

Chapter 1 : Discourse - Examples and Definition of Discourse

A discourse of constancy in two books chiefly containing consolations against publick evils written in Latin by Justus Lipsius, and translated into English by Nathaniel Wanley De constantia. Lipsius, Justus,

Color vision Color vision is a process by which organisms and machines are able to distinguish objects based on the different wavelengths of light reflected, transmitted, or emitted by the object. In humans, light is detected by the eye using two types of photoreceptors, cones and rods , which send signals to the visual cortex , which in turn processes those sensations into a subjective perception of color. Color constancy is a process that allows the brain to recognize a familiar object as being a consistent color regardless of the amount or wavelengths of light reflecting from it at a given moment. This is due to an ignorance of all possible sources of illumination. Although an object may reflect multiple sources of light into the eye, color constancy causes objective identities to remain constant. Foster states, "in the natural environment, the source itself may not be well defined in that the illumination at a particular point in a scene is usually a complex mixture of direct and indirect [light] distributed over a range of incident angles, in turn modified by local occlusion and mutual reflection, all of which may vary with time and position. Color constancy allows for humans to interact with the world in a consistent or veridical manner [5] and it allows for one to more effectively make judgements on the time of day. These specialized cells are called double-opponent cells because they compute both color opponency and spatial opponency. Double-opponent cells were first described by Nigel Daw in the goldfish retina. The different cone cells of the eye register different but overlapping ranges of wavelengths of the light reflected by every object in the scene. From this information, the visual system attempts to determine the approximate composition of the illuminating light. This reflectance then largely determines the perceived color. Neural Mechanism[edit] There are two possible mechanisms for color constancy. The first mechanism is unconscious inference. Research in monkeys suggest that changes in chromatic sensitivity is correlated to activity in parvocellular lateral geniculate neurons. For example, when subjects are presented stimuli in a dichoptic fashion, an array of colors and a void color, such as grey, and are told to focus on a specific color of the array, the void color appears different than when perceived in a binocular fashion. Retinex theory[edit] The "Land effect" refers to the capacity to see full color if muted images solely by looking at a photo with red and gray wavelengths. The effect was discovered by Edwin H. Land realized that, even when there were no green or blue wavelengths present in an image, the visual system would still perceive them as green or blue by discounting the red illumination. Land described this effect in a article in Scientific American. The word "retinex" is a portmanteau formed from " retina " and " cortex ", suggesting that both the eye and the brain are involved in the processing. Land, with John McCann, also developed a computer program designed to imitate the retinex processes taking place in human physiology. A display called a "Mondrian" after Piet Mondrian whose paintings are similar consisting of numerous colored patches is shown to a person. The display is illuminated by three white lights, one projected through a red filter, one projected through a green filter, and one projected through a blue filter. The person is asked to adjust the intensity of the lights so that a particular patch in the display appears white. The experimenter then measures the intensities of red, green, and blue light reflected from this white-appearing patch. Then the experimenter asks the person to identify the color of a neighboring patch, which, for example, appears green. Then the experimenter adjusts the lights so that the intensities of red, blue, and green light reflected from the green patch are the same as were originally measured from the white patch. The person shows color constancy in that the green patch continues to appear green, the white patch continues to appear white, and all the remaining patches continue to have their original colors. Color constancy is a desirable feature of computer vision , and many algorithms have been developed for this purpose. These include several retinex algorithms. One such algorithm operates as follows: Assuming that the scene contains objects which reflect all red light, and other objects which reflect all green light and still others which reflect all blue light, one can then deduce that the illuminating light source is described by r_{max} , g_{max} , b_{max} . The original retinex algorithm proposed by Land and McCann uses a localized version of this principle.

Chapter 2 : Color constancy - Wikipedia

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If you would like this text in the form of a Publisher file, so that you can print it off as a small booklet, please consult the following: Printed versions of this text suitable for classroom use are available from Prideaux Street Productions. The fourth section, the Discourse, outlined the basis for a new method of investigating knowledge. He later in published a more detailed exploration of the philosophical basis for this new approach to knowledge in Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes Discourse on Method If this discourse seems too long to be read in a single sitting, it can be divided up into six parts. In the first will be found various considerations concerning the sciences; in the second, the principal rules of the method which the author has discovered; in the third, some rules of morality which he has derived by this method; in the fourth, the reasons which enable him to establish the existence of God and of the human soul, which are the foundations of his metaphysics; in the fifth part, the order of questions in physics which he has looked into, and particularly the explanation for the movements of the heart and for some other difficulties which are part of medicine, including the difference which exists between our souls and those of animals; in the last part, some matters he believes necessary for further research into nature, beyond where he has been, along with some reasons which have induced him to write.

