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Chapter 1 : Oceanian art - Wikipedia

The South Pacific Fragile States Project The aim of the Lowy Institute's South Pacific Fragile States Project is to produce independent research and forward looking analysis on the key drivers of instability in the South Pacific and the associated security challenges for Australia and the wider region.

Tweet In fragile and conflict-affected states, governments frequently turn to public works programs to provide temporary jobs to vulnerable populations. A new body of research is showing how policy makers can redesign these programs to transform their short-term benefits into long-term prosperity and stability. Mvukiyehe and his colleagues have so far conducted seven impact evaluations of public works programs targeting 40, households in five conflict and violence-affected countries: The motivation for these programs is twofold: The results of these programs have been strikingly consistent. In the short-term, they all deliver critical economic benefits for the communities where they are offered, whether measured by rates of employment, income, or consumption. The improvements in economic welfare—“even if only temporary”—are encouraging since they demonstrate these programs are effective safety nets during emergencies. However, the programs do little to tamp down crime or promote pro-social behaviors. Results from Egypt illustrate these broader patterns. With support from the World Bank, the government of Egypt enacted the Emergency Labor-Intensive Investment Project , which included a component to employ poor youth on a short-term basis to work on health promotion, literacy, and other social service projects. The program achieved its immediate objectives. Communities that were offered the program benefited from an uptick in employment, a 35 percent increase in monthly earnings, and much higher rates of saving. However, the benefits appeared to wane over time, with rates of employment falling close to their pre-intervention levels within a few months. The program also had little or no impact on measures of violence, conflict, or crime. This would require targeting beneficiaries more effectively, providing support to participants to transition to the private labor market or start businesses, and identifying ways to more directly target crime and violence. We need to be clear about what our priorities are and design programs accordingly. Cognitive behavioral therapy CBT is a technique that has proven to be effective at helping at-risk youth challenge harmful patterns of thought, learn how to emotionally self-regulate, and practice new skills and behaviors. Economists and psychologists teamed up to test a CBT intervention in Liberia, a country that has suffered two civil wars in the past three decades. They found that when poor, at-risk youth living in Monrovia were offered both a small cash grant and CBT, crime fell by a striking 37 percent one year after the intervention. Complementary interventions can also help turn the short-term economic benefits of public works programs into sustained livelihoods. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the DIME team is currently examining whether interventions such as vocational training and savings mechanisms can lead to enduring gains in employment. In Tunisia, a future evaluation will identify ways to help women overcome the specific barriers they face to participate in labor markets or start businesses. Finding money to pay for these add-on interventions is no small task, but according to Mvukiyehe better program design could free up additional resources. Over the past two decades, the world has made tremendous strides in reducing extreme poverty. But the extreme poor are becoming ever more concentrated in fragile states, where violence and conflict create large barriers to escaping poverty. Whether the world reaches the goal of eradicating extreme poverty by may hinge on the success of the development research community in designing programs that can address the multifaceted needs of these fragile states.

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Chapter 2 : Australia details investment in Pacific as China clout grows - Washington Times

Timor-Leste has also been a pioneer in establishing the g7+, a group of 17 fragile states, which was formed in as a country-owned and country-led global mechanism to monitor, report and draw attention to the unique challenges faced by fragile states.

Written by Joel Negin The Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness called for the Australian government to put particular focus on a small number of flagships “ and listed fragile states as a candidate flagship. Despite this emphasis, little attention has been given to how effective AusAID is in engaging in the inherently challenging situation that is aid to fragile states. The Zimbabwe program demonstrates the feasibility of effective action across all those areas. There has been significant critique of the way AusAID operates in some parts of the world but it is important to highlight the positive stories as well. As I found in the background report on Africa [pdf] which I was commissioned to co-author for the Independent Review, while parts of the Africa program have been disjointed and piecemeal, the Zimbabwe program demonstrates the impact of a focused and well-funded strategy even in a difficult and fluid environment. After a decade of disastrous economic management, the Zimbabwe election that promised so much triggered tremendous violence and hyperinflation never before seen. Inflation has stabilised with the adoption of the US dollar in That being said, the elections to be held in have the potential to return Zimbabwe to a state of uncertainty and possibly widespread political violence. This uncertainty and the need to work with a range of government partners makes deep engagement by committed, savvy development partners including Australia all the more important to continue to support the transition to a more stable political, social and economic environment. AusAID also has staff “ initially one but now three “ based in the Harare Embassy who manage the program full-time. These are two areas of significant vulnerability in Zimbabwe that are seen as priorities by the government and community and that were not being addressed by other donors. In those sectors in particular, Australia has strong influence among development partners and works closely with reformist elements of the government. Australia was one of the first funders of the multi-donor UNICEF education fund “ that opened the door that created a donor program. The Australian program in Zimbabwe is widely seen by Zimbabwe-based development partners and by the Zimbabwean government as successful and impactful despite being conducted in a fluid political environment with significant uncertainty. Key services are being delivered, water systems are being improved and agricultural sustainability is being built. Australian-funded programs have found a way to work within constraints to improve services to those in need. The success of the program is partly due to strong high-level Australian political support and resourcing on the ground both funding and staffing and partly due to the scope provided due to political support and resourcing to the program to be ambitious, innovative, flexible and catalytic. The team on the ground was given the ability to adapt to the ever-changing landscape, to work dynamically with partners and to make decisions as needs arose. Another key to success has been the strong relationships have been developed with program partners. But Zimbabwe also represents a significant opportunity for Australia and the wider aid community. While there are undoubtedly risks involved in the engagement, the majority of commentators believe that Zimbabwe has all the foundations needed for a quick turnaround. There is a hard-working educated populace, great farming land and significant natural resources. There is also a set of business-minded entrepreneurs ready to engage as soon as a more stable environment appears. AusAID should heed the lessons from Zimbabwe to inform the Africa program and global efforts in fragile states. He is co-author of a study on Australian aid to Africa [pdf] commissioned as part of the Review on Aid Effectiveness.

