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Description logic reasoners are able to detect incoherences such as logical inconsistency and concept unsatisfiability in knowledge bases, but provide little support for resolving them. We propose to recast techniques for propositional inconsistency management into the description logic setting. We show that the additional structure afforded by description logic statements can be used to refine these techniques. Our focus in this paper is on the formal semantics for such techniques, although we do provide high-level decision procedures for the knowledge integration strategies discussed. Show Context Citation Context However, a serious drawback is that work in this area, by and large, is based on the propositional aspects of the logic. These techniques are directly applicable to DLs but do not exploit the addit Generalizing the AGM Postulates: One of the crucial actions any reasoning system must undertake is the updating of its Knowledge Base KB. This problem is usually referred to as the problem of belief change. In this paper, we drop all such assumptions and determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for a logic to support AGM-compliant operators. Our approach is directly applicable to a much broader class of logics. Finally, we investigate why belief base operators cannot satisfy the AGM postulates in standard logics. However, it is generally acceptable that the recovery postulate cannot be dropped unless replaced by some of An intelligent agent may receive information about its environment from several different sources. How should the agent merge these items of information into a single, consistent piece? The first stage consists of weakening the individual pieces of information into a form in which they can be consistently added together. The second, trivial, stage then consists of simply adding together the information thus obtained. This paper is devoted mainly to the first stage of this process, which we call social contraction. We consider both a postulational and a procedural approach to social contraction. With the help of Spohn-type rankings we provide two possible instantiations of this extended framework. This leads to two interesting concrete families of social contraction functions. Stage i is not, and so forms the main topic of this paper. It addresses the problem of how to merge one item of information, usually taken to represent the current beliefs of some agent, w We present a framework for non-prioritised belief revision i. We show how both ordinary partial mee In this paper we show that a particular construction of belief revision operator is equivalent to the standard method for computing consistency-based diagnosis. We show how a diagnosis problem can be translated into a problem of belief revision and show how kernel constructions for revision op We show how a diagnosis problem can be translated into a problem of belief revision and show how kernel constructions for revision operators can be used for computing diagnosis. Traditionally, the body of knowledge is represented by a belief set, a set of formulas closed under logical implication. Instead of belief sets we are going to use belief bases to represent belief states. A belief base is a set not closed under logical consequence [Fuhrmann, ; Hansson, ; Nebel,]. For every belief base B Previously an algorithm for belief base semi-revision for propositional logic has been defined; in pa Previously an algorithm for belief base semi-revision for propositional logic has been defined; in particular it has been shown how the diagnosis problem can be translated into a revision problem. We additionally, discuss various optimizations to make the approach more practical. Belief bases are not closed under logical consequence and are usually interpreted as basic beliefs from which additional beliefs the belief set can be derived. Additionally, [12] defines semi-revision, which differs with the belief base revision model in that the added belief may or may not be a We investigate how belief change in cooperative dialogues can be handled within a modal logic of action, belief, and intention. We first review the main approaches of the literature, and point out some of their shortcomings. We then propose a new framework for belief change. Our basic notion is that Our basic notion is that of a contextual topic: We illustrate our theory by a running example. Standard belief contraction assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic, but there are good reasons for considering contraction in less expressive logics. In this paper we focus on Horn logic. In addition to being of interest in its own right, our choice is motivated by In addition to being of

interest in its own right, our choice is motivated by the use of Horn logic in several areas, including ontology reasoning in description logics. We consider three versions of contraction: We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. We define more appropriate notions of basic contraction for all three types above, and provide associated representation results in terms of postulates. Our interest in p-contraction stems from its relationship with an important reasoning task in ontological reasoning: We show that this restricted version of p-contraction can also be represented as i-contraction. Ontologies are not constructed by writing DL axioms, but rather using ontology editing tools, from which the axioms are generated automatically. Because of this, it is the belief set and not the ax We provide a formal study of belief retraction operators that do not necessarily satisfy the Inclusion postulate. We provide a few possible weakenings of the Inclusion postulate and then provide two models of liberation via retraction operators, -liberation and linear liberation. We show that the class of -liberation operators is included in the class of linear ones and provide axiomatic characterisations for each class. Such a treatment is reminiscent of [3]. Rapaport - University of New South Wales " Is it just the surrounding text?