Part One The most widely shared thing in the world is good sense, for everyone thinks he is so well provided with it that even those who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else do not usually desire to have more good sense than they have. In this matter it is not likely that everyone is wrong. But this is rather a testimony to the fact that the power of judging well and distinguishing what is true from what is false, which is really what we call good sense or reason, is naturally equal in all men, and thus the diversity of our opinions does not arise because some people are more reasonable than others, but only because we conduct our thoughts by different routes and do not consider the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind. The main thing is to apply it well. The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as the greatest virtues, and those who proceed only very slowly, if they always stay on the right road, are capable of advancing a great deal further than those who rush along and wander away from it. As for myself, I have never presumed that my mind was anything more perfect than the ordinary mind. I have often even wished that I could have thoughts as quick, an imagination as clear and distinct, or a memory as ample and actively involved as some other people. And I know of no qualities other than these which serve to perfect the mind. As far as reason, or sense, is concerned, given that it is the only thing which makes us human and distinguishes us from animals, I like to believe that it is entirely complete in each person, following in this the common opinion of philosophers, who say that differences of more and less should occur only between accidental characteristics and not at all between the forms or essential natures of individuals of the same species. But I am not afraid to state that since my youth I think I have been very fortunate to find myself on certain roads which have led me to considerations and maxims out of which I have created a method by which, it seems to me, I have a way of gradually increasing my knowledge, raising it little by little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my mind and the short length of my life can allow it to attain. However, it could be the case that I am wrong and that perhaps what I have taken for gold and diamonds is only a little copper and glass. I know how much we are subject to making mistakes in what touches ourselves and also how much we should beware of the judgments of our friends when they favour us. But I will be only too happy to make known in this discourse what roads I have followed and to reveal my life, as if in a picture, so that each person can judge it. Learning from common talk the opinions people have of this discourse may be a new way of teaching me, something I will add to those which I habitually use. Thus, my design here is not to teach the method which everyone should follow in order to reason well, but only to reveal the ways in which I have tried to conduct my own reasoning. Those who take it upon themselves to give precepts must consider themselves more skilful than those to whom they give them, and if they are missing something, then they are

culpable. But since I intend this text only as a history, or, if you prefer, a fable, in which, among some examples which you can imitate, you will, in addition, perhaps find several others which you will have reason not to follow, I hope that it will be useful to some people, without harming anyone, and that everyone will find my frankness agreeable. I was nourished on literature from the time of my childhood. Because people persuaded me that through literature one could acquire a clear and assured understanding of everything useful in life, I had an intense desire to take it up. But soon after I had completed that entire course of study at the end of which one was usually accepted into the rank of scholars, I changed my opinion completely. For I found myself embarrassed by so many doubts and errors that it seemed to me I had gained nothing by trying to instruct myself, other than the fact that I had increasingly discovered my own ignorance. Yet I had been in one of the most famous schools in Europe, a place where I thought there must be erudite men, if there were such people anywhere on earth. I had learned everything which the others had learned, but still, not being happy with the sciences which we had been taught, I had gone through all the books which I could lay my hands on dealing with those sciences which are considered the most curious and rare. In addition, I knew how other people were judging me, and I saw that they did not consider me inferior to my fellow students, although among them there were already some destined to fill the places of our teachers. And finally our age seemed to me as flourishing and as fertile in good minds as any preceding age. Hence, I took the liberty of judging all the others by myself and of thinking that there was no doctrine in the world of the kind I had previously been led to hope for. However, I did not cease valuing the exercises which kept people busy in the schools. But I believed I had already given enough time to languages and even to reading ancient books as well, and to their histories and stories. For talking with those from other ages is the same as traveling. It is good to know something about the customs of various people, so that we can judge our own more sensibly and do not think everything different from our own ways ridiculous and irrational, as those who have seen nothing are accustomed to do. Hence, those who regulate their habits by the examples which they derive from these histories are prone to fall into the extravagances of the knights of our romances and to dream up projects which surpass their powers. I placed a great value on eloquence, and I was in love with poetry, but I thought that both of them were gifts given to the mind rather than fruits of study. Those who have the most powerful reasoning and who direct their thoughts best in order to make them clear and intelligible can always convince us best of what they are proposing, even if they speak only the language of Lower Brittany and have never learned rhetoric. And those who possess the most pleasant rhetorical inventions and who know how to express them with the most adornment and smoothness cannot help being the best poets, even though the art of poetry is unknown to them. I found mathematics especially delightful because of the certainty and clarity of its reasoning. But I did not yet notice its true use. Thinking that it was practical only in the mechanical arts, I was astonished that on its foundations, so strong and solid, nothing more imposing had been built up. By contrast, I compared the writings of the ancient pagans which deal with morality to really superb and magnificent palaces built of nothing but sand on mud. They raise the virtues to a very great height and make them appear valuable, above everything in the world, but they do not teach us to know them well enough, and often what they teach with such a beautiful name is only insensibility or pride or despair or parricide. I revered our theology and aspired as much as anyone to reach heaven, but having learned, as something very certain, that the road there is no less open to the most ignorant as to the most learned and that the revealed truths which lead there are beyond our intelligence, I did not dare to submit them to the frailty of my reasoning, and I thought that undertaking to examine them successfully would require me to have some extraordinary heavenly assistance and to be more than a man. I will say nothing of philosophy other than this: Considering how many different opinions, maintained by learned people, philosophy could have about the same matter, without there ever being more than one which could be true, I reckoned as virtually false all those which were merely probable. Then, as for the other sciences, since they borrow their principles from philosophy, I judged that nothing solid could have been built on such insubstantial foundations; and neither the honour nor the profit which they promise were sufficient to convince me to learn them; for, thank God, I did not feel myself in a condition which obliged me to make a profession of science in order to improve my fortune, and, although I did not, in some cynical way, undertake to proclaim my disdain for glory, nonetheless I placed very little value on the