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Chapter 3 : Australia's aid program - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Following passage of "foreign interference" laws Australia pushes Pacific Pact to combat China By Mike Head 7 July Acting in concert with Washington, the Australian and New Zealand.

Wearing both of these hats, she convened an international conference on the post development agenda last week in Dili. You can read the Dili Consensus here , and also the outcomes of related discussions among Pacific island countries here [pdf]. I discuss below five specific points about the conference and its outcomes that I think are particularly noteworthy. First, the Dili conference was, to my knowledge, the first such interaction between two quite different types of fragile state—one type being conflict-affected, the other geographically vulnerable. Fragile states lack a bloc identity. Even the typology of fragile states is a fraught business—for example, the OECD counts 47 of them and the World Bank 35, while neither the OECD nor the Bank counts certain countries that consider themselves obviously fragile. In contributing to some background work for this conference, I found a useful starting point was simply to look at the intersection of three groups: This core group can then be enlarged in various directions, for example by including countries experiencing transitory conflict, or exhibiting high levels of climate change vulnerability with low adaptive capacity. However they are defined, fragile states are diverse. They are also more than usually preoccupied with their own challenges. For both of these reasons, they have tended not to caucus or search for common ground. Second, in the context of MDG achievement, the most general point of commonality between fragile states is that they are all on the wrong side of the implacable average. The eight MDGs as originally formulated were global goals. The 21 associated targets were not intended to be applied to individual countries but, inevitably, they are so applied in countless reporting documents. When targets defined for the average country get applied to every country, a lot of countries will necessarily get fail grades—including most of the countries represented in Dili, for most targets. Even countries that have done remarkably well on some things in absolute terms get marked down in terms of proportional progress, simply because their starting points were so bad. This is one frequently-remarked problem with the MDGs, on which Terence Wood has recently written here. Fragile states therefore need to be able to set their own, realistic targets that are aligned with, rather than inherited from, a global framework. Third, in discussing the more truck-sized gaps in the MDG framework, much common ground emerged. Some countries were concerned primarily about peace-building, others primarily about climate change mitigation and adaptation. President Anote Tong of Kiribati, a core fragile state, spoke compellingly on this. The result was the identification of four goal areas requiring attention by the High-Level Panel, which can be roughly labelled inclusive growth, peace and justice, state effectiveness, and climate change. Fourth, the discussion was not dominated by calls for aid. Indeed, a strong theme of the conference was the need for fragile and conflict-affected countries to diagnose and take responsibility for their own problems, with support rather than direction from donors. At the same time, there was a clear message that many of the challenges facing this group of countries can only be overcome through external or global collective action. Most obviously, curbing greenhouse gas emissions depends upon collective action by major emitters, and adaptation to the inevitable effects of climate change will require the construction of accessible and responsive financing and advisory mechanisms at the global and regional levels. Sustainable and equitable management of natural resource wealth in fragile states depends in part on how developed countries regulate the activities of multinational corporations. And growth through employment depends in part on developed-country policies with respect to international labour mobility. In these and other areas, fragile and conflict-affected countries would be beneficiaries of, much more than contributors to, progress toward appropriately-defined global goals. Fifth, while the Dili conference was not intended to be, and was not, a technical discussion about the precise framing of goals, the formulation of targets or the selection of indicators, it did raise two quasi-technical questions. Another question is whether there should be goals that call explicitly for global collective action. A peace goal, for example, could in principle be defined