The mids saw the discovery of logical tools that make it possible to model changes in belief and knowledge in entirely new ways. These logical tools turned out to be applicable to both human beliefs and to the contents of databases. Philosophers, logicians, and computer scientists have.

An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: In the prominent AGM framework [1, 8] for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern the other two deal with the incorporation of new information. Makinson [23] has generalised this work by introducing the notion of a withdrawal operation. Underlying the account proffered by AGM is the idea of rational belief change. A belief change operation should be guided by certain principles or integrity constraints in order to characterise change by a rational agent. However, adoption of this principle in its purest form has been The problem of revising an ontology consistently is closely related to the problem of belief revision which has been widely discussed in the literature. Some syntax-based belief revision operators have been adapted to revise ontologies in Description Logics DLs. However, these operators remove the However, these operators remove the whole axioms to resolve logical contradictions and thus are not fine-grained. In this paper, we propose three model-based revision operators to revise terminologies in DLs. We show that one of them is more rational than others by comparing their logical properties. Therefore, we focus on this revision operator. We also consider the problem of computing the result of revision by our operator with the help of the notion of concept forgetting. Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of our revision operator. IJCAI , " How can an intelligent agent update her knowledge base about an action domain, relative to some conditions possibly obtained from earlier observations? We study this question in a formal framework for reasoning about actions and change, in which the meaning of an action domain description can be r We study this question in a formal framework for reasoning about actions and change, in which the meaning of an action domain description can be represented by a directed graph whose nodes correspond to states and whose edges correspond to action occurrences. We define the update of an action domain description in this framework, and show among other results that a solution to this problem can be obtained by a divide-and-conquer approach in some cases. We also introduce methods to compute a solution and an approximate solution to this problem, and analyze the computational complexity of these problems. Finally, we discuss techniques to improve the quality of solutions. Vardi , " We consider a panel of experts asked to assign probabilities to events, both logically simple and complex. The events evaluated by different experts are based on overlapping sets of variables but may otherwise be distinct. The union of all the judgments will likely be probabilistic incoherent. Revision of a description logic-based ontology deals with the problem of incorporating newly received information consistently. In this paper, we propose a general operator for revising terminologies in description logic-based ontologies. Our revision operator relies on a reformulation of Our revision operator relies on a reformulation of the kernel contraction operator in belief revision. We first define our revision operator for terminologies and show that it satisfies some desirable logical properties. Second, two algorithms are developed to instantiate the revision operator. Since in general, these two algorithms are computationally too hard, we propose a third algorithm as a more efficient alternative. We implemented the algorithms and provide evaluation results on their efficiency, effectiveness and meaningfulness in the context of two application scenarios: Incremental ontology learning and mapping revision. In the scenario of ontology change, this later representation seems to be more natural because we do not require that an ontology should be closed under logical consequence. The problem of revision Revision of a Description Logic-based ontology to incorporate newly received information consistently is an important problem for the lifecycle of ontologies. Many approaches in the theory of belief revision have been applied to deal with this problem and most of them focus on the postulate or logic Many approaches in the theory of belief revision have been applied to deal with this problem and most of them focus on the postulate or logical properties of a revision operator in Description Logics DLs. However, there is no coherent view on how to characterize a revision operator in DLs. In this paper, we lay bare the assumptions underlying different approaches for revision in DLs and

propose some criteria to compare them. Based on the analysis, we give our definition of a revision operator in DLs and point out some open problems.