glory I could hope to acquire only through false titles. And finally, as for bad doctrines, I thought I already understood sufficiently what they were worth in order not to be taken in either by the promises of an alchemist, by the predictions of an astrologer, by the impostures of a magician, or by the artifice or the bragging of any of those who made a profession of knowing more than they know. For it seemed to me that I could arrive at considerably more truth in the reasoning that each man makes concerning the matters which are important to him and in which events could punish him soon afterwards if he judged badly, than in the reasoning made by a man of letters in his study concerning speculations which produce no effect and which are of no consequence to him, except perhaps that from them he can augment his vanity—and all the more so, the further his speculations are from common sense, because he would have had to use that much more wit and artifice in the attempt to make them probable. And I always had an extreme desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false, to see clearly in my actions, and to proceed with confidence in this life. Consequently, the greatest profit which I derived from this was that, by seeing several things which, although they seem really extravagant and ridiculous to us, were commonly accepted and approved by other great people, I learned not to believe too firmly in anything which I had been persuaded to believe merely by example and by custom. Thus, I gradually freed myself of plenty of errors which can obfuscate our natural light and make us less capable of listening to reason. But after I had spent a few years studying in this way in the book of the world, attempting to acquire some experience, one day I resolved to study myself as well and to use all the powers of my mind to select ways which I should follow, a task which brought me considerably more success, it seems to me, than if I had never gone away from my own country and my books. Part Two I was then in Germany, summoned there by the wars which have not yet concluded. As I was returning to the army from the coronation of the emperor, the onset of winter stopped me in quarters where, not finding any conversation to divert me and, by good fortune, not having any cares or passions to trouble me, I spent the entire day closed up alone in a room heated by a stove, where I had all the leisure to talk to myself about my thoughts. Among these, one of the first was that I noticed myself thinking about how often there is not so much perfection in works created from several pieces and made by the hands of various masters as there is in those which one person has worked on alone. Thus we see that the buildings which a single architect has undertaken and completed are usually more beautiful and better ordered than those several people have tried to refurbish by making use of old walls built for other purposes. Even though, considering the buildings in each of them separately, we often find as much beauty in the former town as in the latter, or more, nonetheless, looking at them as they are arranged—here a large one, there a small one—and the way they make the streets crooked and unequal, we say that chance rather than the will of some men using their reason designed them this way. Thus, I imagined to myself that people who were semi-savages in earlier times and who became civilized only bit by bit and created their laws only as they were compelled to by the extent to which crimes and quarrels bothered them would not be so well regulated as those who, from the moment they first assembled, followed the constitution of some prudent legislator. It is indeed certain that the state of the true religion, whose laws God alone created, must be incomparably better ordered than all the others. And, to speak of human affairs, I believe that if Sparta was in earlier times very prosperous, that was not on account of the goodness of each of its laws in particular, seeing that several were very strange and even contrary to good morals, but on account of the fact that they were devised by only a single man and thus they contributed towards the same end. Similarly I thought that the knowledge contained in books, at least those whose reasons are only probable and without any proofs, was put together and crudely fashioned little by little out of the opinions of several different people and thus did not approach the truth as much as the simple reasoning which a man of good sense can make quite naturally concerning matters of his own experience. In the same way I thought that because we were all children before we were men and because it was necessary for us to be governed for a long time by our appetites and our supervisors, who were often at odds with each other, with neither of them perhaps advising us always for the best, it is almost impossible that our judgments are as pure and solid as they would have been if we had had the total use of our reason from the moment of our birth and had never been led by anything but our reason. It is true that we see little point in demolishing all the houses of a city for the sole purpose of rebuilding them in another way to make the streets more beautiful. But we do see several people demolish their houses in order to rebuild them, and, indeed,