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in this way; a climate change mitigation goal, one might assume, would have to be so defined. However, moving in either of these directions takes us away from something that is generally agreed to be the most desirable feature of the present MDGs—that they define concrete goals for human well-being to which people, or at least politicians, can readily relate. Once you go beyond social development objectives, expressing global goals in terms of human well-being gets harder. It might well be possible to do so without sinking into a quicksand of debates about what are the precursors or ingredients of development. Well, Emilia Pires now has much stronger backing vocals when she goes to the next High-Level Panel meeting in Bali at the end of this month. It seems even more inconceivable than it was previously that the post framework would omit goals relating in one way or another to inclusive growth, peace and justice, state effectiveness and climate change. However, it remains entirely open how such goals might be articulated. Any excessive prescriptiveness about how governments govern and function, or about the outcomes of multilateral negotiations, will quickly propel discussions into a cul-de-sac. Maintaining focus on why things matter to people—and on the ends rather than the means—is the more promising path. I do believe, though, that Timor-Leste did something very useful by bringing together this diverse group of countries for the first time on its soil. Fragile states are now a little less a fuzzy statistical category, and a little more an organised grouping with a shared view of their aspirations for the future.

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Chapter 4 : Fragile States: Employment Programs Must Become a Bridge to Prosperity - Modern Diplomacy

Australia's foreign aid is to be focused on the Asia-Pacific, and help phased out to India and China AUSTRALIA'S aid program will be cleaned up and focused on "fragile states", with support for emerging superpowers China and India to be phased out over time, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd says.

The ancestors of the people of these islands came from Southeast Asia by two different groups at separate times. The first, an Australoid people and the ancestors of modern-day Melanesians and Australian Aboriginals, came to New Guinea and Australia about 40, to 60, years ago. The second wave, from Southeast Asia, would not come for another 30, years. They would come to interact and together reach even the most remote Pacific islands. These early peoples lacked a writing system, and made works on perishable materials, so few records of them exist from this time. At around the same time, art began to appear in New Guinea, including the earliest examples of sculpture in Oceania. The period from BC on, the Lapita people would consolidate and begin to create the contemporary Polynesian cultures of Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji. Additionally from about BC, trade between the Pacific Islands and mainland Asia was growing, and starting BC, works of the Dongson culture of Vietnam, known for their bronze working, can be found in Oceania, and their imagery has a strong influence on the indigenous artistic tradition. Records to AD continue to be few, however most artistic tradition are continued to this point, such as New Guinea sculpture and Australian rock art, although the period is characterized by increasing trade and interaction as well as new areas being settled, including Hawaii, Easter Island, Tahiti, and New Zealand. Starting around AD, the people of Easter Island would begin construction of nearly moai large stone statues. At about AD, the people of Pohnpei, a Micronesian island, would embark on another megalithic construction, building Nan Madol, a city of artificial islands and a system of canals. By, the first European explorers begin to reach Oceania. Although previous artistic and architectural traditions are continued, the various regions would begin to diverge and record more distinct cultures. These sites, found in Arnhem Land, Australia, are divided into three periods: They are dated based on the styles and content of the art. Pre-Estuarine, the oldest, is characterized by imagery in a red ochre pigment. However, by about BC, increasingly elaborate images begin to appear, marking the beginning of the Estuarine period. These rock paintings served several functions. Some were used in magic, others to increase animal populations for hunting, while some were simply for amusement. One of the more elaborate collections of rock art in this area is the site of Ubirr, a favored camping ground during wet seasons which has had its rock faces painted many times over thousands of years. Establishing a chronological timeframe for these pieces in most cases is difficult, but one has been dated to BC. The content of the sculptures fit into three categories: The tops of many pestles contain images, often of birds or human heads. Mortars show similar imagery, or sometimes geometric patterns. Freestanding figures again portray similar themes: The original significance of these pieces however, are unknown, but were perhaps used in the context of rituals. The culture was formed by the second wave of Oceanic settlers. The name comes from the site of Lapita in New Caledonia, which was among the first places its distinctive sculpture would be found. It is debated exactly where the culture developed, but the people themselves originally came from Southeast Asia. Their art is best known by its ceramics, which include elaborate geometric motifs and sometimes anthropomorphic imagery. It is thought some of the designs may be related to modern Polynesian tattoos and barkcloths. They were created by firing a comblike tool that stamped the designs on to wet clay. Each stamp would have one design and would be layered until an elaborate pattern was created. Their usage was primarily, in cooking, serving, and storing food.