Chapter 3 : Paul Tillich Resources

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Review by JBH [Note: This review references the pagination of the Perennial Classics version of the original text. In the first chapter, Tillich succinctly delineates his own definition of faith. While faith may certainly involve rationality and emotion, for Tillich it transcends them both without destroying either, thereby overcoming the gap between subjectivity and objectivity 7, In one of the more interesting passages of the book Tillich claims that the holy mysterium tremendum et fascinans "that which grasps a person ultimately lies in a substratum below good and evil, appearing as both creative and destructive 16ff. Likewise, faith also involves the risk or wager of existential courage, i. For Tillich, each of these misunderstandings of faith stem from the tendency to collapse the whole of faith within only one of the functions that constitute the whole personality The first and most pervasive distortion of faith is the penchant to identify or conflate faith as an act of knowledge with little evidence. When this occurs it is almost certain that one is referring to cognitive belief rather than faith itself. The second distortion assumes and builds upon the first. If faith means belief with little or no evidence then it must be supplemented or complemented by a subjective act of the will. This is what Tillich calls the voluntaristic distortion of the meaning of faith. In Roman Catholicism this amounts to an act of the will enabled by grace and contingent upon assent to the teachings of the church; in Protestantism the will to believe is also enabled by grace and is directly connected to personal piety and moralism. Finally, there is the emotionalistic distortion of faith. Chapters three and four outline the symbols of faith and delineate between different types of faith. God functions as the most fundamental symbol for ultimate concern. Myths in this view serve as the language and narrative through which ultimate symbols are communicated or transmitted. Through symbol and myth faith is tangibly manifest in the life of the individual ontologically and morally. Drawing a distinction once again between the structure of faith and its determinate content, Tillich claims that this ontological type of faith is universal, sacramental, and present in all formal religions. Thus, the content of faith is emphasized over its ontological structure. In the final two chapters, Tillich outlines what he calls the truth of faith, i. For Tillich, faith and reason are not incompatible nor are they mutually exclusive. Rather, the latter is the precondition of the former. Likewise, epistemologically, the truth of faith is not contradictory to the truth of science, history, or faith " and vice versa. Since faith is the religious structure of that which grasps a person ultimately, its truth cannot be completely confirmed or validated by the truth of history or science, nor can it be denied. Faith functions more as an interpretive discourse in relation to science, history or philosophy; it asks questions of ultimate meaning and is therefore in no position to pass judgment upon the validity of historical investigation or scientific experimentation. Finally, the life of faith is one marked with various tensions " between doubt and courage, estrangement and wholeness, individual and community " and the attempt to maintain balance such that faith, hope and love are concretely present within the totality of the human personality. For its time, Dynamics of Faith stands among works such as H. For his part, Tillich appears to have succeeded where Niebuhr, and certainly Karl Barth, failed, i. This, too, is significant insofar as it affords the reader the opportunity to engage Tillich in a singular volume, to catch a glimpse into the heart of his immense and intense theological edifice in an uncharacteristically crystallized form. For Tillich, faith involves a fundamental dynamic between several different sets of existential or ontological polarities, the culmination of which is best seen in the difference drawn, though not explicitly in this work, between existential and essential being. Again, though Tillich does not explicate this distinction in detail in Dynamics of Faith, the irreducible gap between essence and existence is the foundation upon which his understanding of faith as ultimate concern is erected. The crucial question here is whether Tillich, despite all his important work to free Christian theology from myopic dogmatism, is still tacitly reliant upon a linear and indeed Neoplatonic theological trajectory still pervasive in Christianity, even in many liberal-progressive quarters. This structure unfolds thusly: The ultimate telos toward which all creation, including especially humanity, is oriented is the restoration of this original, essential state of being.