sometimes they are compelled to do so, when the houses are in danger of collapsing on their own and when their foundations are not steady. This example persuaded me that there would probably be little point for a particular man to draw up a design for reforming a state, changing all of it from the foundations, overturning it in order to put it up again, or even for reforming the body of sciences or the order established in the schools for teaching the sciences. But so far as all the opinions which I had received up to that point and which I believed credible were concerned, I convinced myself that the best possible thing for me to do was to undertake to remove them once and for all, so that afterwards I could replace them either by other better ones or perhaps by the same ones, once I had adjusted them to a reasonable standard. And I firmly believed that by this means I would be successful in conducting my life better than if I built only on the old foundations and relied only on principles which I had been persuaded to accept in my youth, without having examined whether they were true. For, although I recognized various problems with this approach, these were not without remedy and could not compare to those which occur in the reforms of the least matters concerning the public. It is too difficult to re-erect those large bodies if they are thrown down or even to keep them once they are weakened, and their collapses cannot be anything but very drastic. If I thought that there was the slightest thing in this text which would enable someone to suspect me of this foolishness, I would be very reluctant to allow it to be published. My intention has never been to do more than try to reform my own thoughts and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own. Those to whom God has given more of his grace will perhaps have loftier intentions, but I fear that this work may already be too bold for several people. Most of the world is made up of two sorts of minds for whom such a resolution is not suitable. First, there are those who, believing themselves more clever than they are, cannot stop making hasty judgments, without having enough patience to conduct their thoughts in an orderly way, with the result that, once they have taken the liberty of doubting the principles they have received and of leaving the common road, they will never be able to hold to the track which they need to take in order to proceed more directly and will remain lost all their lives. Then, there are the ones who, having sufficient reason or modesty to judge that they are less capable of differentiating truth and falsehood than several others from whom they can be instructed, must content themselves with following the opinions of these others rather than searching for better opinions on their own. As for me, I would have undoubtedly been among the number of this latter group if I had only had a single master or if I had known nothing at all about the differences which have always existed among the opinions of the scholarly. But I learned from my college days on that one cannot imagine anything so strange and so incredible that it has not been said by some philosopher and, later, in my traveling, I learned that those who have views very different from our own are not therefore barbarians or savages, but that several use as much reason as we do, or more. I also considered how much the same man, with the same mind, raised from his infancy on among the French or the Germans, would become different from what he would have been if he had always lived among the Chinese or the cannibals, and how, even in our style of dress the same thing which pleased us ten years ago and which will perhaps please us again ten years from today, now seems to us extravagant and ridiculous. This being the case, we are clearly persuaded more by custom and example than by any certain knowledge. Nonetheless, a plurality of voices is not a proof worth anything for truths which are a little difficult to discover, because it is far more probable that one man by himself would have found them than an entire people. Since I could not select anyone whose opinions it seemed to me preferable to those of other people, I found myself, so to speak, compelled to guide myself on my own. But like a man who proceeds alone and in the shadows, I resolved to go so slowly and to use so much circumspection in all matters, that if I only advanced a very short distance, at least I would take good care not to fall. I did not even wish to begin by rejecting completely any of the opinions which could have slipped into my beliefs previously without being introduced by reason, before I had taken up enough time drawing up a plan for the work I was undertaking and seeking out the best method for arriving at an understanding of everything my mind was capable of knowing. When I was younger, among the branches of philosophy, I had studied a little logic and, among the subjects of mathematics, geometrical analysis and algebra, three arts or sciences which looked as if they ought to contribute something to my project. Although philosophy does, in fact, contain many really true and excellent precepts, mixed in with them there are always so many injurious or superfluous ones that it is almost as