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Chapter 5 : Timor-Leste and the new deal for engagement in fragile states - Asia and the Pacific - ANU

described as 'the string of weak, fragile, and artificial states and sub-states in a region which ranges from the separatist Indonesian province of Aceh in the west to the coup-stricken Fiji islands in the east'. 1 In , former Australian.

It has also been suggested that France and the United Kingdom should undertake joint patrols in the South China Sea to push back against China. Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have all claimed restrictions on the freedoms of navigation not unlike those imposed by China. More seriously, the suggestions overlook the interests of Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea. It is not international waters. It comprises the EEZs of littoral countries , which have significant rights and duties in that water. Other nations operating in that space should do so with due regard to those rights and duties. Perceptions of law of the sea issues, particularly freedoms of navigation, vary widely both within Southeast Asia and between most ASEAN countries and extra-regional powers. The top strategic priority in Asia and around the world today is to protect a global economic order that is under threat. This is a key concern of the Southeast Asian countries. There is no desire to see operations that might cause instability. The concept of freedom of navigation is a broad term. It can mean simply sailing through the sea – a right that is unchallenged by China despite allegations to the contrary. It can mean a warship exercising the right of innocent passage by sailing within 12 nautical miles of a feature occupied by a country that requires prior notification of such a transit. Or it can mean an aircraft flying or a warship sailing within 12 nautical miles of a low-tide elevation to demonstrate that the feature has no territorial sea and therefore high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The warship might demonstrate that this was the case by conducting operations contrary to the right of innocent passage, such as launching a helicopter or test-firing weapons. It may claim all the features, but it only claims sovereign rights over resources of the sea. These rights are not to be confused with the sovereignty that a country exercises over its land territory and territorial sea. This interest is a qualified one. Australia itself has supported new restrictions on the freedom of the seas in particular circumstances. Australia often exaggerates its dependence on seaborne trade across the sea in order to claim a strategic interest. In reality it is China and Southeast Asian countries that would be most affected if trade across the South China Sea were disrupted. Smooth relations with its near neighbours should always be a top priority for Australia. Support for a rules-based order of the seas is also an imprecise interest when there is no agreement on key points of international law related to particular freedoms of navigation. The situation in the South China Sea is messy and complex. Rather these operations could help destabilise a situation that is looking increasingly more stable. The operations would not be supported by most Southeast Asian countries. They would only add to the strategic distrust that continues to prevent effective management of the South China Sea and activities within it.

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Chapter 6 : Australia is hedging its bets on China with the latest Foreign Policy White Paper

Providing access to justice in the Asia Pacific 42 Box 7. Infrastructure and peacebuilding 45 considered fragile. The majority of Australia's aid goes towards.

It tells China that Australia will have polygamous economic relationships with its multiple trade partners throughout the world. The alternative is unpredictability, potential economic chaos and possible conflict. The paper does not level accusations at Beijing in the ham-fisted manner the Defence White Paper did. But in a high-stakes game of international poker, there is one certainty: The revolution has been postponed. In reality, white papers are elite exercises, designed to be pored over by journalists, while strategically engaging a narrow, overseas audience of decision makers. Foreign governments are the real target readership. That is because the Canberra political class are all sailing the same ship. The Labor Party and minor parties may grumble aloud about free trade details, but you would have to go back many years to witness a collapse in bipartisanship on foreign affairs and defence. To , in fact. To Mark Latham and a war with Iraq. You will find no revisionism in this foreign policy white paper; the first foreign policy white paper since is firmly in the camp of the status quo. This latest white paper emphasises the continuity of this overarching strategy. The problem is that the status quo that persisted when the Coalition government took office under Tony Abbott no longer exists. Inquietude about China is not entirely absent, but the criticism is mild and polite. However, the paper merely reiterates bland statements of principle, calling for disputes to be settled under international maritime law. Open seas are, of course, the lifeblood of commerce. By contrast, Japan is expected to atrophy, with virtually no growth in the next decade. Indonesia will almost double in size, but its growth will be slower than China or India. The paper recognises its strategic economic partnerships with India, Indonesia and Southeast Asia, noting that in More than any previous public government document, the paper articulates a hedging strategy. But despite the fact that Australian budgets are built in Beijing, the white paper is curiously silent about the China-dominated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with merely one passing reference. Despite the China challenge, it is clear that in the minds of Canberra, US hegemony is not over, and the Asian century is still to begin.

Chapter 7 : No need to rock the boat in the South China Sea | East Asia Forum

CANBERRA, Australia – Australia's foreign minister said on Monday her country's alliance with the United States had never been more vital in an era of escalating challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

Chapter 8 : Pacific Islands Overview

Andrew Rosser Andrew Rosser is Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at the University of Adelaide. His research interests include development in 'fragile states', the political economy of the resource curse, and ownership and aid effectiveness.