voices are merely rationalizations and acts of self-deception rather than true and settled aspects of our character for general discussion see the essays in Veltman and Piper This has led to the charge that models of autonomy which demand second-order endorsement merely introduce an infinite regress: Various responses to this problem have been made, for the most part involving the addition of conditions concerning the manner in which such reflection must be made, for example that it must be free of certain distorting factors itself, it must reflect an adequate causal history, and the like Christman , Mele Other aspects of the inner reflection model should be noted. As just mentioned, this view of autonomy is often stated as requiring critical self reflection see, e. But an overly narrow concentration on rational assessment exposes such conceptions to charges of hyper intellectualism, painting a picture of the autonomous person as a cold, detached calculator see Meyers ,

For parallel reasons, some theorists have noted that concentration on only desires as the focal point of autonomy is overly narrow, as people can fail to exhibit self-government relative to a wide range of personal characteristics, such as values, physical traits, relations to others, and so on see Double , For Kant, the self-imposition of universal moral law is the ground of both moral obligation generally and the respect others owe to us and we owe ourselves. In short, practical reason

our ability to use reasons to choose our own actions presupposes that we understand ourselves as free. Freedom means lacking barriers to our action that are in any way external to our will, though it also requires that we utilize a law to guide our decisions, a law that can come to us only by an act of our own will for further discussion see Hill This self-imposition of the moral law is autonomy. And since this law must have no content provided by sense or desire, or any other contingent aspect of our situation, it must be universal. Hence we have the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, that by virtue of our being autonomous we must act only on those maxims that we can consistently will as a universal law. The story continues, however: Some theorists who are not self-described Kantians have made this

inference central to their views of autonomy. Paul Benson, for example, has argued that being autonomous implies a measure of self-worth in that we must be in a position to trust our decision-making capacities to put ourselves in a position of responsibility Benson ; cf. But the Kantian position is that such self-regard is not a contingent psychological fact about us, but an unavoidable implication of the exercise of practical reason cf. So we owe to ourselves moral respect in virtue of our autonomy. But insofar as this capacity depends in no way on anything particular or contingent about ourselves, we owe similar respect to all other persons in virtue of their capacity. Hence via the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative , we are obliged to act out of fundamental respect for other persons in virtue of their autonomy. In this way, autonomy serves as both a model of practical reason in the determination of moral obligation and as the feature of other persons deserving moral respect from us. For further discussion, see Immanuel Kant and moral philosophy. Recent discussions of Kantian autonomy have downplayed the transcendental nature of practical reason in this account see, for example, Herman and Hill For example, Christine Korsgaard follows Kant in seeing our capacity for self-reflection as both the object of respect and the seat of normativity generally. But unlike Kant, Korsgaard argues that we have different practical identities that are the source of our normative commitments, and not all of them are of fundamental moral worth. But the most general of such identities “ that which makes us members of a kingdom of ends “ is our moral identity, which yields universal duties and obligations independent of contingent factors. Autonomy is the source of all obligations, whether moral or non-moral, since it is the capacity to impose upon ourselves, by virtue of our practical identities, obligations to act Korsgaard I mention two here, as they connect with issues concerning autonomy in social and political theory. The first concerns the way in which autonomy-based moral theory grounds obligation in our cognitive abilities rather than in our emotions and affective connections see, e. The claim is that Kantian morality leaves too little room for the kinds of emotional reactions that are constitutive of moral response in many situations: To view obligation as arising from autonomy but understanding autonomy in a purely cognitive manner makes such an account vulnerable to this kind of charge. The Kantian model of such a self is of a pure cognizer “ a reflective agent engaged in practical reason. But also involved in decision-making are our passions “ emotions, desires, felt commitments, senses of attraction and aversion, alienation and comfort. These are both the objects of our judgement and partly constitutive of them “ to passionately embrace an option is different from coolly determining it to be best. Judgment is involved with all such passions when decisions are made. And it judgment need not be understood apart from them, but as an ability to engage in those actions whose passionate and reasoned support we muster up. So when the optimal decision for me is an impassioned one, I must value my ability to engage in the right passions, not merely in the ability to cold-heartedly reflect and choose. Putting the passions outside the scope of reasoned reflection, as merely an ancillary quality of the action “ to consider how to do something not merely what we are doing “ is to make one kind of decision. Putting passions inside that scope “ saying that what it is right to do now is to act with a certain affect or passion “ is another. When we generalize from our ability to make the latter sort of decisions, we must value not only the ability to weigh options and universalize them but also the ability to engage the right affect, emotion, etc. Therefore, we value ourselves and others as passionate reasoners not merely reasoners per se. The implications of this observation is that in generalizing our judgments in the manner Korsgaard following Kant says we must, we need not commit ourselves to valuing only the cognitive capacities of humanity but also its relatively subjective elements. This directly relates to the nature of autonomy, for the question of whether moral obligation rests upon and contains affective elements depends on the conception of autonomy at work and whether affective elements are included in the types of reflective judgments that form its core. A second question is this: If the capacity for reflection is the seat of obligation, then we must ask if the conditions under which such hypothetical reflection takes place are idealized in any sense “ if they are assumed to be reasonable for example. Are we considering merely the reflections the actual person would make were she to turn her attention to the question, no matter how unreasonable such reflections might be? If so, why should we think this grounds obligations? If we assume they are reasonable, then under some conditions moral obligations are not imposed by the actual self but rather by an idealized, more rational self. This shows the complex and potentially problematic implications of this ambiguity. This points to the question

of whether autonomy can be the seat of moral obligation and respect if autonomy is conceived in a purely procedural manner. If no substantive commitments or value orientations are included in the conceptual specification of autonomy, then it is unclear how this capacity grounds any particular substantive value commitments. On the other hand, if autonomy includes a specification of particular values in its conditions "that the autonomous person must value her own freedom for example" then it turns out that moral obligation and respect attaches only to those already committed in this way, and not more generally to all rational agents as such as traditionally advertised by the view.