difficult to separate them as to draw a Diana or a Minerva out of a block of marble which has not yet been carved. Then, so far as the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns are concerned, other than the fact that they deal only with really abstract matters, which have no apparent use, the first is always so concentrated on considering numbers that it cannot exercise the understanding without considerably tiring the imagination, and in the latter one is so subject to certain rules and symbols that it has been turned into a confused and obscure art which clutters up the mind rather than a science which cultivates it. Those are the reasons why I thought I had to look for some other method which included the advantages of these three subjects but was free of their defects. And since a multitude of laws often provides excuses for vices, so that a state is much better ruled when it has only a very few laws which are very strictly observed, I thought that, instead of that large number of rules which make up logic, I would have enough with the four following rules, provided that I maintained a strong and constant resolution that I would never fail to observe them, not even once. The first rule was that I would not accept anything as true which I did not clearly know to be true. That is to say, I would carefully avoid being over hasty or prejudiced, and I would understand nothing by my judgments beyond what presented itself so clearly and distinctly to my mind that I had no occasion to doubt it. The second was to divide each difficulty which I examined into as many parts as possible and as might be necessary to resolve it better. The third was to conduct my thoughts in an orderly way, beginning with the simplest objects, the ones easiest to know, so that little by little I could gradually climb right up to the knowledge of the most complex, by assuming the same order, even among those things which do not naturally come one after the other. And the last was to make my calculations throughout so complete and my examinations so general that I would be confident of not omitting anything. Those long chains of reasons, all simple and easy, which geometers have habitually used to reach the most difficult proofs gave me occasion to imagine to myself that everything which could fall under human knowledge would follow in the same way and that, provided only that one refused to accept anything as true which was not and that one always kept to the order necessary to deduce one thing from another, there would not be anything so far distant that one could not finally reach it, nor so hidden that one could not discover it. And I did not have much trouble finding out the issues which I had to deal with first.

Chapter 3 : Project MUSE - Constancy and the Ethics of Jane Austen's 'Mansfield Park'

A Discourse of Constancy in Two Books Chiefly Containing Consolations Against Publick Evils [microform] written in Latin by Justus Lipsius, and translated into English by Nathaniel Wanley. Format.