Tillich certainly does not and for that theologians can be very grateful. However, it is unclear, especially in the present text, as to whether his theological enterprise is buttressed by this linear, triumphalistic trajectory such that the ultimate eschatological end involves the final and indeed terminal realization of essential being over and against existential estrangement. Insofar as Tillich privileges the eventual triumph of one side of all the various ontological and existential polarities in *Dynamics of Faith* and elsewhere it would seem that this may be the case. Would it not be more true to the vicissitudes of existential reality as such to suggest that the dynamic between essence and existence is not one of linearity, but of oscillation? Essence may indeed eclipse existence but such a transfiguration is only momentary, always fleeting and never final or complete. Thus, these two concepts – essential being and existential being – would function not as total opposites on the spectrum of experience but as symbols of reality which are always implicated in one another, presenting themselves as inextricable aspects of human nature, not as phases or stages through which one progresses straightforwardly. To be fair, there are instances in *Dynamics of Faith* where Tillich, whether he realizes it or not, creates the possibility for such a reading, namely his insistence that faith is always an act of courage and risk from within the conditions of existence. His recovery of faith as the existential dynamic or structure of that which apprehends and grasps a person ultimately regardless of particular form or content is an important theological achievement in itself. This combined with his salient discussion of the function of symbols within theological discourse and religious experience constitute the enduring legacy of *Dynamics of Faith* as a text which aims to crystallize an intricate, erudite and indeed robust theological system in a succinct yet compelling manner for the non-specialist. Review by SL [Note: This review references the pagination of the First Harper Torchbook edition published in 1957. Something that holds ultimate concern for us must meet two criteria: Tillich moves on to describe faith as a centered act of the whole individual. Doubt, especially in existential forms, plays a vital role in relationship to faith as it serves as the opposite pole in the state of ultimate concern. Doubt requires the individual to show courage in order to accept doubt as a part of the existential condition. However, communities of faith must not be bound by legalistic ties to doctrinal statements of belief, but rather assert the freedom of faith within the community. In the second chapter, Tillich addresses what faith is not. In the intellectualistic distortion of faith, faith becomes belief rather than the state of being ultimately concerned. The final distortion of faith is emotionalistic. Tillich explains in the third chapter the relationship between faith and symbols. Other symbols for ultimate concern are used with different concrete manifestations from existential experience. In the fourth chapter, Tillich describes two types of faith: Tillich makes it clear that science and faith should not interfere with each other, in that neither can prove nor deny the other; they operate on different dimensions of meaning. In terms of historical truth, faith can assert that events of ultimate concern occurred in the past, but cannot assert the historical truth of any particular events where ultimate concern is supposedly revealed. Thus, those of faith are free from the burdens of determining the veracity of historical occurrences. The relationship between philosophical truth and the truth of faith are more interconnected, in that elements of each exist in the other. However, neither determines the course of the other. Tillich turns in his final chapter to the manifestation of faith in the life of an individual. This is most explicitly experienced through doubt, which is overcome by courage to assume doubt into the experience of faith. Love serves as the manifestation of the state of being ultimately concerned within the conditions of existence. In this text, written in the same year in which the second volume of his *Systematic Theology* (ST) appeared, Tillich offers a sample of his theology with an eye toward the non-academic community. While the tone of the book has a far more popular appeal, Tillich does not shy away from wrestling with grand theological questions. In addressing concepts such as creeds in the church, the role of reason in relation to faith, and the function of doubt in the life of the faithful, among others, Tillich serves his audience well by confronting problematic issues within religious communities. Several specific points deserve praise in *DF*. In fact, Tillich states in his discussion of moral types of faith: "The conflict between religions is not a conflict between forms of belief, but it is a conflict between expressions of our ultimate concern." He goes on later to point out that the perspective from which the discussion is arising will inevitably produce a response that justifies the ultimate concern in that perspective. Tillich acknowledges the many expressions of ultimate concern that exist in the world. The second accolade due to Tillich in *DF* is his depiction of faith as

action in the final chapter. With references to the third volume of the ST, Tillich lays out the concept of faith in manageable and practical ways for the individual. His connection of faith to love—explicitly in terms of the combination of agape and eros, which proves to be a fruitful description of his vision of ultimately concerned love—allows the reader to get a sense for the direction in which this faith takes us. It is along these same lines, however, that Tillich also should be criticized. His definition of love and its identification with faith in the final chapter revolves around, and is predicated upon. Thus, the point of faith, that which is concerned with what is truly ultimate, and its connection to love, through reunion from what humanity is separated, would be lost. While his treatment of estrangement leaves much to be desired, Tillich gives a compelling reinterpretation and illumination of faith. He strengthens a term that carries much baggage throughout the history of religious understanding, leaving the reader with a renewed sense of integrity and purpose appropriate to his vision of faith. If you want to use text or ideas that you find here, please be careful to acknowledge this site as your source, and remember also to credit the original author of what you use, where that is applicable. If you have corrections or want to make comments, please contact me at the feedback address for permission.

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