Jan Joosten 1 Prophetic discourse and popular rhetoric in the Hebrew Bible Jan Joosten, Strasbourg In biblical literature, prophets are consistently depicted as orators. The historical books have the prophets deliver speeches in a court setting—think of Nathan accusing David of the murder of Uriah 2 Sam 12 , or of Micah ben Yimlah announcing defeat in the war against the Arameans 1 Kgs Likewise, in the prophetic books, the prophets are presented as public speakers addressing the King e. Isa 7 or the assembly e. The style of oracles contained in the prophetic books agrees with this picture. Moreover, the oracles are full of rhetorical devices showing that they are rooted in oratorical practice. If the prophets were orators, and to the extent they were so, the question arises where they learnt their craft. Gitay, Isaiah and his audience. Van Gorcum, ; C. Academic Press, ; Th. Brill, ; K. Academic Press, ; more generally: Essays from the Pretoria Conference ed. Biblical Studies in Honour of Paul-E. Academic Press, , Whence comes this way of speaking, or writing? Is it a matter of genius, of innate talent? Did divine revelation go hand in hand with artistic inspiration? Certainly there is something to say for this. But even the greatest genius needs to be schooled, and training is needed to appropriate inspiration. The verbal skills manifest in Hebrew prophecies may at least partly have developed within a prophetic tradition. But we may speculate that everything having to do with inspired speech would have been treated there with utmost interest. Prophetic literature too witnesses to such tradition. It is not rare that later texts quote or allude to earlier ones: Isaiah elaborates on motifs developed by Amos, Habakkuk follows Isaiah; Jeremiah picks up on Hosean themes, and so on. But the art of verbal communication attested in the prophetic writings draws also on another source. The prophets, as it seems, borrowed elements from popular rhetoric, from the verbal exchanges between their contemporaries in day-to-day life. Each nation possesses a set of stylistic and pragmatic conventions, a store of tropes and figures, an inventory of root metaphors making up its peculiar fashion of speaking and arguing. The oratory of the prophets links up with this typical rhetoric of their own people. Israelite rhetoric Confirming the link between prophetic speech and popular rhetoric is difficult for many reasons, not least because we hardly have access to the popular speech of Israelites in the biblical period. What we do have a fair amount of, however, is popular speech imitated, or recreated in literature: Fey, Amos und Jesaja. Neukirchener, ; M. Schulz-Rauch, Hosea und Jeremia. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Hoseabuches Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, ; M. These speeches, and many others, are not samples of real discourse pronounced spontaneously by Israelites on specific occasions, but artful constructs integrated into a larger literary whole. Indirectly, this kind of material does give access to popular rhetoric. The speeches are not real, but they are verisimilar: One may suppose that the authors have their heroes speak more or less the way an Israelite might have spoken if he or she had been in the same situation. The rhetoric deployed in reported speech is subtle and complex. It is as diverse as are the characters playing a part in biblical narrative: The narrators have a perfect feel for all these different registers of speech, and exploit them to literary ends. Direct discourse is an important tool by which they characterize their heroes. One gets to know each individual by the way he or she speaks. In spite of this discursive diversity, it is possible to observe a measure of constancy. Biblical characters as a group express themselves in ways that would not be fitting for the heroes of Homeric epic. They also speak in ways that would be uncommon in our modern world. Wherever it is possible to define precisely what is peculiar to discourses incorporated into biblical narrative, the rhetoric of the people that produced this literature stands revealed. Figures of speech shared by popular discourse and prophetic texts Convincing traits will have to be found in the realm of what is called *elocutio* in classical rhetoric: The realms of argumentation *inventio* and composition *dispositio* may provide interesting analogies as well, but these analogies will typically become apparent only after prolonged analysis, thus weakening their probative force. Stylistic features, however, are visible on the surface of the text and can therefore easily be observed. Let us consider an example. The same trope is found also in the book of Amos: The parallel is striking, but the figure is not unique. In Homeric epic too, destructive battles are repeatedly

presented under the image of fire Iliad The trope cannot serve as an instance of typically Israelite rhetoric. Take a more formal trait. Both prophecy and reported speech regularly use elaborate similes of the following type: But again, the use of comparisons of this type is probably universal in human discourse, and in persuasive speech in particular. The presence of this feature in the two genres of biblical texts is not necessarily significant. One could multiply examples of this type without ever establishing that prophecy and popular discourse are directly related. Typical examples of biblical figures of rhetoric The family-relationship between these genres is to be illustrated with stylistic figures that are rare, striking, and well profiled. Fortunately, figures answering to these criteria do indeed occur in biblical literature. Biblical rhetoric makes use of features that are not listed in inventories of classical rhetoric like the famous manual of Heinrich Lausberg, and appear to be peculiarly Israelite. A fairly certain example is found in the book of Hosea: As is shown in this case by the parallelism, the meaning of Hos 6: In other prophetic passages, the attestation of the figure is less certain: Many critics have deduced from these verses that the numerous prescriptions on sacrifice contained in the Priestly Code were still unknown in the time of Jeremiah. A literal reading can easily lead to this conclusion. If, however, the negation in verse 22 is to be taken figuratively, as in Hos 6: The prophetic instances are confirmed and illuminated by the use of the same figure in reported speech. Thus in the book of Exodus, Moses says to the murmuring people: Your murmurings are not against us, but against the LORD. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft mit einem Vorwort von A.* Indeed, this is stated explicitly in verse 2. What Moses wants to say is that the complaints of the Israelites are not so much directed against them as against God. This use of the negation may seem strange to a western reader, particularly one who is not steeped in biblical literature. In the Bible, however, the figure is completely normal. Joseph says to his brothers, after he has made himself known to them: All these examples are literary. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the impression that the narrative passages imitate a feature of day-to-day speech. As to the prophetic instances, they appear to be more elaborate and sophisticated. Pseudo-quotations Another somewhat egregious phenomenon found in the prophetic writings is the figurative use of quotations. Where speech is attributed to a person, this does not necessarily imply that he or she actually said the words in question. The quotation may instead reflect the prophetic judgment on the person involved. In some cases, they twist the words that were really spoken, while in other cases they do not refer to speech at all, but to a course of action or an attitude. In playing off Egypt against Assyria in a dangerous game of international 8 H. Kaiser, , Wolff provides numerous other examples of possible pseudo-quotations in the prophetic books. Many of them pose real problems of understanding to modern-day readers. In the biblical world, however, this stylistic feature seems to have been well known, and appreciated. Indeed, similar instances are found in discourses incorporated into narrative texts. When one character attributes speech to another, it is not always possible to understand the words as a real quotation. A good example is found in the plea David addresses to Saul begging him to stop pursuing him. In this speech, David calls up the image of men who incited Saul against him: The Jewish medieval commentator David Qimhi, in his commentary on Samuel, glosses as follows: The attribution of words to some person in order to qualify his or her behavior must have been conventional in Israelite culture.

Chapter 4 : Prophetic discourse and popular rhetoric in the Hebrew Bible | Jan Joosten - theinnatdunvilla.c

A discourse of constancy in two books chiefly containing consolations against publick evils written in Latin by Justus Lipsius, and translated into English by Nathaniel Wanley.

Citation Discourse Foucault presents possibly the best definition of discourse. The term assumes slightly different meanings in different contexts. In literature, discourse means speech or writing, normally longer than sentences, which deals with a certain subject formally. In other words, discourse is the presentation of language in its entirety, while performing an intellectual inquiry in a particular area or field, such as theological discourse or cultural discourse. General Classifications of Discourse Discourse can be classified into four main categories , namely: Exposition The main focus of this type of discourse is to make the audience aware about the topic of the discussion. Definitions and comparative analysis of different ideas and beliefs are examples of discourse exposition. Narration Narration is a type of discourse that relies on stories, folklore or a drama as a medium of communication. Stage play, story, and folklore are narrative discourse examples. Description This type involves describing something in relation to the senses. Descriptive discourse enables the audience to develop a mental picture of what is being discussed. Descriptive parts of novel or essay are descriptive discourse examples. Argument This type of discourse is based on valid logic and, through correct reasoning, tries to motivate the audience. Examples of argumentative discourse include lectures, essays, and prose. Examples of Discourse in Literature Poetic Discourse Poetic discourse is a type of literary conversation which focuses on the expression of feelings, ideas, imaginations, events, and places through specific rhymes and rhythms. Poetic discourse makes use of common words in appealing ways to present feelings and emotions. The mechanism of poetic discourse involves certain steps starting from different sources, then entering the mental process, mental realization, and then finally into a finished product as poetry. This is a form of basic or entry-level discourse, and is beneficial for beginners in the field of literature. It primarily deals with generating ideas with no concrete source. Examples include academic essays and diaries. After that to Westminster and dined with Mr. Dalton at his office, where we had one great court dish, but our papers not being done we could [not] make an end of our business till Monday next. Whatever is said has no ambiguity â€” everything is clear for the reader. Usually, this type of discourse is in active voice. Examples include instructions, guidelines, manuals, privacy policies, and patient instructions as written by doctors. Function of Discourse The role of discourse is hard to ignore in our daily intellectual pursuits, for it provides a basis to conduct a comparative analysis and frame our perceptions about different things. According to Jacques Lucan and Ferdinand de Saussure, language discourse is the main force which works behind all kinds of human activities and changes in social fabric; whereas Modernists attribute discourse to development and progress. Another important function of discourse is to generate and preserve truth as argued by the Postmodernist theories.

Chapter 5 : De Constantia - Wikipedia

De Constantia in publicis malis (On constancy in times of public evil) was a philosophical dialogue published by Justus Lipsius in two books in The book, modelled after the dialogues of Seneca, was pivotal in establishing an accommodation of Stoicism and Christianity which became known as Neostoicism.

Chapter 6 : Ren  Descartes: Discourse on Method (e-text)

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Chapter 7 : Academic Achievement Discourse

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Chapter 8 : Staff View: An excellent ballad, intituled, The constancy of Susanna.

In other words, discourse is the presentation of language in its entirety, while performing an intellectual inquiry in a particular area or field, such as theological discourse or cultural discourse. General Classifications of Discourse.

Chapter 9 : Discourse as Social Interaction - Google Books

The analysis of these reports adheres to the analytic paradigm of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and is undertaken in two stages. The first, a general characterization of the newspaper discourse, reveals evidence of a systematic 'othering' and stereotyping of the ethnic community by the 'white' majority.